Washington and Lee University School of Law

Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons
Supreme Court Case Files

Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers

10-1976

United States v. Donovan
Lewis F. Powell Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles
Part of the Criminal Law Commons

Recommended Citation
U.S. v. Donovan. Supreme Court Case Files Collection. Box 36. Powell Papers. Lewis F. Powell Jr.
Archives, Washington & Lee University School of Law, Virginia.

This Manuscript Collection is brought to you for free and open access by the Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers at
Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Supreme
Court Case Files by an authorized administrator of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

~42/;;;:j!~

~~
~ Uw:
'3

~~7L/-

~
1¢~/o
~~'T

o/

~~~k~

~

~ ~

~~.

·'-JL> r9

7b-~~

~~~-~~$-~
~·~~i.o-4.~(~
~'').

4'-~~~-~

~p.-ll.-/ ~ ~ ~ ...t..c_ ~
a-:t!H-

~~ M
;!!- z._ ~

~~~ · ~

~tn\ ~
i{t

\detJ;~cali~

O~to-~9?~erence=="" •
List 1, Sheet 1
No. 75 - 212

DONOVAN

&.c.Jo'10

Iff!.

.

I{• -k

/.AI&,~

~-~t-IJ... ~c ~ ~,.,4.. ~

UNITED STATES

v.

~

7A

Cert to CA 6
(Phi~lips, Ch. J. &
Cec1.l, S.C.J.; En~el,
con 1 ing & dis s 1 ng
Federal/Criminal

)

;:;:; . . e

1/

/_

Timely -

~~

~

-..11....

Q.(.(-4'~ -

Resps were indicted with the petrs in Spaganlo
v. United States, No. 75-217, with which this
c a se is listed. The Spaganlo petrs were severed
for trial after the DC granted the motions a t
issue here. The Court may dispose of the cases
independently.
Please see the pool memo in the related case,
United States v. Bernstein, No. 74-1486 (Summer
List 3, Sheet 3), held for this case.

1/

- Wi th ex tension granted by MR. JUSTICE WHITE.
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1.

SUMMARY:

~

Resps -- Donovan, Robbins, Buzzacco,

Merlo and Lauer-- we re indicted (N.D. Ohio) (Krupansky)
for conspiracy to conduct and for conducting an illegal
gambling business, i n violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1955.
As to resps Donovan , Robbins and Buzzacco, the DC granted
a motion to suppress evidence derived from a wiretap, on
the ground that at the time of application there was probable
cause to believe that their conversations would be intercepted, so that fa i lure to identify them by name in the applications and orders related to the wiretap violated 18 U.S.C.
§§

2518(l)(b)(iv) and 2518(4)(a); this is the issue presented

in the Gove~ment's pending petition in No. 74-1486, United
States v. Bernstein.

As to resps Merlo and Lauer, not known

r ' until after the applications for the wiretaps,

the DC granted

the motion to suppress because they had not been served with
notice of the interception, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d);
this issue is not in Bernstein.

On a 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(b)

appeal, CA 6 affirmed -- one judge dissenting on the Merlo/Lauer
suppression as to which he would remand in light of Giordano and
Chavez.
The questions are whether the Government violated Title
III in this case and, if so, whether suppression of the evidence
derived from the intercept is justified.
2.

FACTS & DECISIONS BELOW:

18 U.S.C. § 2518(10).

On November 28, 1972,

Chief Judge Battisti (N.D. Ohio) authorized a Title III
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interception for fifteen days, ending . December 12, over
two telephones used by Kotoch and Spaganlo and two used by
Florea, of the communications of Kotoch, Spaganlo, Chickeno,
Vara, Florea, Veres "and others, as yet unknown."

On

December 26, the DJ extended the order for 15 additional days
as to two of the four telephones originally authorized, and
issued an order authorizing intercepts over an additional phone
at the same location.

Each order authorized the interception

of communications of Kotoch, Spaganlo, Chuc
Florea "and others, as yet unknown."

- - -

- - - Slyman,

On February 21, 1973, the

DJ ordered notice served on 37 persons whose conversations had
been overheard during both periods of interception; on the
Government's motion, notice to two more persons was ordered on
September 11, 1973.

Conversationsinvolving all of the resps were

2/

intercepted in both periods.-

"Inadvertently," the Government

did not give the court Merlo's and Lauer's names,

an ~ ever

------------------------

received inventory notice.
The Government concedes that resps Donovan and Robbins

were "known" to it at the time of the extension application.
Though the Government was aware that Buzzacco wa.s involved in
gambling activities, it disputes the conclusion that it was aware
of the likelihood that Buzzacco would be overheard in conversations over the phones.

2/
-All suppressed conversations, as in Bernstein, were with the
named targets.

- 4 After a hearing, Judge Krupansky suppressed evidence
as to Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzacco derived from the
December 26 interception for failure to identify them and also
ruled that evidence derived from both periods of interceptions
be suppressed as to Merlo and Lauer for failure to notify.
Affirming, CA 6 reasoned that the failure to identify
meant that the communications were "unlawfully intercepted"
(§ 2518(10)(a)), because the identification requirement "directly

and substantially implement[s] the congressional intention to
limit the use of i ntercept procedures."
527.

Giordano, 416 U.S., at

Only if the known parties whose communications are to be

intercepted are known to the DC can it exercise strict control
over intercepts.

The statutory language "would plainly seem to

· require the naming of a specific person in the wiretap application" when the person is known to be committing the offense.
United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S., at 152.

"[I]t makes no difference

whether the omission was inadvertent or purposeful.
omission is sufficient to invoke suppression."

The fact of

[Petn., lOa.]

Buzzacco was "known" to the Government, because at the time the
December 28 application was filed the Government "had 'suspicions'
tha t he was involved in the gambling activities."
Following United States v. Chun, 503 F.2d 533 (CA 9 1974),
CA 6 concluded that the Government must be required to submit
the names of all overheard parties to the DC, so that the DC may
exercise informed discretion in determining who should be notified
11

in the interests of justice."

18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d).

The
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notice provision plays a " c entral role" and "suppression
must follow when it is s hown t hat this statutory requirement
has been ignored, " Giordano, 416 U.S., at 529, whether lack
of notice was due to deliberate Government circumvention,
United States v. Eastman_, 465 F .2d 1057 (CA 3 1972), or
inadvertent error, United States v. Wolk, 466 F.2d 1143 (CA 8
1972).

Dissepting, Judge Engel agreed that the Government was

obliged to advise the j udge of all persons whose converg ations

----

were overheard, but dis agree d t hat the conversations could J?e

-

suppressed as "unlawf ully intercepted."

Since notification

necessarily occurs a f t er i nterception, it has little to do with

1

deterring improper in i tial resort to the procedure.

Suppression

should be limited to t hose instances where the violation was
shown to be deliberate, or where there was actual prejudice not
curable by less drastic means.

Merlo's and Lauer's identity in

the conversations was first known in August 1973, and no prejudice
appears on the record .
3.

CONTENTIONS:
Re Donovan, Robbins & Buzzacco

a.

SG recaps the arguments made in its Bernstein
petition,~

pool memo.

The lower courts' holding that Buzzacco

should have been identified illustrates the "grave practical
drawbacks" flowing from applying the probable cause standard in
wiretap cases.

At the time the applications were filed, agents

also suspected that Buzzacco was involved in bookmaking with the
named suspects:

they knew he was a bookmaker and that two of the

··-

'·•

- 6 -

targets had placed calls to a phone Buzzacco was using.
During the first intercept period, someone using a Niles,
Ohio telephone and nicknamed "Buzz" or "Buzzer" was overheard
discussing gambling with several named targets.
used several aliases.)

(Buzzacco

Only after the December 28 application

did agents learn that Buzzacco was using the Niles telephone.
There is a conflict on the identification issue between CA 4
(Bernstein), CA 6 (Donovan), and CA D.C. (United States v.
Moore, rehearing en bane denied, mandate recalled and held
pending disposition of Bernstein), on the one hand, and CA 5
(United States v. Doolittle, decided en bane in favor of the
government), on the other.
Resp Buzzacco contends that this Court has given
'

adequate guidance in this area and the issue need not be
reviewed and rehearses the CA 6 opinion.
b.
to notify,

Re Merlo and Lauer SG: On inadvertent failure

3/

CA 6 conflicts with CAs 3, 8 and 9. -

The

notification provision is to ensure that the subject of
surveillance will eventually learn that he was electronically
surveilled, so that he may proceed with a civil action under
18 U.S.C. § 2520, if he believes his rights were violated.
That purpose was amply satisfied by the notice eventually received here.

There was no prejudice because Merlo and Lauer had

3/
-United States v. Iannelli, 477 F.2d 999 (CA 3); United States
v. Wolk, 466 F.2d 1143 (CA 8); United States v. Chun, 503 F.2d
533 (CA 9).

,,

- 7 a full opportunity to file and argue their motions to
suppress.

Even if there was a duty to advise the court that

they had been overhear d, there is no basis for suppression
under 18 U.S.C. § 5218(10)(a).

The interception was manifestly

l awful when made, and violation of the notification provision
does not relate substantially to any congressional intention
to limit the use of intercept procedures.
proper under Giordano and Chavez.

Suppression was not

The standard of the dissenting

judge should be affirmed and made governing.
Resps Merlo and Lauer do not agree that the record shows
that failure to notify them was due to administrative oversight.
They claim that CA 6 did not require the government to give the
names of all overheard persons to the DJ, but only to classify
all persons and to make available information regarding the
classes as the DJ requires.

Since the government's own standard

was to include persons if "positively identified," as Merlo and
Lauer eventually were, the case does not intrude upon the
Government's policy.

Under prior decisions of this Court, sup-

pression is a proper remedy; in Chun, CA 9 held the notification
provision "central or at least a functional safeguard in the
statutory scheme."

There is no conflict:

In Iannelli, the deft

was held to be in the inventory notice; in Wolk, defts' counsel
had actual notice shortly after the 90-day-period lapsed; in Chun,
on remand the DC suppressed after finding that the unnamed persons
had actual notice shortly after the statutory period lapsed.

Even

if there is a conflict, only Chun post-dates Giordano and Chavez.

4.

DISCUSSION :
a.

Identifica tion
There is a conflict on the issue, which is
..,.

.....

important to the administration of Title III.

In Doolittle,

CA 5 held that in the absence of any allegation of prejudice
in not being named or of any indication of bad faith or attempted subterfuge by the Government, and where most of the
conversations were with the named party, there is substantial
compliance with the requirements of the Act.

Another view

(Judge Godbold in dissent in CA 5) is that those who are "targets
of the intercept" must be named.

And there are the views of

CAs 4 and 6 in Bernstein and Donovan, shared by CA D.C. in Moore.
The language of Title III(§§ 1518(1)(b)(iv), 2518(4)(a)) may
support the CA 4, 6 and DC view somewhat better than the Government, but the statute is capricious if it means what those circuits
hold it to.

One purpose of naming persons in the application is

to enable the DJ to determine whether there is probable cause to
intercept that person's conversations.

That person is named in the

order, so that from the outset, or as the tap proceeds, the interceptions can be minimized.

All of the conversations here involved

one of the named persons and a resp.
to intercept the conversation.

The Government had authority

It is difficult to see what the

Government gains by not listing someone known to be involved in
the crime, for it limits the opportunity to intercept conversations
involving that person and other unnamed persons.

On the other

hand, it seems unlikely that in naming on an application someone

- 9 -

as to whom it had probable cause the Government would imperil
its overall application as being too extensive.

Accordingly,

it is unclear why conversations between a named person and an
unnamed person should be suppressed as to the unnamed person.
Notification remains.

Had the Government applied for the

unnamed person and been turned down for want of probable cause
to listen to his conversations, the conversation with a named
person might still have been intercepted.
b.

Notification
The split is less substantial on this issue,

but not as weak as resps claim.

For example, in Wolk and

Iannelli CA 8 and CA 3 relied on lack of prejudice, as well as
actual notice; the inventory was received in time to make a
suppression motion, an argument the Government picks up here.
Under§ 2518(8)(d), inventory notice must go
to all persons named in the order or application and such others
in the DJ's discretion as necessary "in the interest of justice."
This connects the identification and notification requirements, a
reason to prefer Donovan over Bernstein should the Court wish to
grant on the identification question.
It is not clear why suppression is appropriate, for the
conversation was "lawfully intercepted" (§ 2518(10)(a)(i)), at
least where, as here, the conversation was with a named person
There are responses from (1) Buzzacco and (2) Merlo and
Lauer, and a supplemental memo from the SG on Doolittle and
10/15/75
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No. 75-212, United States v. Donovan, et al.

This memorandum, dictated after a preliminary look
at the briefs, is intended only as an "aid to memory" that will
refresh my recollection when I return to a more careful study of
the case prior to argument and decision.

When an opinion is

expressed or intimated, it is wholly tentative.

* * * * *
This is a case of considerable importance in the administration of the wiretap provisions of
Control and Safe Street Act {18

Title~of

u.s.c.

§

the Omnibus Crime

2510-2520).

The principal

issue is whether § 2518(1) (b) (iv) requires the identification by
name, in the application for authority to conduct a wiretap, of all
persons whom the government has probable cause to believe may use
the tapped telephone, in addition to the owner of that phone (usually
referred to as the "principal target" of the tap)?

..

No. 75-212

2.

Brief Summary of Facts
The government, after extensive investigation, filed an
application for authority to tap four telephones, two listed under
an alias of Spaganlo and located in an apartment used by Kotoch,
and two telephones in the home of Florea.

The application indi-

cated that these three "principal targets" were using the telephones to conduct an extensive bookmaking business -- using the
phones to make and receive telephone calls in connection with this
business from many persons.

Three of such persons were identified

by name in the application.

Pursuant to the application, the DC

issued an order authorizing the taps of these four telephones for
the purpose of intercepting gambling-related communications of
Spaganlo, Kotoch, and Florea, the three other named individuals,
and "others as yet unknown," to and from the four telephones.
During the initially authorized interception, the government learned that

~espondents

Donovan and Robbins were talking about

gambling activities with the named targets.

The initial order was

extended from time to time, and also expanded somewhat, but Donovan
and Robbins were not named.
Nearly three months after the taps were authorized, the
government submitted to the court a list of thirty-seven (37) names
in a proposed order directing service of the required "inventories"
giving notice of the interceptions.

This list was thought to contain

all of the individuals who could be identified as having discussed

..•
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3.

gambling over the monitored telephones.

The order was signed by

the DC and an inventory notice served on the persons named.
Respondents Donovan, Robbins and Buzzacco were included in the
list of 37, and they received notices pursuant to the order.
Allegedly through "administrative oversights," respondents
Merlo and Lauer were not included in any order and were not served
with inventory notices.

Decisions Below
These respondents moved to suppress evidence derived from
the taps.

The DC granted the motion with respect to Donovan,

Robbins and Buzzacco on the ground that the failure to identify
them by name inthe applications and authorization
§§

2518(1) (b) (iv) and 2518(4) (a).

m~ders

violated

The district court also held

that, although Merlo and Lauer were not known until after the last
application, evidence as to them must be suppressed because they
were not served with inventories.

CA6 affirmed.

On the principal

question (the "identification question" relating to Donovan, Robbins
and Buzzacco), CA6 held-- relying on dructum in United States v.
Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 152, 155 -- that where the government has
probable cause to believe persons (other than the target individuals)
will be using the bapped telephones, such

p~rsons

must be specifi-

cally identified by name in the intercept applications and orders.
CA6 also held that the government had an implied statutory duty to

4.
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inform the issuing judge of the identities of Merlo and Lauer, and
the government's failure in this respect required suppression of
the evidence against them.

Discussion
As I dictate this, I have the SG's brief and that on
behalf of Merlo and Lauer, but not the brief on behalf of Donovan,
Robbins, and Buzzacco.
The SG argues, persuasively I think, that CA6 has erred
on both issues.

Although CA6 read the "plain language" precisely

to the contrary, the SG argues that the plain language supports
the government's position.

The argument runs as follows:

Section 2518(1) (b) requires that the application
for wire interception authorization set forth a
full and complete statement of facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant to justify
his belief that an order should be issued, including, pursuant to subsection (iv), "the
identity of the person, if known, committing the
offense and whose communications are to be intercepted." Section 2518{4) (a) contains the same
requirement for the interception order:
it also
must specify "the identity of the person, if known,
whose communications are to be intercepted" (see
United States v. Kahn, supra, 415 u.s. at 152).
Thus the plain language of both Sections requires
simply that "the person" committing the offense
-- the target of the interception -- is to be
identified if known.
It does not require that
"any person" or "all persons" expected to participate in incriminating conversations with the
target over the monitored telephone must be so
identified. Cf. 18 U.S.C. 2520. The most reasonable interpretation of this statutory language is
that although it would ordinarily be e~pected that

5.
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many persons will be overheard, only the principal target of the interception must be identified.
This will almost always be the individual whose
phone is to be monitored.
I must say that the foregoing language is not quite as
"plain" to me as it seems to be to the SG.

Nor, is its meaning

to the contrary as plainly evident as it seems to have been to
CA6.

Rather, my present reaction is that the precise language,

standing alone,

is ambiguous.

It requires the identification

"of the person, if known, committing the offense, and whose
communications are to be intercepted."
The SG's second point is more persuasive, namely, that
in context, subsection (iv) must mean what the government contends.
There are four specific subsections of § 2518(1) (b) specifying what
"each application shall include."
details of the offense;

Subsection (i) requires the

(ii) requires "a particular description of

the nature and location of the facilities from which or the place
where the communication is to be intercepted:"

(iii) requires "a

particular description of the type of communications sought to be
intercepted;" and (iv)

the subsection here involved -- requires

"the identity of the person, if known, committing the offense and
whose communications are to be intercepted."

All four of these

subsections are in a single paragraph (see appendix 2a to the SG's
brief).

It seems reasonably clear, I think, that in context these

provisions relate to a "particular offense," a "particular

6.
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description" of the telephone to be tapped, a "particular description" of the type of communications sought to be intercepted
on that telephone, and the "identity of the person • . . committing
the offense [the same offense referred to in subsection (i)] and
[the person] whose communications are to be intercepted."

If the

Congress had intended that all persons, whom the government had
probable cause to believe might be using this specifically identified
telephone) must also be named, it certainly selected ambiguous
language for the purpose.
The SG also relies on the legislative history of the
statute as supporting its interpretation, arguing that Congress
hardly could have intended to impose more stringent requirements
with respect to identification of persons who might use the tapped
telephone than the Fourth Amendment would require.

Although little

evidence is to be found in the government's brief documenting the
legislative history in this respect, I do think it reasonable to
assume -- especially in view of the burdensome nature of a different
view -- that Congress was attempting to comply with the Fourth
Amendment requirements identified so particularly in Berger v. New
York, 388

u.s.

4L and especially in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.

347.
The SG also makes a reasonably persuasive argument that
no genuine interests (in privacy or otherwise) are served by naming
persons other than the "principal target"

(owner or principal user

No. 75-212

7.

of the telephone to be tapped).
SG's brief.

See, e.g., pp. 31, 32 of the

It is argued, realistically I would think, that if

the view of CA6 prevails, law enforcement officers will adopt a
policy of "over inclusion" with the result that intercept applications will identify all persons with respect to whom there is
any possibility that probable cause may be found to exist.

Not

only would this impose a substantial burden on law enforcement,
but it would result -- it is said

in exposure and embarrassment

of possibly innocent persons when the intercept papers become
public during motions to suppress.

The SG puts it this way:

An expansive reading of the naming requirement thus will significantly complicate law enforcement efforts and subject those named, but
not in fact overheard, to predictable harm.
These disadvantages might be justified if the
requirement protected any substantial private
or public interest. But no important interests
are served by the inclusion of the names of
persons other than the principal target in an
intercept application and order.
Indeed, the
consequences which flow from the failure to name
such persons are so insubstantial that we submit
that Congress could not have intended to hamper
the use of electronic interceptions in combatting
major crimes by requiring that all persons who may
be expected to be overheard must be named.

* * * *
As to the second issue, whether the failure to name
Merlo and Lauer in the inventory orders required suppression of
evidence obtained against them, I am inclined to agree with the

No. 75-212

8.

views expressed in dissent by Circuit Judge Engel of CA6.

See

p. 18a, et seq., of the petition for certiorari.

* * * *
I appreciate, of course, that normally we construe
Title 3 strictly.

But this rule of construction derives from a

desire to assure that the authority to invade the privacy of a
telephone is not abused by the police, and conversely to protect
the legitimate privacy of telephone users.

It is not clear to me,

at least in the absence of seeing the brief on behalf of the
principal respondents and further consideration of the issue, that
either of these purposes (i.e., preventing abuse by police and
protecting legitimate privacy) will be furthered by affirmance of
CA6.

The invasion of privacy occasioned by a wiretap is a privacy

of the person who owns or controls the telephone.

Other persons

who elect to call, or to talk with, the owner of the telephone
normally do so at their own peril.
States v. White, 401
with the "named

u.s.

As the Court held in United

745, if an interception _. has been made

targets'permission~

persons talking with him would

have no constitutional basis for complaint.

It would be illogical

to conclude that merely because the interception is authorized by
a court, rather than by consent of the owner of the telephone,
persons such as these respondents would have a greater right to
complain.

9122176

NOTE FOR THE FILE

I sooke with Mike Rodak this morning, and he informed me
that it a ppears that Donovan and Robbins are not going to file
briefs in this case.

C.oepolt.<J -to ~ $ (,.l
Thus, the only brief~e have on the

issue of failure to name someone in the initial application is
that filed by Buzzaco.
gene

ec/ss

BENCH MEMO
TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Eugene Corney

DATE:

September 28, 1976

No. 75-212 U.S. v. Donovan
I.

THE EXISTENCE VEL NON OF A NAMING REQUIREMENT
The first question presented by this case is whether 18

U.S.C. 2518(l)(b)(iv) requires the identification in an
application to intercept telephone communications of all
persons whom the government has probable cause to believe it
will overhear
activity.

participating in conversations about illegal

This question is raised by only three of the five

respondents:

Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco.

Unfortunately,

the brief filed on behalf of respondent Buzzaco is fairly
thin - both in terms of pages and in terms of analysis - and

Mr. Rodak has informed me that respondents Donovan and Robbins
are apparently not going to file a brief in this Court.

The

combination of those factors leaves us with an effective
presentation for the government's position, but no effective
presentation for the other s ide.

Of course, that problem is

alleviated to some extent given the availability of a number
of CA opinions rejecting the SG's interpretation.
A.

The Precise Issue

A good deal of the SG's analysis turns on the statutory
requirement that the government's application include "the
identity of

:.

'

~

Eerson, if known, committing the offense and

2.
whose communications are to be intercepted." 18 U.S.C.
~

lla.

f

Q.cld~d).

--

See id. at 2518(4)(a)(the judicial order

authorizing the interception shall specify "the identity of
the person, if known, whose communications are to be inter[f!./11\ hu~ o.JJ~d .
cepted")
The SG contends that under a reasonable interpretation of this statutory language, the government is required
to identify "only the principal target of the investigation."
Brief at 18 (emphasis added).

According to the SG, this will

almost always be the person whose phone is to be monitored.
At the outs .e.+,

Id.

it is important to stress the precise

boundaries of the SG's interpretation. The SG does not contend
"identif "
that each application need only one person. To the contraryJ
when the government seeks authorization to intercept conversations on a number of phone lines, the SG apparently concedes
that the application would have to name the "principal target"
(if known) for each separate phone number.

Moreover, if two

or more persons are known to be using the telephone "equally"
to commit the offense, and thus are "equally" targets of the
investigation, "all must be named."

Brief at 18 n. 13.

Thus,

the SG reads the statutory phrase "identify the person" to
mean "identify the 'principal target' of the investigation."
He is not suggesting that the government can satisfy the
statutory mandate merely by naming a single individual when
there are in fact several principal targets.
The application in the instant case, for example, sought
authorization to intercept telephone communications involving

3.
an illegal bookmaking business over two telephones listed
under an alias of Spangalo at an apartment used by Kotech,
and two other telephones in the home of Florea.

The applica-

tion was accompanied by an affidavit containing extensive
information from six reliable sources indicating that those
three individuals were using the telephones to conduct an
illegal gambling business.

}

Interestingly enough, the application also identified
three other individuals -

~hickeno ~

Vara and Veres.

According

I to the papers filed by the government with the District Court,
the three principal targets (Kotoch ; J Spaganlo and Florea)
would place calls to and receive calls from these three other
named individuals as part of the illegal bookmaking business.
But the government does not consider the three other named
individuals "principal targets," and would apparently contend
that it was unnecessary to identify them in the application.
B.

The Relevance of United States v. Kahn

Before examining the SG's contention with respect to the
language and legislative history of the statute, it would be
'f

fruitful to take a brief look at the relevance of the Kahn
case to the inquiry sub judice.

In Kahn, the government

applied for an intercept order alleging that one Irving
Kahn was a bookmaker who operated from his residence and
used two home telephones to conduct his illegal business,
and the DC authorized the interception.

In the course of

4.
the wiretap, the government intercepted conversations between
Irving Kahn and his wife, Minnie Kahn, concerning illegal
gambling activities, and also conversations between Minnie
Kahn and a "known gambling figure" concerning certain betting
information.

The government subsequently indicted both Irving

and Minnie Kahn for a federal gambling offense, and introduced
into evidence the intercepted conversations.
The Kahns filed motions to suppress, and CA7 ruled that
conversations involving Minnie Kahn had to be suppressed.
According to CA7, in order to be admissible the intercepted
conversations had to meet two requirements:

(1) that Irving

Kahn be a party to the conversation; and (2) that his intercepted conversations be with "others as yet unknown."

In

effect, CA7 read these provisions of § 2518 as if they required
that the application and order identify "all persons, known
or discoverable, who are committing the offense and whose
communications are to be intercepted."
This Court reversed, noting that the statute requires
identification "only of those 'known' to be 'committing the
offense."' 415

U.S~

The Court held that:

Title III requires the naming of a person in the
application or interception order only when the
law enforcement authorities have probable cause
to believe that that individual is "committing the
offense" for which the wiretap is sought. Since
it is undisputed that the Government had no reason
to suspect Minnie Kahn of complicity in the gambling
business before the wire interceptions here began,
it follows that under the statute she was among the
class of persons "as yet unknown" . . . . 415 U.S.,
at 155.

5.

-

There are two ways to read the holding in Kahn. The

-

~ely

first reading is fairly straightforward, and most
comports with the language of the opinion:

The statute requires

the application to identify only those persons who are known
to be committing the offense; Minnie Kahn, though "known",
was not known to be committing the offense; therefore, it was
not error to fail to name Minnie Kahn in the application.
That reading would be dispositive of the instant case, since
it is agreed that the government had probable cause to suspect
that Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco would use the telephone
wire and would do so while committing the offense.
The SG urges a second interpretation of Kahn.

In his

view, this Court could have assumed that the statute required
the identification in the application of all persons "known
to be committing the offense."

Since Minnie Kahn was not

"known to be committing the offense," there was no error.
On that view, the Court found it unnecessary to decide whether
the identification of only the principal target would be
sufficient, since in any event the unnamed person was not a
target at all.
Both interpretations are plausible, and Kahn is thus not

~~

.

technically dispositive of the case sub judice.

~ ~:~

that neither the language of the statute nor frs legislative

~ ~istory

~~~urns

/4f~

If it turns

proves to be dispositive, and resolution of the issue

on a balancing of competing policy considerations, Kahn

-------

could be harmonized with a decision going either way.
~

6.

C.

The SG's Contentions

The SG relies primarily on three arguments to support his
interpretation of the naming requirement:

(1) neither the

language nor the structure of the Act requires identification
of all known persons; (2) the history of the statute does not
indicate that a broad naming requirement is appropriate; and
(3) policy considerations indicate that the preferable interpretation is that only the "principal target" need be named
in the application.
(1)

The language and structure of the Act.

The SG first

pursues a "plain meaning" approach to the interpretation of
the statute.

The statutory provision at issue refers to "the

person" rather than to "all persons" or "any person," and
therefore, so the argument runs, the statute requires identification only of the target of the investigation.
is silly.

This argument

The language of the statute is obviously ambiguous,

and the mere fact that Congress used the term "the person"
is not conclusive.

I have no doubt that one could discover

other statutes using the term "the person" which have been
held to mean "more than one."

Moreover, as noted above, the

government has conceded that it must identify each and every
"principal target" if a number of individuals use the telephone
"equally" to commit the offense.

As a result, the statutory

language is no less consistent with the interpretation of
CA6 than it is with the interpretation proffered by the

7.
government; if the term "the person" is consistent with
"several principal targets," it seems equally consistent with
"all persons known to be committing the offense."
SG's second contention, and one which you have found
more persuasiveJ is that the context of§ 2518(l)(b)(iv)
supports the "principal target" interpretation.
There is

some merit to the SG's suggestion, but the

argument loses much of its force when one takes into account
the fact that the SG concedes that there can be several "primary"
users all of whom must be named.

There is no indication in

§ 2518(l)(b) that Congress was aware of the~multiple primary
user • problem, or that it intended to require identification •~~
of those "primary users" who utilize the facility "equally"
to commit the offense.

Most important, § 2518(l)(b) offers

no basis on which to draw a line between a "primary user" and
'
~------~------------------------------------a "non-primary user." Indeed, the SG never suggests how it
~

..

is that government officials are supposed to determine whether
two persons "known to be committing the offense" use the
phone "equally" in that regard.

Thus, although the contextual

argument has some surface appeal, it is a less · than satisfactory
ground
._..._ on which to choose between the interpretation proffered
~

by the SG and that adopted by CA6.
For the same reasons I find unsatisfactory the SG's
contention that the structure of the Act supports the "primary
target" interpretation.

For example, § 2518(i)(e) requires

that an intercept application disclose all previous applications

8.

"involving any of the same persons, facilities or places

.

(e,.,. ~ .... J .·~

specified in the application."

a..JJuJ) .

On its face, t at language

suggests that Congress expected that in some cases intercept
applications would identify more than one person.

Unfortunately,

the statutory language itself gives no indication of the circum-

l t"ko ..,l.,. f-./

stances that Congressrm~ght give rise to such a situation.
It may well be that Congress recognized that a given application might cover more than one phone, and thus the application
would list several "primary" users.

But the language in

2518(l)(e) is just as consistent with the view that Congress
expected an intercept application to name all persons "known
to be committing the offense."

Section 2518(l)(e) thus provides

no additional insight concerning the statutory construction
issue before us.
The SG makes a fairly peculiar argument with respect to
§

2518(l)(e).

According to the SG, if one~I
~eau~ ~l)(b)(iv)

to require identification of all persons "known to be committing
the offense" rather than just the "primary target," persons
will often be named who are not in fact subsequently overheard.
The SG then goes on to contend that "[n]o purpose would be
served by requiring that such persons be identified in
subsequent applications for intercept orders as having been
listed in previous applications."

Brief at 21.

In effect,

the SG contends that it is silly to require the naming of
( +t..e_ flo" - p'f i i)<O.>'

persons other than "primary targets" since if they eventually
are named as targets in subsequent applications (relating to

9.
the same or different offenses) the government will have to
disclose that the nontarget had
in a prior application.

be~n~ed ~t

not overheard

The SG's observation may be accurate,

but he errs when he concludes that g£ purpose would be served
by requiring the naming of persons other than primary targets.
Indeed, unless the government is required to name all those
persons it has probable cause to believe will be overheard,
the District Court on subsequent applications may be denied
relevant information.

7

Suppose for example, that the government

has probable cause to believe that primary target A uses his
phone to conduct a gambling business with B, C, D, and E.
Each person has his own phone and each is in daily contact with
the others.

The government applies for an intercept order

identifying only A, the primary user, and gets an order
authorizing a tap on A's phone.

Suppose also that the tap

proves to be of no value and the District Court refuses an
extension.

The government can then file an application (probably

with a different District Court) identifying B as a primary
target and seeking an intercept order with respect to B's phone.
Since A is not named in this application, the government is
not obligated to disclose the prior application indicating
that it has already made one intercept attempt concerning this
same gambling business and the intercept was unsuccessful.
Indeed, the government would be free to do this again with C,
then with D, and finally with E.

If the "primary target"

interpretation of 2518(l)(b)(iv) obtains in the subsequent

10.
application processJthe government would not be required to
disclose the prior applications.

Thus, there are at least some

situations in which the disclosure requirement of 2518(l)(e)
- -

.,.ov:cl,,.

V'el-e.v~

•A

o.,.,.,.a..J..·-. 4...

'f1..L~C:.--

could serve a useful function under the interpretation of
2518(l)(b)(iv) adopted by CA6.
Finally, the government suggests that its reading of the
identification requirement is supported by § 2510(11), which
grants standing to seek suppression to any party to an
intercepted conversation or to "a person a gainst whom the
interception was directed."

The government correctly notes

that there are only two classes of persons who have standing
under § 2510(11) to move for suppression:

parties to inter-

cepted conversations; and the person whose tele phone is
monitored.
176.

Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 175 n. 9,

From that the SG concludes that "a person against whom

the interception was directed" is simply the "principal target,"
the same person referred to in§ 2518(l)(b) (iv).
But the standing provisions under § 2510(11) are unrelated

l

to the naming requirements of § 2518(b)(l)(iv).

Regardless

of whether Donovan, Robbins, or Buzzaco were named in the
intercept application, they would not have standing to seek
suppression of conversations to which they were not a party.
The fact that they would not have standing under such circumstances is not probative of whether Congre ss intended that
only the "principal targets" be named in the application.

11.
In fact, the government's reliance on the standing provision
raises more questions than it answers.

If the SG is correct in

his contention that "a person against whom the interception was
directed" is "simply the principal target, the same person
referred to in§ 2518(l)(b)(iv)," Brief at 22, why did not
Congress refer instead to "the person identified in the
application."

At other points in the statute, Congress does

refer to "the persons identified in the application"; and
given the government's contention, it would have made sense
for Congress to have used more precise cross-reference in the
standing provision.

The use of different language could suggest

that Congress intended the standing provision to be more narrow
than the naming requirement.
Second, the relevance of the standing provision becomes
even less clear when we analyze one of the SG's own hypotheticals.
Suppose for example, that two men (A and B) use a telephone
in a store "equally" to commit an offense, and that neither
A nor B is the proprietor of the store.

The intercept order

is authorized naming A, B, and P, the proprietor.

Suppose the

only intercepted conversation is one between C and D, which
implicates A, B, C, D, and P in the illegal activity.
standing to make a motion to suppress?

Who has

Certainly C and D,

since their conversation was intercepted.

And certainly P,

the proprietor, since it is his phone that is being tapped.
But A and B would not have standing ·to seek suppression of the
~

~eve.-~

conversation between C and D. vA~ne government w~sArequired by

12.
§

2518(l)(b)(iv) to name A and Bin the application for the

intercept order.

That disposes of the suggestion that there

is a connection between the standing and naming provisions.

In conclusion, I cannot find anything in the language of
the provision at issue or the structure of the Act which is
dispositive of the question sub judice.
(2)

The history of the statute.

The SG argues that

the history of the statute supports his construction of the
naming requirement.

He begins by noting that this Court's

decisions in Berger v. New York 388 U.S. 41, and Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, served as guidelines in the drafting
of Title III.

Moreover, Title III has a dual purpose:

(1)

protecting the privacy of wire and oral communications; and
(2) delineating on a uniform basis the circumstances and
conditions under which the interception of wire and oral
communications may be authorized.
The SG's strongest "history" argument is that it would
be inconsistent with this legislative history to interpret
§

2518(l)(b)(iv) as imposing a broad naming requirement extending

beyond what is constitutionally necessary.
i n.

"

IAsv&
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The SG contends

sea..Y""C.~

that there is no constitutional requirement that the person
whose property is to be searched and whose things are to be
seized be

nam~ and

that in the electronic surveillance

13.
context there is no constitutional necessity to name anyone,
even if known, in the application order.

The SG notes, however,

that Congress may have read Berger and Katz as requiring the
naming of the subject of the surveillance.

But he concludes

that: "[Congress] would hardly have read those cases as requiring
the naming of all parties likely to be overheard conversing
about the offenses under investigation.

In neither case was

that issue involved, either directly or by implication."

Brief

at 25-26.
It is difficult to assess the weight that should be given
this particular legislative history argument.

Unfortunately,

the Senate Report makes it almost impossible to determine
exactly what it was Congre ss intended to require.

Take for

example the discussion in the report concerning the requirements
for the intercept application:

I

Subparagraph (b) requires that a full and
complete statement of the facts and circumstances
relied upon by the applicant be set out, including
(i) the details as to what type of offense has been,
is being, or is about to be committed, (ii) the
place where, or the facilities or phone from which
the communication is to be intercepted, (iii) a
particular description of the type of the communication which it is expected will be intercepted, and
(iv) the identity of the person, if known, who is
committing the offense and whose communications are
to be intercepted. Each of these requirements
reflects the constitutional command of particularization. (Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58-60
(1967); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 354-56
(1967) .) -

Senate Report at 101.

The cited portion of Berger includes a

summary of the New York statute at issue in that case, e s pecially
its requirement that the application name "the person or persons

14.
whose communications are to be overhead . or recorded."
388 U.S. at 59 (emphasis

added).

See

The Berger opinion

describes that statutory requirement as one which "does no
more than identify the person whose constitutionally protected
area is to be invaded."

388 U.S., at 59.

On the basis of

the Senate Report's citation to that language in Berger, I
think it is simply impossible to tell whether Congress thought
it was necessary to name just the "primary target" or "all
persons known to be committing the offense."

Unfortunately,

the cited portion of Katz is of no help in clarifying that
ambiguity.
The section of the Senate Report dealing with the requirement that the intercept order itself identify "the person"
whose conversations are to be intercepted is just as troublesome:
Subparagraph (4) sets out in subparagraphs
(a) through (e) the requirements that each order
authorizing or approving the interception of wire
or oral communications must meet. Subparagraph (a)
requires the order to specify the identity, if
known, of the individual whose communications are
to be intercepted. See West v. Cabell, 153 U.S. 78
(1894).
Senate Report~
The citation to West is confusing since that case concerns
proper identification of the subject

of

an arrest . warrant,

and it has no particular relevance to search warrants.
Yet the Report cites West, without explanation, for the
requirement that the order identify "the person" whose
communications are to be intercepted.
The final aspect of the legislative history relied on by
the SG is also inconclusive.

The SG points out that the

15.
discussion of the inventory requirement of§ 2518(8)(d) in
the Senate Report reflects the assumption that only the person
whose telephone is to be monitored is to be named in the order.
That discussion discusses a hypothetical in which "the subject"
of the interception order moves from one location to another,
and suggests that in such circumstances the court could postpone
service of the required inventory.

Read in context, that

discussion has little bearing on the pr ecise requirements of
the naming requirement with respect to applications.

The

SG also errs in this regard when he claims that the bill as
reported out of committee required an inventory to be served
only on "the person named in the order."

To the contrary, the

bill as reported out of committee required service of such
inventories to "the persons named in the order of the application."

~YJ.A
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Senate Report at 17 (emphasis added).

The 2:._e~~ lati~~~ ry i s.:_s inco~c.2:usive a ~ the

langua~e ~~t~e ~f~ A~t.
in this case may

h~~e~n~

overnmental and private interests.

Consequently, the decision
balancing of the relevant
The SG apparently recognizes

as much, since he devotes almost as much attention to the policy
arguments (12 pages) as he does to the statutory language
and legislative history arguments (15 pages).
D.

Policy Considerations

(1)
ment.

Adverse effects on the effectiveness of law enforce-

The SG contends that a naming requirement for "all

16.

persons known to be committing the offense" would be practically
impossible to comply with.

According to the SG, information

with respect to various suspects will be in the hands of
different federal officers, some of whom may well be scattered
across the country.

Moreover, information is likely to be in

different government files under different aliases and nicknames.
Despite these practical difficulties, under a broad naming
requirement the government must make two probable cause
determinations with respect to every suspect:

first, whether

he is committing the offense, and (2) whether he will be overheard during the interception participating in the offenses
under investigation.
A broad naming requirement would obviously place more of
an administrative burden on government officials than would
the "primary target" requirement interpretation suggested by
the government.

But the fact that the administrative burden

would be heavier does not mean that it would be intolerable,
or that it would bring an end to the usefulness of the wiretapping device.

In short, I think the SG's administrative

burden argument exaggerates the effect a broad naming requirement would have on the "average" application for an intercept
order.
In the first place, when an individual's complicity in
the crimes being investigated and his likely use of the target
telephones is merely "discoverable," he is not "known" within
the meaning of the statute's particularity requirements.

17.
United States v. Kahn, supra.

!

It is only when the government

has probable cause as to both complicity and

~

of the phone

that the government must name the individual in the application.

The SG suggests that it will be difficult to "gather" information from various government officials so that it can be "totaled
up" to determine whether it rises to the level of probable
cause.

But in the context of the other requirements for an

intercept order, such information will normally come to the
attention of the government officials seeking the order.

The

statute requires that the intercept application contain "a
full complete statement of the facts and circumstances relied
upon by the applicant .

including details as to the

particular offense that has been, is being, or is about to be
committed."

18 U.S.C. 2518(1)(b)(i).

And the statute also

requires the application to set forth "a full and complete
statement as to whether or not other investigative techniques
have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear •

________ - -------- ---- --

unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous."
U.S.C. 2518(l)(c).

18

I ......think it is fair to conclude that in

-

~

the process of collecting the data and information necessary

-

to present the required "full and complete statements," the

-~--

appropriate government officials are likely in most cases to
have before them the relevant information on which to base a
probable cause decision relevant to the naming requirement.
(2)

The overinclusiveness problem.

~ighlighted

The second difficulty

by the SG is that the agents and government attorneys

must make these decisions themselves, at least in the first

19.
simply means that at the time of the application the marginal
participant did not qualify as a "person known to be committing
the offense."

As long as there was probable cause to justify
l

fo.. d-re r (?().ttf/4-Jtl

an intercept order with respect to the major] preetj~ pert(i ~
it is not unconstitutional to seize conversations of those who
were "unknown" at the time of the application.

Thus, had the

District Court ruled a b initio that there was no probable cause
as to the marginal participant, interception of his conversations
would nevertheless have been permissible.

Consequently,

suppression is inappropriate when an appellate court upsets
a District Court's finding of probable cause as to the marginal
participant.
The second difficulty asserted by the SG is that those who
are not overhead engaging in illegal conversations will suffer
when the intercept papers become public during motions to
suppress.

According to the SG, in a similar context the naming

of persons as unindicted co-conspirators has been held to
impinge on judicially cognizable personal interests in
reputation and ability to obtain employment.
United States v. Briggs, 514 F.2d (CAS).

Brief at 32, citing

The SG surprises me!

His recent petitions and briefs in this Court have made
considerable use of last Term's decision in Paul v. Davis,
96 S. Ct. 1155, and I am sure he must realize that Paul takes
the punch out of this second asserted difficulty.
The third and final asserted difficulty is that agents
cannot realistically present to the issuing judge all the

20.
information they possess about every suspect who might be
overheard.

The assertion rests on two assumptions:

that there

will be a large number of suspects with respect to every
telephone intercept order, and that the government has considerable information on each of those suspects.

I doubt that

a gambling or drug operations makes such widespread use of any
one given telephone that the SG will have to name hundreds of
suspects for each phone.

Moreover, the larger the alleged

conspiracy using the phone, the more suspicious an issuing
judge would become with respect to the availability and usefulness of alternative investigative techniques.

Realistically,

the agents in most cases will face a manageable number of
suspects with respect to each tap, and they need only present
to the magistrate information in the government's hands
pertaining to complicity in the particular crimes under
investigation.

Finally, the underlying difficulty of requiring

agents to guess about "probable cause" applies only to marginal
cases; surely there are a number of suspects as to whom government agents have absolutely no doubt that probable cause is
lacking.
In sum, there is some merit to the administrative burden
argument, but I would probe the SG at oral argument to determine
how significant a problem this really is.

I

(3)

The Other Side of the Coin - Compensating Benefits

from a Broad Naming Requirement.

The SG contends that the

burdens imposed under a broad naming requirement do not achieve
any compensating benefits.

I think the SG is wrong.

21.
The SG starts by pointing out that the chief safeguard
of privacy under the Act is the minimization requirement, and
that the inclusion of names in the application in addition to
the subject of the application will not facilitate minimization.
On this point the SG is correct, and I would conclude that
minimization is not furthered by a naming requirement.
But the SG errs I think when he suggests that a broad
naming requirement would not aid a judge in deciding whether
an interception order should issue.

There are at least two

ways in which a broad naming requirement would prove useful i ~p~~~i·~
to an issuing judge.

First,

~
4
disclosure ~ rior application~ for

intercepts must be presented to the issuing judge only with
respect to individuals named in the application under consideration.

Since Congress believed that information about prior

surveillance is necessary to judicial consideration of whether
the proposed intrusion on privacy is justified by important
crime control needs, identification of all persons as to whom
the government has probable cause facilitates judicial control
by providing the complete history that Congress deemed necessary
for an informed decision.

Suppose for example that two of

three persons named in an application were named in five prior
applications which produced no useful information.

The issuing

judge would certainly want to weigh that evidence in the balance
in determining the need for instant application.

But if the

government names only the third person, who is the "primary
target", there is no requirement that the government disclose
prior applications as to the other two unnamed individuals.

22.
The second way in which a broad naming requirement could

--

prove useful to the issuing judge is by providing information
._ ,_,

,.

relevant to the judge's resolution of the question whether
normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed
or reasonably appear likely to fail or to be too dangerous.
If the judge is aware that the government actually has probable
cause with respect to five persons rather than simply one
·"primary target," he might expect the government to meet a

.~ higher
~~

standard of proof with respect to the failure of normal

investigative techniques.

Congress noted that normal

~ investigative procedure would include, for example, standard
~sual or oral surveillance techniques, general questioning
~ ~'~ interrogation under an immunity grant, use of regular

~

~~

search warrants, and the infiltration of conspiratorial groups

V,

....4..

~ ~~ undercover

agents or informants.

Senate Report, at

.

~ ~

This is not to say that the government would be required to

~

show that alternative investigative techniques were
with respect to each individual.

i~effective

But when the issuing judge

has to decide the need for an intercept order to get at a
particular gambling business or drug operation, the availability
of alternative techniques might be evaluated somewhat differently
if the issuing judge has information concerning other members
of the group as to whom the government has probable cause.
Finally, the SG notes that naming a person in an intercept
application triggers two statutory requirements:

first, if

named in the order, the person must be furnished with an
inventory notifying him that the interception was authorized

23.
and advising him whether and for how

long~ in

effect; and

second, any subsequent applications to monitor calls in which
the person is named must disclose all previous applications
in which he was named.

I have already indicated how a broad

naming requirement when considered in the context of the latter
requirement could facilitate proper administration of the Act
\ ~ Pf 1-~ s~=-'
fUdge. ~ There remains

by the issuing

for discussion the mandatory

notice provision • •

~

~
~
,~

-

The SG argues that whether or not named in an order a

person whose conversations are intercepted will receive notice
if the issuing judge so directs.

The statute provides not only

for mandatory notice to those named in the order but also for

~discretionary notice

to those whose conversations are intercepted.

·~~It is clear f r om the Senate Report that Congress thought that

_~

~

mandatory notice was essential with respect to the "subject"
of the intercept.

"Yet the intent of the [mandatory notice]

~~ provision is that the principle of postuse notice will be
a.A""'

retained.

This provision alone should insure the community

that the techniques are reasonably employed.
operation all .

Through its

authorized interceptions must eventually

become known at least to the subject,

He can then seek

appropriate civil redress . . . if he feels that his privacy
has been unlawfully invaded."

Senate Report at 105.

Unfortunately, as I noted earlier, it is difficult to determine
what Congress meant by the "subject," especially since the
statutory language implementing the mandatory notice provision
has always referred to "the persons" named in the order.

24.

Since the language of the provision and the legislative
history provide no firm basis on which to resolve the statutory
construction issue, the oply principled approach to the problem
is to weigh the administrative costs against the compensating

...

benefits in light of the expressly stated dual congressional
""-"

objectives.

See page /a supra.

Such a balancing leaves the

Court with three alternatives. {fir~~ the Court can go to

-

one extreme and adopt the "primary target" interpretation
suggested by the SG.

-

The~ alternative is to go to the

other extreme and adopt the "all persons known to be committing
the offense" approach suggested by respondents.

Under the

latter interpretation, failure to name such a person results
in suppression of evidence derived from the tap in a proceeding
against the unnamed individual.
Fortunately, there is

~ alternative, though it is

somewhat difficult to square with the language of the statute.

-

CAS, sitting en bane, has adopted a "bad faith or attempted
s ubterfuge" approach.

Under this approach, CAS interprets

§ 2Sl8(b)(l)(iv) to establish a broad naming requirement,

but refuses to require suppression of evidence as long as the
government was in "substantial compliance" with the statutory
provision.

This seems to make considerable sense to me.

On

the one hand, I don't think the administrative burdens outweigh
the compensating benefits, and for that reason I prefer the
broad naming requirement.

On the other hand, if the authorities

25.
are about to move in and seek an intercept order to put the
crunch on an illegal drug operation, you don't want to require
suppression of valid evidence simply because there was an
agent in Brooklyn who had probable cause to believe that X would
participate in incriminating conversations and who forgot to
mention that fact to his superior officers.

The dual purposes

of the statute are best served if we attempt to force the
government to gather as much information as possible about all
real subjects and present that information to the issuing judge.
But as long as there is no evidence of bad faith or attempted
subterfuge, there is no need to require suppression, if the
government is nevertheless in substantial compliance with
the requirement.
The difficulty with this compromise approach is that it

...

must somehow or other be work ed into the portion of the statute
.
d ea 1 ~ng

. h
. h ''suppress~on.

w~t

Since the SG devotes the third

portion of his brief to the availability of suppression as a
remedy, I will discuss the good faith alternative again in
Section III of this memo.

See page

11 infra.

I I.

THE NATURE OF THE NOTICE REQUIREMENT
The second question presented by this case is whether 18

U.S.C. 2518(8)(d) requires that the government advise the court of

tD

the identity of every person whose conversation has been over-

heard in the course of a wire interception so that the court may
~·~·•••

determine whether to require that such person be served

- . with notice of the interception.

In the instant case the

government intended to provide the DC with the names of all persons
whose conversations the government had overheard during the interceptions.

Respondents Merlo and Lauer were not named in the proposed

orders submitted to the DC and a.-IIi. were never

9~-lli

served with

inventory notice.

It is worth noting that the Department of
-tkA..._ wA.S. rov :cled. :111 'tk..iA el'od. ).
Justice's policy is actually to provide less information to
~

current policJ y • is to provide the issuing judge with the name of
every person who has been overheard as to whom there is any
reasonable possibility of indictment, and to provide other names
only • if so requested by the issuing judge.

See Brief for the

SG at 39 n. 34.
The SG makes two brief arguments on this issue.

First, the

statute does not expressly require that the government routinely
~

provide the issuJ ing judge with any sepcific information upon which
ro base his exercise of discretion, either precise identification

~

of individualsj;M i'Ju &aunt 11 r 7 aw eppali'a'A• J9 rr iJ:Hi:MI~ or descriptions
of categories of individuals, as the court found •••••
necessary in United States v. Chun, 503 F.2d 533, 540

lae
(CA9).

In

this regard the government notes that it is a simple matter for
the judge to ask for whatever information he thinks he needs to
makes a notice-order decision.

The government's second argument

is that if it is appropriate to read into the statute some duty
+It~

on the part of the government to inform the court of ~ whose
conversations have been intercepted, that duty should only

2'

require the government to use its best efforts to provide a complete
list of such persons.
Respondents (Merlo and Lauer) argue, as did both the majority
and the dissenting judge . . below,

that the judge has no inde-

oendent information as to the unnamed parties who have been overheard on the intercepts and must &1pr1& sa

•h~

depend on the government to disclose that information in order that
he may exercise his discretion.

According to respondents, the

government must perform its disclosure duty with some greater
degree of care than was exercised in the instant case.
To me, this is not a difficult issue.

The statute clearly

makes no express reference to the nature of the information, if
OWfl\

any, that the government must on its ~ initiative provide to
the issuing judge in order that he can exercise his statutory
discretion.
under no

But it is silly to suggest that the government is

obl~gation

to provide any information until the issuing

~

j udge

furnis ~hes

a request for certain data.

~ between~s

A fair

.,.....

compro ~ ise

competing interests at stake is the

case:
[A]lthougA t he the judicial officer has the duty to cause
the filing of the inventory, it is abundantly clear that the
prosecution has greater access to and familiarity with the
intercepted conversations. Therefore we feel justified in
imposing upon the latter the duty to classify ~~ · all those
whose conversations have been intercepted, and to transmit
this in format ion to the judge. Should the judge des i ~ more
information regarding these classes in order to exercLl se his
§ 2518(8)(d) discretion, we also hold that the goevernment
is required to furnish such information as is available to
it.
United States v. Chun, supra,

1

standard4'~

adopted by CA 9 and by the panel (and dissenter) in the instant

F.2d at 540

~19

I think

JG, ..JL ~ ..... ~ ~~..:..... it ~--...A ~
c..o~t,luW

CA 9 correctly

&9Ael·~~

that such an allocation of responsibility

will best serve the dual purposes of Title III.
The real issue with respect to the notice provisions
Ac ~ i ~~

of the

whether the government has to name all the names or

c/~
merely ae 7
of persosns who were overheard, ~t rather whether

Jt••

suppression is an appropriate remedy for violation of the oappwipnist e
whatever notice requirements are considered appr opriate.

That

question is discussed in the next section.

III.

SUPPRESSION AS A REMEDY
Section 2518(10)(a) permits motions to suppress on the following

grounds:
(1) the communications was unlawfully intercepted;
~

(2) the order of autj ori~ ation or approval under which it was
intercepted is insufficient on its face; or
(3) the interception• was not made in conformity with the order
of authorization or approval.
The only arguably relevant section of the
(1)

t~D dealing

J So statute is subdivision

with instances in which the communication was

unlawfully intercepted.

This Court has

two

considered section

In Unitd~d States v. Giordane 1

2518(10)(a)(i).

u

u.s.

l ~+- s t,.c)-,·"""' .........

, the Court held that ~ embraced "any of those
statutory requirements that directly and substantially implement
the congressional

~neeneii8H

ee

~intention

to limit the use

of intercept procedures to those s ~tuations clearly calling for
the employment of this extraordinary investigative device."
D
It is clear that section 2518(l)(a)(i) does not require
~

suppression for "every failure to comply fully with any requirement of Title III."

United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 574-75.

A.

Suppression for Failure to Comply with a Broad Naming
Requirement

If

l; accept the government's "principal target" interpre-

tation of the naming requirement, there is no real problem with
suppression.

The only suppression situation would be where the

government failed to name even the primary target, and I doubt that
the SG would contend that under such circumstances suppression was
inappropriate.

On

the other hand, if you think there is a ,

•!l

~

~

broad naming requirement, is suppression an

&:~available

remedy

under the statute as interpreted by this Court?
~

--

I think the answer is yes.

•

As I noted earlier, the statutory

language and legislative history is n81! a f m•" fail to resolve
the merits of the issue
requirement.

;-.....
co~cerning

the

~

sc~ ope

of the naming

But the policies that would justify imposition of

a broad naming requirement,

~

pages 21-22

s~ ,

are

s~sh

as

t~

would also warrant the conclusion that the naming requirement
"directly and substantially implement[s] the congressional
\

intention to limit the use of intercept procedures to those
situations ~ clearly calling for the employment of this extraordinary
investigative device."

Giordane , supra, at 527.

--

I also mentioned earlier that it might be difficult to work
a "good

~

reflection,

faith" approach into the statutory language.

I ~

On

don't think the problem is all that serious.

One would simply argue that the intercept order is lawful where

the application all those known to be committing the offense.

Thus,

mere inadvertent failure to name a person whose conversations
~re

subsequently overheard would not make the intercept unlawful.

On the other hand, if the government knowingly and

intentionally~

refused to give the issuing judge the name of

person known to

~ a

be committing the offense, the basic intercept is unlawful as
to that person and suppression is appropriate.
B.

Suppression for Failure to Comply with a Notice Requirement

For similar reasons I agree with Judge

Enge ~s d•aas ~

dissenting opinion which analyzes the availability of the . .
suppression remedy for violations of the notice requirement.

7S-21-z[7) The wiretap authorization referred to "Billy Cecil Doolittle and others as yet unknown." Anderson and
Baxter contend that the Government
had reasonable cause to believe that
their conversations would be intercepted.
Relying on certain langu age in the Supreme Court's opinion in ll!;b.n, they argue that, not being "unknown," they
shou ld have been named in the authorization. They contend that since they
were not named, the wiretap order was
illegal as to their conversations. The
same argument cou ld be made for Sanders.· We reject this argument. Tb e ~ e
fendants neither all ege nor demonstrate
any prcj ud ice to t"Fiem I n not being
nariieo 1 n tJie au t horization.
The
Government contends that its agents had
personal knowledge, as opposed to information, to support probable cause as to
illegal activity only of Doolittle, the coowner of the Sportsman's Club, the establishment wherein the telephones were
located and to which the telephone bills
were sent. All defendants received an
inventory of the intercepted conversations, were allowed to listen to the tapes
and received transcripts of the conversations prior to use against them at trial,
as if they had been named in the order.
Most of the conversations of each defendant were with Doolittle, the person
named in the order. There is no indicatioJL ~. J~ith or attempted subt!;!rfug~ b~ the G_gvernme.nt in its wiretap
application. The application and affidavit delineated specifically the information expected to be gathered from the
tap. We hold there was substantial com pliance with the requiremen ts oT the
Act, and that the failure to name other
defendants does not render the evidence
obtained as to them inadmissible under
18 U.S.C.A. § 2518(10)(a).

-.

~(<:::6-)
~t

;k.~ •'" •-<-.-1 ,J...f/', . ~
S~Iillt...~-- 4 ..t4~ C..c..,.
~- ~""C..&oofo"'~ ..
A$

-

r·

7 :L ~, i'"(~

A-ll-~ ~ ....
N.- ........ ~
~~kA ~~~~
)4-~_,...,.J. ...... ~ ~~ c ,~ ..
'1C'
>< /C. X

~~~~,·~.~~

~ ~ ~4-...,._.:_A.__. 44i"4«..;

7

.

'~
~ ~ <:.o~ .. ~
~

•

/~ )d.--t..~~ ~ ~~ ~

~ w...f;~·4*M- ~~:r ~
~~~~.

c;_ ~ ~.-..t.lt """'~. """-'d

~ ~/.c.¢-hl ,p_ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ..
~~~~~~~

~ e.•·4..,_J ~ #Ill~ /'2..~
~- ~~~ ~ ~c~~~
~~~~~-<:<"'f..,.~ (-r-•u~

J. """-'

~--L.. ~.

•.

r~c,~···
;.-~
~., ,~t.- ~ 1Atoe ~
~~ ~~ T~.l[T ~A-

-~to ~~de ......~it;~~

Tllt' ('hid

.....

.Ju~(ite

Q...

} ~X!x~tx:;x.X:x Stevens, J • ~
-'\
-

~~~ .
., 2-SIS"'

~ ~.

~ -,....c;~~~..,._,.

~ ~ ~I_,. ~ • ..::::7. ~ .
4

)(

't

X

tq,;._, ~., ..~

..J

cp,

~41&c.· ~

Blackmun, J.

Z

44

~~

a~-e-,~4~ .
- ~~~ .... Jl

l<u

,~.c~

~6--

Rchnquist, J.

~

lfp/ss

11/20/16

MEMORANDUM

TO:

Gene Comey

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

November 20, 1976

No. 75-212 United States v. Donovan
I like your first draft and, subject to the questions
below, think it fairly close to being ready for a printed
Chambers draft.
Apart from minor editing, I have no comments or questions
with respect to Parts I and II.

These are well and tightly

written.
I do have some questions as to Part III . although I
could be satisfied - after discussion - that it is substantially
adequate as drafted.

In Parts I and II we categorically "hang"

the government with two statutory violations.

In Part III we

reprieve the government and the dissent will say that, for
practical purposes, we have written out of the statute the
provisions addressed in Parts I and II.

It is therefore

desirable that our Part III be as persuasive as we can properly
make it.
As presently drafted, as you and I agreed at the outset,
principal reliance is placed upon language in Giordano and
Chavez.

The language we rely upon makes three points:

(i)

every failure to comply with requirements of Title III does
not render the "interception of the wire or oral communications

2.
'unlawful'"; (ii) suppression is required only for a failure
to comply with statutory requirements that implement congressional
intent "to limit the use of intercept procedures"; and (iii)
suppression is not appropriate where the requirement violated
does not play a "substantive role" in the regulatory scheme.
The SG's brief (p. 46 et seq.) relies primarily on the
language of § 2518(10)(a)(i), authorizing suppression only (so
far as we are concerned) where the conununication was "unlawfully
intercepted".

The SG disposes of Merlo and Lauer by saying

that this subsection has no application to violations arising
after the interception is completed.

Subsequent errors are

irrelevant to the lawfulness of a prior interception.
This precise line of analysis does not fit the other
three respondents.
argument:

The SG nevertheless makes a rather good

by virtue of the intercept order, the government

was entitled to overhear the conversations of the named targets
and others unknown to the government.

There probably were

scores of persons whose conversations thus were intercepted,
but this did not make these interceptions unlawful.

Also,

as you state, the failure to identify by name in the application
and order all those likely to be overheard does not, under the
statute, affect the decision of the Court whether to authorize
the interception.

That decision turns upon the statutory

conditions you have outlined.

'·

3.
In short, the fact that incriminating conversations of
others not named may be overheard is, as the SG puts it, simply
not relevant to the judge's decision.

This being so, the SG

reasons that the failure to name suspected co-conspirators,
no more than the failure to name unsuspected co-conspirators,
cannot invalidate the interception order and render unlawful
the communications intercepted.
The SG thus emphasizes, more than our draft does, the
precise language of subsection (i) "unlawfully intercepted",
rather than the more generalized language from Giordano and
Chavez.
The fouus of the emphasis in your draft is summarized at
the top of page 21:
"Although both statutory requirements are
undoubtedly important, we do not think that
they function directly and substantially to
limit the use of intercept procedures."
The foregoing reference to limiting the use of intercept

u.s.,

procedures appeared first in Giordano, 416
was repeated in Chavez (p. 575).

at 527, and

I do not read it as a

judicial broadening of subparagraph (i).

Rather it is an

elaboration of its purpose.

***
At this point, Gene, I emphasize that I have no dobbt
as to the basic soundness of your analysis.

I am simply

4.
saying that perhaps it can be buttressed by a more specific
reliance on the language of subsection (i).

***
The SG's brief on "suppression" makes several other points
that may be worth considering as possible additions to, or
elaborations of, our footnotes.
1.

There is nothing in the legislative history to suggest

that the inventory or naming requirements "occupy a central,
or even functional, role in guarding against unwarranted use
of wiretapping or electronic surveillance".

Chavez, at 578

(SG, pp. 49, 50).
2.

There is no occasion to create an exclusionary rule

where none is provided by Title 111.

The SG argues, with

reason, that the statutory provisions for suppression are
exclusive where, as with respect to the issues in this case,
there is no constitutional violation (SG, pp. 50, 51).
3.

No substantial rights of respondents were affected,

a thought you had in mind with your ''second" suggestion in
your memo to me.

In the cases of Donovan, Robbins and Buzzacco,

each of them received inventory notices even though they had
not been named.

They do not suggest anywway in which they

were disadvantaged.

Nor did Merlo and Lauer suffer any impair-

ment of substantial rights.

They certainly had actual notice,

5.
as a practical matter, that their conversations had been
intercepted when inventories were served on 37 of their
confederates.

But apart from this irrelevant observation, the

intercept papers were made available to all of the defendants
no later than December 1973, affording - as the record in this
case demonstrates - abundant time to permit pretrial suppression
motions, and prepare for trial (which has not yet been held).
The SG also notes that the primary statutory protection against
surprise at trial is 18
4.

u.s.c.

2518(9).

(SG 1 s brief p. 53).

In footnote 43 (p. 51) the SG cites a number of

Courts of Appeals decisions said to have refused to suppress
errors of the types involved here wher,e there has been no
showing of prejudice.

This is no issue of "prejudice" in the

case before us, and perhaps it is unwise to address it even
in a footnote.

What do you think?

**

*

Despite the length of this memorandum, I do not think
substantial revision of Part III is indicated.

But I am inclined

to think that the opinion would be strengthened by a more explicit
reliance upon the language of subsection (i), and by including
in the footnotes some of the SG's points.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss
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CHAMBERS OF"

December 7, 197 6

.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re: No. 75-212, United States v. Donovan

Dear Lewis:
In due course I will circulate a dissent in this
case.
Sincerely.

~~
T. M.
Mr. Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

;iuprtmt <!}llurlltf tlrt ~ttb ~htttg
..-~lthtghtn. ~.

Of.

2llgt'!~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

December 9, 1976

Re:

75-212 - United States v. Donovan

Dear Lewis:
Although I agree with Parts I and II, I will
await the dissent before deciding on Parts III and
IV.
Respectfully,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

.in:prtutt ~tturl d tqt ~tb .itatts
._asltington. ~. ~· 2llgt~~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

December 9, 1976

Re:

No. 75-212

United States v. Donovan

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

<!Jcurt cf tqt 'Jitttittb ,jhtttg
~agfrin:ghm. ~. <!f. 2ll&'J!.~

.i~tmt

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

December 10, 1976

Re:

No. 75-212 - U. S. v. Donovan

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to Conference

'
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,ju.prtmt afourl of tqt ~~ ,jtattg
JfuJringhtn. ~. <!]:. 2ll.;t~~
CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

December 10, 1976
PERSONAL
Re:

75-212 - United States v. Donovan

Dear Lewis:
As written, I can only concur in the judgment and in all but
Part IIA of the Court's opinion.
I cannot agree, however, with yo~Ar
~~ Cru,rtLs construction of the identification provisions of
§ 2518(1) (b) (iv).
In my view, the statute plainly requires a
wiretap application to identify by name the principal target of
the investigation. The application in the instant case complies
with that requirement. Since Congress demanded no more, I would
conclude that no statutory violation occurred with respect to the
application.
In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756
(1975), you stated the familiar proposition that the starting
point in every case involving construction of a statute is the
language itself. The statute before us requires no more than
that a wiretap application specify the "identity of the person,
if known, committing the offense and whose communicat1ons are
to be intercepted." 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1) (b) (iv). While requiring
only the identification of "~ person" whose communications are
to be intercepted, Congress manifestly contemplated that interceptions effected pursuant to a single application and order could
well potentially affect a large number of persons, particularly on
incoming calls. Under the statute, notice of the intercept can
be provided by order of the federal district court to "parties"
other than persons named in the application.
Id., § 2518(8) (d).
Similarly, standing to object to intercepted communications is
conferred upon "[a]ny aggrieved person . . . . " Id., § 2518(10) (a).
Finally, the statute confers a civil damages remedy upon "[a]ny
person" whose communications are unlawfully intercepted or used
in violation of the statute.
Congress' clear recognition that multiple parties would
potentially be affected by a single wiretap does no more than
recognize the reality that numerous persons may call in and that
some of them will be fellow "hoods." This is manifest from the
statute itself. This has significant bearing upon our interpretation of§ 2518(1) (b) (iv).
In fashioning highly specific

- 2 requirements with respect to wiretap applications, Congress carefully avoided the use of plural language found in other parts of
the same statute; instead, Congress spoke in the singular, requiring identification of "the person" whose communications are
to be intercepted. Unless Congress meant something other than
what it said, Congress had not thought to require the naming of
"any [other] person" who might be c~ught up by the intercept.

-

You emphasize, however, that the statute expressly recognizes that more than one person may be named in a wiretap
application. Ante, at 10. That is indeed true. See§ 2518(1} (e),
(8} (d). But I would think this is all the more reason for focusing
upon the precise language in the provision establishing specific
requirements for an application. Since Congress expressly contemplated that applications might contain more than one name, its
failure in §2518(1} (b) (iv} to require the naming of "any [other]
person" or "the persons" whose communications are to be intercepted must mean that the suggested open-ended identification
requirement was not intended.
In other words, Congress reasonably foresaw that for a variety of reasons actual wiretap
applications might contain the names of more than one person.
But Congress did not translate its recognition of what an application might contain into a command as to what it must contain,
as is now proposed.
The plain words of the statute, of course, might have to bow
in the face of compelling legislative history to the contrary.
But there is none.
Indeed, you observe that Congress' intent is
enwrapped in its interpretation of this Court's decisions in
Berger and Katz.
But I think it is neither necessary nor appropriate on this sparse record to decide how Congress decided to
read the prior decisions of this Court. The point is that we
do not know. What we do know is that these provisions "'[were]
intended to reflect the constitutional command of particularization.'"
Ante, at 12. The language of the four precise statutory requirements
confirm that purpose. !/
For me, the very precision of the

1/
-Thus, § 2518(1} (b) requires the application to contain a
"full and complete statement of the facts and circumstances",
including "a particular description of the nature and location of
the facilities . . . . " Likewise, the provision requires "a
particular description of the types of communicatbns."

- 3 -

language employed by Congress in§ 2518(1} (b) strongly points
to the conclusion that Congress meant exactly what it said in
establishing an identification requirement in the singular. Also
important, that exact language comports with Fourth Amendment
requirements under our subsequent holding in United States v.
Kahn, 415 U.S., at 155, and thus fulfills the express legislative
purpose.
I would therefore interpret this statute to mean what it says.
Whether wisely or not, Congress decided, consistent with Fourth
Amendment strictures, to require only the identification of
"the person" whose conversations are to be intercepted. Since
it is clear Congress shifted from plural language to singular,
I would take Congress at its word.
I hope you have not "hardened"!
Regards,

Mr. Justice Powell
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December 13, 1976
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Thank you for your thoughtful letter of December 10.
1
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Although I would agree that the statutory construction
question with respect to § 2518(l)(b)(iv) is not free from
doubt, I reached a different conclusion after rather careful
study. Moreover, my Conference notes indicate clearly that
your .:view of. t:he ,1statute did not attract a "Court". · ' ·
My opinion, ·as now written, will impose a hortatory
obligation on the government to name persons whoae · communications it reasonably expects to intercept. But the important ,
holding 1n the case is that a failure to name will not reaul~ '''
1n exclusion of the intercepted coDillUQicationa.
,.
'
'·

'!(!'":<

!I<! •f

"

1. '

·,"';

/

.hpuuu <q:curt ttf tJrt ~a ~hdtg
'~1hu~Jrington. ~.

<q:.

2ll.;i'!~

CHAMBERS OF

December 13, 1976

.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

Re:

No. 75-212 - United States v. Donovan

Dear Lewis:
By a separate letter I am joining your opinion.
the following minor comments:

I have only

MJ# ~·

.g f~~ /:P

1. You will recall that at conference I was somewhat attracted
to Judge Godbold's position in dissent in United States v. Doolittle, 518
~F. 2d 500, 501, 503 (1975), where he thought the standard might be "a
Q.)l
person against whom the ip,terception was directed. 11 On further reflec- "'
~tion, I have concluded that robable cause is erha s the better standard.
I :wonder, however, whether a footnote reference to Judge GOdbokl'ssug• 0/'~.,
11
~#,.V,
sted standard and our rejection of it might be in order. Perhaps not.
Ur
~.lfJb. s you wish about this. I mention it only because it might shore up 1

;vvV1 rv ~

i'V.

J

~~

.'J..A;

r-;~

r;A"'

2:

j;~Ifttle

for me personally•

2. I wonder whether the adoption of the Chun Test, p. 16 and
n. 21, with which I agree, might not be more strongly stated if the footnote were worked into the text and if the conclusion as to Merlo and Lauer
were spelled out there.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell

~ttltt
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CHAMBERS OF

December 13, 1976

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

Re:

No. 75-212 -

United States v. Donovan

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.

Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell

cc:

The Conference

gc/lab

12/14/76

Government carries a greater administrative

,,t3 \\

burden under this holding than would be the case under the
principal target interpretation, a fact which has prompted
some to suggest that Congress did not intend to require the
probable cause standard.

Preferring a middle ground between

principal target and probable cause, Judge Godbold, for
example, takes the position that the statute requires the
naming of all those individuals "against whom the interception
was directed," as that phrase is used in the definition of
aggrieved person in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(11).

United States v.

Doolittle, 518 F.2d 500, 501, 503 (CA 5 1975)(en bane)
(concurring opinion).

Under this interpretation, a suspect

as to whom the probable cause standard is satisfied would
not have to be identified in a wiretap application if, in
light of the information the Government has already collected,
it can reasonably be said that the Government is not investigating that suspect.

Although this interpretation might

ease the Government's administrative burden, we can find
no more support in the legislative history for this
restrictive reading of the statutory language than for
the Government's principal target approach.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

December 14, 1976

75-212 - U. S. v. Donovan
Dear Lewis,
Although I was tentatively of the other
view with respect to one of the issues involved
in this case, I think you have written a most
persuasive opinion. Accordingly, I do not plan
to write in dissent. I shall look carefully at
whatever is written by anyone else, but, subject to that condition subsequent, I acquiesce
for now in your opinion for the Court.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Powell

Copies to the Conference
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATE~oulateci: DEC 27 1976
Rectroula.ted l
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United States, P etitioner. On Writ of Certiorari to t 1lC
v.
rnited States Court of ApThomas vV. Donovan et al.
peals for the Sixth Circujt.
[January -, 1077]
MR. JusTICE MARSHALL, dissenting.
The Court today holds that an application for a. warrant
to authorize a wiretap under Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control a.n d Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U. S. C. ~~ 25102520, must name all individuals whom the Government has
probable cause to believe are committing the offense being
investigated and will be overheard. See 18 U. S. C. ~ 2;')18
( 1) (b) (iv). It also holds that the Government must provide
sufficient information to the issuing judge to allow him to
exercise the discretion provided by 18 U. S.C. ~ 2518 (8)(d).
I fully agree with both of these holdings. The Court concludes, however, that if the Government violates these statutory commands, it is nevertheless free to usc the intercepted
communications as evidence in a criminal proceeding. I
cannot agree.
I continue to adhere to the position, exprcs<oed for four
Members of the Court by Mr. Justice Douglas in his dissent
in United States v. Chavez, 416 U. S. 562, 584 (1974), that
Title III, does not authorize "the courts to pick and choose
among various statutory provisions, suppressing evidence only
when they determine that a provision is 'substantive,' 'central,' or 'directly and substantially' related to the congressional scheme." The Court has rejected that argument, however, sec United States v. Chavez, supra; United States v.
Giordano, 416 U. S. 505 (1974), and nothing is to be gained
by renewing it here. But even under tho standard set forth
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in Giordano and Chavez and reaffirmed by the Court today,
ante, at 18-19, the evidence at issue here should be suppressed.
I

Title III requires that an application for a warrant to authorize ·wiretapping disclose "the identity of the person, if
known, committing the offense and whose communications
are to be intercepted." 18 U. S. C. § 2518 ( 1) (b) (iv). The
Court properly rejects the Government's contention that this
provision requires it to name only the "principal target"
of an investigation. In doing so, the Court relies both on
the pl:1in language and legislative history of the section, which
do not support the Government's position, and on the statutory context. Ante, at 8-13. Part of that context is the
obvious assumption of other portions of Title III that wircta,p applications will name more than one target. See 18
U.S. C.§§ 2518 (1)(e), (8)(d). Another part is
"the fact that identification of an individual in an application triggers other statutory prov·isions. First,
§ 2518 (1) (e) rrquires an intercept application to disclose all previous applications 'involving any of the same
persons . . . specifird in the application.' . . . Second,
§ 2518 (8) (d) mandatrs that an inventory notice be
served upon 'the persons named in the ord('r or the
application.'" Ante, at 10--11, n. 14 (emphasis added).
Yet in determining whether the identification rcquiremeut
"directly and substantial1y imp1ementf s l the congressional
intention to limit the usc of interce}it procedures," United
States v. Giordano, suzmt, 416 U. S., at 527, or plays a "substantive role" in the "regulatory system" rstablished by Congress, United States v. Chavez, supra, 416 U. S., at 578, the
Court ignores the requirement's function as a statutory "trigger." In its analysis, the Court focuses solely on whether
a list of additional names would affect a judge who must
decide whether to issue a warrant. The Court reasons that
once the judge has concluded that the sprcific requirements
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of § 2518 (3) 1 have been met, the presence of additional
names in the warrant application could not change his decision. Ante, a.t 19-21. Failure to provide those names is,
therefore, insignificant.
The Court's reasoning IS d~ed. First, a judge
is not required to issue a warrant if the prerequisites of
§ 2518 (3) are satisfied; he may do so. Once he determines
that the § 2518 (3) requirements have been met, he still must
decide whether the invasion of privacy by the proposed
wiretap is justified under the circumstances. 2 Second, what
is at issue here is more than a simple list of names. Section
2518 (I) (e) requires that the Government disclose to the
court the history of all prior applications to intercept the
communica.tions of anyone named in a warrant application.
A history of recent applications would at the least cause a
judge to consider whethrr the application before him was
an attempt to circumvent the restrictive rulings of another
18 U. S. C. § 251.'\ (3) providr~. in pertinrnt part:
"Upon such application i hr .iudgr m•1y entrr an ex partC' ordrr .. . if
the judge determines on the ba~i:; of the farts submittrd b~· tlw appliPant
that" (a) there i.,; probable eau~.e for brlicf that an individual is rommittin11:,
has committed, or is about to commit a pari irular offen:;c enumerated in
section 2516 of this chaptc·r;
"(b) there is probnhlr catn'c for belief that pnrtirular romm\mi<•ntions
concerning that ofTrnRe will be obtainrd through su ch intrrreption;
"(r) norm:ll inyr.,;tip:aiiYr prorrdure:< have been tried and ha ·e failed
or reasonably nppear to bP unlike]~· to snrreccl if tri C'cl or to hC' too
dangerous;
" (d) there i~ prohnhle c::u~e for belief I hat the facilit iC'H from which,
or the plnce where, the wire or or:1l communications arc to be in I erccpted
arc bein~J; used, or are abo ut to he w;Pd. in comJertion with the commission of such offense. or arr len~<·d I o, li1'1 !'d in the n:tmc of, or commonly
usrd by surh prrson."
2 The informal ion whi<'h the applicant is rrquirrcl to provide to the
Dist1ict Court b~· §§ 251R ( 1) (d)-( f) would br ~uprrnuous if 1he dc><·ision
whether io is5nc a warrant dcpendrd only on thr Jinding' ~per ifi cd in
§2518 (3).
1
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judge or to continue an unjustified invasion of privacy. 3 The
decision whether to issue the warrant would certainly be
affected by such consideration. 4
It is true, as the Court notes, ante, at 20 n. 23," that there
is no allegation in this case that had the District Court been
informed that the Government expected to overhear respondents Donovan, Buzzaco, and Robbins discussing illegal gambling activities it would not have issued a warrant. But
that fact is irrelevant to an analysis of the role of the
naming requirement in the regulatory system established by
Congress. In Giordano, the Court rejected the argument
that the Attorney General's failure to authorize the application for a warrant could be disregarded because the Attorney
General had later ratified the application, thus demonstrating
that he would have approved it originally. 416 U. S .. at
523-524, n. 12. The important consideration was whether
the requirement of high-level authorization was clesignC'd
to play an important role, not whether it would have mattered in the particular case. The same analysis should be
used here.
Moreover, even where there is no prior interception or
application to disclose, as is apparently the case here, the
naming requirement plays a vital role in the system designed
by Congress. For unless that requirement is complied with
Cf. United States v. Bellosi, 1G3 U. S. App. D . C. 273, 501 F. 2d
833 (1974).
4 Thus, this cn~e is unlike United States v. Chavez, supra.
There-, the
Court concluded that the mi~identification of the authorizing official as an
Assi,;tnnt Attornry Gmll'ral when the Attorney General had actually
authorized the warrnnL npplil'ation could not hn.vc allected the judge's
decil'lion to iFsue t.he warrant. 41G U. S., at 572.
5 The Court nctu:dly state~ only that there i~ no suggr.~tion that. the
failure to nnme rrspondents krpt from the judge informn.t ion "11w t
might ha\ e prompted t hr court to conclude- that probable cause was
Jacking." As I h!.lxe shown, thn.t formulation nnder:;tates the District
Court's role.
3
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from the first interception, no judge will know that a later
interception is not the first. In addition, the naming requirement triggers the mandatory notification provision of § 2518
(8) (d), another important component of the congressional
dcsign.6
Thus, I conclude that the naming requirement recognized
by the majority docs play a "substantive role" in the system
designed by Congress to limit the usc of electronic surveillance. Failure to comply with that requirement, therefore,
should lead to supprcRsion on the ground that "tho communication was unlawfully intercepted." 18 U. S. C. ~ 2518
(IO)(a) (i).
II
The Court's discussion of the con sequences of the Government's failure to comply with the notice provif:ion of
§ 2518 (8) (d) parallels its discussion of the naming requirement, and is similarly flawed. The Court does recognize that
the notice provision was designed to assure the community
that the wiretap technique is reasonably employed and that
"Congress placed considerable' emphasis on that aspect of
the overall statutory scheme." Ante, a.t 23-24. But because
notice Of'eurs after the intercept is completed, and because
notice is not itself "an independent restraint on resort to
the wircta.p procedure," the Court concludes that failure to
notify docs not render an interception "unlawful" under
§ 2518 (10) (a) (i) . Ibid.
Again, the Court takes too narrow a view of the provision
at issue, ignoring its place in the system Congress has created
to restrain wiretapping. That system involves not only direct
restraints on applying for a warrant, but also restraints
which reduce wiretaps by providing sanctions for misuse of
surveillance techniques. Those sanctions arc both criminal,
18 U.S. C. § 2511 ( 1), and civil, 18 U.S. C.§ 2520. Congress
6

See Part II, infra.
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designed the notice provisions of § 2518 (8) (d) to provide
tho information necessary to make the civil sanctions of
~ 2520 meaningful.
The congressional analysis of § 2520
states:
"Iujunctive relief. with its attendant discovery proceedings, is not intended to be available. . . . It is expected
that civil suits, if any, will instead grow out of the
filing of inventories under section 2518 (8) (d)." S. Rep.
No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 107 (1968).
See also id., at 105.
The Court's conclusion that the notice provision is not
central dismantles this carefully designed congressional
structure.
III
The Court's opinion implies that if the violations of Title
III considered here had been intentional, the result would
be different. Ante, at 20 n. 23, 23 n. 26. This must be so,
for surely this Court would not tolerate the Government's
intentional disregard of duties imposed on it by Congress.
I also assume that if the Government fails to establish
procedures which offer reasonable assurance that it will
strictly adhere to the statutory requirements, sec ante, at 24,
resulting failures to comply will be recognized as intentional. There is, therefore, reason to hope that the Court's
admonition that the Government should obey the law will
have some effect in the future.
But that hope is a poor substitute for certainty that the
Government will make every effort to fulfill its responsibilities
under Title III. We can obtain that certainty only by according full recognition to the role of the naming and notice
requirements in the statutory scheme created by Congress.
I respectfully dissent from the Court's failure to do so.
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Donovan - Possible Additional Footnote

~ · ~,

The per se rule of exclusion urged by the dissenting
opinion, infra, would impose upon society the consequences

a.-.:1-

of aborting merited prosecutions

-

GE

overturning deserved

convictions merely because of the omission of the name of
a person who was known to someone on the government's side
as a possible target.

Such omissions may occur even when the

utmost care is exercised to avoid them.

For example, in a

major bookmaking or narcotics case, involving extensive
interstate operations and a

H

multiplicity of parties sfXH

often operating under aliases, investigating government
agents would be confronted with difficult problems of
identification and determination of probable cause as well
as of coordination with the prosecutorial team.
therefore argues,

e~eaialy

The SG

not without reason, that an

inflexible exclusionary rule would "significantly impede
the use of electronic surveillance as a law enforcement
tool without safeguarding legitimate privacy interests
or protecting against official abuses''.

Br. 27.

In

these circumstances, we are reluctant to impose a
judicially created exclusionary rule where Congress has
failed to do so in clear and explicit language.
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JUS T ICE Ww. . J . B RE NNAN , JR.

December 28, 1976

RE: No. 75-212

United States v. Donovan

Dear Thurgood:

,...

Please join me in the dissenting opinion
you have prepared in the above.
Sincerely,
l

Mr. Justice Marshall
cc: The Conference

.fttpTtlltt

Q}ouri ltf tlrt ~~ .jtaf.tg

~MJri:ttghttt. ~. <!}. 21lbt'!~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

January 4, 1977

Re:

No. 75-212, U. S. v. Donovan

Dear Lewis,
I have decided to join your opinion
for the Court in this case.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Powell

Copies to the Conference
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The concurring opinion of the CHIEF JUSTICE
contends that respondents Donovan, Robbins, and

~

Buzzaco
at

~ ~tanding

even to seek suppression.

This contention rests on the ground that

Congress rejected an amendment proposed by Senators
Long and Hart that would have added a fourth ground
justifying suppression -" namely, that the person against
whom the government sought to introduce the evidence
was not named in the court order.

Since these three

respondents would have been entitled to suppression

.

under the rejected amendment, the concurring opinion
concludes they cannot seek suppression here.
I

This view . fails to recognize that § 2518(10)(a)
establishing the suppression remedy provides alternative
grounds on which one can seek suppression of evidence
derived from a wiretap.

Thus, the mere fact that

Congress chose not to add a fourth alternative could
not mean that it intended to prevent persons who would
have been covered by that alternative from seeking

2.

suppression on one of the other grounds.

As the Justive

Department commented, in the same statement cited in
the concurring opinion:

"The [Long and Hart] amendment

is designed to limit the scope of electronic surveillance,
but it accomplishes this objective in an artificial
manner.

So long as the court order is validly obtained,

evidence obtained under the order should be admissible
against any person not merely against the person named
in the order."
added).

114 Cong. Rec., at 14718 (1968)(emphasis

Here, respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco

challenge the validity of the court order, and nothing
in either Congress' rejection of the proposed amendment
or the Justice Department's comment thereon suggests
that § 2518(10)(a)(i) is unavailable to persons who
might have had a remedy under a provision not enacted
by Congress.

-
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Donovan
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This caseApresents a number of issues~rni:S~he

c otiS'ilsuctiOR ilif Title III of tkw Qc:saMlrua Cnjwe Ci'A&JHiW and

the federal

wiretap~

statute.

In an opinion filed today with the Clerk, the Court
first holds~that applications for judicial authorization

wiretap~must identify all persons whose relevant
conversati~ns;fhe Government has probable cause to believe
of

it will intercept.

The statutory requirements are not

satisfied~hen the government identifies only the principal
target of the investigation.
Second, the Court holds that the Government must supply
the issuing

judge~with sufficient information about the

parties who were overheard,j to enable him to decide whether
such parties must be notified of the interception.

ca,.U. ~
.tr1_,
Finally, we hold that underAthe circumstances~~ d

~

this case, the faiture of the Government to comply fully

with these statutory obligations/ did ~t make the intercept
order unlawful.
We therefore conclude that it was error to suppress
the evidence obtained by these interceptions.

The order

of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is
remanded to that court.

2.
The Chief Justice filed a concurring '3pin~.
~ r:• 4&ro
C-""••..., '"-' ~·~ ..~1....;~
Mr. Justice "Reh:n:~l!W t :! iled a g QlumrriAS" opinion _ Mr.
/t

Justice Marshall filed a dissenting opinion, in which Mr.
Justice Brennan joined.

February 16, 1977

Holds for No. 75-212 -

u. s.

v. Donovan

Dear Chief:
I would appreciate all of the holds for
Donovan being taken off the list and carried
to the February 25th Conference.

These holds appear on pages 33 and 34, List 9,
Sheets 2 and 3, of the February 18, 1977 Conference
List. There are some 16 cases being held and I
s~ply underestimated the complexity of some of
them.
·
There is also a case on List 1, Sheet 2 of
the February 18 Conference List, No. 76-597, U. s. v.
Cabral, that I would like to take off the list. In
my view, it is a hold for Donovan, and I will include
it in my memorandum.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
LFP/lab
Copies to the Conference
cc:

Mr. Michael Rodak, Jr.
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THE CONFERENCE
\

No . 71-1486 United States v. Bernstein.

CA

4 re-

j ectcd the GoverniTten.t. 's "pr:In"'C.ipal--tarsi(:;-Eii--interpretation

o f § 2518 (1) (b ) (iv ) and held inst:eud t.hat a v·:iretap application must identify an individual if the Government has
probable cause to believe that the person will be overheard
engaging in the criminal activity under investigation.
CA 4 also held that failure to comply fully with the identi f i cation requirement triggers the statutory suppression
r emedy . Since Donovan reaches a contrary result with respect ·to suppression , --:[" wi 11 vote to grant , v ac::.i.:e , and
r emand in ligh·t of Do~van .
No . 7 5-500 Anderson v. United States ; No. 7 ~-509
v. uni teJ .st a·tes ; No-:-· T.s=·s i::(·i5-ooli tt.le v. united
Stut.es . 'rhere--are-s-rx--p-eti tioners in .fhc;~ie~l:.hree cui\-;e·--l inedpeti tions . In adc1it.ion to pe·titioners in ·; 5-500 and
75-509, those in 7 5-513 are Doolittle , Sanders , Union,
a nd \Yhi t<:.~d. CA 5 , si t:l: ing _gn punc. , held that. suppression
vTould be appropriate if t.he Governmeut had procured the
wi retap in bad faith or if the defendants could show that
t hey were prejudiced by the omission of their names from
t h e wiretap upplication.
Ma ll ._o~·,r.r'l

Petitioners first contend th~t evidence derived from
t he wiretap should hn.ve been suppressed since~ t h e intercept

- 2 -

*I

application did not name Sanders or Anderson.- Doolittle
was identified in both the application and order. Malloway,
Union, and Whited do not contend that they should have been
identified.
I have doubts as to the standing of these four
petitioners to seek suppression . Sec No. 76 -232 , Haina v .
Maryland, discussed infra.
In any event, under Do~ovan
the failure to name Anderson and Sanders does not n:wke --the
wiretap "unlav,rful" within the meaning of the SUJ?pression
provision.
I would note in this regard that the CA 5 J?l:l_l}_~!
concluded tha·t ·there was "no indication of bad faith or
attempted subterfuge by the Government in its wiretap
application." I will vote to deny on this issue with respect to all six petitioners~
There is a second issue which is raised only by the
petitioners in No. 75-513: should the monitored conversations h ave been suppressed because the intercept application
failed to establish sufficiently the inadequacy of other
investigative procedures. We recently denied certiorari
on this same issue with respect to a different wire~ap
application. Green v. Unit ed States , No. 75-962, denied at
the April 23, 1976, Conference. ·-r\-lill also vote to deny
on this issue in the instant petition.
No. 75-611 Ganem v. Unit ed States. There are tvw
petitioners: Ganem and Dick. Ganem argues that the
Government's wiretap application should have identified him
as a target, and th at the failure to do so warranted suppression. CA 5, relying on its en bane decision in United
St at_~~ v. }2_?o~J:!_!:le, discussed sup_~-:..9-_, l~os. 7 5-50 0,
-----75 -509 , and 75-513, held that since Ganem had not shown
that his rights were prejudiced by the failure to name him,
suppression was not required. Under Donovan, this result is
correc t, and I will vote to deny on this issue.

*/ The Government contends that Sanders and Anderson
were iden·tified in the appl ic ation since ·they were mentioned
in the supporting affidavit incorporated by reference in
the application. In my view, this does not me e t the statutory identification requirement. In any event, after
Donovan the Government is required to identify all targets
in the application, and I for one am of the view that: the
targets should be identified together in one specific part
of the application.
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The second issue is unrelated to Donovan: Ganem
and Dick contend that the evidence should have been suppressed on the ground that the order authorizing the wiretap
was insufficient on its face. They contend that the wiretap
had been approved by an Acting Assistant Attorney Gen eral
whose authority h ad lapsed. CA 5 found that the Attorney
General had in fact approved the application, and that introduction of the evidence was therefore permissible . He
denied c er tiorari on this issue in Vigi v . United States,
No. 75-101 , Oci:ober 17,1975 , and as to peti·tioners ' codefendants in Joseph v. United States , No. 75-600 ,
February 20 , 1976. ·-· -I wilr-vote to-cteny .
No. 7 5-9 63 Kilg~re v. United Stat.es. Petitioner presen-ts a "laundry-lis·t" of claims, non e of which seems certworthy to me. The factual situation is somewhat complicated.
According to petitioner , the Government , by failing to name
him as a known target in an application f6r a wiretap in
GEORGIA, unlawfully seized his conversations and unlaw fu lly
used th e evidence obtained in subsequent wiretap applic ations .
The nex~ wiretaps were placed on petitioner ' s telephones in
CALIFORNIA. Among the conversations seized \vere talks
between petitioner and Green, a Florida resident. Thos e
conversations were used as a basis for obtaining a wiret ap
on Green's telephone in FLORIDA. Pursuant to that tap, a
number of conversations betv1een Kilgore and Green were seized.
Kilgore was not named as a known target in the FLORIDA
application.
Petitioner first contends that evidence derived from
the FLORIDA wiretap should have been suppressed because the
FLORIDA intercept application did not name him as a person
" known " to be committing the offense although the Government had probable cause to believe that his conversations
would be overheard. Relying on its en bane deci~ion in
United States v. Doolitt.le, Nos. 7s-soo-;---r5-509 , 75-513 ,
aiscussed supra , CA 5 upheld the District Court ' s refusal
to suppress. At this first level of analysis , that is the
c orrect result under Donovan. But the situation is complicated by petitioner Kllgore ' s next contention .

- 4 Kilgore contends (i) that the evidence derived from
the FLORIDA tap on Gree n' s phone should have been supp ressed
because the Government did not mention all of the previous
wire interceptions of Kilgore's conversations in violation
of 18 U.S.C. 2518(1) (c ) and (ii) that he was entitled to
an evidentiary hearing on this issue.*/ The FLORIDA
application did reveal that a previou~ application had bean
made to tap Kilgore's phone in California, and that conv crsa·tions with Green h ad been intercepted pursuant to th a·l:
authorization. But nowhere did the application mention
one prior GEORGIA t~p and several prior C~LIFORNIA taps in
which Kilgore had been overheard. Kilgore argued that the
Government's motive in failing to disclose these prior taps
was to keep the issuing judge from concluding that the wiretap
was unnecessary as to Kilgore.
The District Court refused to include within the scope
of the suppression hearing any consideration of the prior
taps on I<ilgore. As a cautionary measure, given some qu es-·
tion concerning the CALIFORNIA tap mentioned in the application, the District Court struck all references to the
CllliiFORN IJ\ tap that ~vent to the question -of probable cause
to tap Green. The District Court concluded that there was
still sufficient information to justify the _tap on Green's
phone. C~ 5 held that in light of these actions of the
District Court, the FLORIDA application was valid on its
face.
CA 5 then proceeded to determine whether suppression
was required for failure to name Kilgore in the FLORIDA
application. CA 5 noted that under its decision in Unit ed
St.ates v. Dooli ttl~, suppression was required only i ftl~

*/ Kilgore was not named in the applications for other
interception s in Georgia and Californi a during which conversations of his were overheard. His argument that he was
improperly denied an evidentiary h earing on the legality of
all previous interceptions apparently includes, in addition
to his third contention, discussed infra, with respect to
the CALIFORNII-\ interception mentioned in the application,
the complaint that he was thereby precluded from proving
that "he was a known but unnamed target in Georgin."

- 5 -

Government acted in bad faith in failing to name Kilgore,
or if Kilgore were prejudiced by the omission. With respect
to bad fai ·th, CA 5 noted thut the District Court "must have
found implicitly that the Government wus not in bad faith
when it omitted Kilgore's name. Surely if h e hud agreed
that the Government was deliberately disobeying the statute,
he would have delved further in·to the question." As to prejudice, CA 5 concluded that the District Court who approved
the FLORIDA applicution would not have placed any additional
limitations on the use of the evidence or on the surveillance conducted if Kilgore's name and prior taps had
been disclosed. Although Kilgore argues that the tap was
not necess ary with respect to himself, the tap was still
necessary for the investigation of Green, and mjnimization would not have required the Governmen t to stop
listening to criminal conversations between Green and
Kilgore. CA 5 also concluded that Kilgore received a
timely inventory.
Given CA 5's analysis of the case, I will vote to
deny as to this second issue. Under Donovan, mere failure
to name Kilgore does not justify suppre ssi on. Here,
however , there wer~ allegations that that failure to
n ume Kilgore was in bad faith and thaL disclosure of th e
prior applications would have prompted the District
Court to deny the FLORIDA application. These allegations,
if supported , might have justified suppression. See
Donovan, slip opinion at 21 n.23. But given CA 5's
~iscussion of bad faith, prejudice, and provision of inventory notice, I see no reason to grant, va.c ute, and remand
in light of Donovan.
Kilgore's final contention is that he should have been
given an evidentiary hearing with respect to the legality
of the CALIFORNIA tap that was mentioned in the FLORIDA
application. Sec note * supra. At our April 23, 1976,
Conference, we denied certiorari on this issue presented in
a petition by Green, No. 75-962. There is no reason to t ake
a different view no1r.r.
I'll vote to deny on all isues.

No. 75-1393 Principia v. United States; No. 75-1394
Labriola and Slomka v. United States. The three petitioners
raise a num-ber of-Donovai-1 relC\te_d_ i -ss ues. Labriola (No.
1394), contends th~t once a suspect is identified in the
course of an electronic interception, the government (h ere ,
state officials) must obtain an amended ord e r naming that
suspect before continuing to intercept l1is conversations.
Don<?.._'::_~.m :n~quircs the government to name all "known"

,I

- 6 individuals, but the opinion says nothing about when the
identification of the suspect mus·t be accomplishecr:- CA 2
interpreted Title III as requiring the indentific a tion of
"known" individuals only at the time of initial application
or upon any extension.
I think that is the proper inter pretation.
Principle (No . 1393) makes a similar argument. He
points out that he was ide ntified only as "Ralph" in inte rc ept orders of July 5 , July 27, and September 11, d esp ite
the fact that his full identity was known to the government
by August 17 or perhaps by late July. With respect to th e
September 11 order, any error would seem harmless since no
conversations were intercepted pursuant to that order.
And it does not appear that petitioner Principie seriously
contends that he should have been named fully in the July 27
order .
Labriola (No. 75-1394) contends that ~here was insufficient prob a ble cause to name him in the order of July 27
and that it was accordingly imp rope r to intercept his conversations pursuant to that order. CA 2 coricluded th at there
was probable cause to name him, and I see no reason to review
that determination.
In any event, th~re apparently was
probable cause to issue the intercept order to seize the
conversations of others, and petitioner's criminal conversations were properly intercepted under that order.
Labriol a a nd Slomka (No. 74-1394) seek suppression of
all conversations seized pursuant to the July 27 order as
well as those seized pursuant to subsequ en t orders on the
ground that the Governmen t failed to honor a time restriction imposed by the District Court. The court had directed
tha·t certain ini:erceptions were not to take place after
7:30 p.m. on any day, and the Government violated this condition. The court accordingly suppressed all convers ations
that were seized in violation of the time restriction.
Petitioners seek suppression of all evidence seized during
the t aps . CA 2 properly rejected that argument.
Finally, all thre e petitioners contend that they were
not served with inventory notice within 90 days of the
termin ation of the interception. Labriola was notified
within 90 days of the final extension of the initi al order.
At one point there was a change of location, and Labriola
contends that the 90-day period shou ld commence to run
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whenever the original interception is changed in any significant degree., as with a change in location. The argument
is frivolous.
Principie was named in the extension orders,
but he was not given inventory notice as required by the
statute. Labriola was never named in an order and he did
not receive inventory notice. Since there is no allegation
that the Government knowingly sought to keep petitioners
from receiving notice, and since CA 2 found that no prejudice
resulted from the failure to provide notice, suppression would
have been inappropriate under Donovan. See slip opinion
at 24 n.26.
I will vote to deny these petitions.
No. 75 -18 13 Civella v. United States. There are three
petitioners in this case: Tousa, Nicholas Civella, and
Anthony Civella. CA 8 found that the Government had probable
cause to name Tousa and both Civellas in its wiretap application, and consequently that identi1ying only Tousa constituted technical noncompliance; w:L'i:h § 2518 (1) (b) (iv).
CA 8 held, however, that under the circum~tances of this
case suppression of evidence was not warranted for noncompliance with the statute.
Petitioners raise two issues of possible substance.
They first contend that a wiretap application must id entify
all persons as to whom the Government has probable cause,
and that failure triggers the statutory suppression remedy.
Since Tousa was named, I doubt his standing to raise the
issue. See !~~a v. l·1aryli:1.l].0_, No. 76·-232, discussed i_-_0~£~·
CA 8 found "nothing to suggest that the governmen+·. ac·ted
in bad faith or with deceptive intent." Under Donovan
suppression was not required.
The other issue is ~ot directly related to Donovan:
whether the late service of inventories warrants su1J"pression.
The inven to ry question in Donovan concerned the nature of
the Government 's obligation adequately to inform the court
concerning those to whom inventory notice might be served.
At issue here is the statutory provision requiring service
of inventory notice \vi thin 9 0 days after the termination of
an interception order. Petr Tousa was served five days after
the expiration of the 90-day period, and the Civellas were
served 13 days late. Petitioners do not contend th ey were

- 8 prejudiced by the delay.
In my view , suppression is no more
warranted here for late service of notice than it was in
Donovan for the negligent failure of the Government to
proviCJ.e the issuing judge with the names of all those on
whom such service might be made.
I will vote to deny this petition.
No. 7 6-169 United States v. Barletta. This case is
c u rve--lined with -No :-75-=-18-~LJ; Ci vella --v:-uni ted States,
d iscussed supra. The two petitioners in th[s case---=--:-r3arletta
and Fontanella - were overheard during the course of a
wiretap. The SG notes that the District Court did not request,
and no attempt was made to provide him with, a comprehensive
l ist of all the identifiable " sub-agents" overheard during
t he course of the wiretap. As a result these petitioners
were not served with inventory notice. They were indicted
abo ut a year and a half later , and during .pretrial discovery
were informed of the interceptions and allowed to listen to
t h e tapes. CA 8 nevertheless h eld that the evidence should
h ave been suppressed with respect to theie two petitioners,
and reversed their convictions. Since Donovan indicates that
CA 8 erred \vi th respect to suppression, I \vilT vote to grant,
v acate , and remand in light of Dono~~ ·
No . 7 5-1838 Green v. United States ; No. 7 5-695 7 Hill
v. United s·tates; No. 75-iOOl Kirk-V.Unitec1 Stat.es. -This
i s amassi ve- drug conspiracy case; nin-e p8-ti.t-ioncrs have
r a i sed numerous issues in three separate petitions .
The petitions were held for United States v . Donovan
b ecause petitioners contend that evidence should h-ave been
s u ppressed on the ground that t h e wir~tap applic~tion failed
to ·i d entify petitioner Deborah Barnett.
I have serious
doubt as t o the standing of t h e eight petitioners other than
Bar n ett to seek suppression on the ground that the applicat ion failed to nu.me someone else , see I-Iaina_ v . M~c:md ,
No. 7 6-232 , discussed infra , but it is u nnecessary to rest
on that consideration . - CA -8 f ound that " the fact t hat some
o f th e appellants (mainly Deborah Barnett ) were not named
in t he application does not mean that t h e authorization order
was invalid . The application n amed all t h e individuals
wh om the government had probable cause to suspect would be
in volved in telephone communications with the principal,
Eugene Kirk ." CA 8 ' s assessment of the existence of probable

- 9 cause is uncertworthy. Moreover, even if we were to disagree
with CAB's conclusion in that regard, Donovan makes it clear
th at suppression is not required.
I wiJ:-1 vote to deny on
this issue.
I am also not inclined to vote to grant with
respect to the other issues.*/ I will, however, vote to
hold No. 7 5-70 01 for J'effers._v. United States, No. 7 5-·18 0 5,
cert. gran·ted at the Septen1ber 2~J':-97~Conference. One of
the petitioners in No. 75-7001 -- Eugene Kirk -- was convicted of conspiracy and continuing criminal enterprise.
In
Jeffers, CA 7 concluded that conspiracy was a lesser included
of fense of continuing criminal enterprise, but that a defendant could constitutionally be convicted of both offenses.
I recognize that petitioner Kirk attacks the continuing
crimin al enterprise statute on vagueness grounds and makes
no mention of either the Double Jeopardy Clause or the
decision of CA 7 in Jeffers, but I think it advisable to
hold No. 75-7001.
In sum, I will vote to deny 75 -1838 and 75-6957, but
to hold 75-7001 for Jeffers v. United States, 75-1805, on
the possible double jeopardy issue.
No. 75-1816 Labriola v. New York. The contentions
raised by petitioner Labriola wi ti1____respect t:o his sta·te
convi ction are, with one exception, identical t:o tEos·e--presented by Labriola with respect to his federal conviction

*/ (1) Whether the evidence at trial established the
existence of multiple conspiracies or the single conspi:racy
charged in the indictment.
(2) Whether evidence of recorded
telephone conversations between certain petitioners and a
government informant sh·mld have been excluded because the
informant was not available to testify.
(3) Whether the
application for the wire interception order in this case
sufficiently established that other investigative procedures
were inadequate.
(4) Whether the trial court abused its
discretion in allowing the jury to use transcripts while
listening to the recorded conversations at ·trial .
( 5)
Whether the continuing criminal enterprise statute , 21 U.S.C.
848, is unconstitutionally vague.
(6) \.Yhether the jury
selection plan of the Eastern District of Missouri is improper because it compiles the names of potential jurors from
voting lists at four-year intervals.
(7) Whether the court
erred in admitting the expert testimony of government chemists
who identified certain substances as h eroin .
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in No. 75-1394, discu sse d supra. The one difference conc erns
the failure of the police to~l1on or the time restrictions
established on the July 27 hu<Jg.ing order. Counsel for
petitioner failed to raise that point at the initial suppression hearing, and the state court subsequently denied
as untimely a motion to reopen the suppression hearing.
Regardless of the propriety of applying the state procedur al
rule in these circumstances, the case does not warrant full
review .
I will vote to deny.
No. 7 6-2 3 2 HaiEa v. ~1arY1:_9-n~. Pe·ti tioner Haina and one
Strawbridge lived in the same house. The police obtained a
wiretap order authorizing interception of calls over two
telephones located in the house. The order identified
11
Pete:r: Xavier Haina [petr] and others as yet unknown. 11
The state court concluded that the police had probable
cause to name, and should have named, petitioner's housemate (Strawbridge) , arid petit~oner now argues that the wiretap order was invalid since it named only petitioner.
Relying on Al~erman v. United States, 394 u.s. 164, the
state cour·t·- h.R ld th.at pe-E"I"·tion-(~r lacked standing to object
to the failure to name Strawbridge.
I think the state court
ruled correctly on the basis of standing, but in any event
Donovan makes clear that the failure to identify in the
application a person as to whom the Government had probable
c ause does no·t make the wiret.ap 11 Unlm117ful" within the meaning
o f the suppression provision.
There are two other issues in the case which are not
related to Donovan. One issue is whether the wiretap applic ation suffid_entTy dct:ailed the nonfeasibility of o·ther
investigative techniques , and the other concerns the warrantl ess seizure of petitioner's goods from under the por6h
of petitioner ' s neighbor.
I consider none of these issues certworthy and will vote
t o deny .

No . 7 6- 7 20 United States v. Billy Ray Lee. Petitioner
was mentioned in the-i1f£·CdavTt submi ttad--:-Lnsupport of the
Government ' s wiretap application , but h is name was omitted

.

·~·

·'
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from the list of individuu.ls whose communications were to
be intercepted. CA 6, relying on its eu.rlier decision in
United States v. Donovan, reversed u. conviction based on
certain evidence derived from the court-approved wiret a p.
Our decision in Donovan mandu.tes a different result with
----- respect to suppression, and I will vote to grant, vacate,
and remand in light of Donovu.n.
No. 75-6944 Schwartz v. Unitea States. Petitioner
raises three issues in this case, two of which are related
to. Donovu.n. Petitioner first contends that the failure to
name him 1n a wirct.ap application was error requiring suppression. CA 2 found insufficient evidence of probable
cause with respect to petitioner, and that it was therefore unnecessary to name him in the application.
Petitioner next contends that the failure to provide
the issuing judge with information as to petitioner's
involvement in the conspiracy precluded t~e judge from properly exercising his 18 U.S. C. § 2 518 ( 8) (d) <liscre·tion as to
whether inventory notice should be served on petitioner.
The Governmcn± points out that the issuing judge was provided
with a complete list of names of the persons who had been
overheard, and that petitioner's name was included on the
list.
It seems to me that such a list is permissible under
Donovan, see slip opinion page 17, and upon submission of
the list, the District Court could have requested additional
information from the Government.
I do not read Donovan u.s
holding that the Government must initic.ll_y supply the issuing
judge with both a list of names and additional information
as to each namE;d individuul.
In any event suppression vlOUld
be an inappropriate remedy under these circumstances.
The final issue raised by petitioner concerns the
seizure which CA 2 upheld under the plain view doctrine.
Although there may be some doubt as to the correctness of
that ruling, I do not consider the issue ccrtworthy.
I will vote to deny this petition.
No. 76-597 United States v. Cabral. This case, which
is relisted from the Ju.nuary 7, 1977, Conference, is not
listed as a "heretofore held for United Stu.tcs v. Donovun."
Since my vote on January 7, 19 77, \voulcl hu.vc been 'Fo hold the
case for Donovu.n, I thought it would be convenient if I
took thisopportuni~y to recommend a disposition in lisht
of Donovan.
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CA 9 held that the Government _had probable cause to
believe that respondent would be overheard, and therefore
that respondent should have been named in two relevant
wiretap applications. CA 9 ·also concluded that violation of
1 8 u.s.c. § 2518(1) (b) ( iv) required suppression. The SG
filed this petition , noting that the questions were at that
t ime pending before the Court in Donovan.
Since Donovan
mandates a different result vli th respect to supprGS::sion, I
will vote to grant, vacate, and remand in light of !?onov~~·
Sincerely ,
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No. 75-212 UNITED STATES v. DONOVAN
MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

n (\.

f" ~4-Q..,...::t.,

e t..J c.

!n th:i so case

\te

~

c. 0-t c.« V'" (" ,j

are once again called upon to

resolv~

·important issues i:l the construction of Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18

r;

U.S.C. 2510-2520.

Specifically, we must decide whether

18 U.S.C. § 2518(l)(b)(iv), which requires the government

--

to include in its wiretap applications "the identity of
the person, if known, committing the offense, and whose
conversations are to be intercepted", is satisfied when
the government identifies only the "principal targets"
~I'

of the intercept.

Second, we must decide whether the

government has a statutory responsitility to inform the
issuing judge of the identities of persons whose conversa-

7b

dee:JA..

"-'ke.'~~

sk.... rJ ~-t .set"•~
w;tk "ot·-~ c>:b
fu. i"+~~~+.·~
f"Y'.SU~ f-o
I~

I{. d.~.
§ ~s- 1a(a)CJ).

tions were overheard in the course of the interception, thus
Ee c~erei~e his eiss•s~ioA . >--

enabling
P'"' ouailt to l!! !1.

~.e.

§ l518 (8)(d) ;;:•

P""""~""'-'"Q ,.iGQ ""~iee

:e::=ti::! •.:;;

ef Efte fact of hrtetceptie"':>-

2.

/
'('e

supf:>ressier'l: ef e vh:J:enee

O\Ji-IJ.A

fo~failure

to

with

s\lr ~t'.t.A.4i~ 1 r-------------------------------------

,., .......

e \J,· ~ ~ Cl"cle~

If l(.J.~.~ t1SI8(to)(-.).

I.
On November 28, 1972, a special agent of the Federal

Bureau of Investigation

~ ... ~~ , .. QJ

S~Q it

j

d ~ ~ ;pplisatig~ to the

United States District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio for an order authorizing a wiretap interception
:" Q. e c.ord~ w;th....

~rsuaa~

Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968, 18

~2510-2520. 1

U.S.~ l

The application requested

Q.lt\ ,,,.. -

ye,

'"f .. J

authorization to intercept

i4legal gambling operation

l

A+ 0'\Q

Q.dcl

1. in
of

an
condnQtse ~over

two telephones

lrA..CI.) . j

North Olmstead, Ohio, uh!rdi .. a~istee \!Hleer a~ al .i ~

Joseph AnthonJ SpartgartlQ at aa apartmsqt

Ke~oe~ and
itOliiC

o.+

~ ~."".e.

two other telephones in Canton,

ef Coerge

~sea

b9

Albe ~

Ohi~~~ £k~

Fle~e ~

illegal gambling business, and
that in conducting that business they would place telephone
I

calls to and receive telephone calls from various persons,

three of

who~ ~a~o

2
named in the wiretap application.

3.
The affiant also stated that the government's informants
......;.,

would refuse to testify

.

against the persons

~amed

.

applicationJthat telephone records alone would

.

in the

~
be ~ufficient

to support a gambling conviction, and that normal investigative

gambling-related wire communications of Kotoch,
Spaganlo, Florea, three

named individuals other than the

res.p ondents_, and "others as yet unknown~' to and from the

2..1
four listed tel e phones.

The District Go~kt's order>,

~
a\:lthorbwd the iatoreepti.oc. of a maxi mpm of 1 5 Q.ays-,_

-=learned that respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco were
discussing illegal gambling activities with the named

subjects.

-~Vf:~eleo~ ~ December

~
an extension
~ ~~

T"t ~ -+,m-e_ ;f- J ·
~veijiQ"n ) sought

26,

of the initial intercept order.
authorization to int e rcept gambling-

related conversations of Kotoch, Spaganlo, Florea, two

other named individuals, and "others as yet

l Do .. ov.....

a\1'2.-z.,.co I

respondents -wel!e not

~ R.o'''~
ieel"l f f i~

unknown•~t~

in this second

s:
application.

The District Court again authorized inter-

ception of gambling-related conversations for a maximum
days.

of

On February 21, 1973, the government submitted to the

=

District Court a proposed order giving notice of the
interceptions to
government
::

-

4.
apparently thought included all individuals who could be
identified as havin9 discussed gambling over the
telephones.

"·

The District Court signed the proposed ·order,

and an inventory notice was

thereaftc~

persons, including respondents
Robbins.

monito~ed

served on the listed

Donovan, Buzzaco, and

On September 11,1973, after the government submitte

the names of two additional persons whose identities

ha~

allegedly been inadvertently omitted from the initial list,
the District Court _e ntered an amended order giving notice
to those individuals.

As a result of what the government

-

-=-

labels "administrative oversight," respondents Merlo and
Lauer were not included in either list of names and
the~efor:l were

never served with inventory notice.

On November 1, 1973, an indictment was returned in
the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Ohio charging Kotoch, Spaganlo, the five respondents,
~ <.o"Jud,·..
10
and ~ other individuals with conspiracy to conduct a
gambling business in violation of 18

u.s.c:~~l955.

Thefive respondents filed motions to suppress evidence

5.
derived from the wire inter~ion.
hearing on the

mo~ions,

After an evidentiary

the District Court suppressed as

to respondents · Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco all evidence
derive·d from the December 26 intercept order on the ground
that failure to identify them by name in the application
~

and order

.

jj

of that date violated 18 U.S.C. l 2518(l)(b)(iv)

and 2518(4)(a).

With respect to Merlo and Lauer, who were

not known to the government until after the December 26

::

application, the District Court suppressed all evidence
derived from both intercept orders on the ground that they
had not been served with inventory notice.
The Court of Appeals
On the identification issue, the~urt ~f - Ap~9al~held that
the wiretap application must identify every person whose
conversations relating to the subject criminal activity

-

the government has probable cause to believe it will
::::.

intercept.

Agreeing with the District Court that at the

time of the December 26 application the government had

-

-::::.

probable cause to believe that it would overhear Donovan,
Robbins, and Buzzaco "committing the offense," the Court

..
6.
of Appeals affirmed the suppression of evidence derived
from the December 26 order.

Gert

On the notice q~estion, ~

i-4-

e£ A:r>pea ~ held that the ; overnment has an implied

statutory duty to inform the issuing judge of the identities
of the parties whose conversations were overheard so that

Lk.t..

I
Hte j~ge coul~determine ;~ether discretionary inventory
e."""-

notice should be required.

'

Because the government had
~

failed to perform this duty with respect to Merlo and Lauer,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's order
suppressing evidence derived from both intercept orders.
The ,.eDurt -ef Appea~ found it. unnecessary to determine
. whether the failure to identify respondents Donovan, Robbins,
and Buzzaco in the December 26 application and to name
respondents Merlo and Lauer in the proposed inventory
notice orders was ;r:advertent or

purposeful, ~ince

the

mere fact of omission was sufficient to require suppression,
under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10(a).

·.

'"

We granted certiorari to resolve
-4-

~"'«"'-

....... ~~~ ...

~

~~Q~ingly importaa~

...>

issuekin vV in;, the construction of a major federal statute,

./1~ U.S.

\ (,.. ~ d

~ -.w-./

'7>p

reverse.

..

7.
II( Y ·
The United States contends that § 251,8 (1) (b) (iv)
requires that a wiretap application
principal target of the

id~htify ~ly

~~

interception,~Athat §

the

2518(8)(d)

does not require the government to provide the issuing

--

j.udge with a list of all identifiable persons who were
overheard in the course of an authorized interception.

\ ~ ~ ~'""- ~ ~CHAJ. ~
We

d.iea.grg~

'¥ith.

'b1?* c.gntentions)

Avv
We turn first to the identification requirements of
§

2518(l)(b)(iv).

That provision requires a wiretap

application to specify "the identity of the person, if
known, committing the offense and whose communications
are to be intercepted."

In construing that language,

this Court lli@ alreadylrul~d that the government is not

••

required to identify an individual in the application
:~

unless the tvernHl:e~ has probable cause to believe

.

i
(!)

I

that the

indi~ual

is engaged in the criminal activity

· under investigation and'

<t!

that the individual's

conversations will be intercepted over the target telephone.
United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143 (1974).· The question

8.

.,,.-

at issue here is whether the government is required to
.
name all such individuals.
'

The United States argues that the most reasonable
interpretation of the ;;lain

language~

the statute is

that the application must identify only the

target~f
is

~incipal

the investigation, who "will almost always be

.._o,i+ov-eJ . E.:J B~rof' .fft. -11.& u",· ~·J J+~f-...,

the individual whose phone
t( ~ d ~II" ~I" •• " +t ., ,., t'~ ..._. t. \O'W\. I

If

B\ ~ at 18.

"f""'.t..

he United States does not suggest that
circumstances a wiretap appli

need identify

:+-

theJuaite~
are using the
are "equally"
of the investigation,

~estiou

is whieh

''~Fi:H:ei~al

per:H H'l:S FR\Hlfs he

nawg'il

tar get." iAt.81Fpreeati eft sttgges Led by the tJnif! ~
Tftl ~

( ( iovernment has reason to believe that an individual will
use the target telephone to place or receive calls, and
the government has probable cause to believe that the

-

individual is engaged in the criminal activity under
investigation, the individual qualifies as a
' ~
.

targe.t ~

~incipal _

must be named in the wiretap application.

On thetther hand, an individual who uses a different telephone to place calls to or receive calls from the target
telephone is not a principal target even if the government

=

has probable cause to believe that the individual is
engaged in the criminal activity under investigation.
other words, whether one is a

~incipal target~£

In

the

investigation depends on whether one operates the target

• 13 .
telephone to place or receive calls.
Whatever the merits of such a statutory scheme, we

L'; H1.e. I
are unable ~ findl support for it in the language and
structure of Title III or in the legislative history.

+a hegin

wit~

ihe statutory language itself refers only

'\\

to the

person, if known, committing the offense and whose

communications are to be intercepted."

· re~;
(f(r~J

That description

is as applicable to a suspect placing calls to the target
;)

telephone as it is to a suspect placing calls from the
~
target telephone.

It is true, as the United States

suggests, that when read in the context of the other

10.
subdivisions of § 2518(l)(b), an argument can be made that
Congress focused in subdivision (iv) on the primary user
of the target

telephone~

But it is also clear from other

sections of the statute that Congress expected that wiretap
applications would name more than one individual.

F9r

example, Title III requires that inventory notice be served
upon "the persons named in the order
18

u.s.c.l 2518(8)(d)

~the§ application."

(emphasis added),

~~'j ~~;i{l) (e)

requires that an intercept application disclose all
previous intercept applications "involving any of the same

person~ • . . specified in the app~ic~tion~'
added).

~mphasis

It may well be that Congress anticipated that a

given application would cover more than one telephone or
that several suspects would use one telephone, and that
an application

wenl ~ for

those reasons

identification of more than one individual.
~nothing

on the face of the statute

But

eher~

~toel~~suggests

that Congress intended to remove from the identification
requirement those suspects whose intercepted communications
originated on a telephone other than that listed in the
wiretap application.

-

11.

11.
q

~

Nor can we find support for the principal target interpretation in the legislative history.

Title III originated

as a combination of S. 675, the Federal Wire Interception
Act, which was introduced by Senator McClellan several months
prior to this Court's decision in Berger v. New York, 388
U.S. 41 (1967), and S. 2050, the Electronic Surveillance
Control Act of 1967, introduced by Senator Hruska a few
days after the Berger decision.

Both bills required that

wiretap applications include a full and complete statement
of the facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant

and specification of the nature and location of the communication facilities involved.

~~lthough

neither bill

contained an express identification requirement such as
that at issue here, both bills required the application
to include "a full and complete statement of the facts
concerning all previous applications • • . involving any
person named in the application as committing, having
committed, or

aee~~eing

about to commit an offense."

Hearings on Controlling Crime Through More Effective Law
Enforcement Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and

12.
Procedures of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess., at 77, § 8(a)(3) and 1006, § 2518(a)(4)

\.._(eJW\r"cw.M
(1967)1

~dJa~).

_.,

Thus, even .a t this early stage, it was recognized

that an application could identify several individuals, and
there is

absolute~no

indication that the identification

would be limited to ~incipal targets.~
While S. 971, eke

"e~mbiuatiou" btl~as

pending

before the Senate Judiciary Committee, this Court decided
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). S. 971 was then
redrafted to conform to Katz as well as Berger, and the
identification provision was added at that time.
~at regar~

Ana

i~

;he Senate Report states that the requirements

...

set forth in the various subdivisions of § 2518(1)(b),

o.f U!4 . ~ ~'
including the identification requirement "[were] intended
to reflect the constitutional command of particularization."
S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess •) 101 (1968), ,c iting .
4:)...

Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58-60, and Katz .c v. United

.

3

States, 389 U.S. 347, 354-56 (1967).
H---The United States now contends that although it may
be that Congress read Berger and Katz to require, as a
constitutional matter, that the

~bject~f

the surveillance

13.
be named if known, Congress "would hardly have read those
cases as requiring the naming of all parties likely to be

' ':0/

overheard • .. . . "

t k..

Brief at 25-26.
1

(.., t.J..fl.-.. f-:v c.

The difficulty with

o..·L, ..J.o

k ,·d·• r

that argument

lA

J,·c.l~

elefi; t that Congress was

thinking in terms of "subjects" of surveillanc: ,' : ; e

~

considered "subjects" of surveillance to be the principal
users of the target telephone.
Moreover, to the extent that Congress thought it
was meeting the constitutional commands of particularization
established in Berger and Katz,
~ Congress

~t

may have read those cases as mandating a

broad identification requirement.
confronted in Berger

.,

3ft 1/.1.,

a.+

.N.

The statute that we

requi~identification
reJ.:

of "the person ~

~

or persons whose communications

-

js gRtirgllpo~sihl ~

'C)

--~+----•a·r~~

.-\

to be overheard.

"'

And we expressly noted that that provision "[d:J_d]
no more than identify the person whose constitutionally

=l'
protected area is to be invadec;J: • . •

\~· /

"1Given

the statute

at issue in Berger and our comment upon it, Congress may
have concluded that as a constitutional matter a wiretap

.. ''·

application would have to name all suspects rather than
just the primary user.

~

14.
In any event, for our present purposes it is unnecessary

l Afecvlct..~L

o.,..,

+o _.) .

, to Hadertake ~e iFRpos siblo t-sk of

determi~i~

exactly how

Cl....
Congress interpreted Berger and Katz with respect to the

\ :I:'+ ;,

~"ft•'et ~ ~ rto+~ ~o.-i- t.-w,~

identification issue.

~ response to those decisions Congress

included an identification requirement which on its face
draws no distinction based on the telephone one uses, and

the United States

~as

Beea

~ao~le ~~oi~o~dence

in

the legislative history that supports such a distinction.

t:.~
... ffD..V'.Ilh f-.Lc,
Indeed, 4.a readiag ~d legislative materials •ue havej failed)...
\ c. Cl "+"',; ..,

ee

ttf'l:eofr

)1.

0

a:~ use

of the term "principal ·target" or any

"-

discussion of tbo poton~al fo~ different~ treatment based

JJ:j
on the telephone from which a suspect speaks.

We therefore

conclude that a wiretap application must name an individual
if the government has probable cause to believe , that the
individual is engage·d in the criminal activity under
investigation and

i£ the

govornFRon~expects

to intercept the

individual's conversations over the target telephone.

15.
B

The other statutory provision at issue in this case

J
is 18 U.S.C. A2518(8)(d), which provides that the judge
\ ov ~

en,...

shall cause to be served on the persons named in

l ~ it1V.t..~~V:
application or the

the~
~· "e.

~der~ ~vGato~ which

i:n1-'tie'!)

must

, s-1-~ f.~

->

notice of the entry of the order or application, l the
, it\

d c ccA-+"'-

J

disposition of the application, andl Ghe fact that ~

}w"-~~~

B it.

~commun1cat1ons

were

CHi'

Here

fto ~ ntercepted.

Although

the statute mandates the provision of that inventory

. noti~ersons

named in the application or the order,

the statute also provides that the

judg~ovide

similar notice to other parties to intercepted communications

k.e.

if t~ lua~ concludes that such. action is in the interest

l'l.
of justice.

~

tOi:>.st,"' ":

Th; Unit:p

.

St ts&oA.teod ~that this notice

proviGion does not eeat:aia
law enforcement authorities

":> expres"1_require~~~
+o

routinely~provide

the judge
•'

with any specific information upon which to exercise his

1t1._ U."'.·~4! J.

S~ ~e s

CO~& f-t.~

'f1lJ

J

discretion, ana ~ a ~it would be inappropriate to read
~

such a requirement into the statute givga tf- e fe:et: t:ha~
the judge has the option of asking the law enforcement
authorities for whatever information he requires.

16.
Our reading of the legislative history of the
discretionary notice provision in light of the purposes

r

of · Title III leads us to reject the government's interpreta-

=-

tion.

•.., .u.-+. ~

As reported from the Judiciary Committee,

2518(8)(d)

contained only a provision mandating notice to the persons
named in the application or the order; the

disc~etionary

notice provision was added. by amendment on the floor of the
Senate.

In introducing that amendment, Senator Hart

explained its purpose:
"The amendment would give the judge who issued
the order discretion to require notice to be served
on other parties to intercepted conversations,
even though such parties are not specifically
~ named in the court order.
The Berger and Katz
~
decisions established that notice of surveillance
is a constitutional requirement of any
surveillance statute.
It may be that the required
notice must be served on all parties to intercepted
communications. Since legitimate interests of
privacy may make such notice to all parties
undesirable, the amendment leaves the final
determination to the judge." 114 Cong. Rec.
14485-14486 (1968) -~ .MJ

~n deciding whethe~ ~egiti~ate
/

"

privacy interests justify

~eeioien t~ withh~ventory

notice from parties to
\ ~

, •. ,~

intercepted conversations, a judge t;rill al

-h,

tJ •lt~y~

require information and assistance beyond that contained
in the application papers and the recordings of intercepted
conversations made available by law enforcement authorities.

17.
No purpose is served by holding that those authorities
have no routine duty to supply the judge with relevant
·information'£ o
are

The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit recently confronted this problem of
dual responsibility, and we ·adopt the balanced construction
I

z:wol

~J

that court placed on2518(8)(d):

u"; ~=t J s....4-~

;.. c.."'""J $63
~. cld S33, SJ.f o
(..&17 )~

~

the judicial officer has the dutl
to cause the filing of the inventory [notice ,
it is abundantly clear that the prosecution has
greater access to and familiarity with the interc:=z51 cepted communications. Therefore we fe~l
justified in imposing upon the latter the duty
to classify all those whose conversations have
been intercepted, and to transmit this information to the judge. Should the judge desire more
information regarding these classes in order to
exercise his statutory § 2518(8)(d) discretion,
. • . the government is also required to furnish
such information as is available to it."

1~
.

agree with the Ninth Circuit that this

al~ocation

of

iW----

responsibility best serves the purposes of Title

111'.~~

"To discharge this obligation the judicial officer must have
at a minimum, knowledge of the particular categories into which
fall all the individuals whose conversations have been intercepted.
Thus, while precise identification of each party to an intercepted
conversation ~ is not required, a description of the general
class, or classe ~ which they comprise is essential to enable
the judge to determine whether additional information is
necessary for a proper eval ation of the interests of the
various parties. Furthermore, although
~

L

---=-----~

18.
III

We turn now to the question whether the District Court
properly suppressed evidence derived from the wiretaps at
issue solely because of the failure of the law enforcement
authorities to comply fully with the provisions of

l J......;f-,·""'"
§§ 2518(l)(b)(iv) and 2518(8)(d).

cit s- / r __,

~ftiiJjii, expressly

prohibits the use at trial, and at certain other proceedings,
of the contents of any intercepted wire communication or
any evidence derived therefrom "if the disclosure of that
~

information would be in violation of this chapter."

the circumstances that trigger suppression under § 2515
are in turn enumerated in§ 2518(10)(a):

~i)

1

the communication was unlawfully inter-

cepted;

~ii)

the order of authorization or approval

under which it was intercepted is insufficient on
its face; or

''<. . .)
~~~

.
.
. con f
t h e ~ntercept~on
was not rna d e ~n

with the order of authorization or approval.

~

k =h"fl d

h~ appaxgR.fa

.

,,

c ruu·~'j

.
orm~ty

.,

tal>Lae ehc only t:cle ;.'af'l:t:: eategoL;;{jMaei£, i:liil

wjtb respect to

thg

fi:vc tespondents .

i>

19.
There is

~M~

no basis on the facts

~

of

~ case

to suggest that the authorization orders are

facially insufficient, or that the interception was not
conducted in conformity with the orde rs.
«S"Ii (to)(A) {i\ V, re}.ctv~: wer-..e.
~~~~~~~h+th~

the communications

t rr

~

Thus,

~ only

,,

~

unlawfully

u,Jf. o-

the violations of §§ 2518(l)(b)(iv) and

as-18' c B) (d)

Resolution of that question must begin with United
States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1?71), and United States
v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562 (177r).

Those cases hold that

"[not] every failure to comply fully with any requirement
provided in Title III would render the interception of
wire or oral communications 'unlawful'"
~7"/- s'ls-·_~

Chavez, 416 U.S., at

h

~

United States v.

To the contrary, suppression is

required only for a "failure to satisfy any of those
statutory requirements that directly and substantially
implement the congressional intention to limit the use of
intercept procedures to those situations clearly calling
Un.·hJ. .St"'t.-14 v. (;,·o.,clc..Ho 1 ~'' t/~. J J
for the employment of this extraordinary device."

S~7

~

)
jQiordano concerned the provision in Title III requiring

20.
that an application for an intercept order be approved by
the Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney General
specially designated by the Attorney General.

Concluding

that Congress intended to condition the use of wiretap
procedures based on the judgment of senior officials in
the Department of Justice, the Court required suppression
for failure to comply with the approval provision.

Chavez

concerned the statutory requirement that the application
for an intercept order specify the identity of the official
authorizing the application.

The problem in Chavez was one

of

misidentification; altnough the application had in fact been
authorized by the Attorney General, the application identified
an Assistant Attorney General as the official authorizing
th~

application.

The Court concluded that mere misidentifica-

tion of the official authorizing the application did not
make the application unlawful within the meaning of

. I

~

.

§ 2518(10)(a)A since that identification requirement did

Jil' tJ. ~.)
~+- s? f.

not play a "substantive role" in the regulatory system.
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals concluded
~

that both the identification requirement of § 25l~ (l)(b)(iv)

21.
and the notice requirement of

1~ 0.~. ~ §

2515(8)(d)

played a "central role" in the statutory framework, and
for that reason affirmed the District Court's order

..
suppressing relevant evidence.

Although both statutory

requirements are undoubtedly important, we do not think
that the failure to comply fully with those provisions
renders unlawful an intercept order that in all other
respects satisfies the statutory requirements.

A.

LAs

-~-a__.,

\lietj\ r ; qect to l8 '"1j .S. ~ § 2518(1) (b) (iv), the

issue is whether the identification in an intercept
application of all those likely to be overheard in
,Su

b ~~M4.-+;v ~

incrimi~ating conversations plays a "eei tr ~ role"
with respect to judicial authorization of intercept orders

~
and a

consequen ~

procedures.

ro"'Qv., "- ~~
limitation 4tJlt he use of intercept

The statute provides that the issuing judge

may approve an intercept application if he determines
that normal investigative techniques have failed or are
unlikely to succeed and there is probable cause to

22.
believe that:

(i) an individual is engaged in criminal
~

activity, (ii) particular communications concerning ~
offense will be obtained through interception; and (iii)
the target facilities are being used in connection with
the specified criminal activity.

That determination is

based on the "full and complete statement" of relevant
facts supplied by law enforcement authorities.

If, after

evaluating the statutorily enumerated factors in light
of the information contained in the application, the judge
concludes. that the wiretap order should issue, the failure
to identify additional persons who are likely to be
overheard engaging in incriminating conversations could
hardly invalidate an otherwise lawful judicial authoriza-

.

~:d

The intercept order ~s~9 kav) issue~ only if the

tion.

-4.

~

issuing judge determinet that the statutory factors · ~

f"~'

ae~ ~£ie~ and the failure to name additional targets
in no way detracts from the sufficiency of those factors.
This case is therefore unlike Giordano ·, n8\ilfU!:2_ where
failure · to satisfy the statutory requirement of prior
approval by specified Justice Department officials bypassed
a congressionally imposed limitation on the use of the

..
23.
intercept procedure.

..

The Court there noted that it was

reasonable to believe that requiring prior- approval from
senior officials in the Justice Department "would inevitably
foreclose resort to wiretapping in various situations where
investigative personnel would otherwise seek intercept
authority from the court and the court would very likely
authorize its use."

416 U.S., at 528.

Here, however,

the statutorily imposed preconditions to judicial authorization were satisfied, and the issuing judge was simply
unaware that additional persons might be overheard engaging
in incriminating conversations.

In no meaningful sense

Lfr~__.J

can it be said that the ~e~ of that information as to
additional targets would have precluded judicial authoriza-

of

f}

tion ~the intercept.

a.,~t.,
~an~~ag, this case resembles

Chavez, where we held that a wiretap was not unlawful
simply because the issuing judge was incorrectly informed
as to which designated official had authorized the
application.

The Chavez intercept was lawful because

the Justice Department had performed its task of prior
approval, and the instant intercept is lawful because
the application provided sufficient information to

24

-a.s

a

enable the issuing judge to determine that the statutory
preconditions were

satisfied. ~

t\0~'"'5
Finally, we note that i;heze l ! no cvidenc;1 in the
legislative history

~ suggests

that Congress intended

f1~
this broad identification requirement to

et a?

"a central,

or even functional, role in guarding against unwarranted
use of wiretapping or electronic surveillance."
States v. Chavez, 416 U.S., at 578.

United

Neither S. 675 nor

S. 2050, the predecessor bills of S. 971, contained

tki ~

aM.;

~ identification provision.

~ J[Jhe

See p~ ~ supra.

only explanation given in the Senate Report for

the inclusion of the broad identification provision was

w ~ca.i-

Q"

e~,,.e.c:l -f..e (,.a_

that it was intended to reflect the constitutional command

of

particularizatio~planation whic: twas offered
Lo..ll ~

with respect to ~
~~~~~e~i;~~~Ie~r~i~e~c~r~rrs~oo~f~nformation required

by §

2518~(~to be set out in an intercept application.

No additional guidance can be gleaned from the floor
debates, since they contain no substantive discussion of
the identification provision.

~

B

We reach the same conclusion with respect to the
government's duty to inform the judge of all identifiable

--

persons whose conversations were intercepted.

As noted

earlier, the version of Title III that emerged from the
Senate Judiciary Committee provided only for mandatory
notice to the "persons named in the order of the applicall..a. s~V\.CAJ.C. Q.~ ff- de_ i-a:f.ecl
tion."

purpose of that provision: "ilBJil Q81ia:ile@ i l).

ehe SenB:ee

.S.

K.-.1. "'•·

1o1, k - - - - - - - - - - -

t(b tk. eo"a· ,
~ ,S&&.o. ) JD~

<..t'fG,ff).

inte t of the prov~s~on is that the principle
ostuse notice will be retained. This provision
a one s ou
sure the community that the techniques
are reasonably employed. Through its operation
all authorized interceptions must eventually
become known at least to the subject. He can then
seek appropriate civil redress, for example, under
2520 . . . if he feels that his privacy has
been unlawfully invaded."

The floor discussion concerning the amendment adding
the provision for discretionary notice merely indicates
an intent to provide notice to such additional persons as
may be constitutionally required.
Nothing in the structure of the Act or this legislative
history suggests that incriminating conversations are
"unlawfully intercepted" whenever parties to those

d() ....t
conversations faif

t~ receive ~ discretionary inventory

notice as a result of

the~ilure e f tl~iGovernmen~to

inform the District Court of their identities.

At the time

inventory notice was served on the other identifiable persons,
the intercept had been completed and the conversations
had been "seized" under a valid intercept order.

The fact

3?

that discretionary notice reached teaxty fifrie rather than
identifiable persons does not in itself mean

;}.7.
that the conversations were J,:nlawfully
The legislative history indicates that postintercept
notice was designed instead to assure the community that
the wiretap technique is reasonably employed.

But even

recognizing that Congress placed considerable emphasis on
that aspect of the overall statutory scheme, we do not
think that postintercept notice was intended to serve as an
independent restraint on resort to the wiretap procedure.~~-

IV
Although the government was required to identify

,.,..
~

respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco in the December
26 application for an extension of the initial intercept,
failure to do so in the circumstances here presented did

not warrant suppre ssion under

1~ M.S. ~ §

Nor was suppression justified

UftQQs

tke

2518(10)(a)(i).

p•ouiaio ~with

respect to respondents Merlo and Lauer simply because the

L o,..df.Qd
government inadvertently &8~~~their names from the
comprehensive list of all identifiable persons whose

...

•

~{ ~.-....~

.

·..fv~

hold that this is the correct result under the provisions
of Title III, but we

r ~emphasize

the suggestion we made

in United States v. Chavez that "strict adherence by the
Government to the provisions of Title III would nonetheless
be more in keeping with the responsibilities Congress has
imposed upon it when authority to engage in wiretapping

iseerr4"'!, t'in~!JJ..with

this opinion . .

------

It is so ordered.

"t:lcs""t ~ -rev<-~ ~
.

~

V'e W1CH1duf2

-h

-t~c..+ la~N+

U.S.· v. Donovan
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FOOTNOTES
1.

The wiretap application procedure is set forth

at 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1), which provides:
(t. J) Each application for an order authorizing or approving the
interception of a wire or oral communication shall be made in writing upon oath or affirmation to a judge of competent jurisdiction
:md shall state the applicant's authority to make such application.
Each application shall include the following information:
tt (a) the identity of the investigative or law enforcement officer making the application, and the officer authorizing the
application;
1
{b) a full and complete statement ·"Of the facts and circum·
stances relied upon by the applicant, to justify his belie( th:1t
an order should be issued, including (i) details as to the flU·
ticular offense that has been, is being, or is about to be com·
mitted, (ii) a particular description of the nature and location
of the facilities from which or the place where the communic:1·
tion is to be intercepted, (iii) a particular description of th~
type of communications sought to be intercepted, (iv) the i<l.:ntity of the person, if known, committing the offense and who .' "
communications are to be intercepted;

/~c) a full and complete statement as to whether or not oth\·r
investigative procedures h~ve been tried 1and failed or why
they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or
to be too dangerous;
.
·
/ l(d) a statement of the period of time for which the int<'r·
ception is required to be maintained. If the nature of the
investigation is such that the authorization for interception
should not automatically terminate when the described type
·of communication has been first obtained, a particular description of facts establishing probable cause to believe that :trltlitional communications of the same type will occur thereafter;

ie)

1
a full and complete statement of the facts concernin!:
all previous applications known to the individual authorizin~:
and making the application, made to any judge for authorization to intercept, or for _approval of interceptions of, wire or
oral communications involving any of the same persons, facilities or places specified in the application, and the action takl'n
by the judge on each su~h application; and
I

II(!) where the application is for the extension of an order, .:t
stat.ement setting forth . the results thus far obtained from tl:~
interception, or a reasonable explanation of the failure to obtain such results.l'

issuing judge is free to require the applicant to
furnish additional information.

18

u.s.c.

§

2518(2).

N-2
2.

The affidavit set forth extensive information

indicating that the named individuals were conducting a
gambling operation.

This information was derived from

physical surveillance by agents of the F B.I., an
examination of telephone company toll records, and the
personal observations of six informants, whose past

reliability~a~als~detailed
3.

in the affidavit.

The D~strict Court's order was issued pursuant

§j
18 U.S.C.l2518(3), (4) which provid~:
11 (3) Upon s uch applic a tion the judge may enter an ex parte ord_l'r,
as requested or as modified, authorizing or approving intercepbl'"
of wire or oral communic a tions within the territorial jurisdic·
' tion of the court in which the judge is sitting, if the judge deter·
mines on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant that'' (a) there is probable cause for belief that an individual is
committing, has committed, or is about to commit a P.a rticular
offense enumerated in section 2516 of this chapter;
It (b) there is probable cause for belief that particular communications concerning that offense will be obtained through
such interception;
11(c) normal investigative procedures have been tried and have

failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if. tried
or to be too dangerous;
11
(d) there is probable cause for be1ief that the facilities from
which, or the place where, the wire or oral communications are
to be intercepted are being used, or are about to be used, in
connection with the commission of such offense, or are leased
to, listed in the name of, or commonly used by such person.

I(4) Each order authorizing or approving the interception of any
wire or oral communication shall specify1/ (a) the identity of the person, if known, whose communications are to be intercepted;
/l(b) the nature and location of the communications facilitiea
as to which, or the place where, authority to intercept is granted;
ll (c) a particular description of the type of communication
sought to be intercepted, and a statement of the particular
offense to which it relates;

/l (d) the identity of the agency authorized to intercept the
communications, and of the person authorizing the application;
and
/l(e) the period of time during which such interception is authorized, including a statement as to whether or not the interception shall automatically terminate when the described communication has been first obtained. 'I

N-3
4.

In addition to the December 26 application

requesting an extension of the initial intercept order,
the governme nt also filed on that date a separate applica-

a

tion seeking authorization to monitor a third telephone
\

c:L·s.c.o\J~I('e d.
~at

J

the same North Olmstead address.

Tfie 9xictoRee

o~

applications
were accompanied by another affidavit setting forth the
results of the initial monitoring, the manner in which
the third phone was discovered, the facts indicating that
the newly discovered telephone was being used to conduct
a gambling business, and reasons why continued interception
was necessary.

A copy of the affidavit filed on November

28 was also attached to the December 26 applications.
the sake of clarity, the two. applications filed on
December 26 will be treated as a single application.

For

N-4

The United States conceded in the Court of
Appeals that respondents Donovan and Robbins were "known"
within the meaning of the statute at the time of the
December 26 application, but challenged as clearly erroneous
the District Court's finding that respondent Buzzaco was
"known" at that time.

The Court of Appeals upheld the

District Court's finding, and the United States has not
sought review of that disposition.

Thus, for our purposes,

all three respondents were "known" on December 26.

'i:

An inventory notice must be served within a

designated period of time to "the persons named in the
order or the application."
~:v.t.

18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d).
-

.

The inventory must iae~Q~ notice of the entry of the

\

.s+~.f.-c ~

intercept order or application, l the disposition of the
c

.J..a. wk•
were or

were not intercepted.

filing of a motion, the

judge has discretion to make available the intercepted
communications, the applications, and the orders.

~

f d. )

Title III also authorizes the District Court to cause
an inventory notice to be served on "other parties to
intercepted communications" if the judge determines that
such notice is in the interest of justice.

Those

other parties may also be given access to the intercepted

,
communications, the applications, and the orders.

~/

Although respondents Merlo and Lauer were not served with

inventory notice pursuant to § 2518(8)(d), the intercept

order~

applications, and related papers were made available to all the
defendants, including~ Merlo and Lauer, on Nov~ber 26,
1973.

Thus, the

ee1st!ent: ~ntroduction

into evidence at trial

of the contents of the intercepted conversations and evidence
derived therefrom would not be
§

2518(9).

See n
~

r)'~ '

infra.

pue ~ prohibited

by 18

u.s .c.

',+-G..
~/

..........

......

The Government filed e~is ifteerlo~ to ~appeal from the

District Court's order

g~&8Eifl~uppressing

evidence under

18 U.S.C. ~ 731, ~ and there has as yet been no trial
on the charge sol

w:il...

.-~...J

+o '"f\.cL

.,.~.....J ...;::4 ·

N-7
-illlf

inventory

')

See n~ ! supra.
10.

18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) provides in pertinent

part:
1' (10) (a) Any aggrieved person in any trial, hearing, or proceeding in or before any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory
body, or other authority of the United States, a State, or a political
subdivision thereof, may move to suppress the contents of any inter-cepted wire or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom,
on the grounds that'' (i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted;
'I (ii) the order of authorization or approval under wl1ich it
was intercepted is insufficient on its face; or
II (iii) the interception was not made in conformity with the
order of authorization or approval. "

lV
~

t -t~~f- ~~
Every Court of Appeals to

~oncluded

that an

J
h~·~considered

indi~ose

conversatipns

the issue

will~

v..-:1/
probablylbe intercepted by a wiretap must be identified in
t~
wiretap application if the law enforcement authorities

1

have probable cause to believe

~the

individual is

committing the offense for which the wiretap is sought.
United States v. Chiarizio, 525 F.2d 2S9, 292 (CA2 1975);
United States v. Bernstein, 509 F.2d 996 (CA4 1975), petition
for

cer ~ filed,

No. 74-14S6; United States v. Doolittle,

507 F.2d 136S, aff'd en bane, 51S F.2d 500 (CAS 1975),

~

petitions for certA filed Nos. 75-500, 75-509, 75-513;
United States v. Kilgore, 51S F.2d 496 (CAS 1975), petition
for cert. filed, No. 75-963; United States v. Civella, 533
F.2d 1395 (CAS 1976); United States v. Kirk, 534 F.2d 1262
(CAS 1976); United States v. Russo, 527 F.2d 1150, 1156
No. 75-121S.
. (J. , 1
also, United States v. Moore, 513 F. 2d 4S5, 493-494

See

(CAlO 1975), petition for cert. filed

--=<

-U.S.

c "(

1\

(-€~8-

1975)(interpreting 23 D.C. Code 547(a)(2), which is almost
l ~V'_)Vl.. !...J

identical to the provision at issue here).

·

-

-

L-~-;:-:-;·;-.,.-~---.J"--~-4'/-o.,....~-----,r-])-o,_o_"_"'- - -. -'-fl.To_~.,. ,. ";-,"'-"~'
· .:---~--~-d-u-z_.,_~_'_ol

A number of these

cour~ave concluded>~at

decision in United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143

our

(1974)~ :

resolved this ide ntification issue.

See p nited States v.

;;ll

Chairizio, supra; United States v. Moore, supra.
argues

it will inte

Although there is

language in Kahn suggesting that wiretap applications must
identify all such individuals, the identification question
presented here was not before us in Kahn.

Lit..CA.~

e

~_.)

~was

The question in

\.i::)

whetherAwiretap application had to identify a

known user of the target telephone whose complicity in the
criminal activity under investigat.i on was not known at
the time of the application.
not controlling, precedent.

Kahn is a relevant, though

tJ-/0

/~.

I

The United States does not suggest that regardless of

the factual circumstances a wiretap application must identify only
a single individual.

To the contrary, it concedes that if

two or more persons are using the

&sllt'ft8 ~

target telephone

"equally" to commit the offense, and thus are "equally" targets
of the investigation, "all must be named."
States, at 18 n.l3.

Brief for the United

(V-I/

J3.

«.

position

Counsel for the United States explained thi_s
~ui~succinctly

at oral argument:

"The critical

distinction • • • is one between the users of the telephone
that is being monitored on the one hand, and all other
persons throughout the world who may converse from
~

unmonitored phones on the othetand."

Argt.HBent, at 13.
(J

Tr~seri pti

of Oral

11/.

Indeed, the contrary conclusion is suggested

by the fact that identification of an individual in an
application for an intercept order triggers other statutory
j
.
provisions.

Firs~ (l)(e)

requires an intercept

application to disclose all previous applications "inv~lving
any of the same persons

. specified in the application."

To the extent that Congress thought it necessary to provide
~

the issuing judge with such information, we can

·l4-~
dtsce~

congressional intent to require provision of such
information only if a suspect operated from one end of a
telephone line.

~1--·
2518(8)(d)

Second,

mandates that an

inventory notice be served upon "the persons named in the
order or the / application."
se~the

~o.J-

(,.~

.s e. 'I v -t
congressional purpose serv;5. by limiting that
WC)\l

to

IJ

fai~

As with§ 2518(1)(e), we

notice on the basis of the telephone from which one speaks.

/$'.

~

At the time of the enactment of Title III,

Congress
expressed on this issue in United States v. Kahn,
415 U.S., at 155 n. 15.

sppr ~

The Fourth Amendment requires

specification of "the place to be searched, and the

a...

persons or things to be seized."

In the wiretap context,

those requirements are satisfied by identification of the
telephone line to be tapped and the particular conversations

I+

e's

~·... "'-

cc. A.$~; tv t,· •" u.i_
v-e~ui ~ t M fll fi\.J o.l.J 1\0J~

);~e~ io b-e.
ov e.v kt~~~.t"d

ett(t(/() ,.,.
; 1\ C'i t'M

~~ c(~"':_j

c.o" v~,.aca.tl~

lrt

t\G.~•

r conversa
~ .<JoriSpecification of tihese l~ely te 'be ovedteard engagin~

ia griii!tl.R:Ill

cog.urr:r~a•"isaa

).identif[ies] the person whose

constitutionally protected area is to be invaded rather
than 'particularly describing' the communications, conversations, or discussions to be seized."

388

u.s.

41, 59 ( 11,7).

Berger v. New York,

' ' · Ilk

That Congress may have so understood the

constitutional requirement is also suggested by the
portion of the Senate Report dealing with that provision
of S. 971 that required the intercept order to identify
"the person, if known, whose conversations are to be
intercepted."

The Senate Report merely cites West v.

Cabell, 153 U.S. 78 (1894), which concerns the need for
proper identification of the subject of an arrest warrant.

\'lot~.. c.AC\.l aJ
S. Rep. No. 1097,

s......'!

s:jra :0,

(c1U).
102

To the extent that

Congress may have considered West to apply to wiretap
orders~

we have no reason to believe that Congress

d

considered its applicability to

exten~

suspects using the target telephone.

only to those

17.

I

At least one Senator read the identification requirement

in S. 971 to parallel the identification requirement contained
in the statute at issue in Berger v. New York:

"Specificity is

required as to the person or persons whose communications are
to be intercepted."
Senator Percy).

114 Cong. Rec., at 14763 (1968)(remarks of

N-1~
1~. ~

The inventory notice must be served within

a reasonable time but not later than 90 days after the
date the application for an intercept order was filed.
On

~~a_
r~
t~
e

showing of good cause, service of the

inventory may be postponed.

l't.

~

In addition to these provisions for mandatory

and discretionary inventory notice, Title III prohibits
the introduction into evidence at trials and certain
other

proceedin~he

contents of an intercept and evidence

derived therefrom unless each party has been furnished
with copies of the application and order under which the
interception was authorized.

18 U.S.C. § 2518(9).

More-

over, at the expiration of any intercept the Government
is required to supply the issuing judge with recordings
of the intercepted conversations, which are to be sealed
according to his directions.
£ai 1 'Jre

amons

lol?S

the

•k~ New

gri&i.Qi"i:s~eeifiea 'b'

1lv..,

ern!>

IVM

the Court with

lespe~

York statute held unconstitutional in Berger

388 l:J. S.
v. New York~ ....

'd

~

The fa; 1 lif e

~
~

18 U.S.C. f 2518(8)(a).

.r.e ,

'!z

68 E,, 1

~•• ~-I- ~.,._ ;-f. f,.•/~r._
,;

'tkM

·--A
- _.,

c.v;l, .. iu.J.

-1-o ;u/.,k

-do.t. 3 f' ll (j,A., ••J

/,0.

·

It is worth noting that shortly before Senator
Hart proposed this amendment to S. 971, Senator
read to the Senate

~~ga' o "'""""~on federal
il"QJ.gva:nt: te tk:e lla§t

wiretap

B:!lftefi:EiHl:QR ~

legislation~H>islo. "g"";}.
That report noted that

parties to intercepted conversations other than those named
in the application or order should probably be served with
inventory notice, but it also recognized that under some
circumstances the provision of such notice could be harmful

'
A

and gave the following example:
a businessman, talks to his customers, and
e latter are served with pape~s showing that
is being bu?ged[.] [T]he damage to confidence
in A and to A s reputation in general may damage
A unjustly. In this case it would seem that the
customers should not be served with the inventory."
114 Gong. Rec. 14476 (1968).

~1. I

The current ~olicy of the Department of Justice is to

rrovide the issuing judge With the

M8M ~

name of every person

who has been overheard as to whom there is any reasonable
p ossibility of indictment.
States, at 39.

~

Brief for the

This policy does not meet the test
L ~J.A;

soecified above .

sagplJ

e~ hoses

~~

iuAL 1

United

&pag ~

__./

Moreover, wher~ ~he Government ~~~~e~es e ~
to supply the issuing judge with

a list of all identif ~able persons rather than a description
of the classes into which those persons fall, the list must
be comolete.

s~ecified

i

ad.. I

At oral argument, counse 1 for the United States

practically conceded

tiQa'b 'R kQ,g C:W:U:W G'k'ttft B:f'l'ree:eh ,,aB eesta.,_

the merit of the a?proach specified in United

-

Se&s ~ States

v.

Chun:
,\

Perhaps the approach of the Court of Ap?eals for the
Ninth Circuit, which suggested that rather than submitting
specific names we should submit categories of persons who
had been overheard, is a better policy, ~ would be more
heloful to the district court in exercising its discretion,
and we wo~ld have no objection to following any reasonable
ryolicy that the district courts determine would be useful
to them in this regard." TrarU!lBPi-l"t of Oral Arg:meM,
at 6-7.
~

~
A4.

o

The availability of the · suppression remedy
u eel -h c.ert .s. f,· -1-o.~ +t "fl ~ J
I .r'
I lf1

for these statut CZJ 1 violations,

seen~ ~ and ~

supra,turns on the provisions of Title III rather than
the judicially fashioned exclusionary rule aimed at
deterring violations of Fourth Amendment rights.

United

States v. Giordano, supra, 416 U.S., at 524.
~~.

~

There is no suggestion in this case that the

government agents knowingly failed to identify respondents
Donovan, Robbins and Buzzaco for the purpose of keeping
relevant information from the District Court that might
have prompted the court to conclude that probable cause
was lacking.

If such a showing had been made, we would

have a different case.

Nor is there any suggestion that

as a result of the failure to name these three respondents
they were denied the mandatory inventory notice supplied
to persons named in the application.

18

u.s.c.

§

2518(8)(d).

No one suggests that the failure to identify
in a wiret}p application individuals who are "unknown"
within the meaning of the statute, see Kahn v. United
1/IS

f.l.-1. /'/J ( 117'1),

States, ~~~

L c.o" v •., .t4.. +.·oM_;

requires suppression of intercepted ~
V" t. c. o~.-H '-'"!)

Tl-.cJ-

to which those individuals were parties.

identify such an "unknown" individual does not make unlawful
an otherwise valid intercept orderJ ~ spondents Donovan,
Robbins, and Buzzaco suggest ,.

'Re\iell}"e ~

that the opposite

is true with respect to the failure to identify in a wiretap
application individuals who are "known" within the meaning
of the statute.

o~J. A-o"""iJ;
a.+ 'lo. A11\•'d"1~ ~ ... rf)t'C... _'"+
Cff•~tJ.s c~

eb'·AM.

+A-Iu.

Counsel for these respondents suggested

at oral argument that this difference in result is justified
AW\ ... l o
.fo w~v r~lu., -<'4~"' c.k.tA 0'\. A.V .. ~. T'la~sc. ~.-

+-

by eAQ

fact tbllt altA9'4el~ft

law

en:EtH!'~Q me pt

can gfHrs t ,

1~

L w i"""-ouf- ~ ~ ti-.'1 r~.........,

warl!anl!le~ '). actioUJ\when they have been unable to foresee

,..,.,,+

the circumstance
t ~ .I f.:/1
o 'f41"\_,
that eventually confronted them,
€4oe! not )elieo ~
or arrest
warrant when their prior knowledge is sufficient to establish
probable cause.

The major flaw in that reasoning is that

this case does not concern warrantless action.

Her ~

the

omission on the part. of law enforcement authorities was
not a failure to seek prior
make an intercept unlawful has no bearing on the lawfulness
of an intercept order that fails to identify every target.

Ol&.J Ev~.aaal!HftiRJ,

that a broad

that Congress

identification requirement was constitutionally mandated,
:f\1\ oseJ .s+o.-tv
Suf f~~.Jiatl\. ~ !i ~SIS'~ Jrrt(lo)
it does not follow that Congress
I~~) (i) ~ a. .s~:~
~Ol'\

~{£;; ~iefl:

£en..

~
- ~~~~~~~~~~~~

tOM.i:J_J

~J

ae e reaerairrt on anwerr c::.:tea ; af: of

~€ereepe p r eeea~r ~

tlr,..

;~ +e~Gt..f+

In limiting use of the ~i~! t~

procedure to "the most precise and discriminate circumstance ~
Re . "No. 107, fO'h.\.. c." . J ~d Sru. /0~ ( I'' 8') J

s.

enforcement authorities to convince
a Di~trict Court that probable cause existed to believe
that a specific person was committing a specific offense

~ a specific telephon~ (~:.:ment uloie)

was satisfied

here when the application set forth sufficient information
to indicate that the

~imary targets~ere

conducting a

gambling business over four particular telephones.

Nothing

in the legislative history indicates that Congress intended
to declare ~lawfu i for failure to name additional targets.

IA.I\~

.J

~s 18 (Jo) (~)

c:)--

SiRtply )-

V"e.sul+r0 ~

:~:"~'~
~SIS'--

intended
for a

Counsel for respondents Merlo and Lauer conceded at
oral argument that the failure to name those respondents
in the proposed inventory order was not intentional,
and we are therefore not called upon to decide whether
suppression would be an available remedy if the Government
knowingly sought to prevent the District Court from
serving inventory notice on particular parties.

Nor

does this case present an opportunity to comment upon the
suggestion, recognized by the United States, Brief at
4 ~ n~40,

that suppression might be required if the

agents knew before the interception that no inventory
would be served.

Moreover,~

eh~ respondents

R&&e

Merlo and Lauer

~o+were :i:tt

zXBel'\B '

prejudiced by their failure to receive

postintercept notice under either of the District Court's

LA.) ~to4--..c.l ..a.~.·--~

inventory orders · I ~

; ~ +t.rc."' ri- 0 r JQt.s,
~rrt''"~l-,·~ ~
~ ~t~ J- ca.JL
f«f~ .

Metiel't ~

the

"'""~""""~ to

P""t"'ial

olio•....,•"~
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the Government made available to all defendants
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Aet 'B e 'Barred by 18 U. S . C. § 2518(9) , see R.9tQ 13.A.
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Although the possibility of subsequent civil

...

suits to redress unwarranted invasions of privacy functions
in a broad sense to check excessive use of intercepts, that
role is at best minor and indirect.

2.
failure to comply fully with these statutory provisions
requires suppression of evidence under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a).
I

On November 28,1972, a special agent of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation applied to the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio for an order
authorizing a wiretap interception in accordance with Title
III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968, 18 U.S.C. §§

2510-2520.~

The application requested

authorization to intercept gambling-related communications
over two telephones at one address in North Olmstead, Ohio,
and two other telephones at a home in Canton, Ohio.

The

accompanying affidavit recited that the telephones were
being used by Albert Kotoch, Joseph Spaganlo, and
George Florea to conduct an illegal gambling business, and
that in conducting that business they would place telephone
calls to and receive telephone calls from various persons,

2
thre e of whom were also named in the wiretap application.
/

N-21
identify such an "unknown" individual does not make
unlawful an otherwise valid intercept order, respondents
Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco suggest that the opposite
is true with respect to the failure to identify in a wiretap
application individuals who are "known" within the meaning
of the statute.

Counsel for these respondents suggested

at oral argument that this difference in result is justified
..4...

by analogy to warrantless searches or arres ~
Oral Arg:ment, at 40.

Trlft88 ~ipt of

Although law enforcement officials

can often take action without a warrant when they have
been unable to foresee the circumstances that eventually
confronted them, they still must obtain a search or arrest
warrant when their prior knowledge is sufficient to establish
probable cause.

The major flaw in that reasoning is that

this case does not concern warrantless action.

Here, the

omission on the part of law enforcement authorities was
not a failure to seek prior judicial authorization, but
a failure to identify every individual who could be
expected to be overheard engaging in incriminating conversations.

That the complete absence of prior judicial

authorization would make an intercept unlawful has no
bearing on the lawfulness of an intercept order that fails
to identify every target.

)
N-22

26/
-- Even if we assume that Congress thought that a
broad identification requirement was constitutionally
mandated, it does not follow that Congress imposed
statutory suppression under§§ 2515 and 2518 (lO)(a)(i)

---~

as a sanction for noncompliance.

\ In limiting use

of

the intercept procedure to "the most precise and
discriminate circumstances," S. Rep. No. 107, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. , l02 (1968), Congress required law enforcement
authorities to convince a District Court that probable
cause existed to believe that a specific person was
committing a specific offense using a specific telephone.
This requirement was satisfied here when the application
set forth sufficient information to indicate that the
primary targets were conducting a gambling business
over four particular telephones.

Nothing in the

legislative history indicates that Congress intended
to declare an otherwise constitutional intercept order
"unlawful" under§ 2518 (lO)(a)(i) --resulting in
suppression under § 2515 -- for failure to name
additional targets.

' <

CHAMBERS DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATm
No. 75-212
Urtited States, Petitioner, On Writ of Certiorari to the
v.
United States Court of Ap- ·
Thomas W, Donovan et al.
peals for the Sixth Circuit.
[December -, 1976]
MR. JusTrcEi POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents issues concerning the construction of
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968, 18 U. S. C. §§ 2510-2520. Specifically, we must
decide whether 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (1) (b) (iv), which requires
the Government to include in its wiretap applications "the
identity of the person, if known, committing the offense,
and whose conversations are to be intercepted," is satisfied
when the Government identifies only the "principal targets"
of the intercept. Second, we must decide whether the Government has a statutory responsibility to inform the issuing
}udge of the identities of persons whose conversations were
overheard in the course of the interception, thus enabling
him to decide whether they should be served with notice of
the interception pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (8)(d).
And finally, we must determine whether failure to comply
fully with these statutory provisions requires suppression of
evidence under 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (10) (a).
I

On November 28, 1972, a special agent of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation applied to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio for an order
authorizing a wiretap interception in accordance with Title
III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
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1968, 18 U. S. C. §§ 2510-2520? The application requested
authorization to intercept gambling-related communications
over two telephones at one address in North Olmstead, Ohio,
1

The wiretap application procedure is set forth at 18 U. S. C. § 2518
(1), which provides:
"(1) Each application for an order authorizing or approving the inter~eption of a wire or oral communication shall be made in writing upon
- oath or affirmation to a judge of competent jurisdiction and shall state
the applicant's authority to make such application. Each application
shall include the- following information:
. "(a) the identity of the investigative or law enforcement officer making
the application, and the oflicer authorizing the appliration;
"(b) a full and complete statement of the facts and circumstances relied
·upon by the applicant, to just.ify his belief that an order should be issued,
including (i) details as to the particular offense that has been, is being, or
is about to be committed, (ii) a particular desrription of .the nature and
location of the facilities from which or the place where the communication is to be intercepted, (iii) a paraticular description of the type of
communications sought to be intercepted, (iv) the identity of the person,
if known, committing the offense and whose communications are to be
intercepted;
" (c) a full and complete statement as to whether or not other invcsti'g ative procedurrs have been tried and failed or why they reasonably
appear to be unlikely 1o succeed if tried or to be too dangerous;
" (d) a statement of the period of time for which the interception is
required to be maintained. If the nature of the investigation is such
that the authorization for interception should not automatically terminate when the described type of communication has been first obtained,
,a particular description of facts establishing probable cause to believe that
additional communications of the same type will occur thereafter;
"(e) a full and complete statement of the facts conccming all previous
a'pplications known to the individual authorizing and making the application, made to any judge for authori.zation to intercept, or for approval
of interceptions of, wire or oral communications involving any of the
same persons, facilities or places specified in the application, and the
'action taken by the judge on each such application; and
ic (f) where the applicati<,Jn is for the extension of an order, a statement
setting forth the results thus far obtained from the interception, or a
reasonable explanation of the failure to obtain such results."
The issuing judge is free to require the applicant to furnish additional
'information. 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (2).
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and two other telephones at a home in Canton, Ohio. The
accompanying affidavit recited that the telephones were being
used by Albert Kotoch, Joseph Spaganlo, and George Florea
to conduct an illegal gambling business, and that in conducting that business they vmuld place telephone calls to
a:nd receive telephone calls from various persons, three of
whom were also named in the wiretap applica.tion.2 The
a:ffiiant a1so stated that the Government's informants would
refuse to testify against the persons named in the application, that telephone records alone would be insufficient to
support a gambling conviction, and that normal investigative techniques were unlikely to be fruitful. Pursuant to
the Government's request, the District Court authorized for
a period of 15 days the interception of gambling-related
wire communications of Kotoch, Spaganlo, Florea, three
named individuals other than the respondents, and "others
as yet unknown," to and from the four listed telephones.. 8
The affidavit set forth extensive information indicating that the named
individuals were conducting a gambling operation. This information was
derived from physical surveillance by agents of the FBI, an examination
of telephone company toll records, and the personal observations of six
informants, whose past reliability also was detailed in the affidavit.
3 The District Court's order was issued pursuant 18 U. S. C. §§ 2518
(3), (4) which provide:
"(3) Upon such application the judge may enter an ex parte order,
as · requested or as modified, authorizing or approving interception of wire
dr oral communications within the territorial jurisdiction of the court
in which the judge is sitting, if the judge determines on the basis of the
:!'acts submitted by the applicant that" (a) there is probable cause for belief that an individual is committing,
has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense enumerated in
section 2516 of this chapter;
"(b) there is probable cause for belief that particular communications
Cbncerning that offense will be obtained through such interception;
"(c) normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed
or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too
dangerous;
" (d) there is probable cause for belief that the facilities from which,
or the place where, the wire or oral communications are to be intercepted
2

. ..
~-
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During the course of the wiretap, the Government learned
that respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco were discussing illegal gambling activities with the named subjects.
On December 26, 1972, the Government applied for an
.extension of the initial intercept order. 4 This time it sought
authorization to intercept gambling-related conversations of
·Kotoch, Spaganlo, Florea, two other named individuals, and
"others as yet unknown/' but it did not identify respondents
are being used, ,or are about to"be used, in connection with the commis. . ,sian of such offense, or are leased to, listed 'in the name of, or commonly
· used by such person.
" ( 4) Each order authorizing or approving the interception of any wire
or oral communication shall specify" (a) the identity of the person, if ·known, whose communications are
to be intercepted;
"(b) the nature and location of the communications facilities as to
which, or the place where, authority to intercept is granted;
" (c) a particular description of the type of communication sought to
be interce11ted, and a statement of the particular offense to which it
relates;
" (d) the identity of the agency authorized to intercept the communications, and of the person authorizing the application; and
"(e) the period of time during which such interception is authorized,
including a statement as to whether or not the interception shall automatically terminate when the described communication has been first
obtained."
4 In addition to the December 26 application requesting an extension
of the initial intercept ordrr, the Government also filed on that date a
separate application seeking authorization to monitor a third telephone
.discovered at the same North Olmstead address. Both applications were
accompanied by another affidavit setting forth the results of the initial
monitoring, the manner in which the third phone was discovered, the
facts indicating that the newly discovered telephone was being used to
conduct a gambling business, and reasons why continued interception was
necessary. A copy of the affidavit filed on November 28 was also
~ttached to the December 26 applications. For the sake of clarity, the
two applications filed on December 26 will be treated as a single
application.
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Donovan, Buzzaco, and Robbins in this second application.~
The District Court again authorized interception of gamblingrelated conversations for a maximum of 15 days.
On February 21, 1973, the Government submitted to the
District Court a proposed order giving notice of the interceptions to 37 persons, a group which the Government apparently thought included all individuals who could be identified as having discussed gambling over the monitored
telephones. 6 The District Court signed the proposed order,
and an inventory notice was served on the listed persons,
including respondents Donovan, Buzzaco, and Robbins. On
September 11 , 1973, after the Government submitted the
names of two additional persons whose identities had allegedly
been inadvertently omitted from the initial list, the District
Court entered an amended order giving notice to those
individuals. As a result of what the Government labels
"administrative oversight," respondents Merlo and Lauer
The United States conceded in the Court of Appeals that respondents Donovan and Robbins were "known" within the meannig of the
statute at the time of the December 26 application, but challenged as
clearly erroneous the District CourVs finding that respondent Buzzaco was
"known" at that time. The Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's
finding, and the United States has not sought. review of that disposition.
Thus, for our purposes, all three respondents were "known" on December 26.
6 An inventory notice must be served within a designated period of
time to "the persons named in the order or the application." 18 U. S. C.
§ 2518 (8) (d). The inventory must give notice of the entry of the intercept order or application, state the disposition of tho application, and
indicate whether communirations were or were not intercepted. Ibid.
- - Upon the filing of a motion , the judge has discretion to make available
the intercepted communications, the applications, and the orders. Ibid.
Title III also authorizes the District Court to cause an inventory notice to be served on "other parties to intercepted communications" if the
judge determines that such notice is in the interest of justice. Ibid.
Those other parties may also be given access to the intercepted communications, the applications, and the orders. Ibid.
• 5
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were not included in either list of names and were never
served with inventory notice. 7
On November 1, 1973, an indictment was returned in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio charging Kotoch, Spaganlo, the five respondents, and
10 other individuals with conspiracy to conduct and conducting a gambling business in violation of 18 U. S. C. §§ 371
and 1955. The five respondents filed motions to suppress
evidence derived from the wire interception. After an evidentiary hearing on the motions, the District Court suppressed as to respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco
all evidence derived from the December 26 intercept order
on the ground that failure to identify them by name in the
application and order of that date violated 18 U. S. C. §§ 2518
(1)(b)(iv) and 2518 (4)(a). With respect to Merlo and
Lauer, who were not known to the Government until after
the December 26 application, the District Court suppressed
all evidence derived from both intercept orders on the ground
that they had not been served with inventory notice.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
513 F. 2d 337 (1975). 8 On the identification issue, the
court held that the wiretap application must identify every
person whose conversations relating to the subject criminal
activity the Government has probable cause to believe it
will intercept. Agreeing with the District Court that at the
time of the December 26 application the Government had
7 Although respondents Merlo and Lauer were not served with inventory notice pursuant to § 2518 (8) (d), the intercept orders, applications,
and related papers were made available to all the defendants, including
Merlo and Lauer, on Novemoer 26, 1973. Thus, the introduction into
evidence at trial of the contents of the intercepted conversations and
evidence derived therefrom would not be prohibited by 18 U. S. C. § 2518
(9). See n. 19, infra.
8 The Government filed its appeal from the District Court's order suppressing evidence under 18 U. S. C. § 3731, and there has as yet been
no trial on the charges with respect to the respondents.
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probable cause to believe that it would overhear Donovan,
Robbins, and Buzzaco "committing the offense," the Court
of Appeals affirmed the suppression of evidence derived from
the December 26 order. On the notice question, it held
that the Governmnet has an implied statutory duty to inform the issuing judge of the identities of the parties whose
conversations were overheard so that he can determine
whether discretionary inventory notice should be required. 9
Because the Government had failed to perform this duty
with respect to Merlo and Lauer, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the District Court's order suppressing evidence '
derived from both intercept orders. The court found it unnecessary to determine whether the failure to identify re- ·
pondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco in the December
26 application and to name respondents Merlo and Lauer
in the proposed inventory notice orders was inadvertent or
purposeful, since the mere fact of omission was sufficient to
require suppression under 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (10)(a).m
We granted certiorari to resolve these issues, which concern
the construction of a major federal statute, 421 U. S. 907,
and now reverse.
II
The United States contends that § 2518 (1)(b) (iv) requires that a wiretap application identify only the principal
See n. 6, supra.
18 U. S. C. § 2518 (10) (a) provides in pertinent part:
"(10) (a) Any aggrieved person in any trial, hea.ring, or proceeding
in or before any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or
other authority of the United Sta.tes, a State, or a political subdivision
thereof, may move to suppress the contents of any intercepted wire or
oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, on the grounds that~
"(i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted;
"(ii) the order of authorization or approval under which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face; or
"(iii) the interception was not made in conformity with the order of
.authorization or approval."
9

10
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target of the interception, and that § 2518 (8) (d) does not
require the Government to provide the issuing judge with
a list of all identifiable persons who were overheard in the
course of an authorized interception. We think neither con(tention is sound.

A
We turn first to the identification requirements of § 2518
( 1) (b) ( iv). That provision requires a wiretap application
to specify "the identity of the person, if known, committing
the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted."
In construing that language, this Court already has ruled
that the Government is not required to identify an individual
· in the application unless it has probable cause to believe
(i) that the individual is engaged in the criminal activity
under investigation and (ii) that the iridividual's conversations will be intercepted over the target telephone. United
States v. Kahn, 415 U. S. 143 ( 1974). · The question at issue
here is whether the Government is required to name all
such individuals. 11
The United States argues that the most reasonable mEvery Court of Appeals that has considered the issue concluded that
mi individual whose conversations probably will be intercepted by a. wiretap must be identified in the wiretap application if the law enforcement
authorities have probable cause to "believe the individual is committing
• the offense for which the wiretap is sought. United States v. Chiarizio,
525 F. 2d 289, 292 (CA2 1975); IUnited States v. I!lrnstein, 509 F. 2d
996 (CA4 1975), petition for cert. filed, No. 74-1486; I United States v.
Doolittle, 507 F. 2d 1368, aff'd en bane, 518 F. 2d 500 (CA5 1975),
petitions for cert. filed Nos. 75!.500, 75..!'509, 75..!'513; Wnited States v.
Kilgore, 518 F. 2d 496 (CA5 1975), petition for cert. filed, No. 75!963;
"United States v. Civella, 533 F. 2d 1395 (CA8 1976); United States v.
Kirk, 534 F. 2d 1262 (CA8 1976); United States v. Russo, 527 F. 2d
1150, 1156 (CAlO 1975), petition for cert. filed, No. 75~1218. See also
United States v. Moore, U. S. App. D. C. - , 513 F. 2d 485, 493494 ( 1975) (interpreting 23 D. C. Code 547 (a) (2), which is almost
identical to the provi'3ion at issue here).
A number of these courts have concluded, and respondents Donovan,
llobbins, and Buzzaco argue, that our decision in United States v. Kahn,
11

I
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terpretation of the plain language of the statute is that the
application must identify only the principal target of the
investigation, who "will almost always be the individual
whose phone is monitored. 12 Brief for the United States,
at 18. Under this interpretation, if the Government has
reason to believe that an individual will use the target
telephone to place or receive calls, and the Government
has probable cause to believe that the individual is engaged
in the criminal activity under investigation, the individual
qualifies as a principal target and must be named in the
wiretap application. On the other hand, an individual who
uses a different telephone to place calls to or receive calls
from the target telephone is not a principal target even if
the Government has probable cause to believe that the
individual is engaged in the criminal activity under investigation. In other words, whether one is a principal target
of the investigation depends on whether one operates the
target telephone to place or receive calls. 13
415 U. S. 143 (1974), resolved this identification issue. See Unit ed States
v. Chaffrizio, supra; United States v. Moore, supra. Although there is
language in Kahn suggesting that wiretap applications must identify all
such individuals, the identification question presented here was not before
us in Kahn. The question in that case was whether a wiretap application had to identify a known user of the target telephone whose complicity in the criminal activity under investigation was not known at
the time of the application. Kahn is a relevant, though not controlling,
precedent.
12 The United States does not suggest that regardless of the factual
circumstances a wiretap application must identify only a single individual.
To the contrary, it concedes that if two or more persons are using the
target telephone "equally" to commit the offense, and thus are "equally"
targets of the investigation, "all must be named." Brief for the United
States, at 18 n. 13.
13 Counsel for the United States explained this position succinctly at
oral argument : "The critical distinction ... is one between the users of
the telephone that is being monitored on the one hand, and all other persons throughout the world who may converse from unmonitored phones
on the other hand." Tr. of Oral Arg., at 13.

:'
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Whatever the merits of such a statutory scheme, we find
little support for it in the language and structure of Title
III or in the legislative history. The statutory language
itself refers only to "the person, if known, committing the
offense and whose communications are to be intercepted."
That description is as applicable to a suspect placing calls
to the target telephone as it is to a suspect placing calls
from the target telephone. It is true, as the United States
suggests, that when read in the context of the other subdivisions of § 2518 (1)(b), an argument can be made that
Congress focused in subdivision (iv) on the primary user
of the target telephone. But it is also clear from other
sections of the statute that Congress expected that wiretap
applications would name more than one individual. For
example, Title III requires that inventory notice be served
upon "the persons named in the order or the application."
18 U. S. C. § 2518 (8) (d) (emphasis added). And § 2518
(1) (c) requires that an intercept application disclose all
previous intercept applications "involving any of the same
persons ... specified in the application" (emphasis added).
It may well be that Congress anticipated that a given
· application would cover more than one telephone or that
several suspects would use one telephone, and that an appli·
cation for those rrasons alone would require identification
of more than one individuaL But nothing on the face of
the statute suggests that Congress intended to remove from
the identification requirement those suspects whose intercepted communications originated on a telephone other than
that listed in the wiretap application.H
Indeed, the contrary conclusion is suggested by the fact that identification of an individual in an application, for an intercept order
triggers other statutory provisions. FirsL § 2518 (1) (c) requires an intercept application to disclose all previous applications "involving any
of the same persons . . . specified in the application." To the extent
that Congress thought it necessary to provide the issuing judge with
14
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Nor can we find support for the "principal target" interpretation in the legislative history. Title III originated as
a combination of S. 675, the Federal Wire Interception
Act, which was introduced by Senator McClellan several
months prior to this Court's decision in Berger v. New York,
388 U. S. 41 ( 1967), and S. 2050, the Electronic Surveillance
Control Act of 1967, introduced by Senator Hruska a few
days after the Berger decision. Both bills required that
wiretap applications include a full and complete statement
of the facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant
and specification of the nature and location of the communication facilities involved. Although neither bill contained
an express identification requirement such as that at issue
here, both bills required the application to include "a full
and complete statement of the facts concerning all previous
applications ... involving any person named in the application as committing, having committed, or being about to
commit an offense." Hearings on Controlling Crime Through
More Effective Law Enforcement Before the Subcommittee
on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, IJOth Cong., 1st Sess., at 77, § 8 (a) (3) and
1066, § 2518 (a)(4) (1967) (emphasis added). Thus, even
at this early stage, it was recognized that an application
could identify several individuals, and there is no indication
that the identification would be limited to principal targets.
......While
S. 971~t,he
bill tfl:J' .combined the maJ· or provisio_n~s__ .w, \...,.' \ e.. ·tl:'
"
"
- - of S. 675 and S. 2050~nd ~eventually was enacted, f'as
pending before the Senate Judiciary Committee, this Court desuch information, there is no indication of congressional intent to require
provision of such information only if a suspect operated from one end
of a telephone line. Second, § 2518 (8) (d) mandates than an inventory notice be served upon "the persons named in the order or the
application." As with § 2518 ( 1) (e), the congressional purpose would
not be served by limiting that notice on the basis of the telephone from
which one speaks.
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cided Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).. S. 971 was
then redrafted to conform to Katz as well as Berger, and
the identification provision was added at that time. The
Senate Report states that the requirements set forth in the
various subdivisions of §"2518 (1 .) (b), including the identifiCation requirement at issue here, " [were] intended to reflect the
C<?nstitutional command of particularization." ·s. Rep. No.
1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 101 (1968), citing B erger v. New
J:qrk, 388 U.S. 41 , 58-60, and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 354--356 (1967). · The United States now contends that
although it may be that Congress read Berger and Katz to
· fequir_e, as a constitutional matter, that the subject of the
surveillancE) be named if known, Congress "would hardly
liave read those cases .as requiring ·the naming of all parties
likely to be overheard . . . . " 1.5 Brief, at ·25- 26. The difficulty with that argument is that the legislative history fails
to indicate that Congress was 'thinking in terms of "subjects"
of surveillance,. or that Congress considered "subjects" of
surveillance to be the principal users of the target telephone.
Moreover, to the extent that Congress thought it was
~neeting the g_onstitutional commands of particularization established in ~ erger and Katz, Congress may have read those
cases as mandating a broad identification requirement. The
statute that we confronted in Berger required identification
15 N
the time of the enactment of Title III, Congress did not
have hefore it' the view we expressed on this issue in United States
v. K,ahn, 415 U. S., at 155 n. 15. The Fourth Amendment requires
specification of "the place to be seached, and the persons or things to
be seized." In fhe wiretap context, those requirements are satisfied
by identification of the telephone line to be tapped and the particular
conversations to 'be seized. It is not a constitutional requirement that
All those likely to be overht?ard engaging in incriminating conversations
be named. Specification of this sort "identif[ies] the person whose con~stitl1tional!y protected area is to be invaded rather than 'particularly
describing' the communications, conversations, or discussions to be seized."
IEJerger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967).
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of "the person or persons" whose communications were to·
be overheard. 388 U. S., at 59. And we expressly noted
that that provision " [did] no more than identify the person
whose constitutionally protected area is to be invaded .... "
Ibid. Given the statute at issue in Berger and our comment
upon it, Congress may have concluded that as a constitutional matter a wiretap application would have to name
all suspects rather than just the primary user. 16
In any event, for our present purposes it is unnecessary
to speculate as to exactly how Congress interpreted Berger
and Katz with respect to the· identification issue. It is suffi~ient to note that in response to those decisions Congress
included an identification requirement which on its face draws
no distinction based on the telephone one uses, and the
United States points to no evidence in the legisla.tive history
that supports such a distinction. Indeed, the legislative materials apparently contain no use of the term "principal target" or any discussion of a different treatment based on the
telephone from which a suspect speaks. 17 We therefore conclude that a wiretap application must name an individual
if the Government has probable cause to believe that the
16 That Congress may have so understood the constitutional requirement is also suggested by the portion of the Senate Report dealing with
that provision of S. 971 that required the intercept order to identify
"the person, if known, whose conversations are to be intercepted." The
Senate Report merely cites West v. Cabell, 153 U. S. 78 (1894), which
concerns the need for proper identification of the subject of an arrest
warrant. S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 102 (1968). To the
extent that Congress may have considered West to apply to wiretap
orders, we have no reason to believe that Congress considered its applicability to extend only to those suspects using the target telephone.
17 At least one Senator read the identification requirement in S. 971 to
parallel the identifiaction requirement contained in the statute at issue
in Berger v. New York: "Specificity is required as to the person or
persons whose communications are to be intercepted." 114 Cong. Rec.,
at 14763 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Percy).

.
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individual is engaged in the criminal activity under inves~
tigation and expects to intercept the individual's conversations over the target telephone.

B
The other statutory proviSion at issue in this case is
18 U.S. C. §2518(8)(d), which provides that the judge
shall cause to be served on the persons named in the order
or application an inventory, which must give notice of the
:entry of the order or application, state the disposition of
the application, and indicate whether communications were
intercepted. 18 Although the st~ute mandates tb8 ~6 oi~mrr
of tea~ inventory notice only 1!6,;~.persons named in the application or the order, the statute also l?rovide that the judge
maYl.I::}JF8Yible0 similar notice to other parties to intercepted
communications if he concludes that such action is in the
interest of justice. 10 Observing that this notice '{)rovision
_ does not expressly require law enforcement authorities
1
.;v.~f "/ routinely tOll*~ the judge with any specific information
upon which'\"0exercise his discretion, the United States contends that it would be inappropriate to read such a requireThe inventory notice must be served within a reasonable time but
not later than 90 days after the date the application for an intercept
order was filed. On an ex parte showing of ·good cause, service of the
inventory may be postponei:l.
19 In addition to these provisions for mandatory an,d discretionary
•inventory notice, Title III prohibits the introduction into evidence at
trials and certain other proceedings of the contents of an intercept
and evidence derived therefrom unless each party has been furnished
with copies of the application and order under which the interception
was authorized. 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (9). Moreover, at the expiration
· of any intercept the Government is required to supply the issuing judge
with recordings of the intercepted conversatiolls, which are to be sealed
. according to his directions. 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (8) (a). The New York
statute held unconstitutional in Berger v. New York, was criticized by
this Court for its failure to include provisions of this sort. 388 U. S.,
-at 60.
18
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ment into the statute since the judge has the option of
asking the law enforcement authorities for whatever information he requires.
Our reading of the legislative history of the discretionary
notice provision in light of the purposes of Title III leads
us to reject the Government's interpretation. As reported
from the Judiciary Committee, section 2518 (8) (d) contained
only a provision mandating notice to the persons named in
the application or the order; the discretionary notice provision was added by amendment on the floor of the Senate.
In introducing that amendment, Senator Hart explained its
purpose:
"The amendment would give the judge who issued the
order discretion to require notice to be served on other
parties to intercepted conversations, even though such
parties are not specifically named in the court order.
The Berger and Katz decisions established that notice
of surveillance is a constitutional requirement of any
surveillance statute. It may be that the required notice must be served on all parties to intercepted communications. Since legitimate interests of privacy may
make such notice to all parties undesirable, the amendment leaves the final determination to the judge." 114
Cong. Rec. 14485-14486 (1968). 20
20 It is worth noting that shortly before Senator Hart proposed this
amendment to S. 971, Senator Long had r&'ld to the Senate portions
of a rep01t preparPd by the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York on federal wiretap legislation . That report noted that parties
to intercepted conversations other than tho e named in the application
or order should probably be served with inventory notice, but it also recognized that under some circumstances the provision of such notice
could be harmful and pve the following example:
"A, a businessman, talks to his customers, and the latter are served
with papers showing that A is being bugged[.] LT]he damage to confidence in A and to A's reputation in general may damage A tmjustly.
In this ca e it would seem i hat the custom en:; should not be served with
the inventory." 114 Cong. Rec. 14476 (1968).
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In deciding whether legitimate privacy interests justify withholding inventory notice from parties to intercepted conversations, a judge is likely to require information and assistance
beyond that contained in the application papers and the
recordings of intercepted conversations made available by
law enforcement authorities. No purpose is served by holding that those authorities have no routine duty to supply
the judge with revelant information. The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit recently confronted this problem of
dual responsibility, and we adopt the balanced construction
that court placed on § 2518 (8)(d):
"To discharge this obligation the judicial officer must
have, at a minimum, knowledge of the particular categories into which fall all the individuals whose conversations have been intercepted. ·Thus, w"hile precise iden..
tification of each party to an intercepted conversation
is not required, a description of the general class, or
classes, which they comprise is essential to enable the
judge to determine whether additional information is
necessary for a proper evaluation of the interests of the
various parties. Furthermore, although the judicial offifcer has the duty to cause the filing of the inventory
[notice], it is abundantly clear that the prosecution has
greater access to and familiarity with the intercepted
communications. Therefore we feel justified in imposing
upon the latter the duty to classify all those whose
conversations have been intercepted, and to transmit
this information to the judge. Should the judge desire
more information regarding these classes in order to
exercise his statutory § 2518 (8) (d) discretion, ... the
'government is also required to furnish such information
as is available to it." United States v. Chun, 503 F.
2d 533, 540 (1974). 21
The current policy of the Department of .Justice is to provide
the issuing judge with the name of every person who has been over21
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We agree with the Ninth Circuit that this allocation of
responsibility best serves the purposes of Title IIL22

III
We turn now to the question whether the District Court
properly suppressed evidence derived from the wiretaps at
issue solely because of the failure of the law enforcement
authoritis to comply fully with the provisions of §§ 2518 (1)
(b)(iv) and 2518 (S)(d). Section 2515 expressiy prohibits
the use at trial, and at certain other proceedings, of the
contents of any intercepted wire communication or any evidence derived therefrom "if the di~losure of that information would be in violation of this chapter." The circumstances that trigger suppression under § 2515 are in turn
enumerated in § 2518 (10)(a):
"(i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted;
" ( ii) the order of authorization or approval under
which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face; or
"(iii) the interception was not made in conformity
with the order of authorization or approval."
There is no basis on the facts of this case to suggest that
heard as to whom there is any reasonable possibility of indictment.
Brief for the United States, at 39. This policy does not meet i he test
specified above. Moreover, where, as here, the Government chooses to
supply the issuing jurlge with a list of all identifiable persons rather
than a description of the classes into which those persons fall, the list
must be complete.
22 At oral argument, counsel for the United States practically conceded
the merit of the approach sp<>cified in United States v. Chun:
"Perhaps the approach of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
which suggested that rather than submitting specific names we should
submit categories of persons who had been overheard, is a better
policy, would be more helpful to the district court in exercising its
discretion, and we would have no objection to following any reasonable policy that the district courts determine would be useful to them
in this regard." Tr. of Oral Arg., at 6-7.

..3-
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the authorization orders are facially insufficient, or that the
interception was not conducted in conformity with the orders.
Thus, only § 2518 (10) (a) (i) is relevant: were the communications "unlawfully intercepted" given the violations of
·§§ 2518 (1)(b) (iv) and 2518 (8) (d) 23
Resolution of that question must begin with United States
·v. Giordano, 416 U. S. 505 (1974), and United States v.
Chavez, 416 U. S. 562 (1974). Those cases hold that "[not]
,every failure to comply fully with any requirement provided
in Title III would render the interception of wire or ora1
communications 'unlawful.' " United States v. Chavez, 4~6
U. S., at 574-575. To the contrary, suppression is rcquirE)d
only for a "failure to satisfy any of those statutory requirements that directly and substantially implement the congressional intention to limit the use of intercept procedures
to those situations clearly calling for the employment of this
extraordinary device." United States v. Giordano, 416 U. S.,
at 527.
Giordano concerned the provision in Title III requiring
that an application for an intercept order be approved by
the Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney General specially designated by the Attorney General. Concluding that
Congress intended to condition the usc of wiretap procedures
~ on the judgment of senior officials in the Department
of Justice, the Court required suppression for failure to comply with the approval provision. Chavez concerned the statutory requirement that the application for an intercept order
specify the identity of the official authorizing the application. The problem in Chavez was one of misidentification;
although the application had in fact been authorized by the
Attorney General, the application erroneously identified an
The availability of the suppression remedy for these statutory,
as opposed to constitutional, violations, see n. 15 and 19, supra, tums
on the provisions of Title III rather than the judicially fashioned exclusionary rule aimed at deterring violations of Fourth Amendment
rights. United States v. Giordano, supra, 416 U. S., at 524.
23
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Assistant Attorney General as the official authorizing the
applica,tion. The Court concluded that mere misidentification of the official authorizing the application did not make
the application unlawful within the meaning of § 2518 (10)
(a) (i) since that identification requirement did not play a
"substantive role" in the regulatory system. 416 U. S.,
·at 578.
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals concluded that both
the identification requirement of § 2518 ( 1) (b) (iv) and
the notice requirement of § 2515 (8) (d) played a "central
role" in the statutory framework, and for that reason af'firmed the District Court's order suppressing relevant
evidence. Although both statutory requirements are undoubtedly important, we do not think that the failure to
comply fully with those provisions renders unlawful an intercept order that in all other respects satisfies the statutory
requirements.

A
As to § 2518 ( 1) (b) (iv), the issue is whether the identifi·cation in an intercept application of all those likely to be
overheard in incriminating conversations plays a "substantive role" with respect to judicial authorization of intercept
''orders and it consequently provides a limitation on the use
of intercept procedures. The statute provides that the issuing judge may approve an intercept application if he determines that normal investiga.tive techniques have failed or
are unlikely to succeed and there is probable cause to believe
that: (i) an individual is engaged in criminal activity,
(ii) particular communications concerning the offense will
be obtained through interception; and (iii) the target facilities are being used in connection with the specified criminal
activity. That determination is based on the "full and complete statement" of relevant facts supplied by law enforcement authorities. If, after evaluating the sta,t utorily
enumerated fa.ctors in light of the information contained in

.'
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the application, the judge concludes that the wiretap order
should issue, the failure to identify additional persons who
are likely to be overheard engaging in incriminating conversations could hardly invalidate an otherwise lawful judicial
authorization. The intercept order may issue only if the
i:ssuing judge determines that the statutory factors are present, and the failure to name additional targets in no way
detracts from the sufficiency of those factors.
This case is therefore unlike Giordano, where failure to
satisfy the statutory requirement of prior approval by speci~
ned. Justice Department officials bypassed a congressionally
imposed limitation on the use of the intercept procedure.
' The Court there noted that it was reasonable to believe
that requiring prior approval from senior officials in the
Justice Department "would inevitably foreclose resort to
wiretapping in various situations where investigative personnel would otherwise seek intercept authority from the court
and the court would very likely authorize its use." 416 U. S.,
at 528. Here, however, the statutorily imposed preconditions
't o judicial authorization were satisfied, and the issuing judge
was simply unaware that additional persons might be overbeard engaging in incriminating conversations. In no mean'ingful sense can it be said that the presence of that information as to additional targets would have precluded judicial
authorization of the intercept. 24 Rather, this case resembles
Chavez, where we held that a wiretap was not unlawful sim24 There is no suggestion in this ca.se that the Government agents
knowingly failed to identify respondents Donovan, Robbin s, and Buzzaco
for the purpose of keeping relevant information from the District Court
that might have prompted the court to conclude t hat probable cause
was lacking. If such a showing had been made, we would have a
different case. Nor is there any suggestion that as a result of the
failure to name these three respondents they were denied the ma.ndatory
inventory notice supplied to persons named in the application . 18
U. S. C. § 2518 (8) (d). Respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco
were among the 37 persons served wit h the intial inventory.
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ply because the issuing judge was incorrectly informed as
to which designated official had authorized the application.
The Chavez intercept was lawful because the Justice Department had performed its task of prior approval, and the
instant intercept is lawful because the application provided
sufficient information to enable the issuing judge to determine that the statutory preconditions were satisfied. 2 ~
Finally, we note that nothing in the legislative history
suggests that Congress intended this broad identification requirement to play "a central, or even functional, role in
guarding against unwarranted use of wiretapping or electronic
surveillance." United States v. Chavez, 416 U. S., at 578.
Neither S. 675 nor S. 2050, the predecessor bills of S. 971,
contained an identification provision. See p. 11, supra. The
only explanation given in the Senate Report for the in25

No one suggests that the failure to identify in a wiretap application
individuals who are "unknown" within the meaning of the statute, see
Kahn v. United States, 415 U. S. 143 (1974), require·· suppression of
intercepted conversations to which those individuals were parties. Though
recognizing that the failure to identify such an "unknown" individual
does not make unlawful an otherwise valid intercept order, respondents
Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco suggest that the opposite is true
with respect to the failure to identify in a wiretap application individuals who arc "known" within the meaning of the statute. Counsel
for these respondents suggested at oral argument that this difference
in result is justified by analogy to warrantless searches or arrests. Tr.
of Oral Arg., at 40. Although law enforcement officials can often take
action without a warrant when they have been unable to foresee the
circumstances that event.ually confronted them, they still must obtain a
search or arrest warrant when t.heir prior knowledge is sufficient to
establish probable cause. The major flaw in that. rca oning is that this
case does not concern warrantless action. Here, the omission on the part
of law enforcement authorities was not a failure to seek prior judicial
authorization, but a failure to identify every individual who could be
expected to be overheard engaging in incriminating conversations. That
the complete absence of prior judicial authorization would make an intercept unlawful has no bearing on tho lawfulness of an intercept order
that fails to identify every target.
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elusion of the broad identification provision was that it was
intended to reflect what Congress perceived to be the constitutional command of particularization. This explanation
was offered with respect to all the information required by
§ 2518 ( 1) ( 6) to be set out in an intercept application. No
additional guidance can be gleaned from the floor debates,
since ·they contain no substantive discussion of the identifi··cation provision. 26
B
We reach the ·same conclusion with respect to the Gov. ernment's duty to inform the judge of all identifiable persons
·whose co~wersations were intercepted. As noted earlier, the
version of Title III that emerged from the Senate Judiciary
Committee provided only for mandatory notice to the "persons ~1amed in the order of the application." The Senate
Report detailed the purpose of that provision:
"[T]he intent of the provision is that the principle
of postuse notice will be retained. · This provision alone
should insure the community that the techniques are
reasonably employed. Through its operation all authorized interceptions must eventually become 'known at least
2 a Even if we assume that Congress thought that a broad identification
requirem'i19t was constitutionally mandatea, it docs not follow that
'Congress imposed statutory suppression under §§ 2515 and 2518 (10) (a)
(i) as a sanction for noncompliance. In limiting use of the intercept procedure to "the most precise and discriminate circumstances," S. Rep. No.
T07, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 102 (1968), Congress required law enforcement
authorities to convince a District Court that probable cause existed to
believe that a specific person was committing a specific offense using a
· specific telephone. This requirement was satisfied here when the applica. tion set forth sufficient information to indicate that the primary targets
were conducting a gambling business over four particular telephones .
Nothing in the legislative history indicates that Congress intended to
· declare an otherwise constitutional intercept order "unlawful" under
·§ 2518 (10) (a) (i)-resulting in suppression under § 2515-for failure to
name additional targets.
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to the subject. He can then seek appropriate civil redress, for example, under section 2520 . . . if he feels
that his privacy has been unlawfully invaded." S. Rep.
No. 107, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 105 (1968).
The floor discussion concE-rning the amendment adding the
provision for discretionary notice merely indicates an intent
to provide notice to such additional persons as may be
constitutionally required.
Nothing in the structure of the Act or this legislative
history suggests that incriminating conversations are "unlawfully intercepted" whenever parties to those conversations
do not receive discretionary inventory notice as a result of
the Government's failure to inform the District Court of their
identities. At the time inventory notice was served on the
other identifiable persons, the intercept had been completed
and the conversations had been "seized" under a valid intercept order. The fact that discretionary notice reached
39 rather than 41 identifiable persons does not in itself mean
that the conversations were unlawfully intcrcepted. 27
The legislative history indicates that postintercept notice
was designed instead to assure the community that the
wiretap technique is reasonably employed. But even recog27 Counsel for respondents Merlo and Lauer conceded at oral argument
that the failure to name those respondents in the proposed inventory
order was not intentional, and we arc then•fore not called upon to decide
whether suppression would be an available remedy if the Government
knowingly sought to prevent the District Court from serving inventory
notice on particular parties. Nor does this case present an opportunity to
comment upon the suggestion, recognized by the United States, Brief, at
49 n. 40, that suppre;;sion might be required if the agents knew before
the interception that no inventory would be served.
Moreover, respondents Merlo and Lauer were not prejudiced by their
failure to receive postintercept notice under either of the District Court's
in,ventory orders. As noted earlier, the Government made available to
all defendants the intercept orders, applications, and related papers. See
n·:@, supra. And in response to pretrial discovery motions, the GovernJ;Uent produced transcripts of the intercepted conversations.

...
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nizing that Congress placed considerable emphasis on that
aspect of the overall statutory scheme, we do not think that
postintercept notice was intended to serve as an independent
~estraint on resort to the wiretap procedure. 28

IV
Although the Government was required to identify respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco in the December 26
application for an extension of the initial intercept, failure
to do so in the circumstances here presented did not warrant
suppression under § 2518 (10) (a) (i). Nor was suppression
j'ustified with respect to respondents Merlo and Lauer simply
because the Government inadvertently omitted their names
from the comprehensive list of all id'entifiable persons whose
conversations had been overheard. We hold that this is the
correct result under the provisions of Title III, but we reemphasize the suggestion we made in United States v. Chavez,
that "strict adherence by the Government to the provisions of
Title III would nonetheless be more in keeping with the
responsibilities Congress has imposed upon it when authority to engage in wiretapping· or electronic surveillance is
~ought." 416 U. S., at 580.
. The order of the Court of Appeals is reversed· and the case
is remanded to that court for further proceedings in accord
with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

zs Although the possibiliW qf subsequent civil suits to redress unwarqm1.ed invasions of priyacy ·functions in a broad sense to check excessive
u;se of intercepts, that role is at best minor and indirect.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents issues concerning the construction of
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Cory rol and Safe Streets
Act of 1968, 18 U. S. C. §§ 2~10-252Q,( _ S~ifie~~st
- d~ide-w:llether-l.g...:g. &. C. 1!2518 OJ (5~7requircs
·the Government to include m its wiretap applications "the
· identity of the person, if known, committing the offense,
. and whose conversations are to be intercept~';( is satisfied
when the Government identifies only the "principal targets"
of the intercept. Second, we must decide whether the Government has a statutory responsibility to inform the issuing
judge of the identities of persons whose conversations were
overheard in the course of the interception, thus enabling
him to decide whether they should be served with notice of
the interception pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (8)(d).
And finally, we must determine whether failure to comply
fully with these statutory provisions requires suppression of
evidence under 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (10) (a).
I

On November 28, 1972, a special agent of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation applied to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio for an order
authorizing a wiretap interception in accordance with Title
III ~f tfie~rl;m -GR.w.~ Gout~l~ti'eet&· A:et-ef~

'
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1968, 18 U. 8.- G. §-§-2810 2500. 1 The application requested
.authorization to intercept gambling-rela.ted communica.tions
over two telephones at one address in North Olmstead, Ohio,
The wiretap :~pplication procedure is set forth at 18 U. S. C. § 2518
{ 1), which provides:
"(1) Each application for an order authorizing or approving the interception of a wire or oral communication shall be made in writing upon
;oath or affirmation to a judge of competent jurisdiction and shall state
the applicant's authority to make such application. Each application
shall include the following information:
"(a) the identity of the investigative or law enforcement officer making
<the application, and the ofiicer authorizing the application;
"(b) a full and complete statement of the facts and circumstances relied
·upon by the applicant, to justify his belief that an order should be issued,
including (i) details as to the particular offense that has been, is being, or
is about to be committed, (ii) a particular description of the nature and
location of the facilities from which or the place where the communication is to be intercPptcd, (iii) a paraticular description of the type of
communications sought to be intercepted, (iv) the identity of the person,
if known, committing the offense and whose communications are to be
intercepted;
" (c) a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investi. gative procedurrs have been tried and failed or why they reasonably
appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous;
" (d) a statement of the period of time for which the interception is
required to be maintained. If the nature of the investigation is such
1hat the authorization for interception should not automatirally tPrminate when the described ty])e of communication has been first obtained,
·a particular description of facts establishing probable cause to believe that
. additional communications of the same type will occur thrrr.after;
" (e) a full and complete statement of the facts concerning all previous
applications known to the individual authorizing and making the application, made to any judge for authorization to intercept, or for approval
. of interceptions of, wire or oral communications involving any of the
same persons, facilities or places specifiPd in the application, and the
.,action taken by the judge on each such application; and
"(f) where the application is for the extmsion of :~n order, a statement
setting forth the results thus far obtained from the interception, or a
reasonable explanation of the failure to obtain such results."
The issuing judge is free to require the applicant to furnish additional
information. 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (2).
1
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and two other telephones at a home in Canton, Ohio. The
accompanying affidavit recited that the telephones were being
used by Albert Kotoch, Joseph Spaganlo, and George Florea
to conduct an illegal gambling business, and that in conducting that business they would place ~ calls to
and receive teie~e calls from various persons, three of
whom were also named in the wiretap application. 2 The
affiiant also stated that the Government's informants would
refuse to testify agaihst the persons named in the application, that telephone records alone would be insufficient to
support a gambling conviction, and that normal investigative techniques were unlikely to be fruitful. Pursuant to
the Government's request, the District Court authorized for
a period of 15 days the interception of gambling-related
wire communications of Kotoch, Spaganlo, Florea, three
named individuals other than the respondents, and "others
as yet unknown,"· to and from the four listed telephones. 3
2 The affidavit set forth extensive information indicating that the named
individuals were conducting a gambling operation. This information was
derived from physical surveillance by agents of the FBI, an examination
of telephone company· toll records, and the personal observations of six
informants, whose past reliability also was detailed in the affidavit.
3 The District Court's order was issued pursuant 18 U. S. C. §§ 2518
(3), (4) which provide:
"(3) Upon such application the judge may enter an ex parte order,
as requested or as modified', authorizing or approving interception of wire
or oral communications within the territorial jurisdiction of the court
in which the judge is sitting, if the judge determines on the basis of the
facts submitted by the applicant that" (a) there is probable cause for belief that an individual is committing,
has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense enumerated in
section 2516 of this chapter;
"(b) there is probable cause for belief that particular communications
concerning that offense will be obtained through such interception;
" (c) norma.] investigative procedures have been tried and have failed
or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too
dangerous;
" (d) there is probable cause for belief that the facilities from which,
or the place where, the wire or oral communications are to be intercepted

v-
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During the course of the wiretap, the Government learned
that respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco were discussing illegal gambling activities with the named subjects.
On December 26, 1972, the Government applied for an
extension of the initial intercept order.4 This time it sought
authorization to intercept gambling-related conversations of
Kotoch, Spaganlo, Florea, two other named individuals, and
"others as yet unknown," but it did not identify respondents
are being used, or arc a'bout to be used, in connection with the commission of such offense, or are leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly
used by such person.
" (4) Each order authorizing or approving the interception of any wire
or oral communication shall spec'ify" (a) the identity of the person, if known, whose communications are
to be intercepted;
"(b) the nature and location of the communications facilities as to
which, or the place where, authority to intercept is granted;
" (c) a particular description of the type of communication sought to
be intercepted, and a statement of the particular offense to which it
relates;
" (d) the identity of the agency authorized to intercept the communications, and of the person authorizing the application; and
"(e) the period of time during which such interception is authorized,
including a statement as to whether or not the interception shall automatically terminate when the described communication has been first
obtained."
4 In addition to the December 26 application requesting an extension
of the initial intercept order, the Government also filed on that date a
separate application seeking authorization to monitor a third telephone
discovered at the same North Olm tead address. Both applications were
accompanied by another affidavit setting forth the results of the initial
monitoring, the manner in which the third phone was discovered, the
facts indicating that the newly discovered telephone was being used to
conduct a gambling business, and reasons why continued interception was
necessary. A copy of the affidavit filed on November 28 was also
attached to the December 26 applications. For the sake of clarity, the
two applications filed on December 26 will be treated as a single
application.
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Donovan, Buzzaco, and Robbins in this second application. 5
The District Court again authorized interception of gamblingrelated conversations for a maximum of 15 days.
On February 21, 1973, the Government submitted to the
District Court a proposed order giving notice of the interceptions to 37 persons, a group which the Government apparently thought included all individuals who could be identified as having discussed gambling over the monitored
telephones. 6 The District Court signed the proposed order,
and an inventory notice was served on the listed persons,
including respondents Donovan, Buzzaco, and Robbins. ' On
September 11, 1973, after the Government submitted the
names of two additional persons whose identities(hadJallegedly
been inadvertent y orrutte from the initial list~e District
Court entere an amended order giving notice to those
individuals. As a result of what the Government labels
"administrative oversight," respondents Merlo and Lauer

J

5 The United' States conceded in the Court of Appeals that respondents Donovan and Robbins were "known" within the mcannig of the
statute at the time of the December 26 application, but challenged as
clearly erroneous the District Court's finding that respondent Buzzaco was
"known" at that time. The Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's
finding, and the United States has not sought review of that disposition.
Thus, for our purposes, all three respondents were "known" on December 26.
6 An inventory notice must be served within a designated period of
_,___ _Jm
- tN;o athe persons nan1cd in the order or the application." 18 U. S. C.
§ 2518 (8) (d). The inventory must give notice of the entry of the intercept order or application, state the disposition of the application, and
indicate whether communications were or were not intercepted. Ibid.
Upon the filing of a motion, the judge has discretion to malm available
the intercepted communications, the applications, and the orders. Ibid.
Title III also authorizes the District Court to cause an inventory notice to be served on "other parties to intercepted communications" if the
judge determines that such notice is in the interest of justice. Ibid.
Those other parties may also be given access to the intercepted communications, the applications, and the orders. Ibid.
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included in either list of names and were never
serve w1t inventory notice. 7
On November 1, 1973, an indictment was returned in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio charging Kotoch, Spaganlo, the five respondents, and
10 other individuals with conspiracy to conduct and conducting a gambling business in violation of 18 U. S. C. §§ 371
and 1955. The five respondents filed motions to suppress
evidence derived from the wire interception. After an evidentiary hea.ring on the motions, the District Court suppressed as to respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco
all evidence derived from the December 26 intercept order
on the ground that failure to identify them by name in the
application and order of that date violated 18 U. S. C. §§ 2518
(1)(b)(iv) and 2518 (4)(a). With respect to Merlo and
Lauer, who were not known to the Government until after
the December 26 application, the District Court suppressed
all evidence derived from both intercept orders on the ground
that they had not been served with inventory notice.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
513 F. 2d 337 (1975). 8 On the identification issue, the
court held that the wiretap application must identify every
person whose conversations relating to the subject criminal
activity the Government has probable cause to believe it
will intercept. Agreeing with the District Court that at the
time of the December 26 application the Government had

. /2~------~--~~

7 Although respondents Merlo and Lauer were not served with inventory notice pursuant to § 2518 (8) (d), the intercept orders, applications,
and related papers were made available to all the de.fendant.s, including
Merlo and Lauer, on November 26, 1973. Thus, the introduction into
evidence at trial of the contents of the intercepted conversations and
evidence derived therefrom would not be prohibited by 18 U. S. C. § 2518
~
' (9). Seen. 19, infra.
8 The Government filed its appeal from the District Court's order su pressing evidence under 18 U. S. C. § 3731, and there has
een
no trial on the charges with respect to the respondents.
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probable cause to believe that it would overhear Donovan,
Robbins, and Buzzaco "committing the offense," the Court
of Appeals affirmed the suppression of evidence derived from
the December 26 order. On the notice question, it held
that the Governm~t has an implied statutory duty to infbrm the issuing j'udge of the identities of the parties whose
conversations were overheard so that he can determine
whether discretionary inventory notice should be required. 9
Because the Government had failed to perform this duty
with respect to Merlo and Lauer, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the District Court's order suppressing evidence
derived from both intercept orders. The court found it unnecessary to determine whether the failure to identify repondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco in the December
26 application and to name respondents Merlo and Lauer
in the proposed inventory notice orders was inadvertent or
purposeful, since the mere fact of omission was sufficient to
require suppression under 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (10) (a). 10
We granted certiorari to resolve these issues, which concern
the construction of a major federal statute, 421 U. S. 907,
and now reverse.
II
The United States contends that § 2518 (1)(b)(iv) requires that a wiretap application identify only the principal
Seen. 6, supra.
18 U. S. C. § 2518 (10) (a) provides in pertinent part:
"(10) (a) Any aggrieved person in any trial, hearing, or proceeding
in or before any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or
other authority of the United Sta.tes, a State, or a political subdivision
thereof, may move to suppress the contents of any intercepted wire or
oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, on the grounds that"(i) the communication was unl::twfully intercepted;
"(ii) the order of authorization or approval under which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face; or
"(iii) the interception was not made in conformity with the order of
authorization or approval."
9

10
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target of the interception, and that § 2518 (8) (d) does not
require the Government to provide the issuing judge with
a list of all identifiable persons who were overheard in the
course of an authorized interception. We think neither contention is sound.
A
We turn first to the identification requirements of § 2518
(1)(b) (iv). That provision requires a wiretap application
to specify "the identity of the person, if known, committing
the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted."
In construing that language, this Court already has ruled
that the Government is not required to identify an individual
in the application unless it has probable cause to believe
(i) that the individual is engaged in the criminal activity
under investigation and (ii) that the individual's conversations will be intercepted over the target telephone. United
States v. Kahn, 415 U. S. 143 (1974). The question at issue
here is whether the Government is required to name all
such individua.ls. 11
The United States argues that the most reasonable mEvery Court of Appeals that has considered the issue concluded that
. t:tn individual whose conversations probably will be intercepted by a wiretap must be identified in the wiretap application if the law enforcrment
:authorities have probable cause to believe the individual is committing
-the offense for which the wiretap is sought. United States v. Chiarizio,
525 F. 2d 289, 292 (CA2 1975); United Stat es v. Bernstein, 509 F. 2d
996 (CA4 1975) , petition for cert. filed, No. 74-1486; Unit ed States v.
Doolittle, 507 F. 2d 1368, aff'd en bane, 518 F. 2d 500 (CA5 1975),
petitions for cert. filed Nos. 75-500, 75-509, 75-513; Unit ed States v.
Kilgore, 518 F. 2d 496 (CA5 1975), petition for cert. filed, No. 75-963;
Unit ed States v. Civella, 533 F. 2d 1395 (CA8 1976) ; Unit ed States v.
Kir-k, 534 F. 2d 1262 (CA8 1976); United States v. Russo, 527 F. 2d
1150, 1156 (CAlO 1975), petition for cert. filed, No. 75-1218. See also
Unit ed States v. Moore, U. S. App. D. C. - , 513 F. 2d 485, 493494 (1975) (interpreting 23 D. C. Code 547 (a) (2), which is almost
identical to the provision at issue here).
A number of these courts have concluded, and respondents Donovan,
RoBbins, and Buzzaco argue, that our decision in United States v. Kahn,
11
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terpretation of the plain language of the statute is that the
application must identify only the principal target of the
investigation, who "will almost always be the individual
whose phone is monitored. 12 Brief for the United States,
at 18. Under this interpretation, if the Government has
reason to believe that an individual will use the target
telephone to place or receive calls, and the Government
has probable cause to believe that the individual is engaged
i:ri the criminal activity under investigation, the individual
qualifies as a principal target and must be named in the
wiretap application. On the other hand, an individual who
uses a different telephone to place calls to or receive calls
from the target telephone is not a principal target even if
the Government has probable cause to believe that the
individual is engaged in the criminal activity under investigation. In other words, whether one is a principal target
of the investigation depends on whether one operates the
target telephone to place or receive calls. 13
415 U. S. 143 (1974), resolved this identification issue. See United States
v. Chairizio, supra; United States v. Moore, supra. Although there is
language in Kahn suggesting that wiretap applications must identify all
such individuals, the identification question presented here was not before
us in Kahn. The question in that case was whether a wiretap applica--....--"".....
on- o identify a known user of the target telephone whose complicity in the criminal activity under investigation was not known at
the time of the application. Kahn is a relevant, though not controlling,
precedent.
12 The United States does not suggest that regardless of the factual
circumstances a wiretap application must identify only a single individual.
To the contrary, it concedes that if two or more persons are using the
target telephone "equally" to commit the o.ffensc, and thus are "equillly"
targets of the investigation, "all must be named." Brief for the United
States, at 18 n. 13.
18 Counsel for the United States explained this position succinctly at
oral argument: "The critical distinction ... is one between the users of
the telephone that is being monitored on the one hand, and all other persons throughout the world who may converse from unmonitored phones
on the other hand." Tr. of Oral Arg., at 13.
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Whatever the merits of such a statutory scheme, we find
little support for it in the la.nguage and structure of Title
III or in the legislative history. The statutory language
itself refers only to "the person, if known, committing the
offense and whose communications arc to be intercepted."
That description is as applicable to a suspect placing calls
to the target telephone as it is to a suspect placing calls
·e-t telephone. It is true, as the United States
from
suggests, that when read in the context of the other subdivisions of § 2518 ( 1) (b), an argument can be made that
Congress focused in subdivision (iv) on the primary user
of the target telephone. But it is also clear from other
sections of the statute that Congress expected that wiretap
applications would name more than one individual. For
example, Title III requires that inventory notice be served
upon "the persons named in the order or the application."
18 U. S. C. § 2518 (8) (d) (emphasis added). And § 2518
( 1) (c) requires that an intercept application disclose all
previous intercept applications "involving any of the same
pe1·sons ... specified in the application'; (emphasis added).
It may well be that Congress anticipated that a given
application would cover more than one telephone or that
several suspects would usc one telephone, and that an application for those reasons alone would require identification
of more than one individuaL But nothing on the face of
the statute suggests that Congress intended to remove from
the identification requirement those suspects whose intercepted communications originated on a telephone other than
that listed in the wiretap application. 14
Indeed, the contrary conclusion is suggested by the fact that identification of an individual in an application for an intercept order
'triggers other statutory provisions. First -51 ( 1) (e) reqmres an mtercept application to disclose all previous applications "involving any
of the same persons . . . specified in the application." To the extent
thaL Congress thought it necessary to provide the issuing judge with
14
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Nor can we find supE_or for the "principal target" interpretation m the legiSlative istor . Title III originated as
a combination o
ederal Wire Interception
Act, which was introduced by Senator McClellan several
months prior to this Court's decision in Berg ~r v. New York,
388 U.S. 41 (1967), and S. 2050, the Electronic Surveillance
Control Act of 1967. introduced by Senator Hruska a few
c;fays after the Berger decision. Both bills required that
wiretap applications include a full and complete statement
of the facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant
and specification of the nature and location of the communication facilities involved. Although neither bill contained
an express identification requirement such as that at issue
here, both bills required the application to include "a full
and complete statement of the facts concerning all previous
applications ... involving any person named in the application as committing, having committed, or being about to
commit an offPnse." Hearings on Controlling Crime Through
More Effective Law Enforcement Before the Subcommittee
on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., at 77, § 8 (a) (3) and
1066, § 2518 (a)(4) (1967) (emphasis added). Thus, even
at this early stage, it was recognized that an application
could identify several individuals, and there is no indication
that the identification would be limited to principal targets.
While S. 971 , the bill that combined the major provisions
~f S. 675 and S. 2050. and that eventually was enacted, was
pending before the Senate Judiciary Committee, this Court desuch information, there is no indication of congressional intent to require
provision of such information only if a suspect operated from one end
of a telephone line. Second, § 2518 (8) (d) mandates thai! an mventory notice be served upon "the persons named in the order or the
application." As with § 2518 (1) (e), the congressional purpose would
~ot be served by limiting that notice on the basis of the telephone from
which one speaks.
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cided Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).. S. 971 was
then redrafted to conform to Katz as well as Berger, and
the identification provision was added at that time. The
Senate Report states that the requirements set forth in the
various subdivisions of § 2518 (1) (b), including the identification requirement at issue here," [were] intended to reflect the__
constitutional command of particularization." S. Rep. No.
1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 101 (1968), citing Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41, 58-60, and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 354-356 (1967). The United States now contends that
although it may be that Congress read Berger and Katz to
re-quire, as a constitutional ·matter, that the su Ject o
e
surveillance be named if known, Congress "would hardly
have read those cases as requiring the naming of all parties
likely to be overheard . . . . " 15 Brief, at 25-26. The difficulty with· that argument is that the legislative hi~ fails
·to indicate that Congress was thinking in terms of subjects'
of surveillance, or that Congress considered "S'fibjects of
surveillance to be the principal users of the target telephone.
Moreover, to the extent that Congress thought it was
meeting the constitutional commands of particularization es-tablished in B~ger and Katz, Congress may have read those
cases as manda;ting a broad identification requirement. The
statute that we confronted ·in Berger required identification
At the time of the enactment of Title III, Congress did not
·have before it the view we· expressed on this issue in United States
v. Kahn, 415 U. S., at 155 n. 15. The Fourth Amendment requires
specification of "the place to be seached, and the persons or things to
be seized." In the wiretap context, those requirements are satisfied
by identification of the telephone line to be tapped and the particular
conversations to be seized. It is not a constitutional requirement that
all those likely to be overheard engaging in incriminating conversations
be named. Specification of this sort "identif[ies] the person whose constitutionally protected area is to be invaded rather than 'particularly
describing' the communications, conversations, or discussions to be seized."
B-erger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967).
15
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of "the person or persons" whose communic
be overheard. 388 U. S., at 59. And we
..that that provision "[did] no more than iden
whose constitutionally protected area is to be
~-Ibid. Given the statute at issue in Berger an
: ~pon, it, Congress may have concluded that

tions were to·
pressly noted
'fy the person
nvaded .... "
our comment
-~

)~

~:rrra:t-t~l±~~e-.t~

. all suspects rather than just the primary user.H'
In any event, for our present purposes it is unnecessary
to speculate as to exactly how Congress interpreted Berger
... and Katz with respect to the identification issue. It is suf·..ficient to note that in response to those decisions Congress
··included an identification requirement which on its face draws
no distinction based on the telephone one uses, and the
· United States points to no evidence in the legislative history
:. that supports such a distinction. Indeed, the legislative rna. terials apparently contain no use of the term "principal target" or any discussion of a different treatment based on the
, telephone from which a suspect speaks. 17 We therefore conclude that a wiretap application must name an individual
'if the Government has probable cause to believe that the
16 That Congress may have so understood the constitutional require·.men.t is also suggested by the portion of the Senate Report dealing with
that provision of S. 971 that required the intercept order to identify
"the person, if known, whose conversations are to be intercepted." The
Senate Report merely cites West v. Cabell, 153 U. S. 78 (1894), which
concerns the need for proper identification of the subject of an arrest
warrant. S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 102 (1968). To the
extent that Congress may have considered West to a.pply to wiretap
orders, we have no reason to believe that Congress considered its applicability to extend only to those suspects using the target telephone.
1 7 At least one Senator read the identification, requirement in S. 971 to
parallel the identi~tion requirement contained in the statute at issue
in Berger v. New Y orlc: "Specificity is required as to the person or
persons whose communications are to be intercepted." 114 Cong. Rec.,
at 14763 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Percy).

,..

'.
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individual is engaged in the criminal activity under investigation and expects to intercept the individual's conversations over the target telephone.

B
The other statutory prov1s10n at issue in this case is
18 U. S. C. §.:.2518 (8)(d) , which provides that the judge
shall cause to be served on the persons named in the order
or application an inventory, which must give notice of the
·· entry of the order or appiication , state the disposition of
· the application, and indicate whether communications were
intercepted. 18 Although the statute mandates the provision
of that inventory notice only to persons named in the application or the order, the statute also provides that the judge
may provide similar notice to other parties to intercepted
communications if he concludes that such action is in the
interest of justice. 1 0 Observing that this notice provision
does not expressly require law · enforcement authorities
routinely to provide the judge with any specific information
upon which to exercise his discretion, the United States contends that it would be inappropriate to read such a require1 8 The inventory notice must be served within a reasonable time but
· not lator than 90 days after the date the application for an intercept
order was filed. On an ex parte showing of good cause, service of the
inventory may be postponed.
1 0 In addition to these provisions for mandatory and discretionary
inventory notice, Title III prohibits the introduction into evidence at
trials and certain other proceedin'gs of the contents of an intercept
and evidence derived therefrom unless each party has been furnished
.. with copies of the application and order under which the interception
was authorized . 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (9). Moreover, at the expiration
~. of any intercept the Government is required to supply the issuing judge
with recordings of the intercepted conversations, which are to be sealed
'· according to his directions. iS U. S. C. § 2518 (8) (a). The New York
statute held unconstitutional in B erger v. N ew York, was criticized by
this Court for its failure to include provisions of this sort. 388 U. S.,
at 60.
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ment into the statute since the judge has the option of
asking the law enforcement authorities for whatever information he requires.
Our reading of the legislative history of the discretionary
notice provision in light of the purposes of Title III leads
us to reject the Government's interpretation. As reported
from the Judiciary Committee, section 2518 (8) (d) contained
only a provision mandating notice to the persons named in
the application or the order; the discretionary notice provision was added by amendment on the floor of the Senate.
In introducing that amendment, Senator Hart explained its
purpose:
"The amendment would give the judge who issued the
order discretion to require notice to be served on other
parties to intercepted conversations, even though such
parties are not specifically named in the court order.
The Berger and Katz decisions established that notice
of surveillance is a constitutional requirement of any
surveillance statute. It may be that the required notice must be served on all parties to intercepted communications. Since legitimate interests of privacy may
make such notice to all parties undesirable, the amendment leaves the final determination to the judge." 114
Cong. Rec. 14485-14486 (1968). 20
20 It is worth noting that shortly before Senator Hart proposed this
amendment to S. 971, Senator Long had read to the Senate portions
of a report prepar<>d by ~_!le Association of the Bar of the City of
t at parties
New York on federal wiretij) legislation. That report
to interce ted conversations other than those named in the application
or order hould proba y be served with inventory noLice, but it also recognized t mt under some circumstances the provision of such notice
could be harmful and gave the following example:
"A, a business111an, talks to his customers, and the latter are served
with papers showing that A is being bugged[.] [T]he damage to confidence in A and to A's reputation in general may damage A unjustly.
In this case it would seem that the customers should not be served with
the inventory." 114 Cong. Rec. 14476 (1968).
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In deciding whether legitimate privacy interests justify withholding inventory notice from parties to intercepted conversations, a judge is likely to require information and assistance
beyond that contained in the application papers and the
recordings of intercepted conversations made available by
law enforcement authorities. No purpose is served by holding that those authorities have no routine duty to supply
the judge with revelant information. The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit recently confronted this problem of
dual responsibility, and we adopt the balanced construction
that court placed on § 2518 (8)(d):
"To discharge this obligation the judicial officer must
have, at a minimum, knowledge of the particular categories into which fall all the individuals whose conversations have been intercepted. Thus, while precise identification of each party to an intercepted conversation
is not required, a description of the general class, or
.ciasses, which they comprise is essential to enable the
judge to determine whether additional information is
necessary for a proper evaluation of the interests of the
various parties. Furthermore, although the judicial officer has the duty to cause the filing of the inventory
[notice], it is abundantly clear that the prosecution has
greater access to and familiarity with the intercepted
communications. Therefore we feel justified in imposing
upon the latter the duty to classify all those whose
conversations have been intercepted, and to transmit
this information to the judge. Should the judge desire
more information regarding these classes in order to
exercise his statutory § 2518 (8)(d) discretion, ... the
government is also required to furnish such informa.tion
as is available to it." United States v. Chun, 503 F.
2d 533, 540 (1974). 21
·21 The current policy of the Department of Justice is to provide
the issuing judge with the name of every person who has been over-
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We agree with the Ninth Circuit that this allocation of
:r:esponsibility best serves the purposes of Title II!. 22

III
We turn now to the question whether the District Court
properly suppressed evidence derived from the wiretaps at
issue solely because of the failure of the law enforcement
authoritis to comply fully with the provisions of §§ 2518 (1)
(b)(iv) and 2518 (8) (d). Section 2515 expressly prohibits
the use at trial, and at certain other proceedings, of the
contents of any intercepted wire communication or any evidence derived therefrom "if the disy'closure of that information would be in violation of this chapter." The circumstances that trigger suppression under § 2515 are in turn
enumerated in § 2518 (10) (a):
"(i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted;
"(ii) the order of authorization or approval under
which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face; or
" (iii) the interception was not made in conformity
with the order of authorization or approval."
There is no basis on the facts of this case to suggest that
heard as to whom there is any reasonable possibility of indictment.
Brief for the United States, at 39. This policy docs not meet the test
specified above. Moreover, where, as here, the Gov'ernment chooses to
supply the issuing judge with a list of all identifiable. p0rsons rather
than a description of the classes into which those persons fall, the list
________...,
must be complete.
~~ J.
22 At oral argument, counsel for the United States p..x:ac+i~nlcy cancedea--zr- ( ~r~r-'"'the merit of the approach specified in United States v. Chun:
'·'Perlmps the approach of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
which suggested that rather than submitting specific names we should
submit categories of persons who had been overheard, is a better
policy, would be more helpful to the district court in exercising its
discretion, and we would have no objection to following any rt>asonable policy that the district courts determine would be useful to them
in this regard." Tr. of Oral Arg., at 6-7.
l...__- - - --

f
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the authorization orders are facially insufficient, or that the
interception was not conducted in conformity with the orders.
Thus, only § 2518 (10) (a) (i) is relevant: were the communications "unlawfully intercepted" given the violations of
§§ 2518 (1)(b)(iv) and 2518 (8)(d). 23
Resolution of that question must begin with United States
v. Giordano, 416 U. S. 505 (1974), and United States v.
'Chavez, 416 U. S. 562 (1974). Those cases hold that "[not]
every failure to comply fully with any requirement provided
in Title III would render the interception of wire or oral
communications 'unlawful.) " United States v. Chavez, 416
U. S., at 574- 575. To the contrary, suppress1oi1 is required
only for a "failure to satisfy any of those statutory requirements that directly and substantially 'implement the congressional intention to limit the use of intercept procedures
to those situations clearly calling for the employment of this
extraordinary device." 'United States v. Giordano, 416 U. S.,
at 527.
Giordano concerned the provision in Title III requiring
that an application for an intercept order be approved by
the Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney General specially designated by the Attorney General. Concluding that
~
?ong,ress intended to condition the use of wiretap procedures
~ on the judgment of senior officials in the Department
of Justice, the Court required suppression for failure to comply with the approval provision. Chavez concerned the statutory requirement that the application for an intercept order
specify the identity of the official authorizing the application. The problem in Chavez was one of misidentification;
although the application had in fact been authorized by the
Attorney General, the a.pplication erroneously identified an
23 The availabili1Jy of the suppression remedy for these statutory,
: as opposed to constitutional, violations, see n. 15 and 19, supra, turns
· on the provisions of Title III rather than the judicially fashioned exclusionary rule aimed at deterring violations of Fourth Amendment
~rights. United States v. Giordano, supra, 416 U. S., at 524.
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Assistant Attorney General as the official authorizing the
application. The Court concluded that mere misidentification of the official authorizing the application did not make
the application unlawful within the meaning of § 2518 (10)
(a) (i) since that identification requirement did not play a
usubstantive role" in the regulatory system. 4 16 U. S.,
at 578.
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals concluded that both
the identification requirement of § 2518 (1)(b)(iv) and
the notice requirement of § 2515 (8)(d) played a "central
role" in the statutory framework, and for that reason affirmed the District Court's order suppressing relevant
evidence. Although both statutory requirements are undoubtedly important, we do not think that the failure to
comply fully with those provisions renders unlawful an intercept order that in all other respects satisfies the statutory
requirements.

A
As to § 2518 ( 1) (b) (iv), the issue is whether the identification in an intercept application of all those likely to be
overheard in incriminating conversations plays a "substan- ~,~
tive role" with respect to judicial authorization of intercept/~~
~<Wfs ana@) consequently )3i"e'~ a limitation on the use
·
of intercept procedures. The statute provides that the issuing judge may approve an intercept application if he determines that normal investigative techniques have failed or
are unlikely to succeed and there is probable cause to believe
that: (i) an individual is engaged in criminal activity,
(ii) particular communications concerning the offense will
be obtained through interception; and (iii) the target facilities are being used in connection with the specified criminal
activity. That determination is based on the "full and complete statement" of relevant facts supplied by law enforcement authorities. If, after evaluating the statutorily
enumerated factors in light of the information contained in

'·.
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the application, the judge concludes that the wiretap order
should issue, the failure to identify additional persons who
are likely to be overheard engaging in incriminating conversations could hardly invalidate an otherwise lawful judicial
authorization. The intercept order may issue only if the
issuing judge determines that the statutory factors are present, and the failure to name additional targets in no way
detracts from the sufficiency of those factors.
This case @ ~f.ef>etunlike Giordano, where failure to
satisfy the statutory requirement of prior approval by specified Justice Department officials bypassed a congressionally
imposed limitation on the use of the intercept procedure.
The Court there noted that it was reasonable to believe
that requiring prior approval from senior officials in the
Justice Department "would inevitably foreclose resort to
wiretapping in various situations where investigative personnel would otherwise seek intercept authority from the court
·a nd the court would very likely authorize its use.'' 416 U. S.,
at 528. Here, however, the statutoriiy imposed preconditions
to judicial authorization were satisfied, and the issuing judge
was simply una.wa.re that additional persons might be over-heard engaging in incriminating conversations. In no meaningful sense can it be said that the presence of that information as to additionai targets would have precluded judicial
authorization of the 1ntercept. 24 Rather, this case resembles
Chavez, where we held that a wiretap was not unlawful sim24 There is no suggestion in this case that the Government agents
Rnowingly failed to identify respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco
for the purpose of keeping relevant information from the District Court
that might have prompted the court to conclude that probable cause
was lacking. If such a showing had been made, we would have a
d'ifTerent case. Nor is there any suggestion that. as a result of the
failure to name these three respondents they were denied the mandatory
inventory notice supplied to persons named in the application. 18
U. S. C. § 2518 (8) (d). Respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco
were among the 37 persons served with the intial inventory.
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ply because the issuing judge was incorrectly informed as
to which designated official had authorized the application.
The Chavez intercept was lawful because the Justice Department had performed its task of prior approval, and the
instant intercept is lawful because the application provided
sufficient information to enable the issuing judge to determine that the statutory preconditions were satisfied.:!5
Finally, we note that nothing in the legislative histol'y
suggests that Congress intended this broad identification requirement to play "a central, or even functional, role in
guarding against unwarranted use of wiretapping or electronic
surveillance." United States v. Chavez, 416 U. S., at 578.
Neither S. 675 nor S. 2050, the predecessor bills of S. 971,
contained an identification provision. See p. 11, supra. The
oniy explanation given in the Senate Report for the in25 No one suggests that the failure to identify in a wiretap application
individuals who are "unknown" within the meaning of the statute, see
Kahn v. United States, 415 U. S. 143 (1974), requires suppression of
intercepted conversations to which those individuals were parties. Though
recognizing that the failure to identify such an "unknown" individual
does not make unlawful an otherwise valid intercept order, respondents
Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco suggest that the opposite is true
with respect to the failure to identify in a wiretap application individuals who are "!mown" within the meaning of the statute. Counsel
for these respondents suggested at oral argument that this difference
in result is justified by analogy to warrantless searches or arrests. Tr.
of Oral Arg., at 40. Although law enforcement officials can often take
action without a warrant when they have been unable to foresee the
circumstances that eventually confronted them, they still must obtain a
search or arrest warrant when their prior knowledge is sufficient to
establish probable cause. The major flaw in that reasoning is that this
case docs not concern warrantless action. Here, the omission on the part
of law enforcement authorities was not a failure to seek prior judicial
authorization, but a failure to identify every individual who could be
expected to be overheard engaging in incriminating conversations. That
the complete absence of prior judicial authorization would make an intercept unlawful has no bearing on the lawfulness of an intercept order
that fails to identify every target.
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elusion of the broad identification provision was that it was
intended to reflect what Congress perceived to be the constitutional command of particularization. This explanation:
was offered with respect to all the information required by
§ 2518 (1) (6) to be set out in an intercept application. N~
additional guidance can be gleaned from the floor ·debates,
since they contain no substantive discussion of the identification provision. 26

B
We reach the same conclusion with respect to . the Gov,·ernment's duty to inform the judge of all identifiable persons
·whose conversations were intercepted. As noted earlier, the
version of Title III that emerged from the Senate Judiciary
Committee provided only for mandatory notice to the "per·~ sons named in the order of" the ap·pliGation." The Senate
Report detailed the purpose of that provision:
"[T] he intei1t of the provision is that the principle
of postuse notice will be retained. This provision alone
should insure the community that the techniques are
reasonably employed.' Through its operation all authorized interceptions must eventually become known at least
Even if we assume that Congress thought that a. broad identification
was constitutionally mandated, it docs not follow that
Congress imposed statutory suppression under §§ 2515 and 2518 ( 10) (a)
(i) as a sanction for noncompliance. In limiting use of the intercept procedure to "the most precise and discriminate circumstances," S. Rep. No.
107, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 102 (1968), Congress required law enforcement
authorities to convince a District Court that probable cause existed to
believe that a sprcific person was committing a specific offense using a
specific telephone. This requirement was satisfied here when the applica. tion set forth sufficient information to indicate that the primary targets
were conducting a gambling business over four particular telephones.
Nothing in the legislative history indicates that Congress intended to
declare an otherwise constitutional intercept order "unlawful" under
§ 2518 (10) (a) (i)-resulting in suppression under § 2515-for failure to
name additional targets.
26

r~quiremnet
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to the subject. He can then seek appropriate civil redress, for example, under section 2520 . . . if he feels
that his privacy has been unlawfully invaded." S. Rep.
No. 107, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.,, 105 (1968).
The floor discussion concerning the amendment adding the
provision for discretionary notice merely indicates an intent
to provide notice to such additional persons as may be
ponstitutionally required.
Nothing in the structure of the Act or this legislative
history suggests that incriminating conversations are "unlawfully intercepted" whenever parties to those conversations
do not receive discretionary inventory notice as a result of
the Government's failure to inform the District Court of their
identities. At the time inventory notice was served on the
other identifiable persons, the intercept had been completed
and the conversations had been "seized" under a valid intercept order. The fact that discretionary notice reached
39 rather than 41 identifiable persons docs not in itself mean
that the conversations were unlawfully intercepted. 27
The legislative history indicates that postintercept notice
was designed instead to assure the community that the
wiretap technique is reasonably employed. But even recog27
Counsel for respondents Merlo and Lauer conceded at oral argument
that the failure to name those respondents in the proposed inventory
order was not intentional, and we are therc'fore not called upon to decide
whether suppression would be an available remedy if the Government
knowingly sought to prevent the District Court from serving inventory
notice on particular parties. Nor docs this case present an opportunity to
comment upon the suggestion, recognized by the United States, Brief, at
49 n. 40, that suppression might be required if the agents knew before
the interception that no inventory would be served.
Moreover, respondents Merlo and Lauer were not prejudiced by their
failure to receive postintercept notice under either of the District Court's
inventory orders. As noted earlier, the Government made available to
all defendants the intercept orders, applications, and related papers. See
n. 5A, supra. And in response to pretrial discovery motions, the Government produced transcripts of the intercepted conversations.

4
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nizing that Congress placed considerable emphasis on that
aspect of the overall statutory scheme, we do not think that
postintercept notice was intended to serve as an independent
restraint on resort to the wiretap procedure. 28

IV
Although the Government was required to identify respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco in the December 26
application for an extension of the initial intercept, failure
to do so in the circumstances here presented did not warrant
suppression under § 2518 (10)(a) (i). Nor was suppression
justified with respect to respondents Merlo and Lauer simply
because the Government inadvertently omitted their names
from the comprehensive list of all identifiable persons whose
conversations had been overheard. We hold that this is the
correct result under the provisions of Title III, but we reemphasize the suggestion we made in United States v. Chavez,
that "strict adherence by the Government to the provisions of
'T itle III would nonetheless be more in keeping with the
responsibilities Congress has imposed upon it when authority to engage in wiretapping or electronic surveillance is
sought." 416 U. S., at 580.
'The order of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case
is remanded to that court for further proceedings in accord
with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

28

Although the possibility of subsequent civil suits to redress unwar}
ljanted invasions of privacy functions in a broad sense to check excessive
ase of intercepts, that role is at best minor and indirect.
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This case, presents issues concerning the construction of
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968, 18 U. S. C. §§ 2510-2520. Specifically, we must
decide whether 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (1) (b)(iv) , which requires
the Government to include in its wiretap applications "the
identity of the person, if known, committing the offense,
and whose conversations are to be intercepted," is satisfied
when the Government identifies only the "principal targets"
of the intercept. Second, we must decide whether the Government has a sta.t utory responsibility to inform the issuing
judge of the identities of persons whose conversations were
overheard in the course of the interception, thus enabling
him to decide whether they should be served with notice of
the interception pursuant to 18 U.S . C. §2518(8)(d) .
And finally, we must determine whether failure to comply
fully with these statutory provisions requires suppression of
evidence under 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (10) (a).
I

j

On November 28, 1972, a specia.l agent of the Federal
/
Bureau of Investigation applied to the United States Dis-/ ,
trict Court for the Northern District of Ohio for an order
a
in accordance withATitle / j
II:i)_9f tl::ie Oildl::IHl:ms Omne Control and Safe 8treets uet d./~

JJ 1-----~a~u,thorizing

/ (!) /

w~retap i~1terception
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r

4968, 18 U. 8. 0. §§ 2510=252~ The application requested
authorization to intercept gambling-related communications
over two telephones at one address in North Olmstead, Ohio
1

The wiretap application procedure is set forth at 18 U. S. C. § 2518
(1), which provides:
"(1) Each application for an order authorizing or approving the interception of a wire or oral communication shall be made in writing upon
oath or affirmation to a judge of competent jurisdiction and shall state
the a.pplicant's authority to make such application. Each application
shall include thE' following information:
"(a) the identity of the investigative or law enforcement officer making
the application, and the oflicer authorizing the application;
"(b) a full and complete statement of the facts and circumstances relied
upon by the applicant, to justify his belief that an order should be issued,
including (i) deta,ils as to the particular offense that has been, is being, or
is about to be committed, (ii) a particular description of the nature and
location of the faciliti"s from which or the place where the communication is to be intercepted, (iii) a pa~icular description of the type of
communications sought to be intercepted, (iv) the identity of the person,
if known, committing the offense and whose · communications are to be
intercepted;
"(c) a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably
appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous;
"(d) a statement of the period of time for which the interception is
required to be maintained. If the nature of the investigation is such
that the authorization for interception should not automatically terminate when the described type of communication has been first obtained,
a particular description of facts establishing probable cause to believe that
additional communications of the same type will occur thereafter;
" (c) a full and complete statement of the facts concerning all previous
applications known to the individual authorizing and making the application, made to any judge for authorization to intercept, or for approval
of interceptions of, wire or oral communications involving any of the
same persons, facilities or places specified in the application, and the
action taken by the judge on each such application; and
"(f) where the applicrrtion is for 1he extension of an order, a statement
setting forth the re,;ults thus far obtained from the interception, or a
reasonable explanation of the failure to obtain such results."
The issuing judge is free to require the applicant to furnish additional
information. 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (2).

~~~
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and two other telephones/ at a home in Canton, Ohio. The
11ccompanying a.ffidavit rec\ted that the telephones were being
used by Albert Kotoch, Joseph Spaganlo, and George Florea
to conduct an illegal gambling business, and that in con- ¥
ducting that business they would place ~le]9fiB ~ calls to ~
and receive ~e15h""'&. calls from various persons, three of /
whom were also named in the wiretap application. 2 The
affilant also stated that the Government's informants would
refuse to testify against the persons named in the applica' tion, that telephone records alone would be insufficient to
support a gambling conviction, and that normal investigative techniques were unlikely to be fruitful. Pursuant to
the Government's request, the District Court authorized for
a period of 15 days the interception of gambling-related
wire communications of Kotoch, Spaganlo, Florea, three
named individuals other than the respondents, and "other~
/
as yet unknown," to and from the four listed telephones./
The affidavit set forth extensive information indicating that the named
individuals were conducting a gambling operation. This information was
derived from physical surveillance by :tgents of the FBI, an examination
·of telephone company toll records, and the personal observations of six
informants, whose past reliability also was detailed in the affidavit.
3 The District Court's order was issued pursuant 18 U. S. C. §§ 2518
,(3), (4) which provide
"(3) Upon such application the judge may enter an ex parte order,
·.as requested or as modified, authorizing or approving interception of wire
or oral communications within the territorial jurisdiction of the court
in which the judge is sitting, if the judge determines on the basis of the
facts submitted by the applicant that" (a) there is probable cause for belief that an individual is committing,
has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense enumerated in
section 2516 of this chapter;
"(b) there is probable cause for belief that particular communications
concerning that offense will be obtained through such interception;
" (c) normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed
or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too
dangerous;
" (d) there is probable cause for belief that the facilities from which,
()I' the place where, the wire or oral communications are to be intercepted
2

~
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During the course of the wiretap, the Government learned
that respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco were discussing illegal gambling activities with the named subjects.
On December 26, 1972, the Government applied for an
extension of the initial intercept order.4 This time it sought
authorization to intercept gambling-related conversations of
Kotoch, Spaganlo, Florea, two other named individuals, and
"others as yet unknown,'} but it did not identify respondents
are being used, ·or arc about to be used, in connection with the commission of such offense, 0r are leased to, Ii,<;tetl in the name of, or commonly
used oy such person.
" (4) Each order attthoriZing or approving the interception of any wire
or oral communication shall specify" (a) the identity of tbe person, if 'known, whose communications are
to be intercepted;
"(b) the nature and location of the communications facilities as to
which, or the place where, authority to intercept is granted;
" (c) a particular description of the type of communication sought to
be intercepted, and a statement of the particular offense to which it
relates;
" (d) the identity of the agency authorized to intercept the communications, and of the person authorizing the application; and
" (e) the period of time during which such interception is authorized,
including a statement as to whether or not the ·interception shall automatically terminate when the described communication has been first
obtained."
4 In addition to the December 26 application requesting an extension
of the initial intercept order, the Government also filed on that date a
separate application seeking authorization to monitor a third telephone
'discovered at the same North Olmstead address. Both applications were
accompanied by another affidavit setting forth the results of the initial
monitoring, the manner in which the third phone was discovered, the
facts indicating that the newly discovered telephone was being used to
conduct a gambling business, and reasons why continued interception was
necessary. A copy of the affidavit filed on November 28 was also
attached to the December 26 applications. For the sake of clarity, the
two applications filed on December 26 will be treated as a single
application.
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Donovan, Buzzaco, and Robbins in this second application. 5
The District Court again authorized interception of gamblingrelated conversations for a maximum of 15 days.
On February 21, 1973, the Government submitted to the
District Court a proposed order giving notice of the interceptions to 37 persons, a group which the Government apparently thought included all individuals who could be identified as having discussed gambling over the monitored
telcphones. 6 The District Court signed the proposed order,
and an inventory notice was served on the listed persons,
including respondents Donovan, Buzzaco, and Robbins. On
September 11 , 1973, after the Government submitted the
names of two additional persons whose identitiestfuillJallegedlyl
been ma vertent y om1 te from the initial list, the District
Court entere an amended order giving notice to those
individuals. As a result of what the Government labels
/
"adTinistrative oversight," respondents Merlo and Lauer/
1/The United States conceded in the Court of Appeals that respondents Donovan and Robbins were "known" within the meannig of the
statute at the time of the December 26 application, but challenged as
clearly erroneous the District Court's finding that respondent Buzzaco was
"known" at that time. The Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's
finding, and 1he United States has not sought review of that disposition.
Thus, for our purposes, all three respondents were "known" on December 26.
6
- :A!:n inventory notice must be served within a designated period of
tim~the persons named in the order or the application." 18 U.S.~
§ 2518 (8) (d). The inventory must give notice of the entry of the intercept order or application, state lhe disposition of the applica.tion, and
indicate whether communications were or were not intercepted. Ibid.
\~Upon the filing of a motion, the judge has discretion to make available
the intercepted communications, the applications, and the orders. Ibid.
Title III also authorizes the District Court to cause an inventory notice to be served on "other parties to intercepted communications" if the
judge determines that such notice is in the interest of justice. Ibid.
Those other parties may also be given access to the intercepted communications, the applications, and the orders. Ibid.

I (A..flYVV(-----
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were not included in either list of names and were never
served with inventory notice. 7
On November 1, 1973, an indictment was returned in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio charging Kotoch, Spaganlo, the five respondents, and
10 other individuals with conspiracy to conduct and conducting a gambling business in violation of 18 U. S. C. §§ 371
and 1955. The five respondents filed motions to sup:rr_ess
evidence derived from the wire interception. After an evidentiary hearing on the motions, the District Court ~up 
pressed as to respondents Donovan, -Robbins, and Buzzaco
all evidence derived from the December 26 intercept order
on the ground that failure to identify them by name in the
application and order of that date violated 18 U.S. C. §§ 2518
(1)(b)(iv) and 2518 (4)(a). With respect to Merlo and
Lauer, who were not known to the Government until after
the December 26 application, the District Court suppressed
all evidence derived from both intercept orders on the ground
that they had not been served with inventory notice.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
· 513 F. 2d 337 (1975). 8 On the identification issue, the
court held that the wiretap application must identify every
person whose conversations relating to the subject criminal
activity the Government has probable cause to believe it
will intercept. Agreeing with the District Court that at the
time of the December 26 application the Government had

/rj

7 Although respondents Merlo and Lauer were not served with inven·tory notice pursuant to § 2518 (8) (d), the intercept orders, applications,
and related papers were made availnble to all the defendants, including
Merlo and Lauer, on November 26, 1973. Thus, the introduction into
evidence ftt trial of the contents of the intercepted conversations and
evidence derived therefrom would not be prohibited by 18 U. S. C. § 251J
(9). ·-Been. 19, i9ef9~
8 The Government filed its appeal from the District Court's order suppressing evidence under 18 U. S. C. § 3731, and there has ~beeri}
no trial on the charges with respect to the respondents.

...J
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probable cause to believe that it would overhear Donovan,
Robbins, and Buzzaco "committing the offense," the Court
of Appeals affirmed the suppression of evidence derived from
the December 26 order. On the notice question, it held
that the Govern~ has an implied statutory duty to inform the issuing judge of the identities of the parties whose
conversations were overheard so that he can determine
whether discretionary inventory notice should be required. 9
Because the Government had failed to perform this duty
with respect to Merlo and· Lauer, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the District Court's order suppressing evidence
derived from both intercept orders. The court found it unnecessary to determine whether the failure to identify repondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco in the December
2B application and to name respondents Merlo and Lauer
in the proposed inventory notice orders was inadvertent or
purposeful, since the mere fact of omission was sufficient to
require suppression under 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (10)(a).m
We granted certiorari to resolve these issues, which concern
the construction of a major federal statute, 421 U. S. 907,
and now reverse.
II
The United' States contends that § 2518 (1)(b)(iv) requires that a wiretap application identify only the principal
Seen. 6, supra.
18 U. S. C. § 2518 (10) (a) provides in pertinent part:
"(10) (a) Any aggrieved person in any trial, hearing, or proceeding
in or before any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or
other authority of the United Sta.tes, a State, or a, political subdivision
thereof, may move to suppress the contents of any intercepted wire or
oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, on the grounds that" (i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted;
"(ii) the order of authorization or approval under which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face; or
"(iii) the interception was not made in conformity with the order of
,authorization or approval."
9

-ro
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target of the interception, and that § 2518 (8) (d) does not
require the Government to provide the issuing judge with
a list of all identifiable persons who were overheard in the
course of an authorized interception. We think neither contention is sound.
A
We turn first to the identification requirements of § 2518
(1)(b)(iv). That provision requires a wiretap application
to specify "the identity of the person, if known, committing
the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted."
In construing that language, this Court already has ruled
that the Government is not rrquired· to identify an individual
in the application unless it has probable cause to believe
(i) that the individual is engaged in the criminal activity
under investigation and (ii) that the individual's conversations will be intercepted over the target telephone. United
~tates v. Kahn, 415 U. S. 143 ( 1974). The question at issue
IJ
here is whether the Government is required to name -a:;;l ~
such individuals. 11
The United States argues that the most reasonable in-

) re.t:+:oN' foV"'
c.t.~t. ~ '.ed J NOl·
7~-lf/3.)

,,_,,,j

I

~\ j;,~

Every Court of Appeals that has considered the issueJ\?onrluded
an individual whose conversations probably will be intercepted by a wiretap must be identified in the wiretap application if the law enforcement
authorities have probable cause to believe the individual is committing
the offense for which the wiretap is sought. United States v. Chiarizio,
525 F. 2d 289, 292 (CA2 1975); United States v. Bernstein, 509 F. 2d
996 (CA4 1975), petition for cert. filed, No. 74-1486; United States v.
Doolittle, .507 F. 2d 1368, aff'd en bane, 518 F. 2d 500 (CA5 1975),
petitions for cert. filed Nos. 75-500, 75-509, 75-513; &Jtibtei 8tater voKil611~; 81 S F :ld. 4Q9 (G 6 8 1 07S), F8ti~i6ll fm ceJ t. filed , No . 7:3-!1tl ~
nited States v. Civella, 533 F. 2d 1395 (CAS 1976) '"""'h1itQ!il ~tgtg~
"D
,.
.
United States v. Russo, 527 F. 2d
1150, 1156 (CAIO 1975), petition for cert. filed, No. 75-1218. See also
United States v. Moore, U. S. App. D. C. - , 513 F. 2d 485, 493494 (1975) (interpreting 23 D. C. Code 547 (a) (2), which is almost
identical to the provision at issue here).
A number of these courts have concluded, and respondents Donovan,
Robbins, and Buzzaco argue, that our decision in United States v. Kahn,
11

7
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terpretation of the plain language of the statute is that the
application must identify only the principal target of the
investigation, who "will almost always be the individual
whose phone is monitored~ Brief for the United States,
at 18. Under this interpretation, if the Government has
reason to believe that an individual will use the target
telephone to place or receive calls, and the Government
has probable cause to believe that the individual is engaged
ih the criminal activity under investigation, the individual
qualifies as a principal target and must be named in the
wiretap application. On the other hand, an individual who
uses a different telephone to place calls to or receive calls
from the target telephone is not a principal ta.r get even if
the Government ha.s probable cause to believe that the
individual is engaged in the criminal activity under investiga.tion. In other words, whether one is a principal target
of the investigation depends on whether one operates the
target telephone to place or receive calls. 13
415 U. S. 143 (1974), resolved this identification issue. See United States
v. Clfoti'izio, supra; United States v. Moore, supra. Although there is
language in Kahn suggesting that wiretap applications must identify all
such individuals, the identification question presented here was not before
us in Kahn. The question in that case was whether a wiretap application
identify a known user of the target telephone whose complicity m the criminal activity under investigation was not known at
the time of the application. Kahn is a relevant, though not controlling,
precedent.
12 The United States does not suggest that regardless of the factual
circumstances a wiretap application must identify only a single individual.
To the contrary, it concedes that if two or more persons are using the
target telephone "equally" to commit the offense, and thus are "equally"
targets of the investigation, "all must be named." Brief for the United
States, at 18 n. 13.
13 Counsel for the United States explained this position succinctly at
oral argument: "The critical distinction ... is one between the users of
the telephone that is being monitored on the one hand, and all other persons throughout the world who may converse from unmonitored phones
on the other hand." Tr. of Oral Arg., at 13.
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Whatever the merits of such a statutory scheme, we find
little support for it in the language and structure of Title
III or in the legislative history. The statutory language
itself refers only to "the person , if known, committing the
offense and whose communications are to be intercepted."
That description is as applicable to a suspect placing calls
to the target telephone as it is to a suspec.t placing calls
from ilil: t~:tf'g~telephone. It is true, as the United States
suggests, that when read in the context of the other subdivisions of § 2518 (1) (b), an argument can be made that
Congress focused in subdivision (iv) on the primary user
of the target telephone. But it is also clear from other
sections of the statute that Congress expected that wiretap
applications would name more than one individual. For
example, Title III requires that inventory notice be served
upon "the persons named in the order or the application."
18 U. S. C. § 2518 (8) (d) (emphasis added). And § 2518
( 1) (e) requires that an intercept application disclose all
previous intercept applications "involving any of the same
persons ... specified in the application" (emphasis added).
It may well be that Congress anticipa.ted that a given
application would cover more than one telephone or that
several suspects would use one telephone, and that an application for those reasons alone would require identification
of more than one individuaL But nothing on the face of
the statute suggests that Congress intended to remove from
the identification requirement those suspects whose intercepted communications originated on a telephone other than
that listed in the wiretap application. 14
Indeed, the contrary conclusion is suggested by the fact that identification of an individual in an application for an intercept order
triggers other statutory provi~ions. First!§ 2518 (1) (e) requires an intercept application to disclose' all previous applications "involving any
of the same persons . . . specified in the application." To the extent
that Congress thought it necessary to provide the issuing judge with
14

/

/
)

75-212-0PINION
UNITED STATES v. DONOVAN

11

Nor can we find support for the "principal target" inter- /t)..-/
e e 1s at1ve histor ~ Title III originated as /.JJ
a combmation of S. 675, the Federal Wire Interception
Act, which was introduced by Senator McClellan several
months prior to this Court's decision in Bergvr v. New York,
388 U. S. 41 (1967), and S. 2050, the Electronic Surveillance
Control Act of 1967, introduced by Senator Hruska a few
~~f· No.
days after the Berger decisionl Both bills required that
wiretap applications include a full and complete stakment
10,7, f/0'""'of the facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant
and specification of the nature and location of the commu~. ~ e1.J
nication facilities involved. Although neither bill contain ~-
~A44 . )
an express identification requirement such as that at issue
here,
both bills required the application to include "a full
(t1,8') .
and complete statement of the facts concerning all previous
applications ... involving any person named in the application as committing, having committed, or being about to
commit an offense." Hearings on Controlling Crime Through
More Effective Law Enforcement Before the Subcommittee
on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., at 77, § 8 (a) (3) and
,. O"J-t----'liion1!).6, § 2518 (a)(4) (1967) (emphasis added). Thus, even
/
/
at this early stage, it was recognized that an application
could identify several individuals, and there is no indication
that the identification would be limited to principal targets.
~S. 971~ombincd the major provis~·ons
of S. 675 and S. 2050/and ~eventually was enacte~ as
wh.: 1~
pending before the Senate Judiciary Committee, this Court e

Q---p-r-et~a~t":""io.;.;;~ m

S.

Co"

bb

such information, there is no indication of congressional intent to require
provision of such information only if a suspect operated from one end
of a telephone line. Second, § 2518 (8) (d) mandates tha.{ an mven' tory notice be served upon "the persons named in the order or the
application." As with § 2518 (1) (e), the congressional purpose would
not be served by limiting that notice on the basis of the telephone from
which one speaks.

:+-
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1

fcided Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).. S. 971 was
then redrafted to conform to Katz as well as Berger, and
the identification provision was added at that time. The
Senate Report states that the requirements set forth in the
various subdivisions of § 2518 ( 1) (b), including the identification requirement at issue here, " [were] intended to reflect the
constitutional command of particularization." S. Rep. No.
1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 101 (1968), citing Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41, 58-60, and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 354-356 ( 1967). The United States now contends that
although it may be that Congress read Berger and Katz to
- require, as a constitutional matter, that the subject of the q..--surveillance be named if known, Congress ~uld hardly /
hikave retadbthose chasesd~{~ingB ~hfe n.am ing of ::til par~i :s
1 e1y o e over ear .
ne , at 25- 26 .
-

M

tblilt QQJ:l~fQilll Q9}:.}!li~9F9S 118HBjeets" vf tr
t.bs f.lFi}:.}siplill ' liiQri of tho tlilr~ot t9l9ph.eR~

ll1.lFV9illtHl.Ci , OF

Stlt

oeiHa:nee ta l3e

~{are_ave~to the extent that Congress thought

i.t was
meeting the constitutional commands of particularization es-tablished in Berger and Katz, Congress may have read those
cases as mandating a broad identification req~irement. The
statute that we confronted in Berger required identification .
15 At the time of the enactment of Title III, Congress did not
have before it the view we expressed on thi. issue in United States
v. Kahn, 415 U. S., at 155 n. 15. The Fourth Amendment requires
specification of "the place to be sec'tched, and the persons or things to
be seized." In the wiretap context, those requirements are satisfied
by identification of the telephone line to be tapped and the particular
conversations to be seized, It is not a constitutional requirement that
all those likely to be overheard engaging in incriminating conversations
):>e named. Specification of this sort "identiffies] t.he person whose con. stitutionally protected area is to be invaded rather than 'particularly
describing' the communications, conversations, or discussions t.o be seized."
~1Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967).

I
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of "the person or persons" whose communications were to
be overheard. 388 U. S., at 59. And we expressly noted
that that provision " [did] no more than identify the person
whose constitutionally protected area is to be invaded .... ':
~
!bid. Given the statute at issue in Berger and our commen"V"
t----...;;;u;£;p..:.;
on it, Congress may have concluded that as 9s QQ~ititY 2r
a:ll suspects rather than just the primary user. 16
In any event, for our present purposes it is unnecessary
to speculate as to exactly how Congress interpreted Berger
and Katz with respect to the identification issue. It is sufficient to note that in response to those decisions Congress
·included an identification requirement which on its face draws
no distinction based on the telephone one uses, and the
United States points to no evidence in the legislative history
that supports such a distinction. Indeed, the legislative materials apparently contain no use of the term "principal target" or any discussion of a different treatment based on the
telephone from which a suspect speaks. 17 We therefore conclude that a wiretap application must name an individual
if the Government has probable cause to believe that the

/-t-v-/

16 That Congress may have so understood the constitutional requirement is also suggested by the portion of the Senate Report dealing with
that provision of S. 971 that required the intercept order to identify
. "the person, if known, whose conversations are to be intercepted." The
Senate Report merely cites West v. Cabell, 153 U. S. 78 (1894), which
concerns the need for proper identification of the subject of an arrest
warrant. S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 102 (1968). To the
extent that Congress may have considered West to apply to wiretap
orders, we have no reason to believe that Congress considered its applicability to extend only to those suspects using the target telephone.
17 At least one Senator read the identification requirement in S. 971 to
parallel the identityltfion requirement contained in the statute at issue
in Berger v. New York: "Specificity is required as to the person or
persons whose communications are to be intercepted." 114 Cong. Rec.,
f!,t 14763 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Percy).

/

/

75-212-0PINION
UNITED STATES v. DONOVAN

14

individual is engaged in the criminal activity under investigation and expects to intercept the individual's conversa:tions over the target telephone.

i~

1

1Yj
)
of" de""'

'The other statutory prov!ion at issue in this ca.e
\1.8 U. S. C. § 2518 (8)(d), which provides that the judge
shall cause to be served on the persons named in the order
or application an inventory, which must give notice of the
entry of the order or application, state the disposition of
the application , and indicate whether communications were
1c
18
intercepted.
Although the statute mandates tl:J.e pron:isioJl :r- ~/
of tha.h, inventory notice only
persons named in the applif'oY"
cation or the order, the statute also ))".rovides that the judge
maY}..J3Pe"Vid~ similar notice to other parties to intercepted
communications if he concludes that such action is in the
interest of justice.10 Observing that this notice provision
does not expressly require law enforcement authorities
routinely to ~Yid~the judge with a.a{SpeCifiC mformation
upon which to exercise his discretion , the United States cont ends that it would be inappropriate to read such a require-

These notice and return provisions satisfy constitutional
~e4ait~

l ~s- J~-6 .~

requirements .
r1 .

See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.

t l. )

347 ,(~,_ 1967); Berger v. Ne:?J York, 388 U.S . 41, 60

-

/

75-212-0PINION
UNITED STATES v. DONOVAN

15

ment into the statute since the judge has the option of
asking the law enforcement authorities for whatever information he requires.
Our reading of the legislative history of the discretionary
notice provision in light of the purposes of Title III leads
us to reject the Government's interpretation. As reported
from the Judiciary Committee, section 2518 (8) (d) contained
only a provision mandating notice to the persons named in
the application or the order; the discretionary notice provision was added by amendment on the floor of the Senate~
In introducing that amendment, Senator Hart explained its
purpose:
"The amendment would give the judge who issued the
order discretion to require notice to be served on other
parties to intercepted conversations, even though such
parties are not specifically named in the court order.
The Berger and Katz decisions established that notice
of surveillance is a constitutional requirement of any
surveillance statute. It may be that the required notice must be served on all parties to intercepted communications. Since legitimate interests of privacy may
make such notice to all parties undesirable, the amendment leaves the final determination to the judge." 114
Cong. Rec. 14485-14486 (1968). 20
20 It is worth noting that shortly before Senator Hart proposed this
amendment to S. 971, Senator Long had r&'ld to the Sena.te portions
. of a report prcparrd by the Association of the Bar of the Cit of
New York on federal wiretap legislation. That report
t at parties
to intercepted conversations other than those named in the application
or order @iciili!l prooa bl~e served with inventory notice, but it also rec, ognized that under some circumstances the provision of such notice
· could be harmful and gave the following example:
"A, a businessman, talks to his customers, and the latter are served
with papers showing that A is being bugged[.] LT]he damage to con' fidence in A and to A's reputation in general may damage A unjustly.
In this case it would seem that the customers should not be served with
, the ·inventory." 114 Cong. Rec. 14476 (1968).
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Jln deciding whether legitimate privacy interests justify withholding inventory notice from parties to intercepted conversa- 1
tions, a judge is likely to require information and assistance
beyond that contained in the application papers and the
recordings of intercepted conversations made available by
law enforcement authorities. No purpose is sPrved by holding that those authorities have no routine duty to supply
the judge with revelant information. "The Court of Appeals·
~
for the Ninth Circuit recently confronted this problem· o~
· dual responsibility, and we adopt the balanced construction
that court placed on § 2518 (8) (d):
t'To ·discharge this obligation the judicial officer must
have, at a minimum, knowledge of the particular cate..,
gories· into which fall all the individuals whose conver..
sations have been intercepted. Thus, while precise iden·
tification of each party to an intercepted conversation
is not required , a description of the general class, or
classes, which they comprise is essential to enable the
judge to determine whether additional information is
necessary for a proper evaluation of the interests of the
various parties. Furthermore, although the judicial officer has the duty to cause the filing of the inventory
[notice], it is abundantly clear that the prosecution has
greater access to and familiarity with the intercepted
communications. Therefore we feel justified in imposing
upon the latter the duty to classify all those whose
conversations have been intercPpted, and to transmit
this information to the judge. Should the judge desire
more information regarding these classes in order to
exercise his statutory ~ 2518 (8) (d) discretion . . . . the
government is also required to furnish such information
as is available to it." United State; v.. Chun, 503 F.
2d 533, 540 (1974). 21
21 The current policy of the Department of .Justice is to provide
the issuing judge with the name of every person who has been over-
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We agree with the Ninth Circuit that this allocation of
~
22
responsibility best serves the purposes of Title III.
~
III
We turn now to the question whether the District Court
properly suppressed evidence derived from the wiretaps at
issue solely because of the failure of the law enforcement
authorit~ to comply fully with the provisions of §§ 2518 (1)
(b)(iv) and 2518 (8)(d). Section 2515 expressly prohibits
the use at trial, and at certain other proceedings, of the
contents of any intercepted wire c~munication or any evi- //::)/
dence derived therefrom "if the dis1closure of that informa- './
tion would be in violation of this chapter." The circum·stances that trigger suppression under § 2515 are in turn
enumerated in § 2518 (10) (a):
"(i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted;
" ( ii) the order of authorization or approval under
which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face; or
" (iii) the interception was not made in conformity
with the order of authoriza.tion or approval"
There is no basis on the facts of this case to suggest that
heard as to whom there is any reasonable possibility of indictment.
Brief for the United States, at 39. This policy does not meet the test
specified above. Moreover, where, as here, the GO\·ernment chooses to
supply the issuing judge with a list of all identifiable per ons rather
than a description of the classes into which those persons fall, the list
.
1
must be complete.
J"22At oral argument, cotmsel for the United States :ruae!ietdl' e*eel'l:e~7rec.09tflqe.d
~e merit of the approach specified in United States v. Chun:
O d
''Perhaps the approach of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circui~
which suggested that rather than submitting specific names we should
submit categories of persons who had been overheard, is a better
policy, would be morr helpful to the district court in exercising its
discretion, and we would have no objection to following any reasonable policy that the district courts determine would be useful to them
in this regard." Tr. of Oral Arg., at 6-7.

'I
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the authorization orders are facially insufficient, or that the
interception was not conducted in conformity with the orders.
Thus, only § 2518 (10) (a) (i) is relevant: were the communications "unlawfully intercepted" given the violations of
§§ 2518 (1)(b)(iv) and 2518 (8)(d) 23
Resolution of that question must begin with United State~
v. Giordano, 416 U. S. 505 (1974), and United States v.
"·Chavez, 416 U. S. 562 (1974). Those cases hold that "[not]
· every failure to comply fully with any requirement provided
in Title III would render the interception of wire or oral
communications 'unlawful.' " United States v. Chavez, 416
U. S., at 574- 575. To the contrary, suppression is required
only for a "failure to satisfy any of those statutory requirements that directly and substantially implement the con~ gressional intention to limit the use of intercept procedures
to those situations clearly calling for the employment of this
extraordinary device." United States v. Giordano, 416 U. S.,
at 527.
Giordano concerned the provision in Title III requiring
that an application for an intercept order be approved by
the Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney General specially designated by the Attorney General. Concluding that
. Congress intended to condition the usc of wiretap procedures
~on the judgment of senior officials In the Department
of Justice, the Court required suppression for failure to comply with the approval provision. Chavez concerned the statutory requirement that the application for an intercept order
specify the identity of the official authorizing the application. The problem in Chavez was one of misidentification;
although the application had in fact been authorized by the
Attorney General, the application erroneously identified an

?/

tJ..'/
,
!
/j

remedy for thE'se statutory,

\.-------;a;-;:s-;::op::p~o:::::ser7:to~c~on~s:;;ti:;:-:tu-:t'i:lo::n~al~,'7v:fio:-i'la:';t'fio::n::=;:s,~se:;;e-=; 15 and 19, supra, turns

n rl.

on the provisions of Title III rather than the judicially fashioned exclusionary rule aimed at deterring violations of Fourth Amendment
' rights. United States v. Giordano, supra, 416 U. S., at 524.
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Assistant Attorney General as the official authorizing the
application. The Court concluded that mere misidentification of the official authorizing the application did not make
the application unlawful within the meaning of § 2518 (10)
(a) (i} since that identification requirement did not play a
"substantive role?.' · in the regulatory system. 416 U. S., /:;/
at '578.
v
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals concluded that both
the ide.ntificati~n . requirement of § 2518 (1)(b)(iv) and
~
the notice reqmrement of § 25h5 (8)(d) played a "centra~
role" in the statutory framework, and for that reason affi'rrhed the District Court's·· order suppressing relevant
evidence. Although both statutory requirements are undoubtedly important, we do · not think that the failure to
comply fully with those provisions renders unlawful an intercept order that in all other respects satisfies the statutory
requirements.

A

"'/

IJ!
·

As· to § 2518 (1) (b)(iv) , the issue is whether the identification in an intercept application of all those likely to be
overheard in incriminating conversations plays a tsubstan- (
tive role" with respect to judicial authorization of intercept
orders and ~onsequently 191e£~ a limitation on the use
of intercept procedures. The statue provides that the issuing judge may approve an intercept application if he determines that normal investigative techniques have failed or
are unlikely to succeed and there is probable cause to believe
that: (i) an individual is engaged in criminal activity,
(ii) particular communications concerning the offense will
be obtained through interception; and (iii) the target facilities are being used in connection with the specified criminal
activity. That determination is based on the "full and complete statement" of relevant facts supplied by law enforcement authorities. If, after evaluating the statutorily
enumerated factors in light of the information contained in

4t/
"Y
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the application, the judge concludes that the wiretap order
:should issue, the failure to identify additional persons who
are likely to be overheard engaging in incriminating conversations could hardly invalidate an otherwise lawful judicial
authorization. The intercept order may issue only if the
issuing judge determines that the statutory factors are present, and the failure to name additional targets in no way
___..,detracts from the sufficiency of those factors.
This case is 1ifleref6P'"-unlike Giordano, where failure to
satisfy the statutory requirement of prior approval by specified Justice Department officials bypassed a congressiona~
imposed limitation on the use of the intercept procedure.
The Court there noted that it was reasonable to believe
that requiring prior approval from senior officials in the
Justice Department "would inevitably foreclose resort to
wiretapping in various situations where investigative personnel would otherwise seek intercept authority from the court
and the court would very likely authorize its use." 416 U. S.,
at 528. Here, however, the statutorily imposed preconditions
to judicial authorization were satisfied, and the issuing judge
was simply unaware that additional persons might be overheard engaging in incriminating conversations. In no meaningful sense can it be said that the presence of that infor. mation as to additional targets would have precluded judicial
authorization of the intercept. 24 Rather, this case resembles
Chavez, where we held that a wiretap was not unlawful sim24 There is no suggestion in this case that the Government ngents
knowingly failed to identify re::.pondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco
for the purpose of keeping relevant information from the District Court
that might have prompted the court to conclude that probable cause
was lacking. If such a showing lmd been made, we would have a
different case. Nor is there any suggestion that as a result of the
failure to name these three respondents they were denied the mandatory
mventory notice supplied to persons named in the applicntion. 18
U. S. C. § 2518 (8) (d). Respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco
were among the 37 persons served with the intial inventory.
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ply because the issuing judge was incorrectly informed as
to which designated official had authorized the application.
The Chavez intercept was lawful because the Justice Department had performed its task of prior approval, and the
instant intercept is lawful because the application p r o v i d y d
sufficient information to enable the issuing judge to determine that the statutory preconditions were satisfied. 25
Finally, we note that nothing in the legislative history
suggests that Congress intended this broad identification requirement to play "a central, or even functional , role in
guarding against unwarranted use of wiretapping or electronic
surveillance." United States v. Chavez, 416 U. S., at 578.
Neither S. 675 nor S. 2050, the predecessor bills of S. 971,
contained an identification provision. See p. 11, supra. The
only explanation given in the Senate Report for the in25

No one suggests that the failure to identify in a wiretap application
individuals who a,re "unknown" within the meaning of the statute, see
X:flhn ~United tates 415 U. S. 143 (1974), requires suppression o~
intercepted conversations to which those individuals were parties. Though
recognizing that the failure to identify such an "unknown" individua
does not make unlawful an otherwise valid intercept order, respondents
·Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco suggest that the opposite is true
with respect to thE' failure to identify in a wiretap application individuals who are "known" within the meaning of the statute. Counsel
for these respondents suggested at oral argument that this difference
in result is justifiE'd by analogy to warrantless searches or arrests. Tr.
of Oral Arg., at 40. Although law enforcemE'nt officials can often take
.action without a warrant when they have been unable to foresee the
circumstances that eventually confronted them, they still must obtain a
§C_ECh or arrest warrant when their prior knowledge is sufficient to
establish probable causeJ) The major flaw in that reasoning is that t IS
case does not concern war~antless action. Here, the omission on the part
of law enforcement authorities was not a failure to seek prior judicial
authorization, but a failure to identify every individual who could be
expected to be overheard engaging in incriminating com·ersations. That
the complete absence of prior judicial authorization would make an intercept unlawful has no bearing on the lawfulness of an intercept order
that fails to identify every target.
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elusion of the broad identification provision was that it was
intended to reflect what Congress perceived to be the constitutional command of particularization. This explanation
was offered with respect to all the information required by
~ 2518 (1)(6) to be set out in an intercept application. No
additional guidance can be gleaned from the floor debates,
since they contain no substantive discussion of the i d e n t i f i /
cation provision, 26

:a

We reach the saine conclusion with respect to the Government's duty to inform the judge of all identifiable persons
whose conversations were intercepted. As noted earlier, the
version of Title III that emerged from the Senate Judiciary
Committee provided only for mandatory notice to the "per~ons named in the order h the application." The Senate
Report detailed the purpose of that provision:
"[T] he intent of the provision is that the principle
of postuse notice will be retained. This provision alone
should insure the community that the techniques are
reasonably employed. Through its operation all authorized interceptions must eventually become known at least
2a Even if we assume that Congress thought that a broad idcntificationv
t,equirernf\9£ was constitutionally mandated, it does not follow that
Congress imposed statutory suppression under §§ 2515 and 2518 ( 10) (a
(i) as a sanction for noncompliance. In limiting use of the intNcept proc;,edure to "the most precise and discriminate circumstances," S. Rep. No.
107, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 102 (1968), Congress required law enforcement
~uthorities to convince a District Court that probable cause existed to
believe that a specific person was committing a specific offense using a
Jpecific telephone. This requirement was satisfied here when the application set forth sufficient information to indicate that the primary targets
were conducting a gambling business over four particular telephones.
:tj othing in the legislative history indicates that Congress intended to
declare an otherwise constitutional intercept order "unlawful" under
§2518 (10) (a) (i)-resulting in suppression under § 2515-for failure to
name additional targets.

'

'
75-212-0PINION
UNITED STATES v. DONOVAN

23

to the subject. He can then seek appropriate civil redress, for example, under section 2520 . . . if he feels
~~----~th;;a;:.;t:...:his privacy has been unlawfully invaded." S. Rep.
No. ~ 90th Cong., 2d Sess.,, 105 (1968).
The floor discussion concerning the amendment adding the
provision for discretionary notice merely indicates an intent
to provide notice to such additional persons as may be
constitutionally required.
Nothing in the structure of the Act or this legislative
,...
history suggests that incriminating conversations are "unla~
fully intercepted" whenever parties to those conversations
do not receive discretionary inventory notice as a result of
the Government's failure to inform the District Court of their
identities. At the time inventory notice was served on the
other identifiable persons, the intercept had been completed
and the conversations had been "seized" under a valid intercept order. The fact that discretionary notice reached
39 rather than 41 identifiable persons does not in itself mean
that the conversations were unlawfully intercepted. 27
The legislative history indicates that postintercept notice
was designed instead to assure the community that the
wiretap technique is reasonably employed. But even recog-

I /() 1?(

27 Counsel for respondents Merlo and Lauer conceded at oral argument
that the failure to name those respondents in the proposed inventory
order was not intentional,}and we are therefore not called upon to deci .e
whether suppression woufcl be an available remedy if the Government
knowingly sought to prevent the District Court from serving inventory
notice on particular parties. Nor does this case present an opportunity to
comment upon the suggestion, recognized by the United States, Brief, at
49 n. 40, that suppression might be required if the agents knew before
.....,
the interception that no inventory would be served.
Moreover, respondents Merlo and Lauer were not prejudiced by their
failure to receive postintercept notice under either of the District Court's
inventory orders. As noted earlier, the Government made available to
all defendants the intercept orders, applications, and related papers. See /
n. ~~ supra. And in response to pretrial discovery motions, the Government produced transcripts of the intercepted conversations.
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nizing that Congress placed considerable emphasis on that
aspect of the overall statutory scheme, we do not think that
postintercept notice was intended to serve as an independent
Festraint on resort to the wiretap procedure.~

IV
Although the Government was required to identify respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco in the December 26
application for an extension of the initial intercept, failure ~
to do so in the circumstances here presented did not warrant
suppression under § 2518 (10)(a) (i). Nor was suppression
justified with respect to respondents Merlo and Lauer simply
because the Government inadvertently omitted their names
from the comprehensive list of all identifiable persons whose
conversations had been overheard. We hold that this is the
correct result under the provisions of Title III, but we reemphasize the suggestion we made in United States v. Chavez,
that "strict adherence by the Government to the provisions of
Title III would nonetheless be more in keE'ping with the
responsibilities Congress has imposed upon it when authority to engage in wiretapping or electronic surveillance is
sought." 416 U. S., at 580.
The order of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case
is remanded to that court for further proceedings in accord
with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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MR.

PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents issues concerning the construction of
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968, 18 U. S. C. §§ 2510-2520. Specifically, we must
decide whether 18 U.S. C.§ 2518 (1)(b)(iv), which requires
the Government to include in its wiretap applications "the
identity of the person, if known, committing the offense,
and whose convers~tions are to be intercepted," is satisfied
when the Government identifies only the "principal targets"
of the intercept. Second, we must decide whether the Government has a statutory responsibility to inform the issuing
judge of the identities of pers0)1S whose conversations were
overheard in the course of the interception, thus enabling
him to decide whether they should be served with notice of
the interception pursu~tnt to 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (8) (d) .
And finally, we must determine whether failure to comply
fully with these statutory provisions requires suppression of
evidence under 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (10) (a) .
JusTICE

I
On November 28, 1972, a special agent of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation applied to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio for an order
authorizing a wiretap interception in accordance with Title
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IIP The application requested authorization to iutercept
gambling-related communications over two telephones at one
address in North Olmstead, Ohio, and two other telephones
The wiretap application procedure is s~>t forth at 18 U. S. C. § 2518
(1), which provides:
"(1) Each application for an order authorizing or approvmg the inter1

ception of a wire or oral communication shall be made in writing upon
oath or affirmation to a judge of competent junsdiction and shall state
the applicant's authority to make such application. Each application
shall include the following information:
"(a) the identity of the investigative or law enforcement officer making
the applicat,ion, and the officer authorizing the application ;
"(b) a full and complete statement of the facts and circumstances relied
upon by the a.pplicant, to justify his belief that an order should be issued,
including (i) details as to the particular offense that has been, is being, or
is about to be committed, (ii) a particular description of the nature and
location of the facilities from which or the place where the communication is to be intercepted, (iii) a particular descripton of the type of
communications sought to be intercepted, (iv) the identity of the person,
if known, committing the offense and whose communications are to be
intercepted;
" (c) a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably
appear to be unlikely to succeed 1f tried or to be too dangerous;
'' (d) a statement of the period of time for which the interception is:
required to be maintained. If the nature of the investigation IS such
that the authorization for interception should not automatically terminate when the described type of communication has been first obtained ,.
a particular description of facts establishing probable cause to believe that
additional communications of the same type will occur thereafter,
"(e) a full and complete statement of the facts concerning all prevwu:;;·
:,tpplications known to the individual authorizing and making the application, made to any judge for authorization to intercept, or for approval
of interceptions of, wir~> or oral communicat10m; ·inv<llving any of the.
same persons, facilities or places specified in the application , and the·
action taken by the judge on each such application; and
"(f) where the application is fQr the extension of an order, a statement
setting forth the res ults thus far obtamed from the interception, or a
reasonable explanation of the failure to obtain :such results ."
The issuing judge is free to require the apphcant to furnish additional
information 18 U S. (' § 25JR (2) ,
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at a home in Canton, Ohio. The accompanying affidavit
recited that the telephones were being used by Albert Kotoch,
Joseph Spaganlo, and George Florea to conduct an illegal
gambling business, and that in conducting that business they
would place calls to and receive calls from various persons,
three of whom were also named in the wiretap application.2
The affiant also stated that the Government's informants
would refuse to testify against the persons named in the application, that telephone records alone would be insufficient to
support a gambling conviction, and that normal investigative techniques were unlikely to be fruitful. Pursuant to
the Government's request, the District Court authorized for
a period of 15 days the interception of gambling-related
wire communications of Kotoch, Spaganlo, Florea, three
named individuals other than the respondents, and "others
as yet unknown," to and from the four listed .telephones. 8
2 The affidavit set forth extensive information indicating that the named
individuals were conducting a gambling operation. This information was
derived from physical :,urveillance by agents of the FBI, an examination
of telephone company toll records, and the personal observations of six
informants, whose past reliability also was detailed in the affidavit .
8 The District Court's order was issued pursuant 18 U. S. C. §§ 2518
(3), (4) which provide in pertinent pa.rt:
"(3) Upon such application the judge may enter an ex parte order,
as requested or as modified, authorizing or approving interception of wire
or oral communications within the territorial jurisdiction of the court
in which the judge is sitting, if the judge determines on the basis of the
facts submitted by the applicant that" (a) there is probable cause for belief that an individual is committing,
has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense enumerated in
section 2516 of this chapter ;
"(b) there is probable cause for belief that particular communications
.concerning that offense will be obtained through such interception ;
"(c) normal investigative procPdures have been tried and have failed
or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too
dangerous ;
"(d) there is probable cause for belief that the facilities from which,
<Or the place where, the wire or oral communicatiOns are to be intercepted
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During the course of the wiretap, the Government 1earnecf
that respondents Donova-n, Robbins, and Buzzaco were discussing illegal gambling a.ctivities with the named subjects.
On December 26, 1972, the Government applied for an
extension of the initial interc~pt order.4 This time it sought
authorization to intercept gambling"rel~ted conversations of
Kotoch, Spaganlo, Florea, two other n~ed individu~ls, and
uothers as yet unknown," but it did not identify respondents
are being used, or are about to be used, in connection with the commission of such offense, or are lea.~~ed to, listed in the name of, or commonly
used by such person.
" (4) Each order authorizing or approving the interception of any wire
or oral communication shall specify" (a) the identity of the person, if known, whose communications are
to be intercepted ;
"(b) the nature and location of the communications facilities as to
which, or the place where, authority to intercept is granted;
" (c) a particular description of the type of communication sought to
be intercepted, and a statement of the particular offense to which it
relates;
"(d) the identity of the agency authorized to intercept the communications, and of the person authorizing the application; and
"(e) the period of time during which such interception is authorized,
including a statement as to whether or not the interception shall automatically terminate when the deswbed communication has been first
obtained."
4 In addition to the Decemuer 26 application requ{'l)ting an extension
of the initial intercept order, the Government also filed on that date a
separate application ~:>eeking authorization to monitor a third telephone
discovered at the same North Olmstead address. Both applications were
accompanied by another affidavit ~:>etting forth the results of the imtial
monitoring, the manner in which the third phone was discovered, the
facts indiCating that the newly discovered telephone was being used to
conduct a gambling business, and reasons why continued interception was
necessary. A copy of the affidavit filed on November 28 was also
attached to the December 26 applications. For the sake of clarity, th~
two applications filrd on Drcember .2Q will be treated as a sing!~
~ppl~cat~Qn.
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Donovan, Buzzaco, and Robbins in this second application.~
The District Court again authorized interception of gambling.
related conversations for a maximum of 15 days.
On February 21, 1973, the Government submitted to the
District Court a proposed order giving notice of the interceptions to 37 persons, a group which the Government apparently thought included all individuals who could be identified as having discussed gambling over the monitored
telephones. 6 The District Court signed the proposed order,
and an inventory notice was served on the listed persons,
including respondents Donovan, Buzzaco, and Robbins. On
September 11, 1973, after the Government submitted the
names of two additional persons whose identities allegedly had
been omitted inadvertently from the initial list, the District
Court entered an amended order giving notice to those
individuals. As a result of what the Government labels
"administrative oversight," respondents Merlo and Lauer
6 The United States conceded in the Court of Appeals that respondents Donovan and Robbins were "known" within the meannig of the
statute at the time of the December 26 application, but challenged m;
clearly erroneous the District Court's finding that respondent Buzzaco was
"known" at that time. The Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's
finding, and the United States has not sought. review of that disposition.
Thus, for our purposes, all three rel:lpondents were "known" on December 26.
6 An inventory notice must be served within a designated period of
time upon "the persons named in the ordt>r or the application" 18
U. S. C. § 2518 (8){ d) . Tht> Inventory must give notice of the ent.ry of
the intercept order or application, state the disposition of the application,
and indicate whether communicatiOns were or were not intercepted. Ibid .
Upon the filing of a motion, the judgt> has diScretiOn to make available
the intercepted communications, the applications , and the orders. Ibid.
Title III also authonzes the District Court to cause an mventory notice to be servt>d on "other parties to intercepted communications" if the
judge determines that such notice i!; m the interest of justice. Ibid.
Those other parties may also be gtven access to the mtercepted commullications, the applications, and the orders. Ibid.
•
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were not included in either list of names and were never
served with inventory notice.7
On November 1, 1973, an indictment was returned in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio charging Kotoch, Spaganlo, the five respondents, and
10 other individuals with conspiracy to conduct and conducting a gambling business in violation of 18 U. S. C. §§ 371
and 1955. The five respondents filed motions to suppress
evidence derived from the wire interception. After an evidentiary hearing on the motions, the District Court suppressed as to respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco
all evidence derived from the December 26 intercept order
on the ground that fa.ilure to identify them by name in the
application and order of that date violated 18 U. S. C. §§ 2518
(l)(b)(iv) and 2518 (4)(a). With respect to Merlo and
Lauer, who were not known to the Government until after
the December 26 application, the District Court suppressed
all evidence derived from both intercept orders on the ground
that they had not been served with inventory notice.
The Court of Appea.ls for the Sixth Circuit a.ffirmed.
513 F. 2d 337 (1975). 8 On the identification issue, the
court held that the wiretap application must identify every
person whose conversations relating to the subject criminal
activity the Government has probable cause to believe it
will intercept. Agreeing with the District Court that at the
time of the December 26 application the Government had
7 Although respondents Merlo and Lauer were not served with inventory notice pursuant. to § 2518 (8) (d), the intercept orders, applications,
and related papers were made available to all the defendants, including
Merlo and Lauer, on November 26, 1973. Thus, the introduction into
evidence at trw! of the contents of the mtercepted conversations and
evidence denved therefrom would not. he prohibited by 18 U. S. C.
§2518 (9) .
.
s The GovernmE>nt filed its appe,al from the District Court's order suppressing evidencr under lH U. S. C. § 3731, and there has bern no trial
Qn t.he <'har~es with respect to t h~-1 roopond.ents,
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probable cause to believe that it would overhear Donovan,
Robbins, and Buzzaco "committing the offense," the Court
of Appeals affirmed the suppression of evidence derived from
the December 26 order. On the notice question, it held
that the Government has an implied statutory duty to inform the issuing judge of the identities of the parties whose
conversations were overheard so that he can determine
whether discretionary inventory notice should be required. 9
Because the Government had failed to perform this duty
with respect to Merlo and Lauer, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the District Court's order suppressing evidence
derived from both intercept orders. The court found it unnecessary to determine whether the failure to identify repondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco in the December
26 application and to name respondents Merlo and Lauer
in the proposed inventory notice orders was inadvertent or
purposeful, since the mere fact of omission was sufficient to
require suppression under 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (10) (a). 11>
We granted certiorari to resolve these issues, which concern
the construction of a major federal statute 1 421 U. S. 907,
and now reverse.
II
The United States contends that § 2518 (1)(b)(iv) requires that a wiretap application identify only the principal
Seen. 6, supra.
18 U. S. C. § 2518 (10) (a) provides in pertinent part :
"(10) (a) Any aggrieved person in any trial, hearing, or proceeding
in. or before any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or
other authority of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision
thereof, may move to suppress the contents of any intercepted wire or
oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, on the grounds that"(i) t.he communicatiOn was unlawfully intercepted;
"(ii) the order of authorization or approval under which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face ; or
"(iii) the interception was not made in conformity with the order of
authorization or approval.."
11

1o
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target of the interception, and that § 2518 (8) (d) does not
require the Government to 'provide the issuing judge with
a list of all identifiable persons who were overheard in the
course of an authorized interception. We think neither contention is sound.

A
We turn first to the identification requirements of § 2518
(l)(b)(iv) . . That provision requires a wiretap application
to specify "the identity of the person, if known, committing
the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted."
In construing that language, this Court already has ruled
that the Government is not required to identify an individu{tl
in the application unless it has probable cause to believe
(i) that the individual is engaged in the criminal activity
under investigation and (ii) that the individual's conversations will be intercepted over the target telephone. United
States v. Kahn, 415 U. S. 143 (1974). The question at issue
here is whether the Government is required to name all
such individuals. 11
The United States argues that the most reasonable m11 Every Court of Appeals that has considered the issue has concluded
tl1at an individual whose conversations probably will be intercepted by a
wiretap must be identified in the wiretap application if the law enforcement authorities have probable cause to believe the individual is committing the offense for which the wiretap is sought. United States v.
Chianzio, 525 F. 2d 289, 292 (CA2 1975); United States v. Bernstein,
509 F. 2d 996 (CA4 1975), petition for cert. nled, No. 74-1486; United
States v. Doolittle, 507 F . 2d 1368, aff'd en bane, 518 F. 2d 500 (CA5
1975), petitions for cert. liled Nos. 75-500, 75-509, 75-513; United States
v. Civella, 533 F . 2d 1395 (CA8 197o), petitions for cert. filed, Nos.
· 75-1813, 76-169; United Stat es v. Russo, 527 F . 2d 1150, 1156 (CAlO
1975), petition for cert. filed , No . 75-1218. See also United States v.
Moore, U. S. App. D. C. - , 513 F. 2d 485 , 493-494 (1975) (inter-.
preting 23 D. C. Code 547 (a) (2), wh1ch is almost identical to the provision at issue here) .
A number of these courts have concluded, and respondents Donovan,
Rol;!bins, and Buzzaco argue, that ·oQr gecisio~ in United States v. Kahn~
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terpretation of the plain language of the statute is that the
application must identify only the principal target of the
investigation, who "will almost always be the individual
whose phone is monitored~2 Brief for the United States,
at 18. Under this interpr~tation, if the Government has
reason to believe that an individual will use the target
telephone to place or receive calls, and the Government
has probable cause to believe that the individual is engaged
in the criminal activity under investigation, the individual
qualifies as a principal target and must be named in the
wiretap application. On the other hand, an individual who
uses a different telephone to place calls to or receive calls
from the target telephone is not a principal target even if
the Government has probable cause to believe that the
individual is engaged in the criminal activity under investigation. In other words, whether one is a principal target
of the investigation depends on whether one operates the
target telephone to place or receive calls. 13
415 U. S. 143 (1974), resolved this identification issue. See United States
v. Chiarizio, supra; United States v. Moore, supra. Although there is
language in Kahn suggesting that wiretap applications must identify all
such individuals, the identification question presented here was not before
us in Kahn. The question in that case was whether a wiretap application must identify a known user of the target telephone whose complicity in the criminal activity under investigation was not. known at
the time of the application. Kahn is a r!'levant, though not controlling,
precedent.
12 The Unit!'d States does not suggest that regardless of the factual
circumstances a wiretap application must identify only a single individual.
To the contrary, it concedes that if two or more persons are using the
target telephone "equally" to commit the o.ffense, and thus are "equally"
targets of the investigation, ·'all must be named." Brief for the United
.States, at 18 n. 13.
1 a Counsel for the United States explained this position succinctly at
oral argument : "The critical distinction . . is one between the users of
the telephone that is being monitored on the one hand, and all other perfSOns throughout the world who may converse from unmonitored phones:
'Qn ~hEl other ]:land/ ' Tr. of 0"Cal Arg., nt 13.
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Whatever the merits of such a statutory scheme, we find
little support for it in the language and structure of Title
III or in the legislative history. The statutory language
itself refers only to "the person, if known, committing the
offense and whose communications are to be intercepted."
That description is as applicable to a suspect placing calls
to the target telephone as it is to a suspect placing calls
from that telephone. It is true, as the United States suggests, that when read in the context of the other subdivisions of § 2518 ( 1) (b), an argument can be made that
Congress focused in subdivision (iv) on the primary user
of the target telephone. But it is also clear from other
sections of the statute that Congress expected that wiretap
applications would name more than one individual. For
example, Title III requires that inventory notice be served
upon "the persons named in the order or the applicatioil."
18 U. S. C. § 2518 (8) (d) (emphasis added). And § 2518
( 1)(e) requires that an intercept application disclose all
previous intercept applications "involving any of the same
persons ... specified in the application" (emphasis added).
It may well be that Congress anticipated that a given
application would cover more than one telephone or that
several suspects would use one telephone, and that an application for those reasons alone would require identification
of more than one individual. But nothing on the face of
the statute suggests that Congress intended to remove from
the identification requirement those suspects whose intercepted communications originated on a telephone other than
that listed in the wiretap application. 14
H Indeed, the contrary conclusion is suggested by the fact that identification of an individual in an application for an intercept order
triggrrs other statutory provisions. First, § 2518 (1) (e) requires an intercept application to disclose all previous applications "involving any
of the same persons . . . specified in the application ." To the extent
that Congress thou~ht it necessary to provide the issuing jndge with
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Nor can we find support in the legislative history for the
"principal target" interpretation. Title III originated as
a combination of S. 675, the Federal Wire Interception
Act, which was introduced by Senator McClellan several
months prior to this Court's decision in Berg:;r v. New York,
388 U. S. 41 ( 1967), and S. 2050, the Electronic Surveillance
Control Act of 1967, introduced by Senator Hruska a few
days after the Berger decision. S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess., 66 (1968). Both bills required that wiretap ap..
plications include a full and complete statement of the
facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant and
specification of the nature and location of the communication facilities involved. Although neither bill contained
an express identification requirement such as that at issue
here, both bills required the application to include "a full
and complete statement of the facts concerning all previous
applications ... involving any person named in the application as committing, having committed, or being about to
commit an offense." Hearings on Controlling Crime Through
More Effective Law Enforcement Before the Subcommittee
on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., at 77, § 8 (a) (3) and
1006, §2518(a)(4) (1967) (emphasis added). Thus, even
at this eMlY stage, it was recognized that an application
could identify several individuals, and there is no indication
that the identification would be limited to principal targets.
S. 971 combined the major provisions of S. 675 1:1-11d S. 2050
and eventually was enacted. While it was pending before
the Senate Judiciary Committee, this Court decided Katz
such information, there Is no indication of congressional intent to require
provision of such information only if a suspect operated from one end
of a telephone line. Second, § 2518 (8) (d) mandates that an inventory notice be served upon "the persons named in the order or the
application." As with §2518 (l)(e) , the congressional purpose would
not be served by limiting that OQtice Qn the basis of the telephone from.
wh.~ch one svea~.
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v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967). S. 971 was then
redra-fted to confrom to Katz as well as Berger, and
the identification provision was added at that time. The
Senate Report states th&t the requirements set forth in the
various subdivisions of § 2518 ( 1) (b), including the identific&tion requirement at issue here, " [were] intended to reflect the
constitutional comm&I!d of particularization." S. Rep. No.
1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 101 (1968), citing Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41,58-60, and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 354-356 (1967). The United States now contends that
although it may be that Congress rea,d Berger and Katz to
require, as a constitutional matter, that the subject of the
surveillance be named if known, Congress would hardly
have read those cases as requiring the naming of all parties
likely tQ be overheard.15 Brief, at 25-26. But to the extent that Congress thought it was meeting the constitutional
comma-nds of particularization established J... Berger and
Katz, Congress may have read those cases as mandating
a broad identification requirement. The stf\.tute that we
confronted in Berger required identification of "the person
or persons" whose communications were to be overheard.
388 U. S., at 59. And we expressly noted that that provision "[did] no more than identify the person whose constitu~
tionally protected area is to be invaded .. .. ." Ibid. Given
the statute at issue in Berger and our comment upon it,
15 At the time of the enactment of Title III, Congress did not,
have before it the view we expressed on this issue in United States
v. Kahn, 41S U. S., at 155 n. 15. The Fourth Amendment. requires
specification of "the place to be seached, and the persons or things to
be seized." In the wiretap context, those requirements are satisfied
by identification of the telephone line to be tapped and the particular
conversations to be seized. It is not a constitutional requirement that
all those likely to be overheard engaging in incriminating conversation~
be named. Specification of this sort "identif[ies] the person whose constitutionally protected area is to be invaded rather than 'pa,rticularly
describing' the communications, conversations, or discussions to be seizeq!•
perqer v. New York, 388 t], S. 41, 59 (1967) .

. ,/
1
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Congress mtty have concluded that the Constitution required
the naming, in a wiretap application, of all suspects rather
than just the primary user.'6
In any event, for our present purposes it is unnecessary
to speculate as to exactly how Congress interpreted Berger
and Katz with respect to the identification issue. It is sufficient to note that in response to those decisions Congress
inclqded an identification requirement which on its face draws
no distinction based on the telephone one uses, and the
United States points to no evidence in the legislative history
that supports such a distinction. Indeed, the legislative materials apparently contain no use of the term "principal target" or any discussion of a different treatment based on the
telephone from which a suspect speaks. 17 We therefore conclude that a wiretap application must name an individual
if the Government has probable cause to believe that the
individual is engaged in the criminal activity under investigation wd expects to intercept the individual's conversations over the target telephone.

B
The other statutory provision at issue in this case is
Thftt Congress may have so understood the constitutionaJ requirement is also suggested by the portion of the Senate Report dealing with
that provision of S. 971 that required the intercept order to identify
"the person, if known, whose conversations are to be intercepted." The
Senate Report merely cites West v. Cabell, 153 U . S. 78 ( 1894), which
concerns the need for proper identification of the subject of an arrest
warrant. S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 102 (1968) . To the
extent that Congress may have considered West to apply to wiretap
orders, we have no reason to believe that Congress considered its appli·
cability to extend only to those suspects using the target telephone.
17 At least one Senator read the identification requirement in S. 971 to
parallel the identification requirement contamed in the statute at issue
in Berger v. New York: "Specificity is required as to the person or
persons whose communications are to be intercepted." 114 Cong. Rec,,
at 14763 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Percy).
16
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18 U. S. C. § 2518 (8)( d), which provides that the judge
shall cause to be served on the persons named in the order
or applicfl,tion an inventory, which must give notice of the
entry of the order or application, ·state the disposition of
the application, and indicate whether communications were
intercepted. 111 Although the statute mandates inventory notice only for persons named in the application or the order,
the statute also provides that the judge may order similar
notice to other parties to intercepted communications if he
concludes that such action is in the interest of justice.l0
Observing that this notice provision does not expressly require law enforcement authorities routinely to supply the
judge with specific information upon which to exercise his
discretion, the United States contends that it would be inappropriate to read such a requirement into the statute since
the judge has the option of asking the law enforcement
authorities for whatever information he requires.
Our reading of the legislative history of the discretionary
noti~e provision in light of the purposes of Title III leads
us to reject the Government's interpretation. As reported
from the Judiciary Committee, section 2518 (8) (d) contained
only a provision mandating notice to the pe111ons named in
the application or the order; the discretionary notice provision wa.s added by amendment on the floor of the Senate.
u The inventory notice must be served within a reasonable time but
· uot later than 90 days after the date the application for an intercept
order was filed . On an ex parte showing of good cause, service of the
inventory may be postponed.
19 In addition to these provis10ns for mandatory and discretionary
inventory notice, the Government. 1s required to supply the issuing judge
with recordings of the intercepted conversations, which are to be sealed
·according to his directions. 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (8) (a). These notice
:and return provisions satisfy constitutional requirements. See Katz v.
United States, 389 U. S. 347, 355-35(), and n. 16 (1967); Berger v. Nelt''
York, 388 U.S. 41, 60 (1967) .
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In introducing that amendment, Senator Hart explained its
purpose:
"The amendment would give the judge who issued the
order discretion to require notice to be served on other
parties to intercepted conversations, even though such
parties are not specifically named in the court order.
The Berger and Katz decisions established that notice
of surveillance is a constitutional requirement of any
surveillance statute. It may be that the required notice must be served on all parties to intercepted communications. Since legitimate interests of privacy may
make such notice to all parties undesirable, the amendment leaves the final determination to the judge." 114
Cong. Rec. 14485-14486 (1968). 20
Iu deciding whether legitimate privacy interests justify
withholding inventory notice from parties to intercepted conversations, a judge is likely to require information and assistance beyond that contained in the application papers and the
recordings of intercepted conversations made available by
law enforcement at.Jthorities. No purpose is served by holding that those authorities have no routine duty to supply
the judge with revelant information. The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit recently confronted this problem of
20 It is worth noting that shortly before Senator Hart proposed this
amendment to S. 971, Senator Long had re.ad to the Senate portions
of a report prepared by the Allsociation of the Bar of the City of
New York on fed!'ral wiretap legislation . That report commented that
parties to intercepted conversations other than those named in the application or order probably "hould be served with inventory notice, but it
also recognized that under some circumstances the provision of such notice
could be harmful and ga-ve the following example :
"A, a businessman, talks to his customers, and the latter are served
with papers showing that A is being bugged[ .] LT]he damage to confidence in A and to A's reputation in general may damage A unjustly.
In this case it would seem that the customers should not be served with
the inventory." 114 Cong. Rec. 14476 (1968) .
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dual responsibility, and we adopt the balanced construction
that court placed on § 2518 (8) (d):
"To discharge this obligation the judicial officer must
have, at a minimum, knowledge of the particular categories into which fl'tll all the individuals whose conversations have been intercepted. Thus, while precise iden·
tification of each party to an intercepted conversation
is not required, a description of the general class, or
cl~ses, which they comprise is essential to enable the
judge to determine whether adqitional information is
necessary for a proper evaluation of the interests of the
various parties. Furthermore, although the judicial officer has the duty to cause the filing of the inventory
[notice], it is abundantly clear that the prosecution has
greater access to and familiarity with the intercepted
communications. Therefore we feel justified in imposing
upon the latter the duty to classify all those whose
conversations have been intercepted, and to transmit
this information to the judge. Should the judge desire
more information regarding these classes in order to
exercise his statutory § 2518 (8) (d) discretion, ... the
government is also reqt.Jired to ft.Jrnish such information
as is available to it." United States v. Chun, 503 F,
2d 533, 540 (1974). 21
We agree with the Ninth Circuit that' this allocation or
responsibility best serves the purposes of Title IIV 2
The current policy of the Department of Justice is to provide
issuing judge with the name of every person who has been over-.
heard as to whom there is any reasonable possibility of indictment.
Brief for the United States, at 39. This policy does not meet the test
specified above. Moreover, where, as here, t.he Government chooses tosupply the issuing juclge with a list of all identifiable persons rather·
than a description of the classes into which those persons fall, the listmust be complete.
22 At oral argume11t, counsel for the United States recognized the merit
of the approach specified in United States v. Chun .
''ferha:ps the approach qf th{l Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
n

~he
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III
We turn now to the question whether the District Court
properly suppressed evidence derived from the wiretaps at
issue solely because of the failure of the law enforcement
authorities to comply fully with the provisions of §§ 2518 ( 1)
(b)(iv) and 2518 (S)(d). Section 2515 expressly prohibits
the use at trial, and at certain other proceedings, of the
contents of any intercepted wire communication or any evi~
dence derived therefrom "if the disclosure of that informa~
tion would be in violation of this chapter." The circumstances that trigger suppression under § 2515 are in turn
enumerated in § 2518 (10) (a):
"(i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted;
11
(ii) the order of authorization or approval under
which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face; or
"(iii) the interception was not made in conformity
with the order of authorization or approval."
There is no basis on the facts of this case to suggest that
the authorization orders are facially insufficient, or that the
interception was not conducted in conformity with the orders.
Thus, only § 2518 (10) (a) (i) is relevant: were the communications '~unlawfully intercepted'' given the violations of
§§ 2518 (1)(b)(iv) and 2518 (8)(d)?~
Resolutio~ of that question must begin with United States
3

which sugge:;ted that rather than submitting specific name:; we should
submit categorie:; of persons who had been overheard, is a better
policy, would be more helpful to the district court in exercising its
discretion, and we would have no objection to following any reasonable policy that the district . courts determine would be useful to therq
in this regard." Tr. of Oral Arg., at 6-7.
28 The availability of the suppression remedy for these statutory,
as opposed to constitutional, violations, see nn. 15 and 19, supra, turns
on the provisions of Title III rather than the judicia.lly fashioned ex.,.
clusionary rule aimed at deterring violations of Fourth Amendment
fights . United States v. Giordano, supra, 416 U. S., at 524.
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v. Giordano, 416 U. S. 505 (1974), and United States v.
Chavez, 416 U. S. 562 (1974). Those cases hold that "[not]
every failure to comply fully with any requirement provided
in Title III would render the interception of wire or oral
communications 'unlawful.' " United States v. Chavez, 416
U. S., at 574-575. To the contrary, suppression is required
only for a "failure to satisfy any of those statutory requirements that directly and substantially implement the congressional intention to limit the use of intercept procedures
to those situations clearly calling for the employment of this
extraordinary device." United States v. Giordano, 416 U. S.,
at 527.
Giordano concerned the provision in Title III requiring
that an application for an intercept order be approved by
the Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney General specially designated by the Attorney General. Concluding that
Congress intended to condition the use of wiretap procedures
on the judgment of senior officials in the Department of
Justice, the Court required suppression for failure to comply with the approval provision. Chavez concerned the statutory requirement that the application for an intercept order
specify the identity of the official authorizing the application. The prob1em in Chavez was one of misidentification ;
although the application had in fact been authorized by the
Attorney General, tbe application erroneously identified an
Assistant Attorney General as the official authorizing the
application. The Court concluded that mere misidentification of the official authorizing the application did not make
the application unlawful within the meaning of § 2518 (10)
(a)(i) since that identification requirement did not play a
"substantive role'' in the regulatory system. 416 u. s.}
at 578.
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals concluded that both
the identification requirement of § 2518 (1) (b) (iv.) and
the notice requirem~nt of § 2515 (8) (d) played a "centr.l!-1
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role" in the statutory framework, and for that reason affirmed the District Court's order suppressing relevant
evidence. Although both statutory requirements are undoubtedly important, we do not think that the failure to
comply fully with those provisions renders unlawful an intercept order that in all other respects satisfies the statutory
requirements.
A
As to § 2518 (1) (b) (iv), the issue is whether the identification in an intercept application of all those likely to be
overheard in incriminating conversations plays a "substantive role" with respect to judicial authorization of intercept
orders and consequently imposes a limitation on the use
of intercept procedures. The statute provides that the issuing judge may approve an intercept application if he determines that normal investigative techniques have failed or
are unlikely to succeed and there is probable cause to believe
that : (i ) an individual is engaged in criminal activity,
(ii) particular communications concerning the offense will
be obtained through interception; and (iii) the target facilities are being used in connection with the specified criminal
activity. That determination is based on the "full and complete statement" of relevant facts supplied by law enforcement authorities. If, after evaluating the statutorily
enumerated factors in light of the information contained in
the application, the judge concludes that the wiretap order
should issue, the failure to identify addition~ persons who
are likely to be overheard engaging in incriminating conversations could hardly invalidate an otherwise lawful judicial
authorization. The intercept order may issue only if the
issuing judge determines th11t the statutory factors are present, and the failure to name additional targets in no way
detracts from the sufficiency of those factors.
This case is unlike Giordano , where failure to satisfy
the statutory requirement of prior approval by specified

I •
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Justice Department officials bypassed a congressionally
imposed limitation on the use of the intercept procedure.
The Court there noted that it was reasonable to believe
that requiring prior approval from sep.ior officials in the
Justice Department "would inevitably foreclose resort to
wiretapping in various situations where investigative personnel would otherwise seek intercept authority from the court
ancl the court would very likely authorize its use." 416 U. S.,
at 528. Here, however, the sta,tutorily imposed preconditions
to judicial atfthoriza,tion were satisfied, and the issuing judge
wa.S sifUply una.ware that additional persons might be overheard enga,ging in incriminating conversations. In no rneaningfu.l seqse can it be said that the presence of that infor..
mation as to additional targets would have precludecl judicial
authorization of the interoept. 24 Rather, this case resembles
Chavez, where we held that a wiretap was not unlawful sim..
ply because the issuing judge was incorrectly informecl as
to which qesignated official had authorized the applica,tion,
The Chavez intercept was lawful because the Just,ice Department haq performed its task of prior approval, and the
instant intercept is lawful because the application provided
sufficient information to enable the issuing judge to determine that the sta.tutory preconditions were satisfied. 25
There is no suggestion in this case that the Government agents
knowingly failed to identify respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco
for the purpose of kt>eping relevant informatio11 from the District Court
that might have prompted the court to conclude that probable cause
was lacking. If such a showing had been made, we would have a
different case. Nor is there any suggestion ·that as a result of the
failure to name these three respondents they wE-re denied the mandatory
inventory notice supplied to persontS named in the application. 18
U. S. C. § 2518 (8) (d). Respondent Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco
were among the 37 per~;ons served with the intial inventory.
25 No one suggel:its that the failure to identify in a wiretap application
individuals who are "unknown " within the meaning of thr statute, see
United States v. Kahn, 415 U. S. 143 (1974), requires suppression of
iPtercepted convertSati<>ns to which thost> ~nd_ividuals were parties. Though
24
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Finally, we note that nothing in the legislative history
suggests that Congress intended this broad identification requirement to play "a central, or even functional, role in
guarding figainst unwarranted use of wiretapping or electronic
surveillance." United States v. Chavez, 416 U. S., at 578.
Neither S. 675 nor S. 2050, the predecessor bills of S. 971,
contained an identification provision. See p. 11, supra. The
only explanation given in the Senate Report for the inclusion of the broad identification provision was that it was
intended to reflect what Congress perceived to be the constitutional command of particularization. This explanation
was offered with respect to all the information required by
§ 2518 (l) (6) to be set out in an intercept application. No
additional guidance can be gleaned from the floor debates,
since they contain no substantive discussion of the identification provision. 26
recognizing' that tre failqre to identify such an "unknown" individual
does not make unlawful an otherwise valid intercept order, respondents
Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco suggest that the opposite is true
with respect to th~ failure to identify in a wiretap application individuals who are "known" within the meaning of the statute. Counsel
for these respondents suggested at oral argument that this difference
in result is justified by analogy to warrantless searches or arrests. Tr.
of Oral Arg., at 40. Although law ~forcement officials can often take
action without a warrant when they have been unable to foresee the
circumstances that eventually confronted them, they still must obtain a
search or arrest ~arrant when tl1eir prior knowledge is sufficient to
establish probable cause, and it. is S\lggested that the same principle
applies here. The major flaw in that reasoning is that this case does
not concern warrantless action. Here, the omission on the part of law
enforcement authorities was not a failure to seek prior juclicial authorization, but a failure to identify every individual who could be expected
to be overheard engaging In incriminating COllVersations. That the complete absence of prior judicial a1.1thorization would make an intercept
unlawful has no bearing on the lawfulness of an intercept order that
fails to identify every target.
2 6 Ever if we assume that Congress thought that a broad identifica.tioll
Teqlliremcnt was constitutionally mandated, 1t does not follow th!\t
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B
We reach the same conclusion with respect to the Government's duty to inform the judge of all identifiable persons
whose conversations were intercepted. As noted earlier, the
version of Title III that emerged from the Senate Judiciary
Committee provided only fpr mandatory notice to the "persons named in the order or the application." The Senate
Report detailed the purpose of that provision:
"[T]he intent of the provision is that the principle
of postuse notice will be retained. This provision alone
should insure the community that the techniques are
rf,')asanably employed. Through its operation all authorized interceptions must eventually become known at least
to the subject. He can then seek appropriate civil redress, for example, under section 2520 . . . if he feels
that his privacy has been unlawfully invaded." S. Rep.
No. l097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 105 (1968).
The floor discussion concerning the amendment adding the
provision for discretionary notice merely indicates an intent
to provide notice to such additional persons as may be
constitutipnally required.
Nothing in the structure of the Act or this legislative
histor:y suggests that incriminating conversations are "unlawCongress imposed statutory suppression under §§ 2515 and 2518 (10) (a)
(i) as a sanction for noncompliance. In limiting use of the intercept pr0oo
cedure to "the most precise 11nd discriminate circumstances," S. Rep. No.
107, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 102 (1968), Congress required law enforcemept
authorities to convince a District Court tpat probable cause existed to
believe that a specific person was committing a specific offe11se using a
specific telephone. This requirement was satisfied here when the application set forth sufficient information to indicate tl)at the primary targets
were conducting a gambling business over four particular telephones.
Nothing in the legislative history indicates that Congress intended to
declare an otherwise constitutional intercept order "unlawful" under·
§ 2518 (10) (a) (i)-resulting in suppression under § 2515-for failure t<t
:pame additional targets.
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fully intercepted" whenever parties to those conversations
do not receive discretionary inventory notice as a result of
the Government's failure to inform the District Court of their
identities. Ap the time inventory notice was served on the
other identifiq,ble persons, the intercept had been completed
and the convj:lrsations had been "seized" under a valid intercept order. The fact that discretionary notice reached
39 rather th~p 41 identifiable persons does not in itself mean
that the convf:)rsations were unlawfully intercepted. 27
·The legislative history indicates that postinterdept notice
was designed instead to assure the community that the
wiretap technique is reasonably employed. But even recognizing that Congress placed considerable emphasis on that
aspect of the overall statutory scheme, we do not think that
postintercept notice was intended to serve as an independent
restraint on resort to the wiretap procedure.

IV
Although the Government was required to identify respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco in the December 26
application for an extension of the initial intercept, failure
27

Counsel for ff!Spondents Merlo and Lauer concecJed at oral argument
that the failure to name those respondents in the proposed mventory
order was not. intentional, Tr. of Oral Arg. , at. 32, and we are therefore
not called upon to decide whether suppre.ssion would be an available
remedy if the Government knowingly sought to prevent the Distriet
Court from servi~~ inventory notice on particular parties. Nor doC~> this
case present an opportunity to comment upon the suggestion, recognized
by the Unitecj St~tes, Brief, at 49 n. 40, that suppresswn might b~ required
if the agents krjf:l)V before the interceptiOn that no inventory would be
served.
Moreover, resmndents Merlo and Lauer were not prejudiced by their
failure to receive postintercept notice under e1ther of the District Court's
inventory orders. As noted earlier, the Government made available to
all defendants tqe intercept orders, applications, and related papers. See
n. 7, supra. And in respon~e to pretnal discovery motions, the Government produced transcripts of the intArceptPd convPrsations.

..
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to do so in the circumstances here presented did not warrant
suppression under § 2518 (10)(a)(i). Nor was suppression
justified with respect to respondents Merlo and Lauer simply
because the Government inadvertently omitted their names
from the comprehensive list of all identifiable persons whose
conversations had been overheard. We hold that this is the
correct result under the provisions of Title III, but we reemphasize the suggestion we made in United States v. Chavez,
that "strict adherence by the Government to the provisions of
Title III would nonetheless be more in keeping with the
responsibilities Congress has imposed upon it when authority to enga.ge in wiretapping or electronic surveillance is
sought." 416 U. S., at 580.
The order of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case
is remanded to that court for further proceedings in accord
with this opinion.

It is
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United States, Petitioner, On Writ of Certiorari to the
v.
United States Court of ApThomas W. Donovan et al.
peals for the Sixth Circuit.
[December -, 1976]
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents issues concerning the construction of
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968, 18 U. S. C. §§ 2510-2520. Specifically, we must
decide whether 18 U. S. C. § 2518 ( 1) (b )(iv), which requires
the Government to include in its wiretap applications "the
identity of the person, if known, committing the offense,
and whose conversations are to be intercepted,'' is satisfied
when the Government identifies only the "principal targets"
of the intercept. Second, we must decide whether the Government has a statutory responsibility to inform the issuing
judge of the identities of perso~1s whose conversations were
overhea.rd in the course of the interception, thus enabling
him to decide whether they should be served with notice of
the interception pursu11nt to 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (8) (d) .
And finally, we must determine whether failure to comply
fully with these statutory provisions requires suppression of
evidence under 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (10) (a) .

I
On November 28, 1972, a special agent of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation applied to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio for an order
authorizing a wiretap interception in accordance with Title

·· ~
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UP The application requested authorization to intercept
gambling-related communications over two telephones at one
address in North Olmstead, Ohio, and two other telephones
The wiretap application procedure is set forth at 18 U. S. C. § 2518
(1), which provides:
" ( 1) Each application for an order authorizing or approvmg the interception of a wire or oral commumcntion shall be- made in writing upon
oath or affirmation to a judge of competent junsdiction and shall state
the applicant's authority to make such application . Each applicatiOn
shall include the following infonnation:
"(a) the identity of the investigative or law enforcement officer making
the application, and the officer authorizing the application ;
"(b) a full and complete state-ment of the facts and circumstances relied
upon by the applicant, to justify his belief that an order should be issued,
including (i) details as to the particular offe-nse that has been, is being, or
is about to be committed, (ii) a particular description of the nature and
locat.ion of the facilities from which or the place where the communication is to be mtercepted, (iii) a particular descripton of the type of
communications sought to be intercepted, (iv) the identity of the person,
if known, committing the offense and whose communications are to be
intercepted;
" (c) a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedure-s have been tried and failed or why they reasonably
appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous ;
'·' (d) a statement of the period of time for which the interception is:
required to be maintained. If the nature of the investigation IS such.
that the authorization for interception s·hould not automatically terminate when the described type of communication has been first obtained,.
a particular description of facts establishing probable cause to believe that
~;~.dditional communications of the same type will occur thereafter ;
"(e) a full and complete state-ment of the facts .conceming all previous·
t;tpplications known to the mdividual authorizing and making the application, made to any judge for authorizatiOn to intercept, or for approval
of interceptions of, wire or oral communications ·inv<>lving any of thesame persons, fa.cilitie.s or places specified in the application, and the·
action taken by the judge on each ~uch application ; and
"(f) where the application is f<>r the rxtension of an order, a statement
setting forth the results thus far obtained from the interreption , or a
reasonable explanation of the fa1lure to obtain such results."
The issuing judge IS free to requm' the applicant to furnish additional
information. 18 lT S. C' §251R (2) ,
1
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at a home in Canton, Ohio. The accompanying affidavit
recited that the telephones were being used by Albert Kotoch,
Joseph Spa.ganlo, and George Florea to conduct an illegal
gambling business, and that in conducting that business they
would place calls to and receive calls from various persons,
three of whom were also named in the wiretap application.2
The affiant also sta.ted that the Government's informants
would refuse to testify against the persons named in the application, that telephone records alone would be insufficient to
support a gambling conviction, and that normal investigative techniques were unlikely to be fruitful. Pursuant to
the Government's request, the District Court authorized for
a period of 15 days the interception of gambling-related
wire communications of Kotoch, Spa.ganlo, Florea, three
named individuals other than the respondents, and "others
as yet unknown," to and from the four listed telephones. 8
2 The affidavit set forth extensive information indicating that the named
individuals were conducting a gambling operation. This information was
derived from physical surveillance by agents of the FBI, an examination
of telephone company toll records, and the personal observations of six
informants, whose past reliability also was detailed in the affidavit .
8 The District Court's order was issued pursuant 18 U. S. C. §§ 2518
(3), ( 4) which provide in pertinent part:
"(3) Upon such application the judge may enter an ex parte order,
as requested or as modified, authorizing or approving interception of wire
or oral communication:; within the territorial jurisdiction of the court
in which the judge is sitting, if the judge determines on the basis of the
facts submitted by the applicant that" (a) there is probable cause for belief that an individual is committing,
has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense enumerated in
section 2516 of this chapter ;
"(b) there is probable cause for behef that particular communications
.concerning that offense will be obtained through such interception ;
" (c) normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed
or reasonably appror to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too
dangerous;
"(d) there is probable cause for belief that the facilities from which,
or the place where, the wire or oral communications are to be mtercepted
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During the course of the wiretap, the Government 1earnecl
that respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco were discussing illegal gambling activities with the named subjects.
On December 26, 1972, the Government applied for an
extension of the initial intercflpt order.4 . This time it sought
authorization to intercept gambling~related conversations of
Kotoch, Spaganlo, Florea, tw~ other n~ed individuals, and
11
others as yet unknown," but it did not identify respondents
are being used, or are about to be used, in connection with the commission of such offense, or are lea.1!ed to, listed in the name of, or commonly
used by such person.
" (4) Each order authorizing or approving the interception of any wire
or oral communication shall specify" (a) the identity of the person, if known, whose communications are
to be interceptro;
"(b) the nature and location of the communications facilities as to
which, or the place where, authority to intercept is granted;
" (c) a particular description of the type of communication sought to
be intercepted, and a statement of the particular offense to which it
relates;
" (d) the identity of the agency authorized to intercept the communications, and of the person authoming the application; and
"(e) the period of time during which such interception is authorized,
including a statement as to whether or not the interception shall automatically terminate when the described communication has been first
obtained."
4 In addition to the December 26 application requesting an extension
of the initial intercept order, the Government also filed on that date a
separate application seeking authorization to monitor a third telephone
discovered at the same North Olmstead address. Both applications were
accompanied by another affidavit setting forth the results of the initial
monitoring, the manner in which the third phone was discovered, the
facts indicatmg that the newly discovered telephone was being used to
conduct a gambling business, and reasons why continued interception was
necessary. A copy of the affidavit filed on November 28 was also
attached to the December 26 applications. For the sake of clarity, the
two applications filed on Peceml}er 2G will be t reated as a sing!~
appHcat~Qll,

75-212-0PINION
UNITED STATES v. DONOVAN

5

Donovan, Buzzaco, and Robbins in this second application.~
The District Court again authorized interception of gambling·
related conversations for a maximum of 15 days.
On February 21, 1973, the Government submitted to the
District Court a proposed order giving notice of the interceptions to 37 persons, a group which the Government apparently thought included all individuals who could be identified as having discussed gambling over the monitored
telephones. 6 The District Court signed the proposed order,
and an inventory notice was served on the listed persons,
including respondents Donovan, Buzzaco, and Robbins. On
September 11, 1973, after the Government submitted the
names of two additional persons whose identities allegedly had
been omitted inadvertently from the initial list, the District
Court entered an amended order giving notice to those
individuals. As a result of what the Government labels
"administrative oversight," respondents Merlo and Lauer
6 The United States conceded in the Court of Appeals that respondents Donovan and Robbins were "known" within the meannig of the
statute at the time of the December 26 application, but challenged as
clearly erroneous the District Court's finding that rE'Spondent Buzzaco wall
"known" at that time. The Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's
finding, and the United State!:! has not sought review of that disposition.
Thus, for our purposes, all three respondents were "known" on December 26.
0 An inventory notice must be served within a designated period of
time upon "the perl:!ons named in the order or the application.'' 18
U. S. C. § 2518 (8) (d). The inventory mnst give notice of the entry of
the intercept order or application, state th(' disposition of the application,
and indicate whether communications were or were not intercepted. Ibid .
Upon the filing of a motion , the judge has dtscretion to make availablt>
the intercepted communications, the applications, and the orders. Ibid.
Title III also authomes the District Court to cause an inventory notice to be served on "other parties to intercepted communications" if the
judge determines that such notice is m the interest of justice. Ibid.
Those other parties may also be given a.cceBs to the intercepted commullications, the applications, and the orqers. lbi~.
•·
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were not included in either list of names and were never
served with inventory notice. 7
On November 1, 1973, an indictment was returned in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio charging Kotoch, Spaganlo, the five respondents, and
10 other individuals with conspiracy to conduct and conducting a gambling business in violation of 18 U. S. C. §§ 371
and 1955. The five respondents filed motions to suppress
evidence derived from the wire interception. After an evidentiary hearing on the motions, the District Court suppressed as to respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco
all evidence derived from the December 26 intercept order
on the ground that failure to identify them by name in the
application and order of that date violated 18 U. S. C. §§ 2518
(1)(b)(iv) and 2518 (4)(a). With respect to Merlo and
Lauer, who were not known to the Government until after
the December 26 application, the District Court suppressed
all evidence derived from both intercept orders on the ground
that they had not been served with inventory notice.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
513 F. 2d 337 (1975) .8 On the identification issue, the
court held that the wiretap application must identify every
person whose conversations relating to the subject criminal
activity the Government has probable cause to believe it
will intercept. Agreeing with the District Court that at the
time of the December 26 application the Government had
7 Although respondents Merlo and Lauer were not served with inventory notice pursuant. to § 2518 (8) (d), the mtercept orders, applications,
and related papers were made avmla ole to all the defendants, including
Merlo and Laurr, on November 26, 1973. Thus, the introduction into
evidence a.t tnal of the contents of the mtercepted conversations and
evidence denved therefrom would not. he prohibited by 18 U. S C.

§2518 (9)
8 The Government fil ed m, appe.al from the Du;trict Court's order suppressing ev1dence under Ul U. S C. § :37:31, and th«:>re hru:; be«:>n no trial
Qn Uw charges with resp«:>ct to the r"*'ponqpnrs,
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probable cause to believe that it would overhear Donovan,
Robbins, and Buzzaco "committing the offense," the Court
of Appeals affirmed the suppression of evidence derived from
the December 26 order. On the notice question, it held
tha.t the Government has an implied statutory duty to inform the issuing judge of the identities of the parties whose
conversations were overheard so that he can determine
whether discretionary inventory notice should be required. 9
Because the Government had failed to perform this duty
with respect to Merlo and Lauer, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the District Court's order suppressing evidence
derived from both intercept orders. The court found it unnecessary to determine whether the failure to identify repondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco in the December
26 application and to 11ame respondents Merlo and Lauer
in the proposed inventory notice orders was inadvertent or
purposeful, since the mere fact of omission was sufficient to
require suppression under 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (10) (a). 10
We granted certiorari to resolve these issues, which concern
the construction of a major federal statute, 421 U. S. 907,
and now reverse.
II
The United States contends that § 2518 (1)(b)(iv) requires that a wiretap application identify only the principal
See n. 6, supra.
18 U. S. C. § 2518 (10) (a) provides in pertinent part :
"(10) (a) Any aggrieved person in any trial, hearing, or proceeding
in or before any court., department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or
other authority of the United States, a State, or a, political ~ubdivision
thereof, may move to suppress the contents of any intercepted wire or
oral commurucation, or evidence derived therefrom, on the grounds that" (i) the communicatwn was unlawfully intercepted ;
"(ii) the order of authorization or approval under which it was intercepted is insufficient on 1ts face, or
"(iii) the interception was not made in conformity with the order of
authorization or approval."
9

1o
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target of the interception, and that § 2518 (8) (d) does not
require the Government to 'provide the issuing judge with
a list of all identifiable persons who were overheard in the
course of an authorized interception. We think neither contention is sound.

A
We turn first to the identification requirements of § 2518
(1)(b)(iv). That provision requires a wiretap application
to specify "the identity of the person, if known, committing
the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted."
In construing that language, this Court already has ruled
that the Government is not required to identify an individul:Ll
in the application unless it has probable cause to believe
(i) that the individual is engaged in the criminal activity
under investigation and (ii) that the individual's conversations will .be intercepted over the target telephone. United
States v. Ka'hn, 415 U. S. 143 (1974). The question at issue
here is whether the Government is required to name all
such individuals. 11
The United States argues that the most reasonable m-

C~'t'+.

d e~1 eJ,
_U.S.(Itt1b) .

11 Every Court of Appeals that has considered the issue has concluded
that an individual whose conversations probably will be mtercepted by a
wiretap must be identified in the wiretap application if the law enforcement authorities have probable cause to believe the individual is committing the offense for which the wiretap is sought. United States v.
Chiarizio, 525 F. 2d 289, 292 (CA2 1975); United States v. Bernstein,
509 F . 2d 996 (CA4 1975) , petition for cert. filed, No. 74-1486; United
States v. Doolittle, 507 F. 2d 1368, aff'd en bane, 518 F. 2d 500 (CA5
1975) , petitions for cert. 'filed Nos. 75-500,75-509, 75-513; United States
v. Civella, 533 :F. 2d 1395 (CA8 1976), petitions for cert. filed, Nos .
75-1813, 76-169; United States v. Russo. 527 F . 2d 1150, 1156 (CAIO - - ;
1975) ,
· ·
.
,
See also United States v.
Moore, U. S. App. D. C. - , 513 F. 2d 485, 493-494 (1975) (inter-.
preting 23 D . C. Code 547 (a) (2), wh1ch is almost identical to the provision at issue here) .
A number of these courts have concluded, and respondents Donovan,
Rogbins, and Buzzaco argue, that ·ol.\r decjsion in United States v. Kahn~
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terpretation of the plain language of the statute is that the
application must identify only the principal target of the
investigation, who "will almost always be the individual
whose phone is monitored~ Brief for the United States,
at 18. Under this interpretation, if the Government has
reason to believe that an individual will use the target
telephone to place or receive calls, and the Government
has probable cause to believe that the individual is engaged
in the criminal activity under investigation, the individual
qualifies as a principal target and must be named in the
wiretap application. On the other hand, an individual who
uses a different telephone to place calls to or receive calls
from the target telephone is not a principal target even if
the Government has probable cause to believe that the
individual is engaged in the criminal activity under investigation. In other words, whether one is a principal target
of the investigation depends on whether one operates the
target telephone to place or receive calls.u

M

415 U. S. 143 (1974), resolved this identification issue. See United States
v. Chiarizio, supra; United States v. Moore, supra. Although there is
language in Kahn suggesting that. wiretap applications must identify all
such individuals, the identification question presented here was not before
us in Kahn . The question in that case was whether a wiretap application must identify a known user of the target telephone whose complicity in the criminal activity under investigation was not known at
the time of the application. Kahn is a relevant, though not controlling,
precedent.
12 The United States does not suggest that regardless of the factual
circumstances a wiretap application must identify only a single individual.
To the contrary, it concedes that if two or more persons are using the
target telephone "equally" to commit the offense, and thus are "equally"
targets of the investigation, "all must be named." Brief for the United
.States, at 18 n. 13.
13 Counsel for the United States explained this position succinctly at
oral argument: "The critical distinction . .. is one between the users of
the telephone that is being monitored on the one hand, and all other per~ns throughout the world who may converse from unmonitored phones:
'Qn the Qthe,r h_and.. " T.t. of Ol:al Arg., at 13.
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Whatever the merits of such a statutory scheme, we find
little support for it in the language and structure of Title
III or in the legislative history. The statutory language
itself refers only to "the person, if known, committing the
offense and whose communications are to be intercepted."
That description is as applicable to a suspect placing calls
to the target telephone as it is to a suspect placing calls
from that telephone. It is true, as the United States suggests, that when read in the context of the other subdivisions of § 2518 (1)(b) , an argument can be made that
Congress focused in subdivision (iv) on the primary user
of the target telephone. But it is also clear from other
sections of the statute that Congress expected that wiretap
applications would name more than one individual. For
example, Title III requires that inventory notice be served
upon "the persons named in the order or the applicatioh."
18 U. S. C. § 2518 (8) (d) (emphasis added). And § 2518
( 1)(e) requires that an intercept application disclose all
previous intercept applications "involving any of the sarne
persons ... specified in the application" (emphasis added).
It may well be that Congress anticipated that a given
application would cover more than one telephone or that
several suspects would use one telephone, and that an application for those reasons alone would require identification
of more than one individual. But nothing on the face of
the statute suggests that Congress intended to remove from
the identification requirement those suspects whose intercepted communications originated on a telephone other than
that listed in the wiretap application.14
14 Indeed, the contrary conclusion is suggested by the fact that identification of an individual in an application for an intercept order
triggers other statutory provisions. First, § 2518 (1) (e) requires an intercept application to disclose all prev-ious applicatiOns "involving any
of the same persons . . . specified in the application." To the extent
that Congress thought it nece::;sary to provide the issuing judge with
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Nor can we find support in the legislative history for the
"principal target" interpretation . Title III originated as
a combination of S. 675, the Federal Wire Interception
Act, which was introduced by Senator McClellan several
months prior to this Court's decision in Berg:;r v. New York ,
388 U. S. 41 (1967), and S. 2050, the Electronic Surveillance
Control Act of 1967, introduced by Senator Hruska a few
days after the Berger decision. S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess., 66 (1968). Both bills required that wiretap ap..
plications include a full and complete statement of the
facts and circumstances relied upon by the applica.nt and
specification of the nature and location of the communication facilities involved. Although neither bill contained
an express identification requirement such as that at issue
here, both bills required the application to include "a full
and complete statement of the facts concerning all previous
applications . . . involving any person named in the application as committing, having committed, or being about to
commit an offense." Hearings on Controlling Crime Through
More Effective Law Enforcement Before the Subcommittee
on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., at 77, § 8 (a) (3) and
1006, §2518(a)(4) (1967) (emphasis added). Thus, even
at this early sta.ge, it was recognized that an application
could identify several individuals, and there is no indication
that the identification would be limited to principal targets.
S. 971 combined the major provisions of S. 675 a11d S. 2050
and eventually was enacted. While it was pending before
the Senate Judiciary Committee, this Court decided Katz
such information , there is no indication of congressional intent to require
provision of such information only if a suspect operated from one end
of a telephone line. Second , § 2518 (8) (d) mandat es that an inventory notice be served upon "the persons named in the order or the
application." As with § 2518 (1) (e) , the congressional purpose would
not be served by limiting th~t notice on the basis of the telephone from
'YhJch one SJ;Jeak~J,
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v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967). S. 971 was then
redrafted to confrom to Katz as well as Berger, and
the identification provision was added at that time. The
Senate Report states that the requirements set forth in the
various subdivisions of § 2518 ( 1) (b), including the identification requirement at issue here, " [were] intended to reflect the
constitutional comma~d of particulaPization." S. Rep. No.
1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 101 (1968), citing Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41,58-60, and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 354-356 (1967). The U:pited States now contends that
although it may be that Congress read Berger and Katz to
require, as a constitutional matter, that the subject of the
surveillan~e be named if known , Congress would hardly
have read those cases as requiring the naming of all parties
likely tQ be overheard.15 Brief, at 25-26. But to the extent that Congress thought it was meeting the constitutional
commands of particularization established J... Berger and
Katz, Congress may have read those cases as mandating
a broad identification requirement. The statute that we
confronted in Berger required identification of "the person
or persons" whose communications were to be overheard.
388 U. S., at 59. And we expressly noted that that provision "[did] no more than identify the person whose constitu~
tionally protected area is to be invaded .... ." Ibid. Given
the statute at issue in Berger and our comment upon it,
15 At the time of the enactment of Title III, Congress did not
have before it the view we expressed on this issue in United States
v. Kahn, 415 D. S., at 155 n. 15. The Fourth Amendment requires
specification of "the place to be seached, and the persons or things to
be seized." In the wiretap context, those requirements are satisfied
by identification of the telephone line to be tapped and the particular
conversations to be seized. It. is not a constitutional requirement that
all those likely to be overheard engaging in incriminating conversations;
be named. Specification of this sort "identif[ies] the person whose constitutionally protected area is to be invaded rather than 'particularly
describing' the communications, conversations, or discussions to be seize<{!~
f}erqer v. Ne7p York, 388 t}, S. 41 , 59 (1967) .

~
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Congress mf.l,y have concluded that the Constitution required
the naming, in a wiretap application, of all suspects rather
than just the primary user.1il
In any event, for our present purposes it is unnecessary
to specula.te as to exactly how Congress interpreted Berger
and Katz with respect to the identification issue. It is sufficient to note that in response to those decisions Congress
included an identification requirement which on its face draws
no distinction based on the telephone one uses, and the
United States points to no evidence in the legislative history
that supports such a distinction. Indeed, the legislative materials apparently C()nta.in no use of the term "principal target" or any discussion of a different treatment based on the
telephone from which a suspect speaks. 17 We therefore conclude that a wiretap application must name an individual
if the Gbvernment ha.s probable cause to believe that the
individual is engaged in the criminal activity under investigation wd expects to intercept the individual's conversations over the target telephone.J.

B
The other statutory provision at issue in this case is
16 That Congress may have so understood the constitutional require..
ment is also suggested by the portion of the Senate Report dealing with
that provision of S. 971 that required the intercept order to identify
"the person, if known, whose conversations are to be intercepted." The
Senate Report merely cites West v. Cabell, 153 U. S. 78 (1894), which
concerns the need for proper identification of the subject of an arrest
warrant. S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 102 (1968). To the
extent that Congress may have considered West to apply to wiretap
orders, we have no reason to believe that Congress considered its appli~
cability to extend only to those suspects using the target telephone.
17 At least. one Senator read the identification requirement in S. 971 to
parallel the identification requirement contamed in the statute at issue
in Berger v. N flW York : "Specificity is required as to the person or
persons whose communications are to be intercepted." 114 Cong. Rec,,
at 14763 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Percy).

f

II

d .l
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18 U. S. C. § 2518 (8)(d), which provides that the judge
shall cause to be served on the persons named in the order
or applic~ttion an inventory, which must give notice of the
entry of the order or application, state the disposition of
the application, and indicate whether communications were
intercepted. 18 Although the statute mandates inventory notice only for persons named in the application or the order,
the statute also provides that the judge may order simiTar
notice to other parties to intercepted communications if he
concludes that such a.ction is in the interest of justice.10
Observing that this notice provision does not expressly require law enforcement authorities routinely to supply the
judge with specific information upon which to exercise his
discretion, the United States contends that it would be inappropriate to read such a requirement into the statute since
the judge has the option of asking the la.w enforcement
authorities for whatever information he requires.
Our reading of the legislative history of the discretionary
noti~e provision in light of the purposes of Title III leads
us to reject the Government's interpretation. As reported
from the Judiciary Committee, section 2518 (8) (d) contained
only a provision mandating notice to the pensons named in
the application or the order; the discretionary notice provision was added by amendment on the floor of the Senate.
u The inventory notice must be served within a reasonable time but
not later than 90 days after the date thE' application for an intercept
order was filed . On an ex parte showing of good cause, service of the
inventory may be postponed.
19 In addition to these provisions for mandatory and discretionary
inventory notice, the Governml'nt. is required to supply the issuing judge
with recordings of the intercepted conversations, which are to be sealed
·according to his direct ions. 18 U. S. C. §2518 (8)(a). These notice
:and return provi~ions satisfy constitutional requirements. See Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 355-356, and 11. 16 (1967); Berger v. Ne·w:
York, 388 U. S. 41, 60 (1967) .
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In introducing that amendment, Senator Hart explained its
purpose:
11
The amendment would give the judge who issued the
order discretion to require notice to be served on other
parties to intercepted conversations, even though such
parties are not specifically named in the court order.
The Berger and Katz decisions established that notice
of surveillance is a constitutional requirement of any
surveillance statute. It may be that the required notice must be served on all parties to intercepted communications. Since legitimate interests of privacy may
make such notice to all parties undesirable, the amendment leaves the final determination to the judge." 114
Cong. Rec. 14485-14486 (1968).~
0

In deciding whether legitimate privacy interests justify
withholding inventory notice from parties to intercepted conversations, a judge is likely to require information and assistance beyond that contained in the application papers and the
recordings of intercepted conversations made available by
law enforcement a4thorities. No purpose is served by holding that those authorities have no routine duty to supply
the judge with revelant information. The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit recently confronted this problem of
20 It is worth noting that shortly before Senator Hart proposed this
amendment to S. 971, Senator Long had read to the Senate portions
of a report preparf>d by the AssociatiOn of the Bar of the City of
New York on federal wiretap legislation. That report commented that
parties to intercepted conversations other than those named in the application or order probably should be ~erved with inventory notice, but it
also recognized that under some circumstanc~ the proviSion of such notice
could be harmful and gave the following example :
"A, a businessman, talks to his customers, and the latter are served
with papers showing that A is being bugged[.] [_T]he damage to confidence in A and to A's reputation in general may damage A unjustly.
In this case it would seem that the customers ~hould not be served with
the inventory." 114 Cong. Rec. 14476 (1968) .
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dual responsibility, and we adopt the balanced construction
that court placed on § 2518 (8)(d):
"To discharge this obligation the judicial officer must
have, at a minimum, knowledge of the particular categories into which faJl all the individua.ls whose conversations have been intercepted. Thus, while precise identification of each party to an intercepted conversation
is not required, a description of the general class, or
classes, which they comprise is essential to enable the
judge to determine whether adqitional information is
necessary for a proper evaluation of the interests of the
various parties. Furthermore, although the judicial officer has the duty to cause the filing of the inventory
[notice], it is abundantly clear that the prosecution hf.I.S
greater access to ,and familiarity with the intercepted
communications. Therefore we feel justified in imposing
upon the latter the duty to classify all those whose
conversations have been intercepted, and to transmit
this information to the judge. Should the judge desire
more information regarding these classes in order to
exercise his statutory § 2518 (8) (d) discretion, .. . the
government is also required to furnish such informa.tion
as is available to it." United States v. Chun, 503 F
2d 533, 540 (1974) ~
We agree with the Ninth Circuit that' this allocation of
responsibility best serves the purposes of Title III.{

j yj

2 1 The current poli~y of the Department of Justice is to provide
the issuing judge with the name of every person who has been over-.
heard as t<1 whom there is any reasonable possibility of indictment.
Brief for the United States, at 39. This policy does not meet the test
specified above. Moreover, where, as here, the Government. chooses to.
supply the issuing jnrl.gc with a list of all identifiable persons rather·
than a description of the classes into which those persons fall, the list
must be com )ete.
a~~ At oral argument, counsel for the United States. recognized the merit
)
~ the approach specified m United States v. Chun :
''ferha:ps the a-pr>roach of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit~
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Currently, the policy of the Justice Department
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is to provide the issuing judge with the name of every
person who has been overheard as to whom there is any
reasonable possibility of indictment.
United States, at 39.

Brief for the

Because it fails to assure that

the necessary range of information will be before the
issuing judge, this policy does not meet the test set out
in Chun.

Moreover, where, as here, the Government chooses

to supply the issuing judge with a list of all identifiable
persons rather than a description of the classes into which
those persons fall, the list must be complete.

Applying

these principles, we find that the Government did not
comply adequately with§ 2518(8)(d), since the names of
respondents Merlo and Lauer were not included on the
purportedly complete list of identifiable persons submitted
to the issuing judge.

.fFeotuute &l!l&ttt 5hc il!'l!'ele can a a

s upp&o s si ?A
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v. Giordano, 416 U. S. 505 (1974), and United States v.
Chavez, 416 U. S. 562 (1974). Those cases hold that "[not]
every failure to comply fully with any requirement provided
in Title III would render the interception of wire ot oral
communications 'unlawful.' " United States v. Chavez, 416
U. S., at 574-575. To the contrary, suppression is required
only for a "failure to satisfy any of those statutory requirements that directly and substantially implement the congressional intention to limit the use of intercept procedures
to those situations clearly calling for the employment of this
extraordinary device." United States v. Giordano, 416 U. S.,
at 527.
Giordano concerned the provision in Title I'II requiring
that an application for an intercept order be approved by
the Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney General specially designated by the Attorney General. Concluding that
Congress intended to condition tbe use of wiretap procedures
on the judgment of senior officials in the Department of
Justice, the Court required suppression for failure to comply with the approval provision. Chavez concerned the statutory requirement that the application for an intercept order
specify the identity of the official authorizing the application. The problem in Chavez was one of misidentificationv,
although the applica.tion had in fact been authorized by the
Attorney General, tbe application erroneously identified an
Assistant Attorney General as the official authorizing the
application. The Court concluded that mere misidentification of the official authorizing the application did not make
the application unlawful within the meaning of § 2518 (10)1
(a) (i) since that identification requirement did not play a
"substantive role'' in the regulatory system. 416 U. S.,
at 578.
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals concluded that both
the identification requirement of § 2518 ( 1) (b )(iv.) and
the notice requirem~nt of § ~515 (8) (d) played a "centr11.-l
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role" in the statutory framework, and for that reason affirmed the District Court's order suppressing relevant
evidence. Although both statutory requirements are undoubtedly important, we do not think that the failure to
comply fully with those provisions renders unlawful an intercept order that in all other respects satisfies the statutory
requirements.
A
A~ to § 2518 (l)(b)(iv), the issue is whether the identification in an intercept application of all those likely to be
overheard in incriminating conversations plays a "substantive role" with respect to judicial authorization of intercept
orders and consequently imposes a limitation on the use
of intercept procedures. The statute provides that the issuing judge may approve an intercept application if he determines that normal investigative techniques have failed or
are unlikely to succeed and there is probable cause to believe
that : (i) an individual is engaged in criminal activity,
(ii) particular communications concerning the offense will
be obtained through interception; and (iii) the target facilities are being used in connection with the specified criminal
activity. That determination is based on the "full and complete statement" of relevant facts supplied by law e n f o r c e /
ment authorities. If, after evaluating the statutorily
enumerated factors in light of the information contained i
the application, the judge concludes that the wiretap order
should issue, the failure to identify additional persons who
are likely to be overheard engaging in incriminating conversations could hardly invalidate an otherwise lawful judicial
authorization. The intercept order may issue only if the
issuing judge determines that the statutory factors are present, and the failure to name additional targets in no way
detracts from the sufficiency of those factors.
This case is unlike Giordano, where failure to satisfy
the &tatutory requirement of prior approval by specified

......
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Justice Department officials bypassed a congressionally
imposed limitation on the use of the intercept procedure.
The Court there noted that it was reasonable to believe
that requiring prior approval from senior officials in the
Justice Department "would inevitably foreclose resort to
wiretappin~ in various situations where investigative personnel would otherwise seek intercept authority from the court
and the court would very likely authorize its use." 416 U. S.,
at 528. Here, however, the statutorily imposed preconditions
to judicial authorization were satisfied, and the issuing jqdge
was si)llply unaware that additional persons might be overheard engaging in incriminating conversations. In no mertningful sense can it be said that the presence of that infor..
mation as }() additional targets would have precluded judicial
Ol.3
authorization of the intercept.
Rather, t IS case resembles ~..J ~
Chavez, where we held that a wiretap was not unlawful sim.. ~
ply because the issuing judge was incorrectly_ informed as
to which cJesignated official had authorized the, application,
The Chavez intercept was lawful because the Just~ce Department hacJ performed its task of prior approval, and the
instant intercept is lawful because the application provided
sufficient information to enable the issuing judge to ~cit 'I
mine that the statutory preconditions were satisfied.~
\..:'

a~)'"--""lC There

is no suggestion in this case that the Government agents
knowingly failed to identify respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco
for the purpose of kt'eping relevant information from the District Court
that might have prompted the court to conclude that probable cause
was lacking. If snch a showing had been made, we would have a
different case. Nor is there any suggestion ·that. as a result of the
failure to name these three respondents they were denied the mandatory
inventory notice supplied to per;,;ons named in the application. 18
U. S. C. § 2518 (8) (d) . Respondt'nts Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco
were among the 37 persons served with the intial inventory.
No one suggests that the failure to identify in a wiretap application
in~ividuals who are ·'unknown" within the meaning of the statute, see
United States v. Kahn , 415 U. S. 143 (1974) , requires suppression of
ip.tercepted conver::;ations to whlrh those individuaL<~ were parties. Though

h<!!
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Finally, we note that nothing in the legislative history
suggests that Congress intended this broad identifica-tion requirement to play "a central, or even functional, role in
guarding p.gainst unwarranted use of wiretapping or electronic
surveillance." United States v. Chavez, 416 U. S., at 578.
Neither S. 675 nor S. 2050, the predecessor bills of S. 971,
contained an identification provision. See p. 11, supra. Th
only explanation given in the Senate Report for the inclusion of the broad identification provision was that it was
intended to ref!ect what Congress perceived to be the constitutional command of particularization. This explanation
was offered with respect to all the information required by
§ 2518 (l)(6) to be set out in an intercept application. No
additional guidance can be gleaned from the floor debates,
since they contain no substantive discussion of the identification provision.:cs=

{c

recognizing ' that the failqre to identify such an "unknown" individu~l
does not make unlawful an otherwise valid intercept order, respondents
Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco suggest that the opposite is true
with respect to the failure to identify in a wiretap application individuals who are "known" within the meaning of the statute. Counsel
for these respondents suggested at oral ar~ument that this difference
in result is justified by analogy to warrantless searches or arrests. Tr.
of Oral Arg., at 40. Although law enforcement officials can often take
actioij without a warrant when they l11we been unable to foresee the
circumstances that eventually confronted them, they still must obtain a
search or arrest ~arrant when their prior knowledge is sufficient to
establish rrobable cause, and it is suggested that the same principle
applies here. The major flaw in that reao;oning is that this case does
not concern warrantlesi; action. Here, the omission on the part of law
enforcement. authorities was not a failure to seek prior judicial authorization, but a failu~e to identify every individual who could be expected
to be overheard engaging in incriminating COllversations. That the comv
plete absence of prior judicial authorization would make an intercept
unlawful has no bearing on the lawfulness of an intercept order that
fails to identify every target.
~S~ Ever if we assume th11t Congress thought that a broad identificatioJJ
requirement was coustitutionally mandated, 1t does not follow that

a

.!"
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B
We reach the same conclusion with respect to the Government's duty to inform the judge of all identifiable persons
whose conversations were intercepted. As noted earlier, the
version of Title III that emerged from the Senate Judiciary
Committee provided only for mandatory notice to the "persons named in the order or the application." The Senate
Report detailed the purpose of that provision:
"[T]he intent of the provision is that the principle
of postuse notice will be retained. This provision alone
should insure the community that the techniques are
.~
(_\: reasonably employed. Through its operation all author~
ized interceptions must eventually become known at least
·
to the subject. He can then seek appropriate civil redress, for example, under section 2520 . . . if he feels
that his privacy has been unlawfully invaded." S. Rep.
No. ~097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 105 (1968).
The floor discussion concerning the amendment adding the
provision for discretionary notice merely indicates an intent
to provide notice to such additional persons as may be
co:nstitu ti(}nally required.
Nothing in the structure of the Act or this legislative
history suggests that incriminating conversations are "unlaw-

*.---

Congress imposed statutor'Y suppression under §§ 2515 and 2518 (10) (a)
(i) as a sai)ction for noncompliance. In limiting use of the intercept procedure to "the most precise Rnd discriminate circumstances," S. Rep. No.
107, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 102 (1968), Congress required law enforcement
authorities to convince a District Court tjlat probable cause existed to
believe that, a specific person was committing a specific offe11se using a.
specific telephone. This requirement was satisfied here when the application set forth sufficient information to indicate that the primary targets
were conducting a gambling business ovor four particular telephones.
Nothing in the legislative history indicates that Congress intended to
declare an otherwise c.onstitutional intercept order "unlawful" u n v e r ·
§ 2518 (10) (a) (i)-resulting in suppression under § 2515-for failure t<L
:name additional ta.rgets.
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fully intercepted" whenever parties to those conversations
do not receive discretionary inventory notice as a result of
the Government's failure to inform the District Court of their
identities. At the ti:rne inventory notice was served on the
other identififj.ble persons, the intercept had been completed
and the oonv~rsations had been "seized" under a valid intercept order. The fact that discretionary notice reaohed
39 rather thap 41 identiflable persons does not in itself :mean
that the convf)rsations were unlawfully intercepted.lf=
The legisla~ive history indicates that postintercept notice
was designed instead to assure the community that the
wiretap technique is reasonably employed. But even recognizing that Congress placed considerable emphasis on that
aspect of the overall statutory scheme, we do not think that
postintercept notice was intended to serve as an independent
restraint on resort to the wiretap procedure.

IV
Although the Government was required to identify respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco in the December 26
application for an extension of the initial intercept, failure

Ol'h~ Counsel

for respondents Merlo and Lauer conceded at oral argument
that, the f11-ilure to name those respondents in the proposed inventory
order was not. ii)tentional , Tr. of Oral Arg ., at 32, and we are therefore
not called upon to decide whether suppression would be an available
remedy if the Government knowingly sought to prevent the District
Court from ~ervi~~ inventory notice on particular parties. Nor dors this
case present an opportunity to comment, upon the suggestion, recognized
by the United StlJrte:;, Brief, at 49 n. 40, that. suppression might be required
if the agents krjf'lW before the interrept10n that no inventory would be
served.
Moreover. respqndents Merlo and Lauer were not prejudiced by their
failure to receive post.i ntercept notice under either of the District Court's
inventory orders. ' As noted earlier, the Government made available to
all defendants tl1e intercept orders, applications, and related papers. See
n. 7, supra. And in response to pre1rml discovery motions, the Government prodnced tr!lnscripts of the intercepted conversations.
/

/
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to do so in the circumstances here presented did not warrant
suppression under § 2518 (10)(a) (i) . Nor was suppression
justified with respect to respondents Merlo and Lauer simply
because the Government inadvertently omitted their names
from the comprehensive list of an identifiable persons whose
conversations had been overheard. We hold that this is the
correct result under the provisions of Title III, but we reemphasize the suggestion we made in United States v. Chavez,
that "strict adherence by the Government to the provisions of
Title III would nonetheless be more in keeping with the
responsibilities Congress has imposed upon it when authority to engage in wiretapping or electronic surveillance is
sought." 416 U. S., at 580.
The order of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case
is remanded to that court for further proceedings in accord
with this opinion.
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III
We turn now to the question whether the District Court
properly suppressed evidence derived from the wiretaps at
issue solely because of the failure of the law enforcement
authorities to comply fully with the provisions of §§ 2518 ( 1)
(b) (iv) and 2518 (8) (d). Section 2515 expressly prohibits
the use at trial, and at certain other proceedings, of the
contents of any intercepted wire communication or any evi~
dence derived therefrom "if the disclosure of that informa~
tion would be in violation of this chapter." The circumstances that trigger suppression under § 2515 are in turn
enumerated in § 2518 (10) (a):
11
(i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted;
11
(ii) the order of authorization or approval under
which · it was intercepted is insufficient on its face; or
"(iii) the interception was not made in conformity
with the order of authorization or approval."
There is no basis on the facts of this case to suggest that
the authorization orders are facially insufficient, or that the
interception was not conducted in conformity with the order .
Thus, only § 2518 (10) (a) (i) is relevant: were the communications 11unlawfully intercepted" given the violations of _.,
§§ 2518 (1) (b) (iv) and 2518 (8) (d)? 7:!"
Resolution of that question must begin with United States

,_A

which sugge:~ted that rather than submitting specific name> we should
submit categorie:; of persons who had been overheard, is a better
policy, would be more helpful to the district court in exercising its
discretion, and we would have no objection to following any reason~
able policy that the district courts determine would be useful to them
.
~ this regard." Tr. of Oral Arg., at 6-7.
a~)
J.,f; The availability of the suppression remedy for these statutory,
as opposed to constitutional, violation,;, see nn. 15 and 19 , supra, turns
on the provisions of Title III rather than the judicially fashioned ex.,.
clusionary rule aimed at deterring violations of Fourth Amendment
/
rights. United States v. Giordano, supr·a, 416 U. 8., at 524.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents issues concerning the construction of
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968, 18 U. S. C. §§ 2510-2520. Specifically, we must
decide whether 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (1)(b) (iv), which requires
the Government to include in its wiretap applications "the
identity of the person, if known, committing the offense,
and whose conversations are to be intercepted," is. satisfied
when the Government identifies only the "principal targets"
of the intercept. Second, we must decide whether the Government has a statutory responsibility to inform the issuing
judge of the identities of persons whose conversations were
overheard in the course of the interception, thus enabling
him to decide whether they should be served with notice of
the interception pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (8)(d).
And finally, we must determine whether failure to comply
fully with these statutory provisions requires suppression of
evidence under 18 e. s. c. § 2518 (10) (a).

I
On November 28, 1972, a special agent of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation applied to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio for an order
"-uthorizing a wiretap interception in accordance with Title

75-Zl2-0PINION
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IIV The application requested authorization to intercept
gambling-related communications over two telephones at one
address in North Olmstead, Ohio, and two other telephones
1·

The wiretap application procedure is set forth at 18 U. S. C. § 2518

( 1), which provides:
"(1) Each application for an order authorizing or approving the interception of a wire or oral communication shall be made in writing upon
oath or affirmation to a judge of competent jurisdiction a.nd shall state
the applicant's authority to make such application. Each u,pplicatjon
shall include the following information:
"(a) the identity of the investigative or law enforcement officer making
the application, and t.he officer authorizing the application;
"(b) a full and complete statement of the facts and circumstances relied
upon by the applicant, to justify his belief that an order should be issued,
including (i) details as to the particular offense that has been, is being, or
is about to be committed, (ii) a particular description of the nature and
location of the facilities from which or the place where the communication is to be intercepted, (iii) a particular descripton of the type of
communicu,tions sought to be intercepted, (iv) the identity of the person,
if known, committing the offense and whose communications· are to be
intercepted;
" (c) a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably
appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous;
"(d) a statement of the period of time for which the interception is:
required to be maintained. If the nature of the investigation is such
that, the authorization for interception should not autom~~tically terminate when the dPscribed type of communication has been first obtained ,
a particular description of facts establishing probable causP to believe that
additional communications of tl1e same type will occur thereafter;
" (e) a. full and complete statement of the facts concerning alL previous .
applications known to the mdividual authorizing and making the application , made to any judge for at1thorization to intercPpt, or for approval
'Of interceptions of, wire or oral communications involving any of the
same persons, facilities or placPs specified in thl' application, and the
action taken by the j11dge on each such application ; and
"(f) where the applic11tion is for the extension of an order, a statement
setting forth thP results thus far obtained from thP int{:rception , or a
rea<;onable explanation of the failure to obtain such results ."
The issuing judge is free to require the applicant to f1J.rnish additional
information. 18 U. $ . C . ~2518 (2) .
·

...,,

j,
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at a home in Canton, Ohio. The accompanying affidavit
recited that the telephones were being used by Albert Kotoch,
Joseph Spaganlo, and George Florea to conduct an illegal
gambling business, and that in conducting that business they
would place calls to and receive calls from va.rious persons,
three of whom were also named in the wiretap a,pplication. 2
The affiant also stated that the Government's informants
would refuse to testify against the persons named in the application, that telephone records alone would be insufficient to
support a gambling conviction, and that norma,l investigative techniques were unlikely to be fruitful. Pursuant to
the Government's request, the District Court fl.Uthorized for
a period of 15 days the interception of gambling-related
wire communications of Kotoch, Spaganlo, Florea, three
named individuals other than the respondents, and "others
as yet unknown," to and from the four listed telephones. 3
2 The affidavit set forth extensivr information indicating that the namrd
individuals were conducting a gambling opemtion. This information was
drrived from physical surveillance by agents of the FBI, an examination
of telephone company toll records, and the personal observations of six
informa.nts, whose past reliability als~ was detailed in the affidavit.
8 The District Court's order was issued pursuant 18 U. S. C. §§ 2518
(3), (4) which provide in pertinent part:
"(3) Upon such application the judge may enter an ex parte order,
as requested or as modified, authorizing or approving interception of wire
or oral communications within the territorial jurisdiction of the court
in which the judge is sitting, if the judge determines on the basis of the
facts submitted by the applicant that" (a) thrre is probable cause for belief that an individual is committing.
has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense enumerated in
section 2516 of this chapter ;
"(b) there is probable cause for belief tl1at. particular communications
.concerning that offense will be obtained through such interception;
" (c) normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed
or reasonably apprltr to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too
.dangerous ;
·' (d) there is probable cause for belief that the facilities from which,
<()r the place whrre, the wire or or11l communications are to be intercepted

71),-212-0PINION
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During the course of the wiretap, the Government learned
that respondents Donovan, Robbins. and Buzzaco were dis..
cussing illegal gambling activities with the named subjects.
On December 26, 1972. the Government applied for an
extension of the initial intercept order.'1 This time it sought
authorization to intercept gambling-related conversations of
Kotoch, Spaganlo, Florea, two other named individuals, and
"others as yet unknown," but it did not identify respondents
are being used, or are about to be used, in connection with the commis. sian of such offense, or are leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly
used by such person.
" ( 4) Each order authorizing or approving the interception of any wire
or oral communication shall spE-cify" (a) the identity of the person, if known , whose communications are
to be intercepted;
"(b) the nature and location of the communications facilities as to
which, or the place where, authority to intt>rcept is granted;
" (c) a particular description of the type of communication sought to
be intercepted, and a statement of the particular offense to which it
relates;
"(d) the identity · of the agency authorized to intercept the communications, and of the person authorizing the application; and
"(e) the period ' of time during which such interception is authorized,
including a statement. as to whether or not the interception shall automatically terminate when the described communication has been first
obtained."
4 In addition to the December 26 application requesting an extension
of the initial int ercl'pt order, the Government also filed on that date a
separate application seeking authorization to monitor a third telephone
discovered · at the &'tmc North Olm~tead address. Both applications were
accompanied by another affidavit Hf'tting forth tlw results of the initial
monitoring , the mannl'r in which the third phone was discovered, the
facts indicating tl!at the newly discovered telephone was being used to
conduct a gambling business, and reasons why continued interception was
necessary. A copy of the affidavit filed on November 28 was also
attached to th<' December 26 applications. For the sake of clarity, the.
two applications filed on :Pecember 26 wi)l be· treated' as a sing.lea:pplicatiQP..·.
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Donovan, Buzzaco, and Robbins in this second application.G
·T he District Court again authorized interception of gambling·
related conversations for a maximum of 15 days.
On February 21, 1973, the Government submitted to the
District Court a proposed order giving notice of the interceptions to 37 persons, a group which the Government apparently thought included all individuals who could be identified as having discussed gambling over the monitored
telephones. 6 The District Court signed the proposed order,
and an inventory notice was served on the listed persons)
including respondents Donovan , Buzzaco, and Robbins. On
September 11, 1973, after the Government submitted the
names of two additional persons whose identities allegedly haq
been omitted inadvertently from the initial list, the District
Court entered an amended order giving notice to those
individuals. As a result of what the Government labels
11
administrative oversight," respondents Merlo and Lauer
5 The United States conceded in the Court. of Appeals that respondents Donovan and Robbins were "known'' within the meannig of the
statute at the time of the DecembeP 26 application, but challenged a~
clearly erroneous the District Court'o; finding that respondent Buzzaco was
"known" at that time. The Court of Appea.ls upheld the District Court's
finding, and the United State;; has not sought review of that disposition .
Tim·, for our purposes, all three re:;pondents were "known " on Decem·bt>r 26.
6 An inventory notice must be served• within a designated period of
time upon "the persons named in the order or the a,pplication." 18 ,
U . S. C. § 2518 (S){d). Tlre inventory mui:if· give notice of the entry of
the intrrcept order or application, :;tate the disposition of the application ,
and ·mdicatr whether communications werr or were not intrrcepted. Ibid.
UIJon tlw fiiing of a. motion , the jndgr hao; discrf'tion to makr available
the intf'rcrpted communications, the a1Jplications, and the orders. Ibid.
Title III also authonzes thr District Court to cause an inventory no-·
tice to be served on "other parties to intercPptrd communications" if the
j~tdge determines that ;;uch notice t:> in the interest of justice. Ibid.
Those other parties may also be given acc<'S<> to the intercepted commu1
ni<:ations, the applications, and the order. . lbtd.
•
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were not included in either list of names and were never
served with inventory notice. 7
On November 1, 1973; ~tn indictment was returned in the
United States District Court for the . Northern District of
Ohio charging Kotoch, Spaganlo, the fiv~ respondents, and
10 other individuals with conspiracy to conduct and conducting a gamb·l'ing ·business in. violation. of 18 U. S. C. §§ 371
and 1955. The five respondents filed ' motions to suppress
evidence derived from the ' wire interception. After an evidentiary hearing on the motions, the District Court suppressed as to respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco
all evidence derived from the December 26 intercept order
on the ground that failure to identify. them by name in the
application and order of that date violated 18 U. S. C. §§ 2518
(1)(b)(iv) and 2518 (4)(a). With respect to Merlo and
Lauer, w.ho were not known to the Government until after
the December 26 application, the District Court suppressed
all evidence derived from both intercept orders on the ground
th~tt they had not been served ' with inventory notice.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
513 F. 2d 337 (1975). 8 On the identification issue, the
court held that the wiretap application must identify every
person whose conversations relating to the subject criminal
· activity the Government has probable cause to believe it
will intercept. Agreeing with the Pistrict Court that at the
time of the December 26 application the Government had
7 Although respondents Merlo and Lauer were not served with inven. tory notice pursuant. to § 2518 (8) (d), the interc<'pt orders, applications,
and related papers were mad<" available to all tlw defendants, including
Merlo and L~mcr , on November 26, 1973. Thus, the introduction into
evidence nt trial of tlw contents of the intercepted conversations and
evid<'nce denved tlwrefrom would not be prohibited by 18 U. S. C.
§ 2518 (9).
8 The Government filed its appeal from the Di1>trict Court's order suppressing evidencr under 1~ 11. S. C. § :mn, and thE-re has bet>n no trial
<>n the charge< with respect to tlw re1>pondents.
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probable cause to believe that it would overhear Donovan,
Robbins, and Buzzaco "committing the offense," the Court
of Appeals affirmed the suppression of evidence derived from
the December 26 order. On the notice question , it held
that the Government has an implied statutory duty to inform the issuing judge of the identities of the parties whose
conversations were overheard so that he can determine
whether discretionary inventory notice should be required .9
Because the Government had failed to perform this duty
with respect to Merlo and Lauer, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the District Court's order suppressing evidence
derived from both intercept orders. The court found it unnecessary to determine whether the failure to identify repondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco in the December
26 application and to name respondents Merlo and Lauer
in the proposed inventory notice orders was inadvertent or
purposeful, since the mere fact of omission was sufficient to
require suppression under 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (10) (a). 10
We granted certiorari to resolve these issues, which concern
the construction of a major federal statute, 421 U. S. 907,
and now reverse.
II
The United States contends that §2518(1)(b)(iv) requires that a wiretap application identify only the principal
See n . 6, supm.
18 U. S. C. § 2518 (10) (a ) provide'S in pertinent part:
" (10) (a ) Any aggrieved person in any trial, hea ring, or proceeding
in or before any court, department, officer, agency, regulat ory body, or
other authority of the United States, a Sta tr, or n. politica l subdivision
thereof, may move to suppress the con ten t~ of any int ercepted wire or
oral commun ica tion, or evidence deri ved thrrrfrom, on the grounds that" (i) t he communiration was unlawfully mt N<:rpted :
" (ii) thr ord er of authori zation or approval under wh ich it was intr rce-pted is insuffi cir nt on its face; or
" (iii) the mterception was not made in confo rm ity with the order of
a uthorization or Rpp roval."
9

1o
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target of the interc~ption, and that § 2518 (8) (d) does not
require the Government to provide the issuing judge with
a list of all identifiable persons who were overheard in tho
course of an authorized interception. We think neither contention is sound.

A
We turn first to the identification requirements of § 2518
(l)(b)(iv). That provision requires a wiretap application
to specify "the identity of the person, if known, co1nmitting
the offense and whose comp1Unications are to be intercepted."
In construing that langua.ge, this Court already has ruled
that the Government is uot required to identify an individual
in the application unless it has probable cause to believe
(i) that the individual is engaged in the criminal activity
under investigation and (ii) that the individ"!lal's conversations will be intercepted over the target telephone. United
States v. Kahn, 415 U. S. 143 (1974). The question at issue
here is whether the Government is required to name all
such individuals. 11
The United States argues that the most reasonable m11 Every Court of Appeals that has considered t.he issue has concludrd
that an individual who~e conversations probably will be intercepted by a
wiretap must be identified in the wiretap application if the law enforcement authorities have probable cause to believe the individual is committing the offense for which t.hc wiretap is sought. United States v.
Chiarizio, 525 F . 2d 289, 292 (CA2 1975) ; United States v. Bernstein,
509 F . 2d 996 (CA4 1975), petition for cert. filed , No. 7.J.-1486; United
States v. Doolittle, 507 F. 2d 1368, aff'd en bane, 518 F. 2d 500 (CA5
1975), petitions for cert. filed Nos. 75-500, 75-509 , 75-513; United States
v. Civella, 533 F . 2d 1395 (CAS 1976) , petitions for cert. filed, Nos.
75-1813, 76-169; United States "· ausso, 527 F . 2d 1150, 1156 (CAlO}
1975), cert. denied, U . S. (1970). See al~o United States v.
Moore, - U . S. App. D. C. - ' . 513 F. 2d 485 , 493-494 (1975) (intrrpreting 23 D. C. Code 547 (a) (2) , which is alm~t idrntical to the provision at issue here).
A number of these courts have concluded , and respondents Donovan,
Robbins, and Buzzaco argue, that our decision in United States v. Kahn,
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terpretation of the plain language of the statute is that the
application must identify only the principal target of the
investigation, who "will almost always be the individual
whose phone is monitored. " ' 2 Brief for the United States,
at l8. Under this interpretation, if the Government has
reason to believe that an individual will use the target
telephone to place or receive calls, and the Government
has probable cause to believe that the individual is engaged
in the criminal activity under investigation, the individual
qualifies as a principal target and must be named in the
wiretap application. On the other hand, an individual who
uses a different telephone to place calls to or receive calls
from the target telephone is not a principal target even if
the Go'vernment has probable cause to believe thf.l,t the
individual is engaged in the criminal activity under investigation. In other words. whether one is a principal target
of the investigation depends on whether one operates the
target telephone to place or receive calls. 13
415 U. S. 143 ( 1974) , resolved this identification issue. See United States
v. Chiarizio, supra; United States v. Moore, supra. Although there ts
language in Kahn suggesting that wiretap applications must identify all
such individuals, tht> idE.>ntificiltion quE.>stion presE.>nted here was not before
us in Kahn . The question in that CiiSe was wht>ther a wiretap application must identify a known usE>r of the t11rget telephone whose complicity in the criminal activity under investigation was not. known at
the time of the application. Kahn is a relevant, though not controlling,
precedent.
12 The United States does not suggest that regardless of the factual
circumstances a wirE>tap application must idE.>ntify only a single individual.
To the contrary, i't concedes that if two or more persons are using the
targE>t telephone "E>I!)ually" to commit the offense, and thus are "E.>qually'"
targets of the investigation, "all must be named." Brief for the Unite&
States, at IS n. !3'.
18 Counsel for the United States explainE>d this position succinctly at
oral argument: "The critical distinction ... is one between the users or
the telephone that is being monitored on thE> one hand, and all other persons throughout fhe world who ma y conversE> from unmonitored phones:
an the other Tl!lnd."" Tr. of Oral Arg., P-t 13.
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Whatever the merits of such a statutory scheme, we find
little support for it in the language and structure of Title
III or in the legislative history. The statutory language
itself refer~ only to "th~ person, if known, committing the
offense and whose communications are to be intercepted."
That description is as applicable to a suspect placing calls
to the target telephone flS it is to a suspect placing calls
from that telephone. It is true, as the United States sug~
gests, that whe11 read in the context of the other subdivisions of § 2518 (1) (b), an argument can be made th~tt
Congress focused in subdivision (iv) on the primary user
of the target telephone. But it is also clear from other
sections of the statute th~tt Congress expected that wiretfl,p
applications would name more than one individual. For
example, Title III requires that inventory notice be served
upon "the persons named in the order or the application."
18 U. S. C. § 2518 (8)(d) (emphasis f.ldded). And § 2518
(1)(e) requires that an interc~pt applic~ttion dis~lose all
previous intercept applications 1'involving any of the same
persons . . . specified in the application" (emphasis added).
It may well be that Congress anticipated that a given
application would cover more than one telephone or that
several suspects would use one telephone, and that an application for those reasons alone would require identification
of more than one individuaL But nothing Oll the face of
the statute suggests that Congress intended to remove from
the identification requirement those suspects whose intercepted conununications originated on a telephone other than
that listed in the wiretap application .14
1 ' Indeed , th!:' contrary conclusion is ::>uggest!•d by the fart that, identification of an individual in an a.pplication for an intrr-cept order
trigg!:'rs othrr statutory prov1;;ions. First, § 2518 (1) (e) requires an intcrc!:'pt apphcat1on 1o disclose all previous applications "involving any
of the same persons . . . spe<"ifiecl in the application." To the extrnt
tl1at Congress thought it necessary to provide the iS::luing judge with
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Nor can we find support in the legislative history for the
"principal target" interpretation. Title III originated a&
a combination of S. 675, the Federal Wire Interception
Act, which was introduced by Senator McClellan several
months prior to this Court's decision in Berger v. New York ,
388 U. S. 41 (1967), and S. 2050, the Electronic Surveillance
Control Act of 1967, introduced by Senator Hruska a few
days after the Berger decision. S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong.,
~ Sess., 66 (1968). Both bills required that wiretap ap-r
plications include a full and complete statement of the
facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant and
specification of the nature and location of the communication facilities involved. Although neither bill contained
an express identification requirement such as that at issue
here, both bills required the application to include "a full
and complete statement of the facts concerning aU previous
applications ... involvi'ny any person named in the appli..
cation as committing, having committed, or being about to
commit an offense." Hea.rings on Controlling Crime Through
More Effective Law Enforcement Before the Subcommittee
on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., at 77, § 8 (a) (3) and
1006, § 2518 (a)( 4) (1967) (emphasis added). Thus, even
at this early stage, it was recognized that an application
could identify several individuals, and there is no indic~ttion
that the identification would be limited to principal targets.
S. 971 combined the major provisions of S. 675 and S. 2050
and eventually was enacted. While it was pending before
the Senate Judiciary Committee, this Court decided Kats
such information, therr is no indication of congressional intent to requir~
provision of such infGrmation only if a suspect operated from one end
of a t('lrphmw line. Second, §· 2518 (8) (d) mandates that an inven·t ory notice be srrved· upon "the persons named in the order or the
application ."· As with § 2518 ( 1) (e), the congressional purpose would
·not be served by limiting that notice on the 'basis of the telephone frollJ
which one speaks.
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v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967). S. 971 was then
redrafted to confrom to Katz as well as Berger, and
the identification provision was added at that time. The
Senate Report states that the requirements set forth in the
various subdivisions of § 2518 ( 1) (b), including the identification requirement at issue here, " [were] intended to reflect the
constitutional command of particularization." S. Rep. No.
1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 101 (1968), citing Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41,58-60, and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 354-356 (1967). The United States now contends that
although it may be that Congress read Berger and Katz to
require, as a constitution~! matter, that the subject of the
surveillance be named if known, Congress would hardly
have read those cases as requiring the naming of all parties
likely to be overheard.15 Brief, at 25-26. But to the extent that Congress thought it was meeting the constitutional
commands of particularization established in Burger and
Katz, Congress may have read those cases as mandating
a broad identifi'cation requirement. The statute that we
confronted in Berger required identification of "the person
or persons" whose communications were to be overheard.
388 U. S., at 59. And we expressly noted that that provision "[did] no more than identify the person whose constitu.
tionally protected area is to be invaded .... ." . Ibid. Given
the statute at issue in Berger and our comment upon it,
15

At the time of the enactment of Title III, Congress did not
have before it the view we expressed on this issue in United States
v. Kahn, 415 U. S., at 155 n. 15. The Fourth Amendment requires
specification of "the place to be seached, a.nd the persons or things to
be seized." In the wiretap context , those requirements are satisfied
by idcntificntion of the telephone line to be tapped and the particular
·conversations to be seized. It is not a constitutional requirement. that
all those likely to be overheard engaging in incriminating conversations
be named. Specification of this sort "iclentif[ies] the person whose con~titutionally pTotected area is to be invaded rather than 'pa.rtirularly
describing' the communications, conversations, or discussions to be seized."
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967).
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Congress may have concluded that the Constitution required
the naming, in a wiretap application, of all suspects rather
'
than just the primary user.10
In ~ny event, for our present purposes it is unnecessary
to speculate as to exactly how Congress interpreted Berger
and Kat~ with respect to the identification. issue. It is sufficient to note that in response to those decisions Congress
included an identific~tion requirement which on its face draws
no distinction b~ed on the telephone one us~s, and the
Uniteq States points to no evidence in the legislative history
that supports such a distinction. Indeeq, the legislative materials apparently contain no use of the teqn "principal target" or any discqssion of a different treatment based on the
telephone f11om which a suspect speaks. 17 We therefore conclude that a wiretap application must hame an individual
if the Government has probable cause to believe that the
individual .is engaged in the criminal activity under investigation and expects to intercept the individual's conversations ov~r the 4trget telephone.

B
The other statutory provision at issue in this case is
16 That Congress may have so understood the constitt~tional req4irernent is also suggested by the portion of the Sena.te Report dealing with
that provision of S. 971 that required the intercept order to identify
"the person, if known, whose conyersations are to be intercepted." Tpe
Senate Report merely cites West v. Cabell, 153 U. S. 78 (1894) , which
concerns tpe need for proper identification of the subject of an arrest
warrant. S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 102 (1968) . To tpe
extent that. Congress ma.y have considered West to apply to wiretap
ord~rs, we have no reason to believe that Congress considered its appli-·
cability to extend only to those suspects using the target telephone.
1 7 At least one Senator read the identification requirement in S. 971 toparallel the identification requirement contained in the statute at issue•
in Berger v. New York: "Specificity is required as to the person or
persons whose communiCRtions are to be intercepted." 114 Cong. Rec.,.
~t 14763 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Percy).
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18 U. S. C. § 2pl8 (8)(d), which provides that the judge
shf,tll cause to be served on the persons named in the order
or application &n inventory, which must give notice of the
entry of the orqer or application, state the disposition of
the application, and indicate whether communications were
intercepted. 18 Although the statute mandates inventory notice only for persons named in the application or the order,
the statute also provides that the judge may order similar
notice to other parties to intercepted communications if he
concludes that such action is in the interest of justice.1 0
Observing that this notice provision does not expressly require law enforcement authorities routinely to supply the
j'udge with specific , information upon which to exercise his
d'iscretion , the United States contends that it would be inappropriate to read such a requirement into the statute since
the judge has the option of asking the law enforcement
authorities for whatever information he requires.
Our reading of the legislative history of the discretionary
notice provision in light of the purposes of Title III leads
us to reject the Government's interpretf,ttion. As reported
from the Judiciary Committee. section 2518 (8) (d) contained
enl'y a provision mandating notice to the persons named in
the application or the order; the discretionary notice provision was added by amendment on the floor of the Senate.
u The inventory notice· must be served within a reasonable time but
not Inter than 90 days nfter- the date the application for nn intercept
order was filed . On an ex parte showing · of good rause, service of the
inventory may l:ie postponed:
19 In addition to these provisions for mandatory and discretionary
inventory notirr, the Govrrnment is rrquired to supply the issuing judge
with recordings of the intercepted conversations, which are to be sealed
according to hi' dn·ection ~;. 18 U. S. C. § 251/S (8) (a) . These notice
and retum prov1~ions Rnti~f.\' constitutional requirements. See Katz v.
United States,. 389 U. S. 347, 355-356, and. n. 16 (1967:) ; Berger v. Neu'
York, 388 U, S. 41 , 60 (1967). ,
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In introducing that amendment, Senator Hart explained its
purpose:
11
The amendment would give the judge who issued the
order discretion to require notice to be served on other
parties to intercepted conversations, even though such
parties are not specifically named in the court order. .
The Berger and Katz decisions established that notice
of surveillance is a constitutional requirement of 11ny
surveillance statute. It may be that the required notice must be served on all parties to intercept~d communications. Since legitimate interests of privacy may
make such notice to all parties undesirable, the amendment leaves the final determination to the judge." 114
Cong. Rec. 14485-14486 (1968). 20
In deciding whether legitimate privacy interests justify
withholding inventory notice from parties to intercepted conversations, a judge is likely to require information and assistance beyolld that contained in the application papers and the
recordings of intercepted con~ersations made available by
law enforcement authorities. No purpose is served by holding that those authorities have no routine duty to supply
the judge with revelant information. The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit recently confronted this problem of
20 It is worth noting that shortly before Senator Hart proposed this
amendment to S. 971, Senator Long had read to tho Senate portidns
of a report prcparrd by the A:ssociation of the Bar of the City of
New York 011 federal wiretap legi~:da1ion. That report commented that
parties to intercepted conversations other than those named in the application or order probably should be served with inventory noticP, but it
also recognizrd tl1a t under some circ\lmR1 ancrs the provision of such notice
could be harmful and gave the followin~ example:
"A, a businf'Ssman , talks to his customers, and the latter are served
with papers ~bowing that A is being bugged[.] LT]he damage- to confidence in A and to A's reputation in general may damage A unjustly.
In this case it would seem that the customers :should not be served with
the inventory." 114 Cong. Rec. 14476 (1968).
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dual res~nsibility, and we adopt the balanced construction
that c~u·rt plac~d on § 2518 (8) (d) :
"To discha.rge this obligation the juqicial officer · must ·
havlil, at a minimum, knowledg~ of the particul&.r pategorjj3s into which fap
the individuals wqose conversatioqs have been intercepte~ : Thus, while precise identification of each party to an iqtercept~d cpnv~rs~tion
1 ·
·
· · ·
I
ts not required, a descript~on of tpe geQer~:~-1 cla$; or
classes, which they cmqp'rise is essential to en&.ble the
judge to qetermine 'whether add,itional information. ~s
necessary for a proper evaluation of the interest~ df the
various parties. F\lrthermore, alth~4gh the jqdfcial officer has the duty to oau~e the filing of ' ~he inve~topr
(notice]. it is abund&.ntly c)e~r th~t the prosec4tipq 'hi\-!
gr~ater access to and familiartity with the int~rc~pted
communications. Therefore we feel justiped ip imposing
upon the latter the duty to classify all those 'Yhose
eonversations have been . 'nt~rcep~d, and to tl,'anstnit
this information to t}ie j1Jdge: Sho.uld the jlfdge desine
more information regarding these classes in order 1 to
exercise his statutory § 2518 (8) (d) discretion, ... the
government is aJ30 required to £umish S'l\Ch information .
as is available to it." UnitEJd States v. Chun, ·50? F .
2d 533, 540 (1974,.
We agree with the Ninth Cirpui~ that this allocation of
responsibility be!St serves the PllrP~&;!S of Title liL21

all

.

I

'

I

21 At. oral argument, counsel for the United States recognized the mPrit
·of the approach sp~cified in Unitefl St, ate~ v, Chun :
'
"Perhl\-ps the appro~tch of the Cqurt of APl'eals fCif t,he Njnth QircQit,
which suggested that ra.th~r tlvtn ~:~ubtllitt~n~ specific naJlles we should
SUbq)it categories of r>ersons Wao had been <W~rh~rd , is a. QE)tter
policy, woul~ be more helpful t9 the 9istrict court in exercising it~
discretion, and we would have no opjectiol'\ ·to following any reasonable poli~y that the di~trict courts determine would be useft~l to them.
in this r{)ga.rd.'' T.r. of Oral .A:rg., at 6-7.
·

75-212-0PINION
UNITED STATES v. DONOVAN

17

Currently, the policy of the Justice Department is to provide the issuing judge with the name of every person who
h~ts been overheard as to whop1 there is any reasonable possibility of indictment. Brief for the United States, 11-t 39.
Because it fails to assure that the necessary range of infor~
mation will be before the issuing judge, this policy does not
meet the test set out in Chun. Moreover, where, as 'h ere,
the Government chooses to, supply the issuing judge with
a list of all identifiable persons ra.ther than a descript~on
of the classes into which those persons fall, the list must
be complete. Applying these · principles, we find that the
Government did not corpply adequa,.tely with § 2518 (8)(d),
since the names of responqents Merlo and Lauer were not
included on the purportedly complete list of ide11tifiable persons submitted to the issuing judge.

III
We turn now to the question whether the District Court
properly suppressed evidence derived from the wiretaps at
issue solely because of the failure of the law enforcement
authorities to comply fully with the provisions of §§ ~5l8 (1)
(b)(iv) and 2518 (8)(d). Section 2515 expressly prohibits
the use at trial, and at certain other proceedings, of the
contents of any intercepted wire COfBmunication or any evidence derived therefrom "if the disclosure of that , information would be in violatio11 of this cbapter." The circumstances that trigger suppression under § 2515 are in turn
enumerated in § 2518 (10)(a) :
" (i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted;
"(ii) the order of authorization or approval u~der
which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face; or
"(iii) the interceptiou was not made in conformity
with the order of authorization or approval."
'There is no basis on the facts of this case to suggest that
the authorization orders are facially insufficient, or that the

I

I
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interception was not conducted in conformity with the ord~rs.
Thus, only § 2518 (10) (a) (i) is relevant: were the com~nuni
cations "unlawfully intercepted" given .the violations of
§§ 2518 (1) (h) (iv) and 2518 (8) (d)? 22
Resolution of that question must begin with United States
v. Giordano, 416 U. S. 505 (1974), and United States v;
' Chavez, 416 U.S. 56Z (1974). Those cases hold that "rnQt]
every failure to comply fully with any requirement provided
in Title III would ·render the interception of wire or oral
communications 'unlawful.'" United States v. Chavez, 416
U. 8., at 574-575. To the contrary, suppression is required
·only for a "failure to satisfy any of those statutory require~
ments that directly and substantially implement the con·gressional intention to limit the use of intercept procedures
to those situations clearly calling for the employment of this
extraordinary device." United States v. Giordano, 416 U. 8.,
at 527.
Giordano concerned the provision in Title III requiring
that an application for an intercept order be approved by
the Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney General specially designated by the Attorney General. Concluding that
Congress intended to condition the use of wiretap procedures
on the judgment of senior officials in the Department of
J'ustice, the Court required suppression for failure to comply with the approval provision. Chavez concerned the statutory requirement that the application for an intercept order
specify the identity of the official authorizing the application. The problem in Chavez was one of misidentification;
although the application had in fact been authorized by the
Attorney General, the application erroneously identified an
I

1

22

The a.vailability of thr

suppre~sion

remedy for these statutory,

as · opposed _to constitutional. violations, see 11n. 15 and 19, supra, turns
on the provisions of Title III rather than the judicially fashioned exclusionary rule aimed at deterring viola.tions of Fourth Amendment
rights. United States v. Giordano, supra, 416 U. S., at 524.

,

I

,
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· Assistant Attorney General as the official authorizing the
application . The Court concluded that mere misidentification of the official authorizing the application did not make
the application unlawful within the meaning of § 2518 (10)
(a) (i) since that identification requirement did not play a
"substantive role" in the regulatory system. 416 U. S.,
at 578.
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals concluded that both
the identification requirement of § 2518 (1)(b)(iv) and
the notice requirement of § 2515 (8) (d) played a "central
role" in the statutory framework, and for that reason affirmed the District Court's order suppressing releva.nt
evidence. Although both statutory requirements are undoubtedly important, we do not think that the failure to
comply fully with those provisions renders unlawful an intercept order that in all other respects satisfies the statutory
requirements.

A
As to § 2518 (1) (b) (iv), the issue is whether the identification in an intercept application of all those likely to be
overheard in incriminating conversations plays a "substant ive role" with respect to judicial authorization of intercept
orders and consequently imposes a limitation on the use
of intercept procedures. The statute provides that the issuing judge may approve an intercept application if he determines that normal investigative techniques have failed or
are unlikely to succeed and there is probable c~use to belif)ve
that : (i) an individual is engaged in criminal activity,
(ii) particular communications concerning the offense will
be obtained through interception; and (iii) the target facilities are being used in connectio11 with the specified criminal
activity. That determination is based on the "full and complete statemeut" of relevant facts supplied by law enforpement authorities. If, after evaluating the statutorily·
~num (lr~teq factors in light of the ioformation contained in
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the application, the judge concludes that the wiretap order
should issue, the failure to identify additional persons who
are likely to be overheard engaging in incriminating conver~
sations could hardly invalidate an otherwise lawful judicial
~uthoriza~ion . The intercept order may issue only if the
issuing judge determines that the statutory factors are present, and the failure to name additional targets in 110 'way
detracts from the sufficiency of those factors.
This case is unlike Giordano, where failure to satisfy
the statutory requirement of prior approval by specified
Justice Departmen't officials bypassed a congressionally
imposed limitation on the use of the intercept procedure.
The Court there noted that it '\Vas reasonable to believe
that requiring prior approval from senior officials in fhe
Justice Department "would inevitably foreclose resort to
wiretapping ·in various situations where investigative personnel would otherwise seek intercept authority from the court
and the court woulq very likely authorize its use." 416 U. S.,
at 528. Here , however, the statutorily, imposed precondition~
to judicial a~thorization were satisfied, and the issuing judge
was simply ~paware that additional persons might be overheard engaging in incriminating convers~ttions. In no meaningful sense can it be said · that the presence of that in for~
mation as to additional targets would have precluded judicial
authorization of the intercept. ~ 3 Rather, this case resembles
Chavez, where we held that a wiretap was not unlawful sim~
T here is no Rttggrf'tion in t hi" cnse t h. a t 1hr Gov!'rnment agl:'nts
knowingly fail~d to identify respondr nts Donovan , Robbins,' a nd Buzza co
for the purpose of keeping relevant informati011 from t.he District Court
that. might ha ve prompted the court. to conclude that probable cause
was Jackiug. If ~u ch a showing had been m ade, we would have a.
different case. Nor is thrre any ~u gges tion t hat, as a result of the.
failure to nam e t hese thrPe respondents' they were denied t he manda tory
inventory notice supplied to per;;ons named in the appli ca.tion . 18
U . S. C . § 2518 (8 ) (d) . R etipondmts Donovan , Robbins, and Buzzacu.
were among t he 37 p<"rsons servrd with t he intial ilwentory.
23

1

,
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ply because the issuing judge was incorrectly informed as
to which designated official had authorized the application.
The Chavez intercept was lawful because the Justice Department had performed its task of prior approval, and the
instant intercept is lawful because the application provided
sufficient information to enable the issuing judge to determine that the statutory preconditions were satisfied. 2 '
Finally, we note that nothing in the legislative history
suggests that Congress intended this broad identification requirement to play "a central, or even functional, role in
guarding against unwarranted use of wiretapping or electronic
surveillance." United States v. Chavez, 416 U. S., at 578.
Neither S. 675 nor S. 2050, the predecessor bills of S. 971,
contained an identification provision. See p. 11, supra. The
2 4 No onP suggrsts th::tt thr failure t.o identify in a wiretap application
individuals who are ·'unknown" within the meaning of the statute, see
United States v. Kahn, 415 U. S. 143 (1974), requires suppression of
intcrcept("d conversations to which those individuals were parties. Though
recognizing that the failure to identify such an "unknown" indivi<;lual
does not. make unlawful an otherwise valid intercept order, respondents
Donovan , Robbins, and Buzzaco suggest tha.t · the opposite is true
with respect to thr failure to identify in a wiretap application indi~
viduals who are "known" within the meaning of the statute. Counsel
for these respondents suggested at oral argument that this <lifferenee
in resplt is justified by analogy to warrantless searches or arrests. Tr.
of Ora.L Arg., at 40. Although law enforcement officials can often take
action without, a. warra.nt when they have been unable to fore.:;ee the
circumstanef'S that eventually · confronted them, they still must obtain a
search or arrest .warrant when t.heir prior knowledge is sufficient to
establish probable cause, and it is suggested that the same principle
applies here. The major flaw in that rea.:;oning is that this case doe!'!
not concern warrantless actio11. Here, the omission on the part of law
enforcement. authorities was not a failure to seek prior judicial authorizatio,n, but a failure t.o identify every individual who could be expected
to be overheard engaging in incriminating conversations. That the com·
plete ab~ence of prior judicial authorizntion would make an intercept
unlawful has no bearing on the lawfulne&& Qf an intercept order th.a.t
f\\\1~ to identif:y every target,

,
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only explanation giyen in the Senate Report fot· the in~
elusion of the broad identification provision was that it was
intended to reflect what C'ongress perceived to be the constitutional commallll of particularization. This explanation
was offered with respect to all the information required by
§ 2518 (I) (6) to be set out iJ\ an intercept application. No
additional guidance can be gleaned from the floor debates,
since they contain no substantive discussion of the identifi~
cation provision.~~;
I

B
We reach the same conclusion with respect to the Government's duty to inform the .iuclge of all identifiable persons
whose conversations were intercepted. As noted earlier, the
versipn of Title: Ill that c:mergeq from the Senate Judiciary
Committee provided only for mandatory notice to the "persous named in the order or the application." The Senate
Report detailed the purpose of that provision:
"[Tlhe intent of the provision is that the principle
of postuse notice will be retained. This provision alone
should insure the community that the techniques !I-re
reasonably employed. Through its operation all author~
2
" Even if wr fk'sume i,hat. Cougrr~;; though1 thn,t a broa.d idrntificntion
requirement was ron~titutionally mandated, it dors not follow that
{;ongrl'!'s irnpo~ed statutory :-:upprrsr;ion under §§ 2515 and ~518 (10) (a)
(1) ns a sanction for noncompliance. In limiting m;e of the mterrept pro·
cedure to "t.he mos1 precise and di:,;crimnm!!• circumstances," S. Rep . ~o .
107, 90th Cong., 2d SeHI:i., 102 (196H), Congrrs:,; rrquired law enforcrm('llt
authorities to ronvim·<' a District Court that probable cau~c exiti!<'cl to
believe that 11. ~peeific prr~on was committing n ~pecific offen~e usmg a
specific t<'lephone. This requirement waH ;;ati~fiE'cl here '\Vhen th<' npplica ·
tion srt forth ::;ufficirnt information to indicate that the primary targets.
were conducting a gambling bus1nps;; over four particular telephones.
Nothing in the lc·gi:;lativc history indicatt>;; that Congretis i!ltenclt>d to
declare nn o1l1rnyise consntntionul mtcreevi ordt>r ''unl!Lwful" uncier§ 2518 (10) (a) (i)-resltlting in ::;uwre:;sion nudrr § 2515-for failun' tn.
name additional target<>.
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Jzed interceptions must eventually become known at least
to the subject. He can then seek appropriate civil re.
dress, for example, under section 2520 .. . . if he feels
that his privacy has been Ulllawfully invaded." S. Rep.
No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 105 (1968).
The floor discussion concerning the amendment adding the
provision for discretionary notice merely indicates an intent
to provide notice to such additional persons as may be
constitutionally required.
Nothing in the structure of the Act or this legislative
history suggests that incriminating conversations are "unlaw·
fully intercepted'' whenever parties to those conversations
do not receive discretionary inventory notice as a result of
the Government's failure to inform the District Court of their
jdentities. At the time inventory notice was served on the
other identifiable persons, the iutercept had been complet~d
and the conversations had been "seized" under a valid in·
tercept order. The fact that discretionary notice reached
39 rather than 41 identifiable persons does not in itself mean
that the conversations were unlawfully intercepted. 2 n
The legislative history i11dicates that postintercept noticE>
I

2 n Counsel for respondents 1\I«:'rlo and Lauer concedt>d at ornl argtllm'nt
that the failttre to nnme those rrspondents in the proposed inventory
ordPJ' wa:;; not. intent.ional, Tr. of Oral Arg., at 32. and wr are thrrqfore
uot railed upon to decidr wlwt.her ;;upprt'l:ision would rn' au availablt•
renwdy if the <iovi'mment knowingly Haught lo prevent the District
Court from srrving inventory noticr on particular parties . Nor does thi;;
ease prcst'JJ1 an opportunity t.o connnent. upon the suggestion, recognized
hy the United States, Brief, at 49 n. 40, thnt suppre;;sion might be required
if t ht' agmtH knrw hrfore the intercPptiou that no inwntory would be
::;rrvrd.
1\lol'f•over, respondents :vlrrlo and Lauer were not prejudiced by their
failure to rt'rC'ive postmtercept notice under either of the District Court's
inventory orders. A:-; noted earhrr. the Government madf' available toall drfendants the intercept orrlers, applications, and relatffi papers. Soo
n . 7, su7Jra. And in responH<' to prrtrial diHrovery motions, the Governmrnt produce(! tran1)cripts of the interrrptcd convrr::;ations.
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was designed instead to assure the community that the
wiretap technique is reasonably employed. But even recognizing that Congress placed considerable emphasis on that
aspect of the overall statutory scheme, we do not think that
postintercept notice was intended to serve as an independent
restraint on resort to the wiretap procedure.

IV
Although the Government was required to identify respondents Donovan , Robbins, and Buzzaco in the December 2()
application for an extension of the initial intercept, failure
to do so in the circumstances here presented did not warrant
suppression under ~ 2518 (lO)(a)(i). Nor was suppression
justified with respect to respondents Merlo and Lauer simply
because the Government inadvertently omitted their names·
from the comprehensive list of all identifiable persons whose
conversations had been overheard. We hold that this is the'
correct result under the provisions of Title III, but we reemphasize the suggestion we made in United States v. Chavez,.
that "strict adherence by the Government to the provisions of
Title III "vould nonetheless be more in keeping with the
responsibilities Congress has imposed upon it when authority to enga.ge in wiretapping or electronic surveillance is
sought." 416 U. S., at 580.
The order of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case
is remanded to that court for further procet'dings in accord'
w.ith this orpinitln.
1t is so ordexeil.
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Mn. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents issues concerning the construction of
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968, 18 U. S. C. §§ 2510-2520. Specifically, we must
decide whether 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (1)(b) (iv), which requires
the Government to include in its wiretap applications "the
identity of the person, if known, committing the offense,
and whose conversations are to be intercepted," is satisfied
when the Government identifies only the "principal targets"
of the intercept. Second, we must decide whether the Government has a statutory responsibility to inform the issuing
judge of the identities of persons whose conversations were
overheard in the course of the interception, thus enabling
him to decide whether they should be served with notice of
the interception pursuant to 18 D. S. C. § 2518 (8)(d).
And fina.lly, we must determine whether failure to comply
fully with these statutory provisions requires suppression of
evidence under 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (10) (a) .

I
On November 28, 1972, a special agent of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation applied to th(> Fnited States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio for an order I
{I.Uthorizing a wiretap interception in accordance with Tity

75-212-0PINION
UNITED STATES v. DONOVAN

III,l The application requested authorization to intercept
gambling-related communications over two telephones at one
address in North Olmstead, Ohio, and two other telephones
1 The wiretap application procedure is set forth at 18 U. S. C. § 2518
( 1), which provides:
" ( 1) Each application for an order authorizing or approving the interception of a wire or ornl communication shall be made in writing upon
oath or affirmation to a judge of competent jurisdiction and shall state
the applicant's authority to make such application. Each applicatjon
shall include the following information:
"(a) the identity of the investigative or law enforcement officer making
the a.pplica.tion, and the officer authorizing the application;
"(b) a full and complete statement of the facts and circumstances relied
upon by the applicant, to justify his belief that an order should be issued,
including (i) details as to the particular offense that has been, is being, or
is about to be committed, (ii) a particular description of the nature and
location of the facilities from which or the place where the communicntion is to be intercepted, (iii) a particular descripton of the type of
communications sought to be intercepted, (iv) the identity of the person,
if known, committing the offense and whose communications· are to be
intercepted;
"(c) a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedmf's have been tried and failed or why they reasonably
appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous;
"(d) a statement of the period of time for which the interception is:
required to be maintained. If the nature of the investigation is such
that. the authorization for interception ~hottld not automatically terminate when the described type of communication has been first obtained.
a particular description of facts establishing probable catt ·e to believe that
additional communications of the same type will occur t.h ereafter;
"(c) a full and complete statement of the facts concerning aU previous :
applications known to the individual authorizing and making the application, made to any judge for authorization to intercept, or for approval
•o f interceptions of, wire or ora I communications involving any of the
same pt>rsons, facilities or places specified in the application, and the
:action taken by tlw judge on each such application; and
" (f) where the application is for the extension of an order, a statement
setting forth the re.~mlts t1ms far obtained from the interception, or a
reasonable explanation of the failurt> to obtain such results ."
The issuing judge is frre to require the applicant to furni!lh additional
information . 18 U. $ . C . §2518 (2) .
·

.jL'
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at a home in Canton, Ohio. The accompanying affidavit
recited that the telephones were being used by Albert Kotoch,
Joseph Spaganlo, and George Florea to conduct an illegal
gambling business, and that in conducting that business they
would place calls to and receive calls from various persons,
three of whom were also named in the wiretap application. 2
The affiant also stated that the Government's informants
would refuse to testify against the persons named in the application, that telephone records alone would be insufficient to
support a gambling conviction, and that normal investigative techniques were unlikely to be fruitful. Pursuant to
the Government's request, the District Court authorized for
a period of 15 days the interception of gambling-related
wire communications of Kotoch, Spaganlo, Florea, three
named individuals other than the respondents, and "others
as yet unknown," to and from the four listed telephones. 8
2 The affidavit set forth extensive information indicating that the named
individuals were conducting a gambling opemtion. This information was
derived from physical surveillance by agents of the FBI, an examination
of telephone company toll records, and the personal observations of six
informants, whose past reliability also was detailed in the affidavit.
a The District Court's order was issued pursuant 18 U. S. C. §§ 2518
(3), (4) which provide in pertinent part :
"(3) Upon such application the judge may enter an ex parte order,
as requested or as modified, authorizing or approving interception of wire
or oral communications within the territorial jurisdiction of the court
in which the judge is sitting, if the judge determines on the basis of the
facts submitted by the applicant that"(a) there is probable cause for belief that an individual is committing.
has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense enumerated in
section 2516 of this chapter;
" (b) there is probable cause for belief that particular communications:
concerning that offense will be obtained t hrough such interception;
" (c) normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed
or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too
dangerous;
" (d) there is probable cause for belief tha.t the facilities from which,
,Qr the place where, the wire or oral communications are to he intercepted
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During the course of the wiretap, the Government learned
that respondents Donovan, Robbins. and Buzzaco were discussing illegal gambling activities with the named subjects.
On December 26, 1972, the Government applied for an
extension of the initial intercept order. 4 This time it sought
authorization to intercept gambling-related conversations of
Kotoch, Spaganlo, Florea, two other named individuals, and
11
others as yet unknown," but it did not identify respondents
are being used , or are about to be used, in connection with the commis. sion of such offense, or are leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly
used by such person.
" ( 4) Each order authorizing or approving the interception of any wire
or oral communication shall specify" (a) the identity of the person , if known , whose communications are
to be intercepted ;
"(b) the nature and location of the communications facilities as to
which , or the place where, authority to intercept is granted;
" (c) a particular description of the type of communication so1.1ght to
be intercepted, and a statement of the particular offense to which it
relates;
"(d) the identity · of the agency authorized to intercept the communications, and of the person authorizing the application ; and
" (e) the period of time during which such interception is authorized,
including a statement as to whether or not. the interception shall automatically t erminate when the described communication has been first
obtained."
4 In addition to the December 26 application requesting an extension
of the initial intercept order, the Government also filed on that date ~~
sepnrate application seeking authorization to monitor a third telephone
discovered at the same North Olm~ tPa d addrPss. Both applications were
accompanied by another affidavit. :setting forth the re~ ult s of the initial
monitoring, the manner in whi ch the third phone was discovered , the
facts indicating tha t the newly discovered telephone was being used to
conduct a gambling business, and reason::; why continued interception was
necessary. A copy of thB affidavit filed on Novembpr 28 was also
attached to th r Decrmber 26 applications. For the sakr of clarity, the .
two n.pplications fil ed on December 26 wiJl be· treated' as a. singJ~ ..
applicatiQJ},.,
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Donovan, Buzzaco, and Robbins in this second application.~
The District Court again authorized interception of gamblingrelated conversations for a maximum of 15 days.
On February 21, 1973, the Government submitted to the
District Court a proposed order giving notice of the interceptions to 37 persons, a group which the Govemment apparently thought included all individuals who could be identified as having discussed gambling over the monitored
telephones. 0 The District Court signed the proposed order~
and an inventory notice was served on the listed persons1
including respondents Donovan, Buzzaco, and Robbins. On
September 11, 1973, after the Government submitted the
names of two additional persons whose identities allegedly hacl
been omitted inadvertently from the initial list, the District
Court entered an amended order giving notice to those
individuals. As a result of what the Government labels
"administrative oversight," respondents Merlo and Lauer
5 The United Sta.tes conceded in the Conrt of Appeals that respondents Donovan and Robbins were "known'' within the meannig of the
statute at the time of the December 213 application, but challenged as
clearly erroneous the District Court's finding that. respondent Buzzaco wa~
"known" at that time. The Ceurt of Appeals upheld the District Court'::;
finding, and the United Sta.tes hm; not sought. review of that disposition.
Thus, for our purposes, all three re:spondents were "known" on Decem'ber 26.
6 An inventory notice must be served r within a designatrd period of
time upon "the persons named in the ordrr or the application." 18.
U . S. C. § 2518 (8) (d). Thr inventory must give notice of the rnt.ry of
the interc<'pt ordrr or application , state the di~posit ion of the applicntion ,
and indicate wh<'ther communications wf•re or wrre not intercepted. Ibid .
Upon the fiting of n motion. the judgr has discrrtion to make available
the intercrpted communications, the applications, and the orders. ibid.
Title III also authoriz('S the District C'omt to cause an inventory no-·
tice to be s<>rved on "otlwr parties to interccpt<>d communications" if the
j;udge determines thnt ~uch notice is in the interest of justice. ibid.
Those other parties mny also br giwn 3('('1':>~:> to the intercepted commu1
•
nlGations, the applications, and the orcle~ ·. lbtd.
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were not included in either list of names and were never
served with inventory notice. 7
On November 1, 1973; an indictment was returned in the
United States Dis~rict · CO'!.lrt for the . Northern District of
Ohio charging Kotoch, Spaganlo, the five respondents, and
10 other individuals with conspiracy to conduct and conducting a gambTing 'busiiiess in· violatioJl of 18 U. S. C. §§ 371
and 1955. The five respondents filed '· motions to suppress
evidence derived from the wire interception. After an evidentiary hearing on the motions, the District Court suppressed as to -respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco
all evidence derived from the Decem~er 26 intercept order
on the ground that failure to identify them by name in the
application and order -of that date violated 18 U. S. C. §§ 2518
(l)(b)(iv) and 2518 ( 4) (a). With respect to Merlo and
Lauer, w,ho were not known to the Government until after
the December 26 application, the District Court suppressed
all evidence derived from both intercept orders on the ground
that they had not been served ' with inventory notice.
The Cour-t of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
513 F. 2d 337 (1975). 8 On the identification issue, the
court held that the wiretap application must identify every
person whose conversations relating to the subject criminal
activity the Government has probable cause to believe it
will intercept. Agreeing with the Pistrict Court that at the
time of the December 26 application the Government had
7 Alt.hough respondents Merlo and Lauer were not served with inven, tory notice ptirsuant. to § 2518 (8) (d) , the intercept orders, applications,
and rela.ted papers wrre madr available to all tlw defendants, including
Merlo and Lau('r. on November 26, 1973. Thus, the introduction into
evidence a.t trial of tlw contents of the intercepted conversations and
evidence denved therefrom would not. be prohibited by 18 U. S. C.
§ 2518 (9).
8 The Government filed its appeal from the District Court's order sup~
}>ressing evidence under 18 tT . S. C. § 3731, and therr has bef'n no trial
()Tl t.he charg~ with r('o;pcct to the r~pondents.
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probable cause to believe that it would overhear Donovan,
Robbins, and Buzzaco "committing the offense," the Court
of Appeals affirmed the suppression of evidence derived from
the December 26 order. On the notice question , it held
that the Government has an implied statutory duty to inform the issuing judge of the identities of the parties whose
conversations were overheard so that he can determine
whether discretionary inventory notice should be required .0
Because the Government had failed to perform this duty
with respect to Merlo and Lauer, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the District Court's order suppressing evidence
derived from both intercept orders. The court found it unnecessary to determine whether the failure to identify repondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco in the December
26 application and to name respondents Merlo and Lauer
in the proposed inventory notice orders was inadvertent or
purposeful, since the mere fact of omission was sufficient to
require suppression under 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (10) (a). 111
We granted certiorari to resolve these issues, which concern
the construction of a major federal statute, 421 U. S. 907,
and now reverse.
II
The United States contends that § 2518 (1)(b) (iv) requires that a wiretap application identify only the principal
See n . 6, supra.
18 U. S. C. § 2518 (10) (a.) providt>S in perti nent part:
" (10) (<1) Any aggrieved person in any trial, hea ring , or proceeding
in or before any court , department, officer, ag:ency, regulatory body, or
other authority of the United Sta.tcs, a State, or a. politi ca l subdivision
thereof, may mo ve to o;uppres.' the cont pnt ~ of any intercepted wire or
oral communicatiOn, or evidence de rived therefrom , on the grounds that" (i) the communication was unlawfully in tercepted ;
" (ii) the order of authorization or approval nnder wh ich it was intercepted is insufficient on its face; or
" (iii ) the int erception was not made in confo rmity with the ,order of
authorization or approval."
9

10

.,
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target of the interc~ption , and that § 2518 (8)(d) does not
require the Government to provide the issuing judge with
a list of all identifiable persons who were overheard in the
course of an authorized interception. We think neither contention is sound.
A
We turn first to the identification requirements of ·§ 2518
(1)(b)(iv). That provision requires a wiretap application
to specify "the identity of the person, if known, committing
the offense and whose comJllunications are to be intercepted."
In construing that language, this 8ourt already has ruled
that the Government is not required to identify an individual
in the application unless it has probable cause to believe
(i) that the individual is engaged in the criminal activity
under investigation and (ii) that the individual's conversations will be intercepted over the target telephone. United
States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143 (1974). The question at issue
here is whether the Government is required to name all
such indivicluals. 11
The United States argues that the most reasonable inu Every Court of Appeals that hns considered the issue hns ronrludrd
tl1at an individual whose conversntions probably will be interc0pted b~r H
wiretnp must be identified in the wiretap application if the law enforcement authorities have probable cause to believe the individunl is rommit~
ting the offense for which the wiretap is sought . UnitPd States v.
Chiarizio, 525 F . 2d 289, 292 (CA2 1975): United States v. Bernstein,
509 F. 2d 996 (CA4 1975), petition for rert. filed , No. 74-1486; United
States v. Doolittle, 507 F . 2d 1368, aff'd en bane , 518 F. 2d 500 (CA5
1975) , petitions for cert . filed Nos. 75-500, 75-509 , 75-513; United States
v. Civella, 533 F . 2d 1395 (CAS 1976) , petitions for cPrt. filPd , Nos.
75-1813, 76-169 ; United States \'. Russo, 527 F. 2d 1150, 1156 (CAIO
1975) , cPrt . dPnied , F. S. (1976). See also United StatPs v.
Moore, - U. S. App. D . C.-· . 513 F. 2d 485, 493-494 (1975) (interpreting 23 D . C. Code 547 (a) (:2) , which is almost idPntical to the provi~
sion at issue here).
A number of these cou rts hnve concluded, and respondents Donovan,
Robbins, and Buzzaco argue, that our drrision in United States v. Kahn,

I
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terpretation of the plain language of the statute is that the
application must identify only the principal target of the
investigation, who "will almost always be the individual
whose phohe is monitored." 12 Brief for the United States,
at 18. Under this interpretation, if the Government has
reason to believe that an individual will use the target
telephone to place or receive calls, and the Government
has probable cause to believe that the individual is engaged
in the criminal activity under investigation, the individual
qualifies as a principal target and must be named in the
wiretap application. On the other hand, an individual who
uses a different telephone to place calls to or receive calls
from the target telephone is not a principal target even if
the Government has probable cause to believe that the
individual is engaged in the criminal activity under investigation. In other words. whether one is a principal target
of the investigation depends on whether one operates the
target telephone to place or receive calls. 13
415 U. S. 143 ( 1974) , resolved this identification issue. See United States
v. Chiarizio, supra.; United States v. Moore, supra. Although there i8
language in Kahn suggesting that wiretap applications must identify all
such individuals, the identification question presented here was not before
us in Kahn . The question in that case was whether a wiretap application mutit identify a known u ~rr of the target telephone whose complicity in the criminal activity under investigation was not kno\Vn at
the time of the application . Kahn is a relevant, though not controlling,
precedent.
12 The United States does not, suggest that regardless of the factual
circumstances a win'ta.p application must identify only a. single individual.
To the contrary, i't concedes that if two or more persons are using the
targrt. trlephone "et~ ually" to commit the offense, an.d thus are "equally',.
targets of the investigation, "all must be namrd." Brief for the Unite&
States, at IS n . !6.
18 Counsel for the United States explained this position succinctly at
oral argumrnt : "TI1e critical distinction ... is one bet\Veen the users or
the telephone that is being monitored on the on(> hand, and all other persons througl10ut the world who may converse from unmonitored phones<
m1 the Qthe~r T1.'1n<i"' Tr. of Oral Arg., g,t 13.
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Whatever the merits of such a statutory scheme, we find
little support for it in the language and structure of Title
III or in the legislative history. The statutory langua.ge
itself refers only to "th~ person, if known, committing the
offense and whose communications are to be intercepted."
That description is as applicable to a suspect placing calls
.t o the target telephone as it is to a suspect placing calls
from that telephone. It is true, as the United States sug~
gests, that when read in the context of the other subdivisions of §2518(1)(b) , an argument can be made that
Congress focused in subdivision (iv) on the primary user
of the target telephone. But it is also clear from other
sections of the statute that Congress expected that wiretap
applications would nan1e more than one individual. For
example, Title III requires that inventory notice be served
upon "the persons named in the order or the application."
18 U. S. C. § 2518 (8) (d) (emphasis added). And § 2518
( 1 )(e) requires that an intercj:)pt application disclose all
previous intercept applications 11 involving any of the same
persons ... specified in the application" (emphasis added).
It may well be that Congress anticipated that a given
application would cover more than one telephone or that
several suspects would use one telephone, and that an application for those reasons alone would require identification
of more than one individual, But nothing on the face of
the statute suggests that Congress intended to remove from
the identificatiou requirement those suspects whose intercepted communications originated on a telephone other than
that listed in the wiretap application.14
11 Indeed, 1lw contrary conclusion is suggested by the fact that identification of an i11dividual in an a.pplication for an intercept order
triggers othrr statutory provi~ions. Fir~t, § 2518 (1) (e) requires an intercept application to disclose all previous applications "involving any
of the same persons . .. spreified in the application ." To the extent
tlmt Congress thou"ht it necessary to provide the issuing judge with
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Nor can we find support in the legislative history for the
"principal target" interpretation. Title III originated a&
a combination of S. 675, the Federal Wire Interception
Act, which was introduced by Senator McClellan several
months prior to this Court's decision in Berger v. New York,
388 U. S. 41 (1967), and S. 2050, the Electronic Surveillance
Control Act of 1967, introduced by Senator Hruska a few
days after the Berger decision. S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong.,
~d Sess., 66 (1968). Both bills required that wiretap ap ..
plications include a full and complete statement of the
facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant and
specification of the nature and location of the communication facilities involved. Although neither bill contained
an express identification requirement such as that at issue
here, both bills required the application to include "a full
and complete statement of the facts concerning all previous
applications ... involving any person named in the appli..
cation as committing, having committed, or bein~ about to
commit an offense." Hea.rings on Controlling Crime Through
More Effective Law Enforcement Before the Subcommittee
on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., at 77, § 8 (a) (3) and
1006, § 2518 (a)(4) (1967) (emphasis added). Thus, even
at this early stage, it was recognized that an application
could identify several individuals, and there is no indic~ttion
that the identification would be limited to principal targets.
S. 971 combined the major provisions of S. 675 and S. 20M
and eventually was enacted. While it was pending before
the Senate Judiciary Committee, this Court decided Kats
such information, there is no indication of congressional intent to require
provision of such int'errnation only if a suspect operated from one ~Jnd
of a telPphone line. Second, § 2518 (8) (d') mandates tlu~t an inventory notice be served· upon "the persons named in the order or the
application."· As with §2518 (l)(e), the congressional purpose would
·not be served 'by limiting that notice on the basis of the telephone froll}
which one speaks.
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v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967). S. 971 was then
redrafted to confrom to Katz as well as Berger, and
the identification provision was added at that time. The
Senate Report states that the requirements set forth in the
various subdivisions of § 2518 ( 1)(b), including the identification requirement at issue here, " [were] intended to reflect the
constitutional command of particularization." S. Rep. No.
1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 101 (1968), citing Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41, 58-60, and /(atz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 354-356 (1967). The United States now contends that
although it may be that Congress read Berger and Katz to
require, as a constitution~! matter, that the subject of the
surveillance be named if known, Congress would hardly
have read those cases as requiring the naming of all parties
likely to be overheard.15 Brief, at 25-26. But to the extent that Congress thought it was meeting the constitutional
commands of particularization established in Burger and
Katz, Congress may have read those cases as mandating
a broad identification requirement. The statute that we
confronted in Berger required identification of "the person
or persons" whose communications were to be overheard.
388 U. S., at 59. And we expressly noted that tha.t provision "[did] no more than identify the person whose constitutionally protected area is to be invaded .. .. ." . Ibid. Given
the statute at issue in Berger and our comment upon it,
15 At the time of the enactment of Title III, Congress did not
have before it the view we expressE-d on this issue in United States
v. Kahn, 415 U. S., at 155 n. 15. The Fourth Amendment requires
specification of "the place to be sea.ched, and thP persons or things to
be seized." In the wiretap context, those requirements are satisfied
by identification of the telephone line to be tapped and the particular
·conversations to be seized. It is not a constitutional requirement that
all those likely to be overheard engaging in incriminating conversations
be named. Specification of this sort "identif[ies] the person whose con~titutionally ·protected area is to be invaded rather than 'pa.rticularly
~escribing' the communications, conversations, or discussions to be seized."
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967).
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Congress may have concluded that the Constitution required
the naming, in a wiretap application, of all suspects rather
than just the primary user.1 G
In any event, for our present purposes it is unnecessary
to speculate as to exactly how Congress interpreted Berger
and Kat~ with respect to the ide'ntification issue. It is sufficient to note that in response to those decisions Congress
included an identific~ttion requirement which on its face draws
no distinction based on the telephone one uses, and the
.
Uniteq States points to no evidence in the legislative history
that supports such a distinction. Indeed, the legislative materials apparently contain no use of the teqn "principal target" or any discQssion of a different treatment based on the
telephone fvom which a suspect speaks. 17 We therefore conclude that a wiretap application must hame an individual
if the Government has probable cause to believe that the
individual .is engaged in the criminal activity uncler investigation and ex~ectl:! to intercept the individual's conversations over the ~rget telephone.
'

B
The other statutory provision at issue in this case is
1 6 That Congress may have so understood the constit1.1tional reqtjirement is also suggested by the portion of the Senate Report dealing with
that provision of S. 971 that required the intercept order to identify
"the person, if known, whose conyersations are to be intercepted." Tfle
Senate Report merely cites West v. Cabell, 153 U. S. 78 (1894), which
concerns t!1e need for proper identification of the subject of an arrest
warrant. S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 102 (1968). To theextent that Congress ma.y have considered West to a.pply to wireta.p
ord~rs, we have no reason to believe that Congress considered its applicability to extend only to those suspects using the target telephone.
17 At least one Senator read the identification requirement in S. 971 toparallel the identification requirement contained in the statute at issue•
in Berger v. New York: "Specificity is required as to the person or
persons whose communications are to be intercepted." 1H Cong. Rec.,.
~t 14763 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Percy).
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18 U. S. C. § 2518 (8 )(d), which provides that the judge
cause to be served on the persons named in the order
or application &n inventory, which must give notice of the
entry of the orqer or application , state the disposition of
the application, and indicate whether communications were
intercepted. 18 Although the statute mandates inventory notice only for persons named in the application or the order,
the statute also provides that the judge may order similar
notice to other parties to intercepted communications if he
concludes that such action is in the interest of justice. 10
Observing that this notice provision does not expressly require law enforcement authorities routinely to supply the
j'udge with specific information upon which to exercise his
discretion, the United States contends that it would be inappropriate to read such a requirement into the statute since
the judge has the option of asking the law enforcement
authorities for whatever information he requires.
Our reading of the legislative history of the discretionary
notice provision in light of the purposes of Title III leads
us to reject the Government's interpretation. As reported
from the Judiciary Committee, section 2518 (8)(d) contained
0nl'y a provision mandating notice to the persons named in
the application or the order; the discretionary notice provision was added by amendment on the floor of the Senate.
sh~ll

18 The inventory notice· m\1st be served within a rea:sonable time but
not later than 90 days after- the date th<> application for an intercept
order was filed . On an ex part!' showing· of good ra11se, service of the
inventory may Of:' postponed.
10 In addition to these provisions for mandatory and discretionary
jnventory noticr, the Government is required to :supply the issuing judge.
with recordings of the intercepted conversation:;, which are to be scaled
according to hi:'> directions. 18 U. S. C. § 251R (8) (a). Tlwse noticC:~
and retum provi::;ions sa ti s f~· constitutional rf:'qnirements. See Katz v.
United States,.:389 11. S. 347,355-356, and in . 16 (1967.); Berger v. Ne1t~
York, 388 U, S, 41, 60 (1967) ..
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In introducing that amendment, Senator Hart explained its
purpose:
"The amendment would give the judge who issued the
order discretion to require notice to be served on other
parties to intercepted conversations, even though such
parties are not specifically named in the court order. .
The Berger and Katz decisions established that notice
of surveillance is a constitutional requirement of a,ny
surveillance statute. It may be that the required notice must be served on all parties to intercepted communications. Since legitimate interests of privacy may
make such notice to aU parties undesirable, the amendment leaves the final determination to the judge." 114
Cong. Rec. 14485-14486 ('1968). 20
In deciding whether l~gitimate privacy interests justify
withholding inventory notice from parties to intercepted conversations, a judge is likely to require information and assistance beyond that contained in the application papers and the
recordings of intercepted con~ersations made available by
law enforcement authorities. No purpose is served by holding that those authorities have no routine duty to supply
the judge with revelant information. The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit recently confronted tqis problem of
2 0 It is worth noting that shortly before Senator Hart. proposed this
amendment. to S. 971 , Senator Long had read to tho Senate portidns
of a report prepared by the A.;sociation of the Bar of the City of
New York on feder:ll wir<.'tap IPgislation. That report commented that
parties to intcrcept.ed conversations other than those named in the appliea lion or order probabl~· should be served with inventory notice, but it
also recognized tl1at under some circumstancr.; the provision of such notice
could be harmful nnd gave the following example :
"A, a businessman , talks to his customers, and the latter are served
with papers ;;bowing that A is being buggedr.J LT]he damage to confidence in A and to A's rrputntion in general may damage A unjustly.
In this case it would seem that. the customer:; should not be served with
'the inventory." 114 Cong. Ree. 14476 (1968).
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dual respansibility, and we adopt the balanced construction
that cou·r t placed on § 2518 (8) (d):
"To discharge this obligation the jU<liciaJ officer must
hav~, at a minimum, knowledge of the particu}&r pate--

all

gorif}s into which fall
the individuals wqose conversatioqs have been interceptecl~ Thus, ~bile precise identification of each party to &n intercept~d conv~rsation
is ·not required, a description of the gener~:~-1 clas~ 1 or
classes, which they couw'rise is essential to en&ble the
judge to qetermine whether additional information 1s
necessary for a proper evalu~ttion of the iriter~sts of tpe
various parties. F1.trthermore, although the j-qdlcial officer has the duty to cau~e the filing of · ~he iuve~topr
tnotice]. it is abundantly cle~r th~t the prosemttipn ' h~
greater access to and familiarity with the intercepted
communications. Therefore we feel justified ip imposing
upon the latter the duty to classify all those whose
eonversations have been int~rcept-tJd, and to t~&nsmit
this information to the judge: Should the jlfdge desine
more information regarding these classes in order 1 to
exercise his statutory § 251S (8)(d) discretion, ... the
government is also required to fumish s4ch inform~:~-tion
as is available to it." UnitlJ4 States v. Chun, 503 F .
2d ~33, 540 (1974,.
We agree with the Ninth Circuit that this allocation of
responsibility best serves the p].lrp~~s of Title IIV 1
21

At oral argumE-nt, counsel for the United States recognized the merit

of the approach specifie<l in Unite(! States v, Chun :

·

"Perh~ps the approach of the Cqurt of Appeals fm· the Jlf!nth Circt1it,
which suggest<-'<.! that rather than submittin~ specific nallles we should
submit ()a.tegories llf 1113r~ons w~o had been overhj'lard, is a hetter
poli()y, would be more helpful t9 the qistrlct cotut in exercising ite
discretion, apq we would have no opjection to following any reasonable policy that the di~trict courts determine would be useful to them
in this r~gard." Tr. of Oral .Arg., at 6-7.
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Currently, the policy of the Justice Department is to provide the issuing judge with the name of every person who
has been overheard as to whom there is any reason~tble possibility of indictment. Brief for the United States, ~tt 39.
Because it fails to assure that the necessary range of infor~
mation will be before the issuing judge, this policy does not
meet the test set out in Chun. Moreover, where, as 'here,
the Government chooses to supply the issuing judge with
a list of all identifiable persons ra.ther than a descript~ou
of the classes into which those persons fall, the list must
be complete. Applying these principles, we find that the
Government did not corpply adequ~tely with § 2518 (8)(d) ,
since the names of responqents Merlo and Lauer were not
included on the purportedly complete list of identifiable persons submitted to the issuing judge.

III
We turn now to the question whether the District Court
properly suppressed evidence derived from the wiretaps at
issue solely because of the failure of the law enforcement
authorities to comply fully with the provisions of §§ 2518 (1)
(b)(iv) and 2518 (S)(d). Section 2515 expressly prohibits
the use at trial , and at certain other proceedings, of the
contents of any intercepted wire communication or any evidence derived therefrom "if the disclosure of that informa~
tion would be in violatioQ of this chapter." The circumstances that trigger suppression unQer § 2515 are in turn
enumerated in § 2518 (10) (a) :
"(i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted;
"(ii) the order of autl~orization or approval under
which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face; or
" (iii) the interception was not made in conformity
with the order of authorization or approval."
'There is no basis on the facts of this case to suggest that
the authorization orders are facially insufficient, or that the
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interception was not conducted ~n conformity with the ord~rs.
Thus, only § 2518 (10) (a) (i) is relevant: were the comJ?unications "unlawfully intercepted'' '?iver the violations of
§§ 2518 (1) (b) (iv) and 2518 (8) (d) NY
Resolution of that question must begin with United States
v. Giordano, 416 U. S. 505 (1974), and United States v:
' Chavez, 416 U. S. 562 (1974). Those cases hold that "[not]
every failure to comply fully with any requirement provided
in Title III would render the interception of wire or oral .
communications 'unlawful.' " United States v. Chavez, 4:16
U. S., at 574-575. To the contrary, suppression is required
·only for a "failure to satisfy any of those statutory require~
ments that directly and substantially implement the con·gressional intention to limit the use of intercept procedures
to those situations clearly calling for the employment of this
extraordinary device." United States v. Giordano, 416 U. S.,
a.t 527.
Giordano concerned the provision in Title III requiring
that an application for an intercept order be approved by
the Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney General specially designated by the Attorney General. Concludiug that
Congress intended to condition the use of wiretap procedures
on the judgment of senior officials in the Department of
justice. the Court required suppression, for failure to comply with the approval provisiou. Chavez concerned the statutory requirement that the application for an intercept order
specify the identity of the official authorizing the application. The problem in Chavez was one of misidentification;
although the application had in fact been authorized by the
Attorney General, the application erroneously identified an
The availability of the ~nppress ion remedy for these statutory,
as · opposed : to constitutional, violations, see nn. 15 and 19, supra, turns
on the provisions of Titlr III rather than the judicially fashioned exclusionary rule aimed nt deterring violations of Fourth Amendment.
rights. United · States v. Giordano, supra, 416 U . 8 ., a.L 524.
22
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Assistant Attorney General as the official authorizing the
application . The Court concluded that mere misidentification of the official authorizing the application did not make
the application unlawful within the meaning of § 2518 (10)
(a) (i) since that identification requirement did not play a
"substantive role" in the regulatory system. 416 U. S.,
at 578.
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals concluded that both
the identification requirement of § 2518 ( 1)(b) (iv) and
the notice requirement of § 2515 (8)(d) played a "central
role" . in the statutory framework, and for that reason a f /
firmed the District Court's order suppressing releva.nt
evidence. Although both statutory requirements are undoubtedly important, we do not think that the failure to
comply fully with those provisions renders unlawful an intercept order that in all other respects satisfies the statutory
requirements.

A
As to §2518 (l)(b)(iv), the issue is whether the identifi•.
cation in an intercept application of all those likely to be
overheard in incriminating conversations plays a "substantive role" with respect to judicial authorization of i11tercept
orders and consequently imposes a limitation on the use
of intercept procedures. The statute provides that the fssuing judge may approve an intercept application if he determines that normal investigative techniques have failed or
are unlikely to succeed and there is probable c~use to believe
that: (i) an individual is engaged in criminal activity,
(ii) particular communications concerning the offense will
be obtained through interception; and (iii) the target facilities are being used in connection with the specified criminal
activity. That determination is based on the "full and complete statement" of relevant facts supplied by law enforcement authorities. If, after evaluating the statutorily·
~num(')_r~J.teq factors in light of the information contained in
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the application, the judge concludes that the wiretap order
should issue, the failure to identify additional persons who
are likely to be overheard engaging in incriminating conver~
sations could hardly invalidate an otherwise lawful judicial
~uthorization . The intercept order may issue only if the
issuing judge determines that the statutory factors are present, and the failure to name additional targets in no way
detracts from the sufficiency of those factors.
This case is unlike Giordano, where failure to satisfy
the statutory requirement of prior approval by specified
Justice Department officials bypassed a congressionallv
imposed limitation on the use of the intercept procedure.
The Court there noted that it was reasonable to believe
that requiring prior approval from senior officials in the
Justice Department "would inevitably foreclose resort to
wiretapping in various situations where investigative personnel would otherwise seek intercept authority from the court
and the court woulq very likely authorize its use. " 416 U. S.,
at 528. Here. however, the statutorily imposed preconditions
to judicial a!.fthorization were satisfied, and the issuing .i udge
was simply ~paware that additional 1~erso11S might be overheard engaging in incriminating conversations. In no meaningful sense can it be said · that the presence of that infor~
mation as to additional targets would have precluded judicial
authorization of the intercept.t3 Rather, this case resembles·
Chavez, where we held that a wiretap was not unlawful sim2 3 There it~ no ~:; u ggeR tion in t hi ~ en::;e that ihe Government agentR
1
knowingly failed t o identify respondents Donovan, Robbiqs, and Buzza co
for the purpose of keeping relevant informai jon from the District Court
that might have prompt ed the court t o conclude t hat p robable eause
was lacking. If ~u ch a showing had been ma de, we would have a.
different case. 1 or is there uny i:i uggp::;iion tha.t, as a result of the.
failure to runne the ·e thrPe rPSpondPnts' thf'y were denied t he manda to ry
inventory notice supplied to persons named in the applica tion . 18
U . S. C. § 2518 (8 ) (d ) . R ei:ipo ncl ent ~ Donova 11 , Robbins, and Buzzaro.
were among t he 37 person.s ;-;crvr d wii h t.he int ial ilwento ry.
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ply because the issuing judge was incorrectly informed as
to which designated official had authorized the application.
The Chavez intercept was lawful because the Justice Department had performed its task of prior approval, and the
instant intercept is lawful because the application provided
sufficient information to enable the issuing judge to determine that the statutory preconditions were satisfied.~
Finally, we note that nothing in the legislative history
suggests that Congress intended this broad identification requirement to play "a central, or even functional, role in
guarding against unwarranted use of wiretapping or electronic
surveillance." United States v. Chavez, 416 U. 8., at 578.
Neither S. 675 nor S. 2050, the predecessor bills of S. 971,
contained an identification provision. See p. 11, supra. The
1

~~No one> :suggrst:s that thP failure to identify in a wiretap application
individuals who !Lr<' "unknown" within the meaning of the statute, seP
United States v. Kahn, 415 U. S. 143 ( 1974), requires suppression of
interceptt>d conversations to which those individuals were parties. Though
recognizing that the.. failure to identify such an "unknown" individua~l
does not make unlawful an otherwise valid intercept order, respondents
Donovan , Robbins, and Buzzaco suggest tha.t the opposite is true
with respect to the failure to identify in a wjretap application inclividuals who are "known" within the meaning of the statute. Counsel
for thes(:) respondents suggested at oral argument that t.his difference
in result is justified by analogy to warra.ntless searches or arrests. Tr.
of Oral Arg., at 40. Although law enforcement officials can often take
action without a warrant when they have been unable to foresee the
circumstances that eventually · confronted them, they still must. ohtrlin a
search or arrest warrant when t.heir prior knowledge is sufficient to
establish probable cause, and it. is suggested that the same principle
applies here. The major flaw in that ren<ioning is that this case doel'l
not concern warrantless action. Here, the omission on the part of Jaw
enforcement. authorities was not a fa.ilure to seek prior judicial authorization , but a failure to ident1fy every individual who could be expected
to be overheard engaging in incriminating conversations. That the complete absence of prior judicial authorization would make an intercept
unlawful has no bearing on the Jawf~J.Ine&S Qt un. intercept order that
f~J:il~ to identify every target,
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only explanation given in the Senate Report for the in~
cl4sion of the broad identification provision was that it was
intended to reflect what Congress perceived to be the constitutional command of particularization. This explanation
was offered with respect to all the information required by
§ 2518 (1) (6) to be set out in an intercept application. No
additional guidan. ce can be gleaned from the floor debates/
since they contain 110 substantive discussion of the identifi.
~
·cation provision.~ 5

B
We reach the same conclusion with respect to the Government's duty to inform the judge of all identifiable persons
whose conversations were intercepted. As noted earlier, the
versipn of Title III that emerged from the Senate Judiciary
Committee provided only for mandatory notice to the "persons named in the order or the application .'' The Senate
Report detailed the purpose of that provision:
"[T]he intent of the provision is that the principle
of postuse notice will be retained. This provision alonf'
should insure tl~e community that the techniques arc
reasonably employed. Through its operation all authorEven if we a.:smnr that. Congre~« thought that a broRd idrn!tfication
was constitutionally mandatrd , it does not follow tha1
Congrc:;.-; imposed statutory :::uppn>:<;;ion under §§ 2515 and 2518 (10) (a)/
(i) ns a sa nction for noncompliance. In limiting usr of thr mtercrpt procrdurc to "tlw mo~t precise and discrirrnnat(' circumstancrs," S. Hrp . No.
107, 90th Cong., 2d Se:o:s., 102 (l9nk) . Congress rrquired law enforePmPJJt
authorities to eonvince tt District Court that probable cause exbtrd to
believe that. n. ~pPcific p0r~on was committing rt sprcific offense using a
sprcific trl<'phonr. Thi~> rrquirrment wn ~ :sa tisfird hrre '!"hen the Hpplica tion srt forth <;ufficirllt informntion to inclicat(' that the prima.ry target1.1 :
were conducting- a gambling bmqnrs~; over fonr particular telephonr:s.
Nothing in th<' lrgi:slativc history indicatl>:< that Congre8s intrnded to
declare an ot110nyisE' constitutional mtrrcept ordrr "unlawful " nnciPr[2518 (10) (a) (i)-re8tdting in :snppre>:sl'ion undrr § 2515-for failure to.
11ame additional t:ugcts.
2"

re~uirrmrnt
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ized interceptions must eventually become known at least
to the subject. He can then seek appropriate civil redress, for example, under section 2520 .. . . if he feels
that his privacy has been unlawfully invaded." S. Rep.
No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 105 (1968).
The floor discussion concerning the amendment adding the
provision for discretionary notice merely indicates an intent
to provide notice to such additional persons as may be
constitutionally required.
Nothing in the structure of the Act or this legislative
history suggests that inctimiuating conversations are "unlaw~
fully intercepted'' whenever parties to those conversations
do not receive discretionary inventory notice as a result of
the Government's failure to inform the District Court of their
jdentities. At the time inventory notice was served on the
other identifiable persons, the intercept had been completed
and the conversations had been "seized" under a valid intercept order. The fact that discretionary notice reached
39 rather than 41 identifiable persons does not in itself mean
that the conversations were unlawfully intercepted.~(;
The legislative history i11dicates that postintercept noticf'

° Counsel for respondents Merlo and Lluwr roncedrd at oral argument
that the failll!'e to tlJlme thOSI' rrspondents in the propo>ied invPntor)'
ordrr wa1; not. intPntional, Tr. of Oral Arg .. ut 32, and we are ther~fore
Hot rullcd upon to decidr whether >iUpprr;;sion would he an available
remedy if the Govt:!rnment knowingly !:>ought. to prevent thr District
Court from serving inventor~· notice ou particular partie;; . Nor doeH tlHR
easr presrnt nn opportunity t.o commrni. upon thr 8uggestion , recognized
hy thr United Stnies, Brief, at 49 n. 40, that suppre:;siou might be reqnirerl
if the rrgrnto< knew before. the intrrePption thnt. no invpntory would Ul'
srrved .
l\loreovet, rrspondents Merlo and Lauer w«>re not prejudiced by thrtr
failure to receive postintercept notice undPr etthcr of the District Court'
inventory otdPrs. As notPd <'arlier, thP Government made available toall clrfendants the intercept orders , application:;, and relatPd papers. Sre
n. 7, supra. And in rPsponse to pretrial discovPry motions , tlw GovPrnlnrnL produced tran!icripts of the interrPptcd conversations.
2

/

/
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was designed instead to assure the community that the
wiretap technique is reasonably employed. But even recognizing that Congress placed considerable emphasis on that
aspect of the overall statutory scheme, we do not think that
postintercept notice was intended to serve as an independent
restraint on resort to the wiretap procedure.

IV
Although the Government was required to identify respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco in the December 2().
application for an extension of the initial intercept, failur~
~
to do so in the circumstances here presented did not warranV
suppression under ~ 2518 (lO)(a)(i). Nor was suppression
justified with respect to respondents Merlo and Lauer simply
because the Government inadvertently omitted their names·
from the comprehensive list of all identifiable persons whose
conversations had been overheard. We hold that this is the·
correct result under the provisions of Title III, but we reemphasize the suggestion we made in United States v. Chavez,.
that "strict adherence by the Government to the provisions of
Title III would nonetheless be more in keeping with the
responsibilities Congress has imposed upon it when authority to engage in wiretapping or electronic surveillance is
sought." 416 U. S., at 580.
The order of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case
is remanded to that court for furtJ1er proceedings in accord'
with this opinion.

lt is so orde.:r.ed..

JAN 1 ~ fll7
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This case presents issues concerning the construction of
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968, 18 D. S. C. §§ 2510-2520. Specifically, we must
decide ·whether 18 U. S. C. ~ 2518 ( 1 )(b) (iv), which requires
the Government to include in its wiretap applications "the
identity of the person, if known, committing the offense,
and whose conversations are to be intercepted," is satisfieJ
when the Government identifies only the "principal targets"
of the intercept. Second. we must decide whether the Govenunent has a statutory responsibility to inform the issuing
judge of the identities of persohs whose conversations were
overheard in the course of the interception, thus enabling
him to decide whether they should be served with notice of
the interception pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 25Ui (8)(cl).
And finally, we must determine whether failure to comply
fully with these statutory provisions requires suppression of
evidence under 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (10) (a).

I
On Nov(•mber 28. 1972, a. special agent of the Federal
Bureau of Iuvestigatio11 applied to the United States Dis~
trict Court for the Northern District of Ohio for an order
authorizing a wiretap interception ln accordance with Title

:ro FlL£
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III.' The application rcquest0cl authorization to intercept
gambling-related commu11ications over two telephones at one
address in North Olmstead, Ohio, and two other telephone:s
1 Thr wirrtttp application procedure is set forth at 18 U. S. C. § 2518
(1), which prm·idrs:
"(1) Each appliention for an ordrr authorizing or npproving tlw intc•rccplion of a wirr or oral communicntion shall br m:Hle in writing upon
oath or nffirmation to n. judge of compf'trnt jurisdiction and shall stat0
the n.pplirant 's nuthority to makr such nppliration. Each application
shall include the following in formntion:
"(a) the identity of the inv<'~tig:ltin• or hnv rnforcC'Ol('Jl( officrr making
t)l(' applirntion, nnd thr ofllcer authorizing the nppliration;
"(b) a full nncl completr stat<'ment of th<' facts and cirrHm::;tanc<'.· rrlicd
upon hy thr npplirant, to justify his belief that an ordrr ::;honlcl br i~surd,
including (i) detail~ as to thr particulnr oJTemf' that has brcn, i::; being, or
i~ about to he colnmittrd, (ii) n parlirttlar description of the nature and
location of the farilitir~ from which or the place whrre the communication is to be intrrcrptrd, (iii) a particular desrripton of the typr of
communirationi' sottght to br intC'rreptrcl, (iv) thr identity of the pC'rson ,
if known, committing the offcn~e and who c communication~ are to he
int rrcrptrd;
'' (c) a fttll nne! complete ~tntcment as to whether or not other invr~ti
gativc proceclurrs have been trird and failed or why the~- reasmutbly
apprar to be unlikrly to succrrd if trircl or to be too clangrrous;
" (<.!) a ~tatem('J)t of the JWriod of tih\e for which the intrrcrption i~ .
required to be rnalntnined. If the natmc of the inve:;tigntion i;; i:iUCh
that I he alit hori:tation for intrrrrptlon shoUld not automaticaJb- trrminate whrn thr de~cribrd type of communication has been fir,.;t ohtninrd ,
a pa rticulnr dc:;c·ription of facts C'stablishin~ prohablr ca.'LI:;r to h<'lir\'e thn.t
:uldit tonal c·ommunlca tlon;; of i he same' ty)lc will occ1tr i her<':t ftrr ;
" ( r) a f11ll nnd cohlplete ~tatrment of the fact:; conceming all previou~ .
n.pplica.tions lmown to the lndivldtlal atlthorlzmg and mabng the application, madr to any j1ldge for atlthorization to intercrpt, or for npproval
of intrrerptions 'Of, Wlf(1 or oral commttnirations Involving any of the·
~amr prrsons, facilltir,.; or plate's specified in the applieation, and the·
act ion takrn h· t hC' judge on rarh sttch applieation; anci
'·(f) whc'n' I he applieatlon j~.; for tlw extension of :111 cmlrr, a statement
~l'tting forth thr rr~11lt~ tlm~ far ohtainrcl from the intrrception , or a
rc•nsotHtblr explanation of i he failure to obtain :;urh re:;ults."

Th0 i~suing judgr ·is frer to rrquirc thr applicant to fttrni::;h additional
information. lt.' ll. ~ - C. §251~ (2).
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at a home in Canton, Ohio. The accompanying affidavit
recited that the telephones were being used by Albert Kotoch,
Joseph f-;paganlo. and George Florea to conduct an illegal
gambling business, and that iu conducting that business they
wou lei place calls to and receive calls from various persons,
three of whom were also named in the wiretap application.~
The affiant also stated that the Government's informants
would refuse to testify against the persons named in the application. that telephone records alone would be insufficient to
support a gambling conviction, and that normal investigative techniques were unlikely to be fruitful. Pursuant to
the Government's request, the District Court authorized for
a period of 15 days the interception of gambling-related
wire communications of Kotoch, Spaganlo, Florea, three
Hamed individuals other than the respondents. and "others
as yet unknown," to and from the four listed telephones. 3
Thr affid:1vit H('t forth cxtf'n~ivr information indicating that thr nnmrd
wrre condurt ing a gambling operation. This information wn~
dc•rivrd from physical surYrillancr by agrntH of the FBI, an rxamination
of trlrphonr company toll records, and the pen-;onal ob~ervation~ of ~1x
iuformantH, whose pa~t reliability abo was drtnilf'd in the affidaYit.
1
: The Di~trirt Court\ ordrr was issued pursuant 18 U. S. C. §§ 2518
(-J.) which j)fO\'icJr in prrtinent part:
"(3) Upon I';Urh application the judge may ent<'f an ex parte order.
as requr~trd or as modified, authorizine; or approYing intercrption of w1re
or oral c·omm1micat ions witl1in 1l1C trrritorial juriHdiction of the court
in whif'h thr judgr is Hitting. if the judge drtermincs on the basii.:i of tlw
fncts ~ubmittrd by the applicant that" (n) t hrrc iH probable rausr for belirf that an individual is commit I ing,
ha~ rommittrd , or i" about to commit a particular offense Pl111mrratcd in
section 25lfi of n1is cl1aptrr;
" (b) t hrrr is prob:1blr cau~e for brlirf that p:uticular communications
roncrrning that offrnsc will br obtainrd through such interception;
'' ( t) normal invr~:~tigati1' e procPdllfPi:i have brrn tried and havr failed
or rra><onubly appear to be nnlikrly to sneered if tried or to be too
oangrrous;
"(d) thrrr is probable cause for brlirf tha.t the facilitieo~ from which ,
•Qr the pi:Lre wherr, thr wire or oml rommttnication~ arc to be intcrerptrd
2

indiYidual~

on,
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During the course of the wiretap, the Government learned
that respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco were discussing illegal gambling activities with the named subjects.
On December 26. 1972, the Government applied for an
extension of the initial intercept order.4 This time it sought
authorization to intercept gambling-related conversations of
Kotoch, Rpaganlo, Florea, two other named individuals, and
"others as yet unknown," but it did not identify respondents
nrc being u~o;rd, or arc about to be used, in connection with the commission of ~;urh offense, or are lmscd to, listed in the name of, or commonly
u~rd by ~uch per~on.
"(4) Each order authorizing or approving the interception of any wire
or oral romnnmicntion ,<.;h~tll specify" (n) t!H' ii:kntity of the person, if known, whose communications are
i o lw in t rrr<'p t rd ;
" (h) th<' natm<' and ]oration of the communications facilities as to
\\'hi<·h, or thP phr<' where, :mthority to intcrcept is granted;
" ( r) a, particular drscription of the type of communication sought to
be intrrrrptcd, and a statemrnt of the particular offense to which it
rrlatrs;
"(d) thr idrntity of the agency authorizrd to intercept the communirat ions, and of th<' person authorizing the application; and
"(<•) the period' of lime during which such interception is authorized,
inrlucling :t stntemrnt as to whether or not the interceptiou »hall automatically tC'rminatc when the de»eribcd communication ha~; hC'cn fin;t,
ohtainrd."
1 In addition to the Dccrmber 26 application rrque:;ting an cxtrnsion
of thr initial intercrpt order, the Government also filed on that date a
Rrpnratr nppliC'ation ~rrking authorization to monitor a third trlephonc
(oTi~rovNrd at the samr North Olmstead address. Both appl'iralions wrre
nccompallird hy anothrr aflidavit Hctting forth the restllts of the initial
monitonng, the mannrr in whirh thr third phone was disroYered, the
fact.~ indicating that thr newly dJsC'o\·<'rcd trlephone was bring used to
conduC't <l gambling lm~inrss, and rrasons why continued intrrception was
nree~snry. A copy of th<' aflidnvit fiiPd on November 2R was also
ttttnchrd to th0 Drcrmbcr 26 a.pplirations. For the sak<' of clarity, thetwo npplirations filed Oil DecemhPr 26 will be treated ns a single·
appli<·ation.
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Donovan, Buzzaco, and Robbins iu this second application. 5
The District Court again authorized iuterception of gambling~
related conversations for a maximum of 15 days.
On February ~1, 1973, the Government submitted to the
District Court a proposed order giving notice of the interceptions to 37 persons, a group which the Government apparently thought included all individuals who could be identified as having discussed gambling over the monitored
telephones. 6 The District Court signed the proposed order,
and an inventory notice was served on the listed persons,
including respondents Donovan, Buzzaco, and Robbins. On
September 11. 1973, after the Government submitted the
names of two additional persons whose identities allegedly had
been omitted inadvertently from the initial list, the District
Court entered an amended order giving notice to those
individuals. As a result of what the Government labels
"administrative oversight," respondents Merlo and Lauer
Tho United States conceded in the Court of Appeals that respondDonovan and Robbins were "known" within the mcannig of the
statute a.t. the time of the December 2G application, but chai!Pnged as
clearly erroneous the District Court's finding that respondent Buzzaco was
1'known" ftf . that limo.
The Co1.1rt of Appeals upheld the District Court's
finding, and thr United States has not sought revirw of that di~position.
Thus, for our purpo:;es, ali three respondents were "known" on December 26.
6 An inventory noticr must be served within a designatrd period of
timo upon "tho pPrsons named in the order or the application." 18
U. S. C . § 2518 (8) (d). The invrntory must give noticr of thr entry of
the intrreept ordrr or application, sbte the disposition of thr application,
and indicatr whrther communieation~ wPre or wrre not intercepted. Ib£d.
Upon thr filing of a motion. the judge has eli wetion to make available
the interecpted communieations, the application~, and the orders. Ibid.
Title Ill also aut horizrs the District Court to cause an inventory notice to be servrd on "other parties to intrrcepted communications" if the
judge drtermincs that such notice is in the interest of justice. Ibid.
'Tho~r other parties may also be given accesH to the interceptrd commLtnications, the ••pplication ·, and the order ·. ibid.
5

ent .~
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were not included in either list of names and were never
served with inventory notice. 7
On November 1, 1973, an indictment was returned in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio charging Kotoch, Spaganlo, the five respondents, and
10 other individuals with conspiracy to conduct and conductjng a gambling business in violation of 18 U. S. C. §§ 371
aml Hl.55. The five respondents filed motions to suppress
evidence derived from the wire interception. After an evidentiary hearing on the motions, the District Court suppressed as to respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco
all evidence derived from the December 26 intercept order
on the ground that failure to identify them by name in the
application and order of that elate violated 18 U. S. C. §§ 2.518
(l)(b)(iv) and 2518 (4)(a). With respect to Merlo and
Lauer, who were not known to the Government until after
the December 26 application, the District Court suppressed
all rvidrnce derived from both intercept orders on the ground
that thry had not been served with inventory notice.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmrd.
513 F. 2d 337 (1975). 8 On the identification issue, the
court hrlcl that the wiretap application must identify every
person whose conversations relating to the subject crimi11al
activity the Government has probable cause to believe it
will intercept. Agreeing with the District Court that at the
time of the December 26 application the Government had
7 A!though rr>ipondrnt>' ;\I rrlo and La ncr \\'rrc not >'rn·rcl with in,·rnlory notiec· pur~uant to§ 2518 (R) (d), the intcrcrpt ordrr~, applirntions,
nnd rrlntrd paper~ wrre made availnblc to all the dcfrndants, including
Mc·rlo n.nd Latwr, on K ov<•mber 21), 1973. Thus, the introduc·tion into
c\·idrnrr nt trial of th(' eontrnt~ of the intrrrrptrd convcr~a1ions and
cvidrnre derived tl1rrC'from would not be prohibited by 18 U. S. C.
§ 2518 (0).
~ Thr Govrrnment filed it::; npprnl from the Di~triC't Court 's order sup])!'C':<"ing f'videllcr undPr lK U. R. C. § :3731 , nnd thrrc ha;; bC'rn no trinl
on the rharg<'>i with rc·~prrt to the rc•:,pondcntR.
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probable cause to believe that it would overhear Donovan,
Robbins, and Buzzaco "committing the offense," the Court
of Appeals affirmed the suppression of evidence derived from
the December 26 order. On the 11otice question, it hchl
that the Government has a.n implied statutory duty to inform the issuing judge of the identities of the parties whose
conversations were overheard so that he can determine
whether discretionary inventory notice should be required."
Because the Government had failed to perform this duty
with respect to Merlo and Lauer, the Court of AppC'als
affirmed the District Court's order suppressing evidC'nce
derived from both intercept orders. The court found it unnecessary to determine whether the failure to identify repondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco in the December
26 application and to name respondents Merlo and Lauer
in the proposed inventory notice orders was inadvertent or
purposeful, since the mere fact of omission was sufficient to
require suppression under 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (10) (a). 10
vYe granted certiorari to resolve these issues, which conc<'rn
the construction of a major federal statute, 421 U. S. 907,
and now reverse.
II
The United States contends that § 2518 (1) (b) (iv) requires that a wiretap application identify only the prin<'ipal
Sre n . fi, supra.
18 U. S. C. § ~518 (10) (a) providrs in pNtinrnt part:
"(10) (a) Any aggrieved prrson in any n·lal, hearing, or proceeding
in or before any court, department, offir~t, ngency, rrgulatory body , or
other authority of the Unltrd Stnto:s, a Statr, or a political subdiYision
'thereof, mny mov<' to s\lpprPss tho content;; of any intercepted wire or
ural communirntion, or evidence derived therefrom, on the grounds that" (i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted;
"(ii) the order of authorization or approval under which it was intercepted is inRuffiricnt on its facr; or
"(iii) the intrrception was not made in conformity with the order of
·authori(:ation or approval."
D

10
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target of the interception, and tha.t § 2518 (8) (d) does not',
require the Government to provide the issuing judge with
a list of all identifiable persons who were overheard in the
course of an authorized interception. We think neither contention is sound.
A
We turn first to the identification requirements of § 2518
( il) (b) (iv). That provision requires a wiretap application
to specify "the identity of the person, if known, committing
the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted."
In construing that language, this Court already has ruled
that the Government is not required to identify an individual
hi the application unless it has probable cause to believe
(i) that the individual is engaged in the criminal activity
under investigation and (ii) that the individual's conversations will be intercepted over the target telephone. United
States v. Kahn, 415 U. S. 143 ( 1974). The question at issue
here is whether the Government is required to name all
such individuals. 11
The United States argues that the most reasonable m11 Every Court of A11peals that has considered the issue has concludrd
tT1at an individual whosr conversations probably will bE> intercrptrd by a
wirrtap must br identified in the wiretap application if the law rnforrement authoritirs have probable cause to believe the individual is rommitting thr offcn~e for which the wiretap i::; sought . U11itcd States v.
('hiarizio, 525 F. 2d 289, 292 (CA2 1975); United States v. Bernstein,
509 F. ~d 906 (CA4 1975) , petition for cert. filrd, No. 74-1486; United
States v. Doolittle, 507 F. 2d 1368, aff'd en bane, 518 F . 2d 500 (CAS
1075), prlitions for cert. filed Nos. 75-500, 75-509, 75-513; U11ited States
~ Civella, 533 F . 2d 1395 (CAS 1976) , petitions for crrt. filrd, Nos.
75-1813, 76-Hl9 ; T../nited States v. Russo, 527 F . 2d 1150, 11.'i6 (CAlO
1975), cert. drnied, U. S. (1976) . See also United States v.
Jlfoore, U. S. App. D . C.-, 513 F. 2d 485, 493-494 (1975) (interpreting 2:3 D . C'. Code 547 (a) (2) , which is almost identical to the provision at i~ su c here).
A number of these courts have ronrluded, and respondents Donovan,
I~obbins, and Duzzaco arguP, that our decision in United States v. Kahn,.
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tcrpretation of the plain language of the statute is that the
application must identify only the principal target of the
investigation, who "will almost always be the individual
"'·hose phone is monitored." ' 2 Brief for the United States,
at 18. Under this interpretation, if the Government has
reason to believe that an individual will use the target
telephone to place or receive calls, and the Government
has probable cause to believe that the individual is engaged
in the criminal activity under investigation, the individual
qualifies as a principal target and must be named in the
wiretap application. On the other hand, an individual who
uses a different telephone to place calls to or receive calls
from the target' telephone is not a principal target even if
the Government has probable cause to believe that the
individual is engaged in the criminal activity under investigation. In other words, whether one is a principal target
of the investigation depends on whether one operates the
target telephone to place or receive calls. 13
415 U. R. 143 (1974), resolved thi:< identification issue. Sec United States
v. Chiarizio , supra; United States v. Moore, supra. Although there is
hlngnage in Kahn suggesting that wiretap applications must identify all
such indiYidnal ·, th:? identification quest ion presented here was not before
u~ in Kahn. The que~tion in that case was whether a wiretap application must idPntify a known user of the target telephone whose romplirity in the criminal activity under im·estigation was not known at
the time of the application. Kahn i · a relevant , though not controlling.
precedent .
12 The United States does not o;uggest I hat regardless of the farina!
cirrumstanrc~ a wiretap application must iclcntif:v only a single individual.
To the contrnr~r , it concedr~:> that if two or more persons are using the
target telephone " equally" to commit the offem;e, and thu:; are "N]nnlly"
tnrget» of the investigation, "all mu.'t be named." Brief for the United
Stnte~, at 1~ n. 1:3.
n Counsel for thr United Stntes explained this position succinctly at
oral nrgnment: "The eritiral di~tinction . .. i~:> one between the users of
the te!Pphone that is being monitored on the one hnnd, and all other person , t hronghont the world who may conver::;e from unmonitored phon~
on the other h:tnd." Tr. of Oral Arg., nt 1:3.
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Whatever the merits of such a statutory scheme, we find'
little support for it in the language and structure of Title
Ill or in the legislative history. The statutory language
itself refers only to "the person, if known, committing the
offense and whose communications are to be intercepted."
That description is as applicable to a suspect placing calls
to the target telephone as it is to a suspect placing calls
from that telephone. It is true, as the United States suggests, that when read in the context of the other subdivisions of § 2518 ( 1) (b), an argument can be made that.
Congress focused in subdivision (iv) on the primary user
of the target telephone. But it is also clear from other
sections of the statute that Congress expected that wiretap
a.pplications would · name more than one individual. For
example, Title II! requires that it1Ventory notice be served
upon "the persons named in the order or the application."
18 U. S. 0. § 2518 (8)(d) (emphasis added). And § 2518
(1) (e) requires that an intercept application disclose all
previous intercept applications "involving any of the same
persons . . . specified in the application') (emphasis added).
Jt may well be that Congress anticipated that a given
application would cover tnore than one telephone or that
several suspects would use one telephone, and that an application for those reasons alone would require identification
of more than one individuaL But nothing on the face of
the statute suggests that Congress intended to remove from
the identification requirement those suspects whose inter·ceptcd comrnuu!cati.ons originated on a telephone other than
that listed in the wiretap application. l 1
Indrrd. tlw contrni·~' eonclll~ion Is ~i\)l:gc:;trd by the fact that idrnt.ifirat ion of an indi\·idual in nn application for an intrrcrpt order
trigp;cr~ othrr ~tatutory provl~iowi, First , § :2;)18 (1) (c) rrquires an intrrc<'pt applirat ion to di:;dosP nll prrvlo\u; applications " involving any
'o f 1hr c;anw pt•r,;ons .. . sprrified in the n pplicntion." To the rxtrnt
that Congrc~~ thought it nerrs:;ar~· to prov.idr thr i~:;uing judge with
14
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Nor can we find support in the legislative history for the
"principal target" interpretation. Title III originated as
a combination of S. 675, the Federal Wire Interception
Act, which was introduced by Senator McClellan several
months prior to this Court's decision in Berg ~ r v. New York,
388 U. S. 41 (1967), and S. 2050, the Electronic Surveillance
Control Act of 1967, introduced by Senator Hruska a few
days after the Berger decision. S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess., 66 (1968). Both bills required that wiretap applications include a full and complete statement of the
facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant and
specification of the nature and location of the communication facilities involved. Although neither bill contained
an express identification requirement such as that at issue
here, both bills required the application to include "a full
and complete statement of the facts concerning all previous
applications ... involving any person named in the application as committing, having committed, or being about to
commit an offense." Hearings on Controlling Crime Through
More Effective Law Enforcement Before the Subcommittee
on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., at 77, § 8 (a) (3) and
1006. § 2518 (a)(4) (1967) (emphasis added). Thus, even
at this early stage, it was recognized that an application
could identify several individuals, and there is no indication
that the identification would be limited to principal targets.
S. 971 combined the major provisions of S. 675 and S. 2050
and eventua.lly was enacted. While it was pending before
the Senate Judiciary Committee, this Court decided Katz
such information, there is no indication of congressional intent to require
provi:>ion of such information only if a suspect operated from one end
of a telephone line. Second, § 2518 (8) (d) mandates that an inventory no1icr be served upon "the persons named in the order or the
application." As with § 2518 ( 1) (e), the congressional purpose would
not be served by limiting that notice on the basis of the telephone from
which. one speaks.
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v. United States, 389 · U. S. · 347' '(1967). S. 971 was then
redrafted to confrom to Katz as well as Berger, and
the identification provision was added at that time. The
Senate Report states that the requirements set forth in the
various subdivisions of ·§ 2518 (1){b), including the identification requirement at issue here, " [were] intended to reflect the
constitutional command of particularization." S. Rep. No.
1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 101 (1968), citing Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41, 58-60, and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 354-356 (1967)-. ' Tlie United States now contends that
although it may be that Congress read Berger and Katz to
require, as a constitutional matter, that the subject of the
surveillance be named if known, Congress would hardly
have read those cases as requiring the naming of all parties
likely to be overheard.15 Brief, at 25-26. But to the extent that Congress thought it was meeting the constitutional
commands of particularization established in Burger and
Katz, Congress may have read those cases as mandating
a broad identification requirement. The statute that we
confronted in Berger required identification of "the person
or persons" · whose communications were to be overheard.
388 U. S .. at 59. And we expressly noted that that provision "[did] no more than identify the person whose constitutionally protected area is to be invaded .... ." · Ibid. Given
the statute at issue in Berger and our comment upon it,
15 At the time of the enactment of Title III, Congr<'ss did not
have before it the view we expreo;sed on this issue in United States
v. Kahn, 415 U. S., at 155 n. 15. The Fourth Amendment rrquires
specification of "the place to be sea.ched, and the persons or thing.s to
be seized." " In the wiretap contrxt, those requirements aro satisfied
by identification of the telephone line to be tapped and the particular
conver;:;~Ltions to be seized'. It is not a constitutional requirement, that
all those likely to be overh<'ard engaging in incriminating conversations
be named. Specification of this sort "iclentif[ies] the person whose constitutionally protected ' area is to be invadrcl rather than 'particularly
describing' the communications, conver:sations, or dio;cuso;ions tQ be seized."
Berger v. New York, 388 U~ S. 41, 59 (1967).
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may have concluded that the Constitution required
the naming, in a wiretap application, of all suspects rather
than just the primary user.~ 6
In any event, for our present purposes it is unnecessary
to speculate as to ex11ctly how Congress interpreted Berger
and Katz with respect to the identification issue. It is sufficient to note that in response to those decisions Congress
included an identification requirement which on its face draws
no distinction based on the telephone one uses, and the
United States points to no evidence in the legislative history
that supports such a distinction. Indeed, the legislative materials apparently contain no use of the term "principal target" or any discussion of a different treatment based on the
telephone from which a suspect speaks. 17 We therefore conclude that a wiretap application must name an individual
if the Government has probable cause to believe that the
individual is engaged in the criminal activity under investigation and expects to intercept the individual's conversations over the target telephone.

B
The other statutory provision at issue m this case is
~ 6 That Congress may have so understood the constitutional requirement is also suggested by the portion of the Senate Report dealing with
that provision of S. 971 that required the intercept order to identify
"the person, if known, whose conversations are to be intercepted." The
Senate Report merely cites West v. Cabell, 153 U. S. 78 (1894), which
concerns the need for proper identification of the subject of an arrest
warrant. S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 102 (1968). To the
extent that Congress may have considered West to apply to wiretap
orders, we have no reason to believe that Congress considered its applicability to extend only to those suspects using the target telephone.
17 At least one Senator read the identification requirement in S. 971 to
parallel the identification requirement contained in the statute at issue
in Berger v. New Yorlc: "Specificity is required as to the person or
persons whose communications are to be intercepted." 114 Cong. Rec.,
at 14763 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Percy) .

--
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18 U. S. C. § 2518 (8) (d), which provides that the judge
shall cause to be served on the persons named in the order
or application an inventory, which must give notice of the
entry of the order or application, state the disposition of
the application, and indicate whether communications were
intercepted. 18 Although the statute mandates iHventory notice only for persons named in the application or the order,
the statute also provides that the judge may order similar
notice to other parties to intercepted communications if he
concludes that such action is in the interest of justice.1 n
Observing that this notice provision does not expressly require law enforcement authorities routinely to supply the
j"udge with specific information upon which to exercise his
discretion, the United States contends that it would be inappropriate to read such a requirement into the statute since
the judge has the option of asking the law enforcement
authorities for whatever information he requires.
Our reading of the legislative history of the discretionary
notice provision in light of the purposes of Title III leads
us to reject the Government's interpretation. As reported
from the Judiciary Committee, section 2518 (8) (d) contained
only a provision mandating notice to the persons named in
the application or the order; the discretionary notice provision was added by amendment on the floor of the Senate.
18

Thr inventory notice · must be served within a reasonable time but
not Inter than 90 dltys after the date the application for an intrrcept
Qrder was filrd. On an ex parte showing of good cause, service of the
invrntory may be po~t paned.
lv In addition to ~ IH•sc provisions for mandatory and discretionary
inventory not icc , the Government "is required to supply the is~uing judgP
with recordings of t11e int<"rceptrc1 convcr~a tions, which are to be ~en led
according to his dirrrtions. 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (8) (a). Thrse notire
.and rrturn provi:;;ions ,.;at i:,;fy constitutional requirements. Sec Kat.z v.
United States, 380 U. S. 347, 355-356, and n. 16 (1967); Berger v. New

York, 388 U.S. 41, 60 (1967).
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fn introducing that amendment, Senator Hart explained its
purpos<':
''The amendment would give the judge who issued the
order discretion to require notice to be served on other
parties to intercepted couversations, even though such
parties are not specifically named in the court order.
The Berger and Katz decisions established that notice
of surveillance is a constitutional requirement of any
surveillance statute. It may be that the required notice must be served ou all parties to intercepted commuuications. Since legitimate interests of privacy may
make such notice to all parties undesirable. the amendment lea.vcs the final determination to the judge." 114
Cong. Rec. 14485-14486 (1968) .~"
In dc>ciding whether legitimate privacy interests justify
withholding inventory notice from parties to intercepted conversations, a judge is likely to require information and assistance beyond that contained in the application papers and the
recordings of intercepted conversations made available by
law enforcement authorities. No purpose is served by holding that those authorities have no routine duty to supply
the judge with revelant information. The Court of Appeals
for the Niuth Circuit recently confronted this problem of
~" It i~ worth noting that ::;hort 1)1 b(•for<' S!'na tor Hart propo~NI this
Amendnwnt to S. 971 , Sen11tor Long had !'<'ad to the Senate portion::;
of a report prt>parrd by the A:<soriation of thr Bar of tlw Cit~· of
Kew York on fcdrral wirctnp kgi,.;lation. That r<'port romm!'nt<'d 1hnt
partir" to int<'rcrpt<'d eonn~ r::;ations othrr than those named in the applicntion or order probabl~· "hould hr ,.:rrv<'d with inYrntor~· notirc. but it
:1bo rrcognizrd that under somr circum::;tancr,; the provi~ion of ::;uch noticr
could br harmful nnd g:1ve the following rxample :
1'!\, a hu,.;inr~,;man, t:1lk~ to hi~ ru~tomer~ , and the lntlt'r are srrvrd
with paper~ !:lhowing t h:1 t A is bring buggrd I .1 IT] he dnmAge to conJidcnce iu A and to A's rrputation in genrral ma~r damage A unju~tly.
In thi~ t':t ~ c it would ~rem that thr ru~tomer" should not br :;<•rvrd witla
the invrntory." 114 C'ong. Tiee . 14476 (Hlfi ' ) .
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dual responsibility, and we adopt the balanced construction
that court placed on § 2518 (8) (d):
"To discharge this obligation the judicial officer must
have, at a minimum, knowledge of the particular categories into which fall all the individuals whose conversations have been intercepted. Thus, while precise identification of each party to an intercepted conversation
is not required, a description of the general class, or
classes, which they comprise is essential to enable the
judge to determine whether additional information is
necessary for a proper evaluation of the interests of the
various parties. Furthermore, although the judicial officer has the duty to cause the filing of the inventory
[notice]. it is abundantly clear that the prosecution hag:
greater access to and familiarity with the intercepted'
communications. Therefore we feel justified in imposing
upon the latter the duty to classify all those whose
eonversations have been intercepted; and to transmit
this information to the judge. Should the judge desire ·
more information regarding these classes in order to·
exercise his statutory § 2518 (8) (d) discretion, ... the ·
government is also required to furnish such information
as is available to it." United States v. Chun, 503 F.
2d 533, 540 (1974).
We agree with the Ninth Circuit that this allocation of
responsibility best serves the pur:t~oses of Title III. 21
21 At oral argument, counsel for the United States recognized the merit
of the approach specified in United States v, Chun:
"Perhaps the approach of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
which suggested that rather than submitting specific names we should
submit ca.tegories of persons who had been overheard, is a. better
policy, would be more helpful to the district court in exercising its
discretion, and we would have no objection to following any reasonable policy that the district courts determine would be useful to them
in this regard." Tr. of Oral Arg., at 6-7.
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Currently, the policy of the Justice Department is to provide the issuing judge with the name of every person who
has been overheard as to whom there is any reasonable possibility of indictment. Brief for the United States, at 39.
Because it fails to assure that the necessary range of information will be before the issuing judge, this policy does not
meet the test set out in Chun. Moreover, where, as here,
the Government chooses to supply the issuing judge with
a list of all identifiable persons rather than a description
of the classes into which those persons fall, the list must
be complete. Applying these principles, we find that the
Government did not comply adequately with § 2518 (8)(d),
since the names of respondents Merlo and Lauer were not
included on the purportedly complete list of identifiable persons submitted to the issuing judge.

III
We turn now to the question whether the District Court
properly suppressed evidence derived from the wiretaps at
issue solely because of the failure of the law enforcement
authorities to comply fully with the provisions of §§ 2518 (1)
(b)(iv) and 2518 (8) (d). Section 2515 expressly prohibits
the use at trial, and at certain other proceedings, of the
contents of any intercepted wire communication or any evidPnce derived therefrom "if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of this chapter." The circumstances that trigger suppression under § 2515 are in turn
enumerated in § 2518 (10) (a):
"(i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted;
"(ii) the order of authorization or approval under
which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face; or
"(iii) the interception was not made in conformity
with the order of authorization or approval."
There is no basis on the facts of this case to suggest that
the authorization orders are facially insufficient, or that the
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interception wa.s not conducted in conformity with the orders.
Thus, only § 2518 (10) (a) (i) is relevant: were the communications "unlawfully intercepted" given the violations of
§~ 2518 (1)(b) (iv) and 2518 (8)(d)? 22
Resolution of that question must begin with United States
v. Giordano, 416 U. S. 505 (1974), and United States v.
Chavez, 416 U. S. 562 (1974). Those cases hold that "[not]
every failure to comply fully with any requirement provided
The availability of the SUJ11HE'ssion rem<'dy for thf';:;e statutor~r,
opposed to constitutionnl, violations, see nn. 15 nnd 19, supra, turns
on thr provisions of Title III rather than the judicially fashioned exclu:sionnry rule aimrd at dctrrring violations of Fourth Amendment
rights. United States v. Giordano, supra, 416 U. S., at 524.
The concurring opinion of THB CHIEF JusTICE contends that rc ;pondents Donovan, Robbins, and 13uzzaco lack standing even to seek suppn•.,:;ion. Post, at - . This contrnt ion r c~; t :; on t h<' ground that
Congrr.:;s rf'jrc tf'd an amf'ndment propost•d by S<'nators Long and IJart
that would have added a fourth ground justifying s uppres~ ion-namrl~ ·.
that thr p<'rson against whom thr Governmf'nt sought to introduce thr
evidence was not namrd in the court ordrr. Sine<' these thrre respondents would havr bren f'ntitled to suppression under the rf'jrct Pd atmndmf'nt, thr concurring opinion concludrs thry cannot seek suppre:;sion herr.
This virw fails to recognizr that § 2.51R (10) (a) e.:;tablishing thP ·uppre.:;sion rrmedy provides alternative grounds on which one can seek
s uppre~siou of evidenc<' derived from a wiretap. Thus. the mer<' fact
that Congress chose not to add a fourth alt ernat ive could not mean that
it intendrd to prevent prrsons who would have bren coverrd by that
altrrnative from sreking suppres::;ion on one of the other grounds. As
the .Tnst icr Department commrnted, in the same statement cited in thr
concmring opinion: '' Thr [Long and Hart] amendment i ~:> designed to
limit thr scope of electronic surveillance, but it accomplishes thil:i objective i11 an artificial mannrr . So long as the court order is validly
obtained, rvidence obtained under the ordrr should be admissible again~t
an~' JWrHO!J... not mrr el~· against the person named in the order." 114
Cong. nee., at 1471k (19GS) (emphaf'is added). Here. respondents
Donovan , Hohbim;, and Buzzaco challengr the validity of the court order,
and nothing in eit hrr Congrrss' rejection of the proposed amendmrnt or
the .Tui:iticr Departmrnt's comment thrreon sugge.;ts that § 2518 (10) (a)
(i) is unavailable to pen;on~ who might have had a remedy undrr a
provision not rnactecl by Congre. s.
22
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in Title III would render the interception of wire or oral
communications 'unlawful.' " United States v. Chavez, 416
U. S., at 574- 575. 'J.1o the contrary, suppression is required
only for a "failure to satisfy any of those statutory requirements that directly and substantially implement the congressional intention to limit the use of intercept procedures
to those situations clearly calling for the employment of this
extraordinary device." United States v. Giordano, 416 U. S.,
at 527.
Giordano concerned the provision in Title III requiring
that an application for an intercept order be approved by
the Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney Genera.! specially designated by the Attorney General. Concluding that
Congress intended to condition the use of wiretap procedures
on the judgment of senior officials in the Department of
Justice. the Court required suppression for failure to comply with the approval provision. Cha.v ez concerned the statutory requirement that the application for an intercept order
specify the identity of the official authorizing the application. The problem in Chavez was one of misidentification;
although the application had in fact been authorized by the
Attorney General, the application erroneously identified an
Assistant Attorney General as the official authorizing t 1,e
application. The Court concluded that mere misidentification of the official authorizing the application did not make
the application unlawful within the meaning of § 2518 (10)
(a) (i) since that identification requirement did not play a
"substantive role" in the regulatory system. 416 U. S.,
at 578.
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals concluded that both
the identification requirement of § 2518 ( 1) (b) (iv) and
the notice requirement of § 2515 (8) (d) pla.yed a "central
role" in the statutory framework , and for that reason affirmed the District Court's order suppressing relevant
·evidence. Although both statutory requirements are un-
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doubtedly important, we do not thiuk that the failure to·
comply fully with those provisions renders unlawful an intercept order that in all other respects satisfies the statutory
requirements.

A
As to § 2518 ( 1)(b) (iv), the issue is whether the identification in an intercept application of all those likely to be
overheard in incriminating conversations plays a "substantive role" with respect to judicial authorization of intercept
orders and consequently imposes a limitation on the use
of intercept procedures. The statute provides that the issuing judge may approve an intercept application if he determines that normal investiga.tive techniques have failed or
are unlikely to succeed and there is probable cause to believe
that: (i) an individual is engaged in criminal activity,
('ii) particular communications concerning the offense will
be obtained through interception; and (iii) the target facilities are being used in conBection with the specified criminal
activity. That determination is based on the "full and complete statement'' of relevant facts supplied by law enforcement authorities. If, after evaluating the statutorily
enumerated factors in light of the information contained in
the application, the judge concludes that the wiretap order
should issue, the failure to ideBtify additional persons who
are likely to be overheard engaging in incriminating conversations could hardly invalidate an otherwise lawful judicial
authorization. The intercept order may issue only if the
issuing judge determines that the statutory factors are present, and the failure to name additional targets in no way
detracts from the sufficiency of those factors.
This case is unlike G1"ordano, where failure to satisfy
the statutory requirement of prior approval by specified
Justice Department officials bypassed a congressionally
imposed limitation on the use of the illtercept procedure.
The Court there noted that it was reasonable to believe ·
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that rcqumng prior approval from senior officials in the
Justice Department "would inevitably foreclose resort to
wiretapping in various situations where investigative personnel would otherwise seck intercept authority from the court
and the court would very likely authorize its usc." 416 F. S.,
at 528. Here, however, the statutorily imposed preconditions
to judicial authorization were satisfied. and the issuing judge
was simply unaware that additional persons might be overheard engaging in illcriminating conversations. I11 no meaningful sense can it be said that the presence of that information as to additional targets would have precluded judicial
authorizatioll of the intercept.~'' Rather. this case resembles
Chavez, where we held that a wiretap was not unlawful simply bccause the issuing judge was incorrectly informed as
to which designated official had authorized the application.
The Chavez intercept was lawful because the Justice Department had performed its task of prior approval, and the
instant intercept is lawful because the application provided
sufficicnt information to enable the issuing judge to determine that the statutory preconditions were satisfied. 2 '
Therr is no suggr~tiou in this cnse thnt thP Govrrnmrnt ngrnts
knowingly fniled to identify re,pondrnls Donovnn, Robbins, nnd Buzznro
for the purpose of keeping relevant, in format ion. from the District Court
that might have prompted the court to conclude that probable cause
was larking. If such a showing hnd been made, we would have a
diiTerent case. Nor is there any suggestion that, as a result of the
failure to namo these three respondents they were denied the mandatory
inventory notire &1.1pplied to persons named in. the application. 18
U. S. C. § 2518 (8) (d). Respondrnts Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco
were among the 37 persons servrd with the intial inventory.
2 •1 No one suggests that the fnilurC' to identify in n wirE'tap application
mdividuals who are "unknown" within the menning of the statute, see
United States v. Kahn, 415 U. S. 143 (1974), requires suppression of
intercepted conversations to which those individual· were parties. Though
recognizing that the failure to identify such an "unknown" individual
does not makP unlawful an otherwise valid intercept, order, respondents
Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco suggest that the opposite is true
23
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Finally, we note that nothing in the legislative history
suggests that Congress intended this broad identification requirement to play "a central, or even functional, role in
guarding against unwarranted use of wiretapping or electronic
surveillance." United States v. Chavez, 416 U. S., at 578.
Neither S. 675 nor S. 2050, the predecessor bills of S. 971,
contained an identification provision. Sec p. 11, supra. The
Ollly explanation given in the Senate Report for the inclusion of the broad iclc11tification provision was that it was
intended to reflect what Congress perceived to be the constitutional command of particularization. This explanation
was offered with respect to all the information required by
§" 2518 (1") (6) to b0 set out in an intercept application. No
additional guidance can be gleaned from the floor debates,
since they contain no substantive discussion of the identification provision. 25
with respect to the failure to identify in a wiretap application inclividuals who are ''known" within the meaning of the statute. Coun~-;c]
for theso retipondents suggPstcd at. oral argument that this differenc('
in result is justiftrd by analogy to warrantiC'Ss searches or nrre:;;ts. Tr.
of Oral Arg., at 40. Although law enforcement officials can often take
action without n warrant when they h:we been unable to foreser 1 he
cii·cumstanres that eventually confronted them, thc•y still must obtain a
·earch or arrest warrant when their prior knowledge is snfT-ieient to
establish probable cause, and it i;; suggested that the samr principle
applies here. The major flaw in that reasoning is that thi~ rasr dor~
not conceru warrantletis action. Here, the omi,;sion on the part of l:iw
enforcement authoritie;; wns not a failure to serk prior judicial nuthorization, but a failure to idrntify every individual who could. be rxpect eel
to be overheard engaging .in incriminating· conven;at ion:>. Thnt the complete absence of prior judicial authorization would make an intrrcept
unlawful ha::; no bearing on the lnwfulness of an intercept order that
fail8 to identify eYery tar~l't.
2 r. Evm if we as<;umc thnt Congrc~s thought that n broad idcntifieation
requirement was cons Iit ul ionally mandated, it docs not follow thnt
Congress imposed statutor!l ;:;npprcs::;ion under §§ 2515 and 2518 ( 10) (a)
(i) as a sanction for non('otnpliance. In limiting u~e of the intercept pro'Cedure to "the most precise and dis('riminate circumstance;:;," S. Hep. J\'" o ..
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B
We reach the same conclusion with respect to the Government's duty to inform the judge of all identifiable persons
whose conversations were intercepted. As noted earlier, the
version of Title III that emerged from the Senate Judiciary
Committee provided only for mandatory notice to the "persons named in the order or the application." The Senate
Report detailed the purpose of that provision :
"[T] he intent of the provision is that the principle
of postuse notice will be retained. This provision alone
should insure the community that the techniques are
reasonably employed. Through its operation all authorized interceptions must eventually become known at least
to the subject. He can then seek appropriate civil redress, for example, under section 2520 . . . if he feels
that his privacy has been unlawfully invaded." S. Rep.
N'o. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 105 (1968).
The floor discussion concerning the amendment adding the
provision for discretionary notice merely indicates an intent
to provide notice to such additional persons as may be
constitutionally required.
Nothing in the structure of the Act or this legislative
history suggests that incriminating conversations are "unlawfully intercepted)) whenever parties to those conversations
do not receive discretionary inventory notice as a result of
107, 90th Cong., 2d Sc.,;.;;,, 102 (196R) , Congrrss requirrd law enforrrment
authoritirs to convince a District Court that probable cause existed to
hrlirvo that a specific prr::;on was committing a specific offense using a
specific tclrphone . This requirement was satisfied here when the application set forth sufficient information to indicate that the primary targets
were conducting a gnmbling busine"s over four particular telephones.
Nothing in the lrgislative history indicates tlmt Congress intended to
derln rc an ot herwisc constitutional intercept order "unlawful" under
§ 2518 ( 10) (a) (i)-resulting in suppression under § 2515-for failure tG
name additional targetii.
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the Government's failure to inform the District Court of their
identities. At the time inventory notice was served on the
other identifiable persons, the intercept had been completed
and the conversations had been "seized" under a valid intercept order. The fact that discretionary notice reached
39 rather than 41 identifiable persons does not in itself meall
that the conversations were unlawfully intercepterl. 26
The legislative history indicates that postintercept notice
was designed instead to assure the community that the
wiretap technique is reasonably employed. But even recognizing that Congress placed considerable emphasis on that
aspect of the overall statutory scheme, we do not think that
postintercept notice was intended to serve as an independent
restraint on resort to the wiretap procedure.

IV
Although the
ents Donovan,
application for
to do so in the

Government was required to identify respondRobbins, and Buzzaco in the December 26
an extension of the initial intercept, failure
circumstances here presented did not warrant

zr. Coum;rl for rrspondents l\Irrlo and Lauer conredrd at oral argumC:'nt
that the failure to name tho:;e rrspondcnts in the propo:;ed inventory
ordrr wa~ not intrntional, Tr. of Oral Arg., at 32, and we arr thrrefore
not callrd upon to drcide whether supprrssion would br an available
rrmedy if the Government knowingly sought to prrvent th<• Di~t rict
Court from srrving inventory notiee on particular partir:;. Nor doc;; 1his
case prrl:!rnt an opportunity to comment. upon thr suggt:'::;tion , recognized
hy thr United States, Brirf, at 49 n. 40, that suppres::;ion might be rrquirrd
if the agrnts knew before the intrrception that no inventory would be
srrvrd .
Moreovrr, rt:'spondrnts :.\•I rrlo nnd Lauer wC:'re not prejudiced by thrir
failurr to receive postintercept notice under eitht:'r ol' the District Court's
inventorr ordrrs. As notrd earlirr, the Govermnrnt madP available to·
all defendants the intrrcPpt orders, applications, and related paprr,;. Sec
n. 7, supra. And in rrsponse to prrtrial disrovrry motions, the Govrm-·
ment produced transcripts of the intcrceptrd conversations.
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suppression under § 2518 (10)(a)(i). Nor was suppression
justified with respect to respondents Merlo and Lauer simply
because the Government inadvertently omitted their names
from the comprehensive list of all identifiable persons whose
conversations had been overheard. We hold that this is the
correct result under the provisions of Title III, but we reemphasize the suggestion we made in United States v. Chavez,
that "strict adherence by the Government to the provisions of
Title III would nonetheless pe more iu keeping with the
responsibilities Congress has imposed upon it when authority to engage in wiretapping or electronic surveillance is
sought." 416 U. S., at 580.
The order of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case
is remanded to that court for further proceedings in accord
with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

